[Cites 13, Cited by 0]

Orissa High Court

Bikram Pradhan vs State Of Odisha & Others .... Opposite ... on 16 March, 2026

Author: Biraja Prasanna Satapathy

Bench: Biraja Prasanna Satapathy

        IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                      W.P.(C) No.887 of 2021

  In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution of India.
                                   ..................

 Bikram Pradhan                             ....                     Petitioner


                                    -versus-

 State of Odisha & Others                   ....             Opposite Parties


        For Petitioner       :       Mr. R.P. Kar, Sr. Advocate with
                                     Mr. A.N. Ray, Advocate

           For Opp. Parties :         Mr. P.K. Panda, ASC



PRESENT:

     THE HONBLE JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Date of Hearing:16.03.2026 and Date of Judgment:16.03.2026
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   Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J.

1. Heard Mr. R.P. Kar, learned Senior Counsel along

with Mr. A.N. Ray, learned counsel for the petitioner

and Mr. P.K. Panda, learned Addl. Standing Counsel

for the State.

2. The present Writ Petition has been filed inter alia

with the following prayer // 2 //

"Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the petitioner prays that this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to admit this petition, issue notice to the opposite parties, and after hearing both sides, further be pleased to allow the writ petition;

And issue writ of mandamus to the opposite parties to consider the representations of the petitioner vide Annexure-1 series within a period stipulated and/or regularize the services of the petitioner as a peon;

And issue writ of prohibition to the opposite parties from retrenching the petitioner from his services;

And pass such other writ(s)/order(s)/direction(s)/declaration(s) as may be deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."

3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the

petitioner contended that by facing due recruitment

process, petitioner was appointed as a contractual Peon

in the establishment of Gopabandhu Academy of

Administration-Opp. Party No.2 on 31.12.2010 under

Annexure-4.

3.1. It is contended that even though petitioner was

allowed to continue on contractual basis w.e.f.

31.12.2010 by facing due recruitment process and

when he was not regularized on the face of such long

continuance, the present Writ Petition has been filed

inter alia with the prayer as indicated hereinabove.

// 3 //

3.2. It is also contended that along with the petitioner

7 (seven) other contractual Peons so appointed in the

establishment of Opp. Party No.2 and pursuant to the

order passed by this Court so affirmed by the Hon'ble

Apex Court in the meantime have already been

regularized, and one such order is available under

Annexure-8. However, petitioner's claim is yet to be

considered and disposed of on the face of the

recommendation available under Annexure-7 by Opp.

Party No.2 to Opp. Party No.1 vide letter dated

30.09.2022.

3.3. It is contended that in view of such long

continuance w.e.f. 31.12.2010 on contractual basis,

petitioner though became eligible and entitled to get the

benefit of regularization in terms of the resolution

issued by the G.A. & P.G. Department on 17.09.2013

and 16.01.2014 as well as the Notification issued on

14.11.2022, while replacing the 2013 Rule, but

petitioner was never regularized.

// 4 //

3.4. It is also contended that in view of such long

continuance w.e.f. 31.12.2010 claim of the petitioner

for his regularisation in service is covered by the

decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of

Jaggo vs. Union of India & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine

SC 3826; Shripal & Anr. vs. Nagar Nigam,

Ghaziabad, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 221, as well as

Dharam Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Anr. (Civil

Appeal No(s).8558 of 2018 and another decision of

the Apex Court in the case of Bhola Nath Vs. State of

Jharkhand and Others, 2026 INSC 99.

3.5. View expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the

case of Jaggo in Para-22 to 25 and 27 reads as

follows:-

"22. The pervasive misuse of temporary employment contracts, as exemplified in this case, reflects a broader systemic issue that adversely affects workers' rights and job security. In the private sector, the rise of the gig economy has led to an increase in precarious employment arrangements, often characterized by lack of benefits, job security, and fair treatment. Such practices have been criticized for exploiting workers and undermining labour standards. Government institutions, entrusted with upholding the principles of fairness and justice, bear an even greater responsibility to avoid such exploitative employment practices. When public sector entities engage in misuse of temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the detrimental trends observed in the gig economy

// 5 //

but also sets a concerning precedent that can erode public trust in governmental operations.

