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Patna High Court

Sobh Nath Singh vs State Of Bihar on 13 May, 2026

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
                 CRIMINAL APPEAL (DB) No.162 of 1995
======================================================
Sobh Nath Singh Yadav, Son of Sri Lorik Singh, Resident of Village-Pillapur,
P.S.-Jagdishpur, District-Bhojpur.

                                                            ... ... Appellant/s
                                   Versus
The State of Bihar

                                          ... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Appellant/s     :     Ms. Aishwarya Shree, amicus curiae
For the Respondent/s    :     Mr. Sujit Kumar Singh, APP
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NANI TAGIA
        and
        HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANSUL
                      CAV JUDGMENT

(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANSUL)

Date : 13-05-2026

Heard Ms. Aishwarya Shree, learned amicus curiae for

the appellant and Mr. Sujit Kumar Singh, learned Additional

Public Prosecutor for the State.

2. In the instant appeal, the appellant has challenged the

judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 31.05.1995

and 01.06.1995 respectively passed by the learned Additional

Sessions Judge-II, Bhojpur at Ara in Sessions Trial No. 654 of

1992, arising out of Jagdishpur P.S. Case No. 82 of 1992 (G.R. No.

1004 of 1992), whereby the appellant has been convicted under

Section 302 of Indian Penal Code (for short "I.P.C.") and Section

27 of the Arms Act. For the offence under section 302 IPC, the

appellant has been sentenced to undergo Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

rigorous imprisonment for life and for the offence under Section

27 of the Arms Act, the appellant has been sentenced to undergo

rigorous imprisonment for three years. Both the sentences were

directed to run concurrently

3. The prosecution case as stated by the informant, Deo

Rani Devi, P.W. 4 is that on 09.05.1982 at about 5.30 P.M. she got

her statement recorded with the allegation that on the preceeding

night she was sleeping with her husband Sajan Saw (deceased),

daughter Dulari Devi and young kids. Her son Ram Naresh Saw

(deceased) was sleeping on the roof and his son Manohar Sao with

daughter-in-law, Tetari Devi were sleeping in the room. At 1.00

P.M. in the night, she woke up and saw that a person was sitting on

the western wall. Meanwhile, two persons got on the roof and

fired thrice, in which her son Ram Naresh Saw was shot. She

started raising hulla, on which one person sitting on the boundary-

wall started throwing bricks towards her which hit her on the rib

and hip. Her husband was also attacked by them and he fell down.

In the light of 'diya', she saw that the man was her co-villager,

Sobh Nath Singh Yadav. Her husband was also attacked and fired

upon twice. The motive opined by the informant is that Sobh Nath

Singh Yadav used to allege her of practicing witchcraft and that he

would not let her live in the village. The informant further alleges Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

that Sobh Nath Singh Yadav along with 10-12 criminals came to

her house and killed her husband and her son, by shooting them,

due to previous enmity. The FIR had been lodged by Deo Rani

Devi and Manohar Prasad Sah is witness in the FIRand other

witness mentioned in the FIR is Tetari Devi (P.W. 2).

4. Inquest report of the dead body of Ram Naresh Saw

and Sajan Saw was prepared. The FIR was lodged on 09.05.1992

at 5.30 P.M. but it was sent to the local police on 14.05.1992. The

inquest report of both the deceased Ram Naresh Saw and Sajan

Saw was prepared on the same date. Jang Bahadur Sao is the

witnesses to the inquest who has been examined as P.W. 6. The

post-mortem of the deceased was conducted on 09.05.1992 at

12.10 P.M., i.e., within 12 hours of the occurrence.

5. After investigation, police submitted charge-sheet for

the offence under Section 302 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act,

thereafter, the cognizance was taken and charges were framed

under Section 302 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act

against the appellant, which he denied and claimed to be

tried.

6. During the course of trial, altogether eight witnesses

were examined in support of the prosecution case, who are as

under: -

Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

P.W.-1 Manohar Sao (Son of the Informant) P.W.-2 Tetari Devi (Daughter-in-law of the informant) P.W.-3 Geeta Kumari (Daughter of the Informant) P.W.-4 Dev Rani Devi (the informant) P.W.-5 Devta Nand Singh First I.O. P.W.-6 Jag Bahadur Sao (Brother of deceased Sajan Sao) P.W.-7 Jag Narayan Ram (Second I.O.) P.W.-8 Dr. S.P. Srivastava (doctor)

7. Apart from the oral evidences, the documentary

evidences were also exhibited on behalf of the prosecution, which

are as follows: -

        Exhibit- 1               Fardbeyan
       Exhibit- 1/1    Forwarding report on Fardbeyan
        Exhibit- 2               Formal FIR
        Exhibit- 3               Seizure-list
       Exhibit-3/1               Seizure-list
        Exhibit- 4    Inquest Report of Ramnaresh Saw
        Exhibit- 5       Inquest Report of Sajan Saw
        Exhibit- 6    Post-mortem report of Sajjan Saw

Exhibit- 7 Post-mortem Report of Ram Naresh Saw

8. P.W. 1, Manohar Prasad Sah is the son of the deceased

Ram Naresh Saw. He stated that he woke up to the sound of

gunfire and he saw Sobh Nath Singh Yadav sitting on wall but he

did not see him firing on his father and that the same was told to

him by his mother. In paragraph 5, he stated that his father was

lifted from a cot at 2 P.M. and he died near village Kantra which is Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

about three kilometers away from his village. He further stated

that he went up to Ishahi village and thereafter his father was

taken on jeep and he came back to his house. In paragraph 6, he

stated that after taking back the dead body of his father from

Ishahi village, he and his mother conferred among themselves to

lodge an FIR. Nobody went to the police and Daroga Ji came at

around 5 to 5.30 A.M. in the morning on the succeeding day. In

paragraph 8, his attention was drawn to the statement that he had

stated before the police that his mother had informed him that his

father had been killed by Sobh Nath Singh Yadav..

