Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 6024 P&H
Judgement Date : 4 July, 2022
CRM-M No. 1366 of 2020 -1-
In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh
CRM-M No. 1366 of 2020
Date of Decision: 04.7.2022
Joga Singh ......Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana and another ......Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESHWAR THAKUR
Present: Mr. Pawan Attri, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Sumit Gupta, Addl. A.G., Haryana.
Ms. Pinki Mehla, Advocate for
Mr. Fateh Saini, Advocate
for respondent No. 2.
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SURESHWAR THAKUR, J. (ORAL)
1. Through the instant petition, cast under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,
the petitioner seeks quashing of FIR No. 106 dated 26.6.2019, registered at
Police Station Ismailabad, District Kurukshetra, initially constituting therein
an offence under Section 379-A IPC, whereas, upon, presentation of
challan, offences under Sections 332, 353, 186 IPC, rather became
embodied thereins, and, also seeks quashing of all the consequent
proceedings arising therefrom, hence on the basis of compromise dated
14.12.2019 (Annexure P-2), arrived at between the parties.
2. When the instant petition came up before this Court on
09.4.2021, an order was made upon the learned Magistrate concerned, to
make a report to this Court, with respect to the genuineness of the
compromise, as also with respect to the following:-
"(1) The name of the complainant and all accused arrayed in the FIR; whether all of them have appeared and made their respective statements in support of the compromise 1 of 7
so effected between them;
(2) Whether any of the accused has been declared a proclaimed offender;
(3) The stage of trial/proceedings;
(4) If the compromise so arrived at between the parties is
genuine, voluntarily and out of free will."
3. The afore order, makes it apparent that the petitioner had
depended, upon, a compromise/settlement, arrived at, in respect of the FIR
(supra) with the complainant-respondent.
4. The afore made order by this Court on 09.4.2021, has been
complied with by the learned Magistrate concerned, and, the elicited report
has been placed on record. A perusal of the report, transmitted to this
Court, by the learned Magistrate concerned, reveals that the
settlement/compromise, arrived at inter se the petitioner, and, the
respondent No. 2, is a sequel of both, being ad idem qua it, besides the
compromise/settlement being a sequel of no pressure or coercion, being
exercised upon each other. Therefore, the learned Magistrate has reported
that the settlement/compromise, depended upon by the petitioner, for
seeking quashing of the FIR (supra), is both voluntary, and, genuine.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned
counsel for respondents No. 2 have stated at the bar, that all concerned have
signed the compromise deed.
6. Today, the learned counsel appearing for the State of Haryana,
has submitted that though, in the petition FIR, an offence under Section
379-A IPC has been embodied, but he further submits that the investigating
officer concerned, after making investigations into the present FIR, chose to
institute an affirmative report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., with offences
embodied thereins under Sections 332, 353, and, under Section 186 of the
IPC. He further submits that the relief, as claimed by the petitioner, in the
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petition, cannot be granted, as the offences constituted against the accused-
petitioner, under Sections 332, 353, and, under Section 186 IPC, are non-
compoundable.
7. However for the reasons to be assigned hereinafter, the afore
prayer, as made by the learned State counsel, cannot be accepted by this
Court. The pre-eminent reason for dispelling the vigour of afore made
argument, is rested, upon the factum of also a statement, being made before
this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that though, the relevant
charges have been framed by the learned trial Court, yet the recording of the
prosecution evidence has not commenced, besides also from the statement
made before this Court by the learned State counsel, that only a wrangle
occurred amongst the petitioner and the private respondent, and, that
obviously no public money became snatched by the petitioner from the
private respondent.
8. The effect of the afore statement, as made with extreme
vehemence by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and, also the effect of
the statement made by the learned counsel appearing for the State of
Haryana, is that the relevant parameters as encapsulated in a verdict of the
Hon'ble Apex Court, rendered in case titled as, Gian Singh versus State of
Punjab and another 2012(4) RCR (Criminal) 543, inasmuch as a
postulate/occurring therein, that the inherent power under Section 482
Cr.P.C., as vested in the High Court, for quashing of criminal proceedings,
as/of FIR or complaint, through recourse being made to the provisions of
Section 482 Cr.P.C rather being distinct and different from the power given
to a criminal Court, hence for compounding the relevant offence(s), and, it
being enjoined to become tested vis-a-vis the facts in hand, for apposite
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application thereon. However, it has also been held therein, the afore power
vested in the High Court, is of the widest plenitude, with no statutory
limitation, being placed thereon, yet it has to be exercised to secure the ends
of justice, and, to prevent the abuse of process of any Court. Though no
straightjacket formula, has been contemplated therein, for recourse being
made to the mandate of Section 482 Cr.P.C., hence for quashing of an FIR,
or criminal proceedings or complaint, yet the essential rubric viz-a-viz its
valid exercising, is comprised in the principle, that if the accused and the
complainant rather enter into a valid ad idem settlement, and, when
thereupon the conviction of the accused becomes remote and bleak.
Consequently, it has been mandated, that unless the offence sought to be
quashed, through exercising of the power vested under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,
are not serious and heinous, inasmuch as the afore, do not embody offences
appertaining to murder, rape, dacoity etc., and, or when the offences are in
relation to special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or offences
committed by public servants, while working in that capacity, thereupon it
can be permissibly exercised. However, upon evident existences of
embargos (supra), spelt in the verdict (supra), thereupon, the High Courts
are barred, through recoursing the mandate of Section 482 Cr.P.C., hence, to
quash the FIR or quash the criminal proceedings appertaining to
serious/heinous offences (supra).
9. It is apt to extract the relevant paragraph of the verdict made by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in Gian Singh's case (supra).
"The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power
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given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with
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the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."
10. Since the offences under Sections 332, 353, and, 186 IPC do
not, prima facie, appear to be so grave and nor are so heinous, so as to
attract the rigour of the embargo (supra) foisted upon the High Court in
verdict (supra). Therefore, the settlement/compromise, as validly entered
into, enjoins its being revered. Consequently, even if the afore offence is
non-compoundable, this Court does not deem it fit to accept the
contention(s) of the learned State counsel, that this Court, may not through
recoursing the mandate of Section 482 Cr.P.C., quash the FIR, especially
when after filing of the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., the
prosecution evidence has not commenced. In aftermath when rather
thereupons, the chances of the petitioner being convicted are remote as well
as bleak. In sequel, the ordering for the trial of the accused, would result in
harassment and humiliation, being caused to the accused, besides would
defeat the ends of justice.
11. Furthermore, an immense support to the afore made view, is
also derived from the judgment rendered by this Court in case titled as
Vinod @ Boda and others versus State of Haryana and another 2017(1)
R.C.R. (Criminal) 571, wherein also, the above view has been reiterated.
12. There is merit in the petition, and, the same is allowed.
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Consequently, after accepting the report of the learned Magistrate concerned,
this Court proceeds to quash the FIR (supra).
13. Accordingly, FIR No. 106 dated 26.6.2019, registered at Police
Station Ismailabad, District Kurukshetra, constituting therein offence, under
Section 379-A IPC, whereas, upon presentation of challan, offences under
Sections 332, 353, 186 IPC, rather became embodied, and, also all the
consequential proceedings, hence arising therefrom, are quashed qua the
petitioner.
(SURESHWAR THAKUR)
JUDGE
July 04, 2022
Gurpreet
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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