23. The International Labour Organization (ILO), of which India is a founding member, has consistently advocated for employment stability and the fair treatment of workers. The ILO's Multinational Enterprises Declaration6 encourages companies to provide stable employment and to observe obligations concerning employment stability and social security. It emphasizes that enterprises should assume a leading role in promoting employment security, particularly in contexts where job discontinuation could exacerbate long-term unemployment.

24. The landmark judgement of the United State in the case of Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corporation7 serves as a pertinent example from the private sector, illustrating the consequences of misclassifying employees to circumvent providing benefits. In this case, Microsoft classified certain workers as independent contractors, thereby denying them employee benefits. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that these workers were, in fact, common-law employees and were entitled to the same benefits as regular employees. The Court noted that large Corporations have increasingly adopted the practice of hiring temporary employees or independent contractors as a means of avoiding payment of employee benefits, thereby increasing their profits. This judgment underscores the principle that the nature of the work performed, rather than the label assigned to the worker, should determine employment status and the corresponding rights and benefits. It highlights the judiciary's role in rectifying such misclassifications and ensuring that workers receive fair treatment.

25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees, particularly in government institutions, often face multifaceted forms of exploitation. While the foundational purpose of temporary contracts may have been to address short-term or seasonal needs, they have increasingly become a mechanism to evade long- term obligations owed to employees. These practices manifest in several ways:

• Misuse of "Temporary" Labels:

Employees engaged for work that is essential, recurring, and integral to the functioning of an institution are

// 6 //

often labeled as "temporary" or "contractual," even when their roles mirror those of regular employees. Such misclassification deprives workers of the dignity, security, and benefits that regular employees are entitled to, despite performing identical tasks.

• Arbitrary Termination: Temporary employees are frequently dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in the present case. This practice undermines the principles of natural justice and subjects workers to a state of constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or duration of their service.

• Lack of Career Progression: Temporary employees often find themselves excluded from opportunities for skill development, promotions, or incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in their roles, creating a systemic disparity between them and their regular counterparts, despite their contributions being equally significant.

• Using Outsourcing as a Shield:

Institutions increasingly resort to outsourcing roles performed by temporary employees, effectively replacing one set of exploited workers with another. This practice not only perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular employment.

• Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits:

Temporary employees are often denied fundamental benefits such as pension, provident fund, health insurance, and paid leave, even when their tenure spans decades. This lack of social security subjects them and their families to undue hardship, especially in cases of illness, retirement, or unforeseen circumstances.

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxxx

27. In light of these considerations, in our opinion, it is imperative for government departments to lead by example in providing fair and stable employment. Engaging workers on a temporary basis for extended periods, especially when their roles are integral to the organization's functioning, not only contravenes international labour standards but also exposes the organization to legal challenges and undermines employee morale. By ensuring fair employment practices, government institutions can reduce the burden of unnecessary litigation, promote job security, and uphold the principles of justice and fairness that they are meant to embody. This approach aligns with international standards

// 7 //

and sets a positive precedent for the private sector to follow, thereby contributing to the overall betterment of labour practices in the country."

3.6. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shripal in

Para-14, 15, 17 & 18(IV) has held as follows:-

"14. ...... More importantly, Uma Devi cannot serve as a shield to justify exploitative engagements persisting for years without the Employer undertaking legitimate recruitment.

15. ....... Indian labour law strongly disfavors perpetual daily-wage or contractual engagements in circumstances where the work is permanent in nature.

xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx

17. Indeed, bureaucratic limitations cannot trump the legitimate rights of workmen who have served continuously in de facto regular roles for an extended period.

18.(IV) The Respondent Employer is directed to initiate a fair and transparent process for regularizing the Appellant Workmen within six months from the date of reinstatement, duly considering the fact that they have performed perennial municipal duties akin to permanent posts. In assessing regularization, the Employer shall not impose educational or procedural criteria retroactively if such requirements were never applied to the Appellant Workmen or to similarly situated regular employees in the past. To the extent that sanctioned vacancies for such duties exist or are required, the Respondent Employer shall expedite all necessary administrative processes to ensure these longtime employees are not indefinitely retained on daily wages contrary to statutory and equitable norms."