9. P.W. 2, Tetari Devi is wife of P.W. 1, Manohar

Prasad Sah and daughter-in-law of Sajjan Saw (deceased). She

stated that she woke up after hearing the sound of firing. She

claims that she saw Sobh Nath Singh Yadav sitting on the

boundary wall and that he fired upon her father-in-law. The first

shot hit his left elbow and second shot hit him in the rib. She

claims to have identified the accused persons in the moonlight and

diya. In paragraph 6, her attention was also drawn to have made

her statement before the police. In her cross-examination, she had

stated that the accused sitting on the boundary-wall had covered

his face with a black mask.

Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

10. P.W. 3 is Geeta Kumari, is the grand-daughter of

Sajjan Sao (deceased). She stated that Sobh Nath Singh Yadav

shot her grandfather and fled away. The 'diya' was lit in the

courtyard. In her chief-examination, she has stated that the same

fact that her grandfather had been shot by Sobh Nath Singh Yadav

and that the same was told to her by her grandmother-Dev Rani

Devi.

11. P.W. 4, Deo Rani Devi, who is the informant of

the present case. She stated that when she woke up at night she

saw that two persons went up to the roof and shot her husband

Ram Naresh Saw and threw him down after shooting. She further

stated that Sobh Nath Singh Yadav fired at her husband which hit

him at his left elbow and rib. She had also stated that she

identified Sobh Nath Singh Yadav in the light of diya. She failed

to attribute any specific motive for the occurrence and stated that

she had no enmity with Sobh Nath Singh Yadav. Per contra to the

deposition of P.W. 2, the informant, P.W. 4 has explicitly stated in

her deposition that the accused persons had not covered their face

with any kind of cloth.

12. Devta Nand Singh, the first I.O. of the case had

been examined as P.W. 5. He stated that he recorded the fardbeyan

at 5.30 in the morning. He also claimed to have inspected the Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

place of occurrence. He stated that the blood which fell from the

dead body of the deceased Ram Naresh Saw was found in the

back of the house towards north. He had also seized the blood

from the courtyard. He stated that the dead body of Sajan Saw was

found near the place of occurrence in an empty field. In paragraph

3, he had admitted that there was no mark of firing or empty

cartridges at the place of occurrence nor any empty shell casing

was found at the place of occurrence. He stated that no mark of

blood was found on the roof or on the body. He stated that he had

seized the blood stained clothes. He also stated that no diya was

seized. He was also asked about diya and sending the FIR to the

Chief Judicial Magistrate which he could not explain. In

paragraph 7 of his deposition, he had stated that P.W. 1 Manohar

Prasad Sah had not stated before him that he saw and identified

Sobh Nath Singh Yadav and he had not stated anything about

identifying the accused. He also stated that even P.W. 2 Tetari

Devi had not stated about witnesses or identifying the accused but

had only talked about the hearsay version. He also stated that P.W.

4, Dev Rani Devi had not stated about the injury sustained by

deceased in his rib-cage and left elbow. She had only stated that

Sobh Nath Singh Yadav fired.

Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

13. P.W. 6, Jang Bahadur Sao is a formal witness of

inquest. P.W. 7, Jag Narayan Ram is the formal Investigating

Officer who only submitted charge-sheet.

14. P.W. 8, Dr. Surendra Prasad Srivastava is the Doctor

who conducted the post-mortem of the deceased persons. He

found two injuries on the dead bod, i.e., one bone deep on left

elbow and one lacerated wound on left lumber region. He also

conducted the post-mortem of Ram Naresh Saw and found one

lacerated injury on hyocondrium. The post-mortem

examination of the dead bodies of deceased Sajan Sao

and Ram Naresh Sao was conducted on 09.05.1992 at

12.10 P.M. and found the following injuries on the dead

body of Sajan Sao:-

"(i) One lacerated wound of size 3"x2" bone deep of left elbow with multiple fracture of humorous of left side.

(ii) One lacerated wound at left lumber region of size 2"x2" paritonial cavity deep from which from which loop of interactve warrant no charring of the wound.

On the same day, he conducted the

post-mortem on the dead body of Ram Naresh

Sao and found the following injuries:-

Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

(i) lacerated wound at the left hypocandrium with multiple charring on skin around the wound.

Spleen-found ruptured, penetration on the large intestine

Paritonial cavity full of blood from the wound seven pillates were taken out. ..........Lever, kidney, lungs-found pale Bladder-empty Stomach---found perforated "

15. After conclusion of the prosecution witnesses. The

statement of accused person under Section 313 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure was recorded. It is relevant to note that the

important question is to know the motive to kill the deceased

persons. The same did not form part of the question. Another

important question is that who are those two persons who fired

upon the deceased Ram Naresh Saw and Sajan Sao. The same also

is not part of the question. There is only one general question that

the appellant killed Sajan Sao and this is extremely insufficient

insofar as Section 313 Cr.P.C. is concerned.

16. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that though

the statement of Manohar Prasad Sah was recorded initially but

the police proceeded to lodge FIR on the statement of Dev Rani

Devi, i.e., the mother and the version of Manohar Prasad Sah has

been given a go bye.

Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

17. This version of the counsel for the appellant is not

supported by the records.

18. The second argument of learned counsel for the

appellant is that though the FIR was recorded on 09.05.1992 but it

was sent to the police only on 14.05.1992, i.e., after delay of four

days. The I.O. in paragraph 3 of his deposition was asked about

the same but he could not give any explanation for the same.

19. Recently, Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

Chotkau vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (Criminal Appean Nos.

361-362 of 2018) decided on 28.09.2022 has elaborately dealt

with this situation. The relevant paragraphs 60, 62, 64, 65 and 66

of the aforesaid judgment are as follows:-

"60. While reiterating the above principles, a note of caution was also added by this Court in Bhajan Singh alias Harbhajan Singh and Others vs. State of Haryana. Paragraphs 28 to 30 of the said decision read as follows:

"28. Thus, from the above it is evident that the Criminal Procedure Code provides for internal and external checks: one of them being the receipt of a copy of the FIR by the Magistrate concerned. It serves the purpose that the FIR be not anti-timed or anti dated. The Magistrate must be immediately informed of every serious offence so that he may be in a position to act under Section159 Cr.P.C., if so required. Section 159 Cr.P.C. empowers the Magistrate to hold the investigation or preliminary enquiry of the offence either himself or Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

through the Magistrate subordinate to him. This is designed to keep the Magistrate informed of the investigation so as to enable him to control investigation and, if necessary, to give appropriate direction.

29. It is not that as if every delay in sending the report to the Magistrate would necessarily lead to the inference that the FIR has not been lodged at the time stated or has been anti-timed or anti dated or investigation is not fair and forthright. Every such delay is not fatal unless prejudice to the accused is shown. The expression "forthwith" mentioned therein does not mean that the prosecution is required to explain delay of every hour in sending the FIR to the Magistrate. In a given case, if number of dead and injured persons is very high, delay in dispatching the report is natural. Of course, the same is to be sent within reasonable time in the prevalent circumstances.

30. However, unexplained inordinate delay in sending the copy of FIR to the Magistrate may affect the prosecution case adversely. An adverse inference may be drawn against the prosecution when there are circumstances from which an inference can be drawn that there were chances of manipulation in the FIR by falsely roping in the accused persons after due deliberations. Delay provides legitimate basis for suspicion of the FIR, as it affords sufficient time to the prosecution to introduce improvements and embellishments. Thus, a delay in dispatch of the FIR by itself is not a circumstance which can throw out the prosecution's case in its entirety, particularly when the prosecution furnishes a cogent explanation for the delay in dispatch of the report or prosecution case Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

itself is proved by leading unimpeachable evidence"

61. XXX

62. It is clear from the aforesaid decisions that the delay in forwarding the FIR may certainly indicate the failure of one of the external checks to determine whether the FIR was manipulated later or whether it was registered either to fix someone other than the real culprit or to allow the real culprit to escape. While every delay in forwarding the FIR may not necessarily be fatal to the case of the prosecution, courts may be duty-bound to see the effect of such delay on the investigation and even the creditworthiness of the investigation.

63. XXX

64. To come to the above conclusion, reliance was placed upon a decision of a three-Judge Bench in Balram Singh v. State of Punjab [Balram Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 11 SCC 286 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 149] . In Balram Singh [Balram Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 11 SCC 286 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 149] , the three-Judge Bench of this Court rejected the contention with regard to the delay in transmitting the FIR to the Magistrate, on the ground that : (SCC p. 291, para 10) "10. ... while considering the complaint in regard to the delay in the FIR reaching the jurisdictional Magistrate, we will have to also bear in mind the creditworthiness of the ocular evidence adduced by the prosecution and if we find that such ocular evidence is worthy of acceptance, the element of delay in registering a complaint or sending the same to the jurisdictional Magistrate by itself would not in any manner weaken the prosecution case." Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

65. In State of Rajasthan v. Daud Khan [State of Rajasthan v. Daud Khan, (2016) 2 SCC 607 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 793] , this Court referred to Brahm Swaroop [Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 288 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 923] and interpreted the word "forthwith" appearing in Section 157(1) of the Code, as follows :

(Daud Khan case [State of Rajasthan v. Daud Khan, (2016) 2 SCC 607 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 793] , SCC p. 619, para 26) "26. ... The purpose of the "forthwith"

communication of a copy of the FIR to the Magistrate is to check the possibility of its manipulation. Therefore, a delay in transmitting the special report to the Magistrate is linked to the lodging of the FIR. If there is no delay in lodging an FIR, then any delay in communicating the special report to the Magistrate would really be of little consequence, since manipulation of the FIR would then get ruled out. Nevertheless, the prosecution should explain the delay in transmitting the special report to the Magistrate. However, if no question is put to the investigating officer concerning the delay, the prosecution is under no obligation to give an explanation. There is no universal rule that whenever there is some delay in sending the FIR to the Magistrate, the prosecution version becomes unreliable. In other words, the facts and circumstances of a case are important for a decision in this regard."

66. Therefore, the learned Additional Advocate General for the State may be right, in theory, that a delay in transmission of the FIR to the court, may not, per se, be fatal, without anything more. But in the case on hand, the delay was not small. The FIR said to have been registered on 8-3- 2012 was received by the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 13-3-2012. It is true Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

that no question was put in cross-

examination to the investigating officer about this delay."