3.7. Placing reliance on the decision in the case of

Jaggo and Shripal, Hon'ble Apex Court in the case

// 8 //

of Dharam Singh, in Paragraph-13, 14, 15 & 17, 18,

19 & 20 has held as follows:

"13. As we have observed in both Jaggo (Supra) and Shripal (Supra), outsourcing cannot become a convenient shield to perpetuate precariousness and to sidestep fair engagement practices where the work is inherently perennial. The Commission's further contention that the appellants are not "full-time"

employees but continue only by virtue of interim orders also does not advance their case. That interim protection was granted precisely because of the long history of engagement and the pendency of the challenge to the State's refusals. It neither creates rights that did not exist nor erases entitlements that may arise upon a proper adjudication of the legality of those refusals.

14. The learned Single Judge of the High Court also declined relief on the footing that the petitioners had not specifically assailed the subsequent decision dated 25.11.2003. However, that view overlooks that the writ petition squarely challenged the 11.11.1999 refusal as the High Court itself directed a fresh decision during pendency, and the later rejection was placed on record by the respondents. In such circumstances, we believe that the High Court was obliged to examine the legality of the State's stance in refusing sanction, whether in 1999 or upon reconsideration in 2003, rather than dispose of the matter on a mere technicality. The Division Bench of the High Court compounded the error by affirming the dismissal without engaging with the principal challenge or the intervening material. The approach of both the Courts, in reducing the dispute to a mechanical enquiry about "rules" and "vacancy" while ignoring the core question of arbitrariness in the State's refusal to sanction posts despite perennial need and long service, cannot be sustained.

15. Therefore, in view of the foregoing observations, the impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained. The State's refusals dated 11.11.1999 and 25.11.2003,in so far as they concern the Commission's proposals for sanction/creation of Class-III/Class-IV posts to address perennial ministerial/attendant work, are held unsustainable and stand quashed.

xxx xxx xxx

17. Before concluding, we think it necessary to recall that the State (here referring to both the Union and

// 9 //

the State governments) is not a mere market participant but a constitutional employer. It cannot balance budgets on the backs of those who perform the most basic and recurring public functions. Where work recurs day after day and year after year, the establishment must reflect that reality in its sanctioned strength and engagement practices. The long-term extraction of regular labour under temporary labels corrodes confidence in public administration and offends the promise of equal protection. Financial stringency certainly has a place in public policy, but it is not a talisman that overrides fairness, reason and the duty to organise work on lawful lines.

18. Moreover, it must necessarily be noted that "ad- hocism" thrives where administration is opaque. The State Departments must keep and produce accurate establishment registers, muster rolls and outsourcing arrangements, and they must explain, with evidence, why they prefer precarious engagement over sanctioned posts where the work is perennial. If "constraint" is invoked, the record should show what alternatives were considered, why similarly placed workers were treated differently, and how the chosen course aligns with Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Sensitivity to the human consequences of prolonged insecurity is not sentimentality. It is an institutional discipline that should inform every decision affecting those who keep public offices running.

19. Having regard to the long, undisputed service of the appellants, the admitted perennial nature of their duties, and the material indicating vacancies and comparator regularisations, we issue the following directions:

i. Regularization and creation of Supernumerary posts: All appellants shall stand regularized with effect from 24.04.2002, the date on which the High Court directed a fresh recommendation by the Commission and a fresh decision by the State on sanctioning posts for the appellants. For this purpose, the State and the successor establishment (U.P. Education Services Selection Commission) shall create supernumerary posts in the corresponding cadres, Class-III (Driver or equivalent) and Class-IV (Peon/Attendant/Guard or equivalent) without any caveats or preconditions. On regularization, each appellant shall be placed at not less than the minimum of the regular pay-scale for the post, with protection of last-drawn wages if higher and the appellants shall be entitled to the subsequent increments in the pay scale as per the pay grade. For

// 10 //

seniority and promotion, service shall count from the date of regularization as given above. ii. Financial consequences and arrears: Each appellant shall be paid as arrears the full difference between (a) the pay and admissible allowances at the minimum of the regular pay-level for the post from time to time, and (b) the amounts actually paid, for the period from 24.04.2002 until the date of regularization /retirement/death, as the case may be. Amounts already paid under previous interim directions shall be so adjusted. The net arrears shall be released within three months and if in default, the unpaid amount shall carry compound interest at 6% per annum from the date of default until payment. iii. Retired appellants: Any appellant who has already retired shall be granted regularization with effect from 24.04.2002 until the date of superannuation for pay fixation, arrears under clause