20. In the present case, the I.O. in chief-examination

has fumbled with regard to the manner in which he received the

information as well as the mode and manner in which he

proceeded to the place of occurrence. He stated that initially sanha

was recorded, thereafter, the fardbeyan of Dev Rani Devi was

recorded on 09.05.1992 at 5.30 P.M. He further stated that sanha

No. has not been recorded in the case diary. Moreover, he also

stated that entry has been made in station diary by mentioning the

name of the Officer who moved to the place of occurrence that

station diary had not been brought on record. In such

circumstances, delay in sending the FIR to the Magistrate

becomes relevant event in terms of aforesaid judgment which

elaborately discusses automatic grant of benefit of such situation

to the accused. Moreover, the I.O. was asked a pointed question

and he failed to explain the delay in sending the FIR to the learned

Magistrate. Though the FIR was promptly lodged but the

circumstances surrounding the lodging of the FIR are shrouded in

mystery and, thus, the scope and possibility of manipulation in the

FIR by adding name of accused person cannot be ruled out. In

support of the aforegoing discussion it would be relevant to rely Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

Chotkau vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported as (2023) 6 SCC

742. The relevant paragraphs 60 to 67 are hereunder:-

"60. On the importance of promptitude, both in the registration of the FIR and in the transmission of the same to the court, reliance is placed by Shri Nagamuthu, learned Senior Counsel on the following passage in Meharaj Singh v. State of U.P. [Meharaj Singh v. State of U.P., (1994) 5 SCC 188 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1391] : (SCC pp. 195-96, para 12) "12. FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of appreciating the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstance in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger also creeps in of the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determine whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of the copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course the prosecution can offer a Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. Prosecution has led no evidence at all in this behalf. The second external check equally important is the sending of the copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest report, prepared under Section 174CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution story was still in embryo state and had not been given any shape and that the FIR came to be recorded later on after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity and it appears to us that the same has been ante-timed and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8."

61. While reiterating the above principles, a note of caution was also added by this Court in Bhajan Singh v. State of Haryana [Bhajan Singh v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 421 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 241] . Paras 28 to 30 of the said decision read as follows : (SCC p. 431)

"28. Thus, from the above it is evident that the Criminal Procedure Code provides for internal and external checks : one of them being the receipt of a copy of the FIR by the Magistrate concerned. It serves the purpose that the FIR be not ante-timed or ante- dated. The Magistrate must be immediately informed of every serious offence so that he Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

may be in a position to act under Section 159CrPC, if so required. Section 159CrPC empowers the Magistrate to hold the investigation or preliminary enquiry of the offence either himself or through the Magistrate subordinate to him. This is designed to keep the Magistrate informed of the investigation so as to enable him to control investigation and, if necessary, to give appropriate direction.

29. It is not that as if every delay in sending the report to the Magistrate would necessarily lead to the inference that the FIR has not been lodged at the time stated or has been ante-timed or ante-dated or investigation is not fair and forthright. Every such delay is not fatal unless prejudice to the accused is shown. The expression "forthwith" mentioned therein does not mean that the prosecution is required to explain delay of every hour in sending the FIR to the Magistrate. In a given case, if number of dead and injured persons is very high, delay in dispatching the report is natural. Of course, the same is to be sent within reasonable time in the prevalent circumstances.

30. However, unexplained inordinate delay in sending the copy of FIR to the Magistrate may affect the prosecution case adversely. An adverse inference may be drawn against the prosecution when there are circumstances from which an inference can be drawn that there were chances of manipulation in the FIR by falsely roping in the accused persons after due deliberations. Delay provides legitimate basis for suspicion of the FIR, as it affords sufficient time to the prosecution to introduce improvements and embellishments. Thus, a delay in dispatch of the FIR by itself is not a circumstance which can throw out the Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

prosecution's case in its entirety, particularly when the prosecution furnishes a cogent explanation for the delay in dispatch of the report or prosecution case itself is proved by leading unimpeachable evidence."

(emphasis supplied)

63. Section 157(1) of the Code requires the officer-in-charge of the police station to send the FIR, "forthwith". The legal consequences of the delay on the part of the police in forwarding the FIR to the court was considered by this Court in Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P. [Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 288 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 923] Incidentally Brahm Swaroop [Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 288 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 923] is also a case where there was a delay of five days in sending the report to the Magistrate (as in the present case). After taking note of several earlier decisions of this Court, this Court held in Brahm Swaroop [Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 288 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 923] in para 21 as follows : (SCC p. 300)

"21. In the instant case, the defence did not put any question in this regard to the Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

Investigating Officer, Raj Guru (PW 10), thus, no explanation was required to be furnished by him on this issue. Thus, the prosecution had not been asked to explain the delay in sending the special report. More so, the submission made by Shri Tulsi that the FIR was ante-timed cannot be accepted in view of the evidence available on record which goes to show that the FIR had been lodged promptly within 20 minutes of the incident as the police station was only 1 km away from the place of occurrence and names of all the accused had been mentioned in the FIR."

(emphasis supplied)

"10. ... while considering the complaint in regard to the delay in the FIR reaching the jurisdictional Magistrate, we will have to also bear in mind the creditworthiness of the ocular evidence adduced by the prosecution and if we find that such ocular evidence is worthy of acceptance, the element of delay in registering a complaint or sending the same to the jurisdictional Magistrate by itself would not in any manner weaken the prosecution case."

65. In State of Rajasthan v. Daud Khan [State of Rajasthan v. Daud Khan, (2016) 2 SCC 607 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 793] , this Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

Court referred to Brahm Swaroop [Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 288 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 923] and interpreted the word "forthwith" appearing in Section 157(1) of the Code, as follows :

(Daud Khan case [State of Rajasthan v. Daud Khan, (2016) 2 SCC 607 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 793] , SCC p. 619, para 26) "26. ... The purpose of the "forthwith"

Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

examination to the investigating officer about this delay.

67. But we have found that the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 is untrustworthy, particularly on the question of the origin and genesis of the first information report. Therefore the inordinate delay in the FIR reaching the jurisdictional court assumes significance. We agree that the word "forthwith" in Section 157(1) of the Code is to be understood in the context of the given facts and circumstances of each case and a straitjacket formula cannot be applied in all cases. But where ocular evidence is found to be unreliable and thus unacceptable, a long delay has to be taken note of by the court. The mandate of Section 157(1) of the Code being clear, the prosecution is expected to place on record the basic foundational facts, such as, the officer who took the first information report to the jurisdictional court, the authority which directed such a course of action and the mode by which it was complied. Explaining the delay is a different aspect than placing the material in compliance of the Code."

21. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that

the place of occurrence has not been proved. The allegation is that

Ram Naresh Saw was shot on the roof while Sajan Sao was shot

in the courtyard of the house. However, the I.O. has found both

the bodies outside the house.

22. Prosecution case is that Ram Naresh Saw was shot at

the roof and then Sobh Nath Singh Yadav threw the body on the

ground and his dead body was found on the western wall of the

house and Sajan Sao was shot inside the house and his dead body Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

was also found outside the house. The I.O. in paragraph 3 of his

deposition had clearly stated that he had not found the mark of

gunshot or empty cartridges at the place of occurrence. He also

stated that he had not found any mark of blood on body or even on

the mattress of the cot. The I.O. in his deposition has further stated

that neither any blood was found on the mattress of the cot nor it

was seized. He has further said that he is unaware of the fact,

whether the blood stained soil was sent for testing or not. This

omission of any objective material does not support the

prosecution case. The fact that shooting took place inside the

house and the bodies were found outside makes the prosecution

case unbelievable and unreliable.

23. The consistent version of the prosecution is that Dev

Rani Devi along with Geeta Kumari were sleeping with Sajan Saw

in the courtyard and Manohar Prasad Sah, P.W. 1 and Tetari Devi,

P.W. 2, son and daughter-in-law of the deceased respectively were

also sleeping inside the room. Their attention had been drawn

towards their statement made before the police.

24. During trial, they have clearly stated that they identified

Sobh Nath Singh Yadav and also saw him shooting Ram Naresh

Saw and Sajan Sao. Their attention had been drawn towards their

previous statement made before the police under Section 161 Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

Cr.P.C. They asserted that they had made the same statement that

has been made in the Court. The I.O. was also pointedly asked

with regard to statement made by these two persons. The I.O. had

clearly stated in his deposition that these two witnesses claimed

that they remained inside their room after hearing the gunshot and

did not see anybody firing. The entire edifice of chief-examination

and cross-examination are illicit. The truth from the witnesses is

centered around finding the material improvement or omission in

the case. This has been extensively dealt in the case of Tehsildar

Singh vs. State of Uttar pradesh reported in AIR 1959 SC 1012.

It provides that the contradiction must be put to the witness. If

denied, it must be proved through the investigating officer. If a

witness orally changes her stand in the trial as compared to the

version given before the police then his attention has to be drawn

to his previous statement made before the police in terms of

Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Then the I.O. has to

be questioned with regard to the statement made by the witnesses

before the police. This completes the process of impeaching the

credit of the witnesses in terms of Section 145(3) of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872 which provides that the credit of witness

could be impeached by showing that his statement was

inconsistent with the statement made before the police.

Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

25. Another aspect of the matter is the relevance of the

improvement that is being talked about the occurrence. Hon'ble

Supreme Court has consistently held that each and every change

in the statement may not be material affecting the outcome of the

case. The improvement has to be material which is dependent

upon the facts of the case. In the instant case, the improvement

relates to persons and identification of the accused at the place of

occurrence, as the person who fired at least on Sajan Saw and

their statement before the police P.W. 1, Manohar Prasad Sah and

P.W. 2, Tetari Devi did not claim to be eye-witness or did not

claim that they identified Sobh Nath Singh Yadav. They did so

while deposing before the trial court. This improvement is the

basis on which the fate of the entire case hangs, thus, this is the

material change in the statement giving with the mode of material

improvement as contemplated under Section 145 of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872 and, thus, the statement of these witnesses

claiming to identify the accused as the person who were present at

the place of occurrence or as the person who fired at the deceased

is to be taken out of consideration at all.

26. P.W. 3, Geeta Kumari, in course of her examination

initially stated that Sobh Nath Singh Yadav had fired, thereafter,

she had stated that she had heard and she was an eye-witness.

Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

Subsequently, she stated that it was told by her grandmother Dev

Rani Devi that Sobh Nath Singh Yadav had shot the deceased.

This also contradicts the allegation since all of them seem to be

hearsay witnesses. The sole witness of the case is Dev Rani Devi,

the informant. She claimed that two persons went up the roof and

shot at her son and her husband. Sobh Nath Singh Yadav shot both

of them. This case is dependent upon certain objective findings

also. She stated that her son was shot at roof and her son was

sleeping while lying on his bed. The police has neither found any

empty cartridge or blood either at the roof or on the mattress or on

the cot. The dead bodies were found outside the house. The body

of Ram Naresh Saw was thrown near the wall of the house while

the dead body of Sajan Sao was found outside the house in an

empty field.

27. It is relevant to mention that after describing P.W. 1,

P.W. 2 and P.W. 3, Dev Rani Devi remains the eye-witness to the

incident and this is rule of caution though not a rule of evidence

that her evidence is to be examined with caution and examination

of her evidence with caution would show that her allegation is not

supported by any objective finding or by any objective material.