(ii), and recalculation of pension, gratuity and other terminal dues. The revised pension and terminal dues shall be paid within three months of this Judgment.

iv. Deceased appellants: In the case of Appellant No. 5 and any other appellant who has died during pendency, his/her legal representatives on record shall be paid the arrears under clause (ii) up to the date of death, together with all terminal/retiral dues recalculated consistently with clause (i), within three months of this Judgement.

v. Compliance affidavit: The Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh, or the Secretary of the U.P. Education Services Selection Commission or the prevalent competent authority, shall file an affidavit of compliance before this Court within four months of this Judgement.

20. We have framed these directions comprehensively because, case after case, orders of this Court in such matters have been met with fresh technicalities, rolling "reconsiderations," and administrative drift which further prolongs the insecurity for those who have already laboured for years on daily wages. Therefore, we have learned that Justice in such cases cannot rest on simpliciter directions, but it demands imposition of clear duties, fixed timelines, and verifiable compliance .As a constitutional employer, the State is held to a higher standard and therefore it must organise its perennial workers on a sanctioned footing, create a budget for lawful engagement, and implement judicial directions in letter and spirit. Delay to follow these obligations is not mere negligence but rather it is a conscious

// 11 //

method of denial that erodes livelihoods and dignity for these workers. The operative scheme we have set here comprising of creation of supernumerary posts, full regularization, subsequent financial benefits, and a sworn affidavit of compliance, is therefore a pathway designed to convert rights into outcomes and to reaffirm that fairness in engagement and transparency in administration are not matters of grace, but obligations under Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India."

3.8. It is contended that in the recent decision of the

Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bhola Nath so cited

(supra), Hon'ble Apex Court in Para-13.5 to 14 of the

judgment has held as follows:-

"13.5. Such a decision must necessarily be a conscious and reasoned one. An employee who has satisfactorily discharged his duties over several years and has been granted repeated extensions cannot, overnight, be treated as surplus or undesirable. We are unable to accept the justification advanced by the respondents as the obligation of the State, as a model employer, extends to fair treatment of its employees irrespective of whether their engagement is contractual or regular.

13.6. This Court has, on several occasions, deprecated the practice adopted by States of engaging employees under the nominal labels of "part-time", "contractual" or "temporary" in perpetuity and thereby exploiting them by not regularizing their positions. In Jaggo v. Union of India, this Court underscored that government departments must lead by example in ensuring fair and stable employment, and evolved the test of examining whether the duties performed by such temporary employees are integral to the day-to-day functioning of the organization.

13.7. In Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, and Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, this Court cautioned against a mechanical and blind reliance on Umadevi (supra) to deny regularization to temporary employees in the absence of statutory rules. It was held that Umadevi (supra) cannot be employed as a shield to legitimise exploitative engagements continued for years without undertaking regular recruitment. The Court further clarified that Umadevi itself draws a distinction between

// 12 //

appointments that are "illegal" and those that are merely "irregular", the latter being amenable to regularization upon fulfilment of the prescribed conditions.

13.8. In Dharam Singh v. State of U.P., this Court strongly deprecated the culture of "ad-hocism" adopted by States in their capacity as employers. The Court criticised the practice of outsourcing or informalizing recruitment as a means to evade regular employment obligations, observing that such measures perpetuate precarious working conditions while circumventing fair and lawful engagement practices.

13.9. The State must remain conscious that part-time employees, such as the appellants, constitute an integral part of the edifice upon which the machinery of the State continues to function. They are not merely ancillary to the system, but form essential components thereof. The equality mandate of our Constitution, therefore, requires that their service be reciprocated in a manner free from arbitrariness, ensuring that decisions of the State affecting the careers and livelihood of such part-time and contractual employees are guided by fairness and reason.