The relevant paragraph 28 of Haribabi @ Hari Babu Prasad vs. Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

The State of Bihar (Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 257 of 2019) decided on

01.07.2024 is as under:-

"28. In the case of Naresh @ Nehru (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para-9.3 as follows:-

"9.3. As noticed hereinabove, the evidence of the eye-witness should be of very sterling quality and calibre and it should not only instil confidence in thecourt to accept the same but it should also be a version of such nature that can be accepted at its face value. This Court in the case of Rai Sandeep @ Deepu alias Deepu Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 8 SCC 21 has held:

"22. In our considered opinion the "sterling witness" should be of very high quality and caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

should have corelation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a "sterling witness"

whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged"

PW-9, the cousin of the deceased, was examined as an eyewitness to the crime. However, the presence of PW-9 at the scene raises doubt due to contradictions. Although Suraj, who was also the deceased's cousin, was accompanying the deceased, PW-9 never tried to contact him to ascertain the names of the accused persons. This raises a serious doubt about his presence that has been ignored by the courts below. The presence of PW-9 at the scene raises doubts and raises questions about the veracity of Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

his evidence. This is the second lacunae in the prosecution case."

28. Moreover, this witness has initially given a motive to

the alleged occurrence that the accused persons wrongfully

accused her of practicing witchcraft and that is why the

unfortunate incident took place. However this would not explain

the killing of Ram Naresh Saw and Sajan Sao.

29. The source of identification at midnight also becomes

doubtful. The lady stated that in the moonlight she had identified

the accused in the light of 'diya'. The police had not found any

diya in the house. Moreover, the said 'diya' was not handed over

to the police. This brings the mode of identification under a

shadow of doubt. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held in the

case of Durbal vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported as (2011) 2

SCC 676 that:-

"23. It is also required to note that all the eyewitnesses had stated in their evidence that lantern was burning in the verandah and Kaldhari (PW 1), Sheo Kumar (PW 2) and Sonai (PW 3) were having torchlights in their hands and only with the help of the lantern and the torchlights they could recognise and identify the assailants. The lantern and the torchlights though were alleged to have been seized vide seizure mahazar, Exts. Ka-2 and Ka-3 respectively, were not produced in the court. The seizure memos, Exts. Ka-2 and Ka-3 did not contain the crime number and other recovery Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

particulars. In the circumstances, it becomes highly doubtful as to whether those torchlights and lantern were actually seized during the course of investigation by the investigating officer. The investigating officer (PW 8) did not explain as to why the crime number was not noted on Exts. Ka-2 and Ka-3 and as to why the material objects if at all seized, were not produced in the court.

24. The very fact that the lantern and torchlights were pressed into service for the purpose of identifying the accused, itself suggests that it was a pitch-dark night during the mid-winter and it was not possible to identify the assailants without the aid of lantern and torchlights. It is highly doubtful as to whether PWs 1, 2 and 3 had actually torchlights in their hands as stated by them, in the absence of their recovery details in the seizure memo and their non-production before the court. Moreover, Kaldhari (PW 1) refused to state as to whether the assailants were covering their faces with chadar. His evidence does not inspire any confidence.

25. These all are the factors which give rise to doubt in our minds as to the presence of PWs 2 and 3 at the scene of offence. The trial court rightly entertained the doubt and accordingly gave the benefit of doubt to the accused. It is a plausible view taken by the trial court which could not be held to be a perverse one. Such a view has been taken by the trial court after appreciation of the evidence."

30. The question of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C.

also seems to be absurd. The circumstances relied against the

accused could be the motive, the entry into the house and

identification by three witnesses but all of them have been clubbed Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

in a single line of question which leaves much to be desired.

Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of cases has deprecated the

practice of single line of question under Section 313 Cr.P.C. which

is the right of the accused. It is his opportunity to provide direct

answer to the allegations against him. The Hon'ble Supreme Court

in the case of Raj Kumar vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported as

(2023) 17 SCC 95 after considering various judicial precedents

had culled out the basic principles of law as under :-

"15. Therefore, we will have to consider the effect of, the aforesaid omission on the part of the trial court. The law on this aspect is no longer res integra. Apart from the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel representing the parties, there are other important decisions on this aspect. The first relevant judgment is of a Bench of four Hon'ble Judges of this Court in Tara Singh v. State 1951 SCC 903 : 1951 SCC OnLine SC 49]. The Court considered the provision of Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (for short "CrPC, 1898"). Section 313 CrPC and Section 342 CrPC, 1898 are in pari materia. In para 18, this Court held thus:-

"18. It is important therefore that an accused should be properly examined under Section 342 and, as their Lordships of the Privy Council indicated in Dwarkanath Varma v. King Emperor 1933 SCC OnLine PC 11 : AIR 1933 PC 124], if a point in the evidence is considered important against the accused and the conviction is intended to be based upon it, then it is right and proper that the accused should be questioned about the Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

matter and be given an opportunity of explaining it if he so desires. This is an important and salutary provision and I cannot permit it to be slurred over. I regret to find that in many cases scant attention is paid to it, particularly in the Sessions Courts. But whether the matter arises in the Sessions Court or in that of the Committing Magistrate, it is important that the provisions of Section 342 should be fairly and faithfully observed."

(emphasis supplied)

16. Again in para 23, this Court held thus :-

"23. Section 342 requires the accused to be examined for the purpose of enabling him "to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him". Now, it is evident that when the Sessions Court is required to make the examination under this section, the evidence referred to is the evidence in the Sessions Court and the circumstances which appear against the accused in that court. It is not therefore enough to read over the questions and answers put in the Committing Magistrate's Court and ask the accused whether he has anything to say about them. In the present case, there was not even that. The appellant was not asked to explain the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him but was asked whether the statements made before the Committing Magistrate and his answers given there were correctly recorded. That does not comply with the requirements of the section."

17.The second important decision on this aspect is the decision of a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of this Court. This is a decision in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033]. In para 16 of the decision, Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

this Court examined the issue of non-

compliance with the requirements of Section 342 CrPC, 1898. Para 16 reads thus : (SCC pp. 806-807)

"16.The discovery of incriminating materials pursuant to confessions made by the accused constitutes the third category of evidence. Obviously, the confessions are inadmissible but the discoveries are, provided they are pertinent to the guilt of the accused. So far as Accused 2 is concerned, his statement resulted in the discovery of a knife (Vide Panchnama, Ext. 13). Of course, knives were discovered long ago and not now but this knife lay buried and was recovered by the accused from a pit in the corner of a wall of his house. There was human blood on the blade of the knife, MO 5/1 according to the chemical analyst's report. The second accused's clothes also were picked up by him pursuant to his statement. He had worn a shirt and pants on the day of occurrence and PW 13, a neighbour deposes that the second accused had come to him at about 6 p.m. on the Monday when Hariba died and had mentioned to him that since his own house was locked he might be permitted to keep his clothes in the witnesses house. Thereafter he left his clothes under an empty khokha from where he himself took them out when he later came in the company of the police. There are blood-stains on the clothes and it is found by the chemical examiner that the blood on the pants are of the same blood group as that of the deceased. When the second accused was asked under Section 342 CrPC about the report of the chemical examiner noticing blood stains on the shirt, MO 5/2 and of human blood on the blade of the knife, MO 5/1, he merely answered, "I do not know". He also described as false the fact of his recovering the clothes and the knife. Bald denial notwithstanding, we are inclined to Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

believe, with the learned Judges of the High Court, that the knife and the shirt have been identified as his and since he had recovered them, thereby making the police discover the fact, there was incriminating inference available against the said accused. We may notice here a serious omission committed by the trial Judge and not noticed by either court. The pants allegedly worn at the time of the attack by the second accused has stains of blood relatable to the group of the deceased. This circumstance binds him to the crime a little clear but it is unfortunate that no specific question about this circumstance has been put to him by the Court. It is trite law, nevertheless fundamental, that the prisoner's attention should be drawn to every inculpatory material so as to enable him to explain it. This is the basic fairness of a criminal trial and failures in this area may gravely imperil the validity of the trial itself, if consequential miscarriage of justice has flowed. However, where such an omission has occurred it does not ipso facto vitiate the proceedings and prejudice occasioned by such defect must be established by the accused. In the event of evidentiary material not being put to the accused, the court must ordinarily eschew such material from consideration. It is also open to the appellate court to call upon the counsel for the accused to show what explanation the accused has as regards the circumstances established against him but not put to him and if the accused is unable to offer the appellate court any plausible or reasonable explanation of such circumstances, the Court may assume that no acceptable answer exists and that even if the accused had been questioned at the proper time in the trial court he would not have been able to furnish any good ground to get out of the circumstances on which the trial court had relied for its conviction. In such a case, the Court Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

proceeds on the footing that though a grave irregularity has occurred as regards compliance with Section 342 CrPC, the omission has not been shown to have caused prejudice to the accused. In the present case, however, the High Court, though not the trial court has relied upon the presence of blood on the pants of the blood group of the deceased. We have not been shown what explanation the accused could have offered to this chemical finding particularly when we remember that his answer to the question regarding the human blood on the blade of the knife was "I do not know". Counsel for the appellants could not make out any intelligent explanation and the "blood" testimony takes the crime closer to the accused. However, we are not inclined to rely over much on this evidentiary circumstance, although we should emphasise how this inadvertence of the trial court had led to a relevant fact being argued as unavailable to the prosecution. Great care is expected of the Sessions Judges who try grave cases to collect every incriminating circumstance and put it to the accused even though at the end of a long trial the Judge may be a little fagged out."

(emphasis supplied)

18. Then we come to the decision of this Court in S. Harnam Singh v.State (UT of Delhi), (1976) 2 SCC 819 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 324] . In para 22, this Court held thus :-

"22. Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, casts a duty on the court to put, at any enquiry or trial, questions to the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. It follows as a necessary corollary therefrom that each material circumstance appearing in evidence against the accused is required to be put to Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

him specifically, distinctly and separately. Failure to do so amounts to a serious irregularity vitiating the trial if it is shown to have prejudiced the accused. If the irregularity does not, in fact, occasion a failure of justice, it is curable under Section 537, of the Code."

(emphasis supplied)

19.Then we come to a decision in Samsul Haque v. State of Assam, (2019) 18 SCC 161 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 596] relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. In paras 21 to 23, this Court held thus :-

"21. The most vital aspect, in our view, and what drives the nail in the coffin in the case of the prosecution is the manner in which the court put the case to Accused 9, and the statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC. To say the least it is perfunctory.

22. It is trite to say that, in view of the judgments referred to by the learned Senior Counsel, aforesaid, the incriminating material is to be put to the accused so that the accused gets a fair chance to defend himself. This is in recognition of the principles of audi alteram partem. Apart from the judgments referred to aforesaid by the learned Senior Counsel, we may usefully refer to the judgment of this Court in Asraf Ali v.State of Assam (2008) 16 SCC 328 :

(2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 278] . The relevant observations are in the following paragraphs '21. Section 313 of the Code casts a duty on the court to put in an enquiry or trial questions to the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any of the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. It follows as a necessary corollary therefrom that each material circumstance appearing in the evidence Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

against the accused is required to be put to him specifically, distinctly and separately and failure to do so amounts to a serious irregularity vitiating trial, if it is shown that the accused was prejudiced.

22.The object of Section 313 of the Code is to establish a direct dialogue between the Court and the accused. If a point in the evidence is important against the accused, and the conviction is intended to be based upon it, it is right and proper that the accused should be questioned about the matter and be given an opportunity of explaining it. Where no specific question has been put by the trial court on an inculpatory material in the prosecution evidence, it would vitiate the trial. Of course, all these are subject to rider whether they have caused miscarriage of justice or prejudice. This Court also expressed a similar view in S. Harnam Singh v. State (UT ofDelhi) (1976) 2 SCC 819 :

1976 SCC (Cri) 324] while dealing with Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (corresponding to Section 313 of the Code). Non-indication of inculpatory material in its relevant facets by the trial court to the accused adds to the vulnerability of the prosecution case. Recording of a statement of the accused under Section 313 is not a purposeless exercise.'

23. While making the aforesaid observations, this Court also referred to its earlier judgment of the three Judge Bench in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033], which considered the fallout of the omission to put to the accused a question on a vital circumstance appearing against him in the prosecution evidence, and the requirement that the accused's attention should be drawn to every inculpatory material so as to enable him to explain it. Ordinarily, in such a Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

situation, such material as not put to the accused must be eschewed. No doubt, it is recognised, that where there is a perfunctory examination under Section 313 CrPC, the matter is capable of being remitted to the trial court, with the direction to retry from the stage at which the prosecution was closed."

(emphasis supplied)

20. xxxx

21. xxx

22. The law consistently laid down by this Court can be summarised as under:

22.1. It is the duty of the trial court to put each material circumstance appearing in the evidence against the accused specifically, distinctively and separately. The material circumstance means the circumstance or the material on the basis of which the prosecution is seeking his conviction.

22.2. The object of examination of the accused under Section 313 is to enable the accused to explain any circumstance appearing against him in the evidence. 22.3. The Court must ordinarily eschew material circumstances not put to the accused from consideration while dealing with the case of the particular accused.

22.4. The failure to put material circumstances to the accused amounts to a serious irregularity. It will vitiate the trial if it is shown to have prejudiced the accused.

22.5. If any irregularity in putting the material circumstance to the accused does not result in failure of justice, it becomes a curable defect. However, while deciding whether the defect can be cured, one of the Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

considerations will be the passage of time from the date of the incident.

22.6. In case such irregularity is curable, even the appellate court can question the accused on the material circumstance which is not put to him.

22.7. In a given case, the case can be remanded to the trial court from the stage of recording the supplementary statement of the accused concerned under Section 313CrPC. 22.8. While deciding the question whether prejudice has been caused to the accused because of the omission, the delay in rais-

ing the contention is only one of the several factors to be considered."

(emphasis supplied)

31. In the totality of the circumstances finding that the

credit of three witnesses has been impeached and the version of

the fourth witness Dev Rani Devi, P.W. 4 who is also the

informant lacks any objective support, delay in sending FIR to the

Magistrate and lack of any objective material to support the

prosecution allegation and the fact that the dead bodies were

recovered from outside the house create a serious doubt with

regard to prosecution version and the presence of the accused at

the place of occurrence.

32. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State has

supported the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence and

has submitted that the appellant is the assailant who has fired on

the deceased on account of which two persons died, i.e., the father Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

and the son as such the impugned order passed by learned Trial

Court finds no infirmity.

33. Having carefully considered the statement of the

witnesses and the medical evidence, we find that the impugned

judgment passed by learned trial Court is not well considered and

the evidence on record is not sufficient to prove the foundational

fact of the prosecution case.

34. For the reasons stated above, we are not agreeable with

the findings made by the learned Trial Court. We find that the

impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence does not

stand to scrutiny, hence the same requires interference, thus, the

appellant deserves to be acquitted of the charges levelled against

him.

35. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of

conviction and order of sentence dated 31.05.1995 and order of

sentence dated 01.06.1995 passed by the learned Additional

Sessions Judge-II, Bhojpur at Ara in Sessions Trial No. 654 of

1992, arising out of Jagdishpur P.S. Case No. 82 of 1992 (G.R.

No. 1004 of 1992), whereby the appellant has been convicted

under Sections 302 of Indian Penal Code (for short "I.P.C.") and

Section 27 of the Arms Act, are set aside. Consequently, the Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.162 of 1995 dt. 13-05-2026

appellant of the present appeal is acquitted of the charges levelled

against him.

36. If the appellant is in jail, he shall be released forthwith,

if not required in any other case. The appellant is discharged from

the liabilities of his bail bonds.

37. Office is directed to send back the trial court records

along with a copy of this judgment of the learned trial court,

forthwith.

38. Patna High Court Legal Services Committee is directed

to pay Rs. 10,000/- to Ms. Aishwara Shree, learned amicus curiae

who has assisted this Court in the present appeal.




                                                       (Ansul, J)


                           I agree



Vikash/-                                            (Nani Tagia, J)
AFR/NAFR
CAV DATE              12.02.2026
Uploading Date        13.05.2026
Transmission Date     13.05.2026