13.10. In the aforesaid backdrop, we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the respondent-State's contention that the mere contractual nomenclature of the appellants' engagement denudes them of constitutional protection. The State, having availed of the appellants' services on sanctioned posts for over a decade pursuant to a due process of selection and having consistently acknowledged their satisfactory performance, cannot, in the absence of cogent reasons or a speaking decision, abruptly discontinue such engagement by taking refuge behind formal contractual clauses. Such action is manifestly arbitrary, inconsistent with the obligation of the State to act as a model employer, and fails to withstand scrutiny under Article 14 of the Constitution.

FINAL CONCLUSION:

14. In light of our discussion, in the foregoing paragraphs, we summarize our conclusions as follows:

I. The respondent-State was not justified in continuing the appellants on sanctioned vacant posts for over a decade under the nomenclature of contractual engagement and thereafter denying them consideration for regularization.

II. Abrupt discontinuance of such long-standing engagement solely on the basis of contractual nomenclature, without either recording cogent reasons or

// 13 //

passing a speaking order, is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

III. Contractual stipulations purporting to bar claims for regularization cannot override constitutional guarantees. Acceptance of contractual terms does not amount to waiver of fundamental rights, and contractual stipulations cannot immunize arbitrary State action from constitutional scrutiny.

IV. The State, as a model employer, cannot rely on contractual labels or mechanical application of Umadevi (supra) to justify prolonged ad-hocism or to discard long-

serving employees in a manner inconsistent with fairness, dignity and constitutional governance.

V. In view of the foregoing discussion, we direct the respondent-State to forthwith regularize the services of all the appellants against the sanctioned posts to which they were initially appointed. The appellants shall be entitled to all consequential service benefits accruing from the date of this judgment."

3.9. It is also contended that since similarly situated

7(seven) nos. of contractual employees have already

been regularized in the establishment of Opp. Party

No.2, petitioner being similarly situated, he cannot be

discriminated. In support of the aforesaid submission

reliance was placed to the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex

Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs.

Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Others, (2015) 1 SCC

347 and State of Karnataka & Others vs. C. Lalitha,

reported in (2006) 2 SCC-747

3.10. Hon'ble Apex Court in Para-13 and 22 of the said

judgment has held as follows:-

// 14 //

"13. In State of Karnataka v. C. Lalitha [State of Karnataka v. C. Lalitha, (2006) 2 SCC 747 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 447] , which is the next case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, our attention was drawn to the following passage from the said judgment : (SCC p. 756, para 29) "29. Service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all persons similarly situated should be treated similarly. Only because one person has approached the court that would not mean that persons similarly situated should be treated differently. It is furthermore well settled that the question of seniority should be governed by the rules. It may be true that this Court took notice of the subsequent events, namely, that in the meantime she had also been promoted as Assistant Commissioner which was a Category I post but the direction to create a supernumerary post to adjust her must be held to have been issued only with a view to accommodate her therein as otherwise she might have been reverted and not for the purpose of conferring a benefit to which she was not otherwise entitled to."

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxxx

22. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents can be summed up as under.

22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.

22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-

recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment

// 15 //

rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence- sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.

22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India [K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721: 1998 SCC (L&S) 226] ). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence."

3.11. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of C. Lalitha in

Para-29 of the said judgment has held as follows:-

"29. Service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all persons similarly situated should be treated similarly. Only because one person has approached the court that would not mean that persons similarly situated should be treated differently. It is furthermore well-settled that the question of seniority should be governed by the rules. It may be true that this Court took notice of the subsequent events, namely, that in the meantime she had also been promoted as Assistant Commissioner which was a Category I Post but the direction to create a supernumerary post to adjust her must be held to have been issued only with a view to accommodate her therein as otherwise she might have been reverted and not for the purpose of conferring a benefit to which she was not otherwise entitled to".

// 16 //

3.12. It is accordingly contended that Opp. Party No.2

be directed to regularize the services of the petitioner

with passing of order within a stipulated time period.

4. Learned Addl. Standing Counsel on the other

hand contended that since petitioner's claim after due

consideration, has neither been rejected nor allowed

and petitioner prior to approaching this Court has

never raised the claim, so made in the writ petition, the

writ petition is not maintainable.

4.1. It is further contended that petitioner was never

appointed on regular basis and his contractual

engagement is being renewed from year to year. Not

only that at the time of initial appointment of the

petitioner, since ORV Act has not been followed,

petitioner's claim cannot be considered. Reliance was

also placed to a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in

the case of State of Rajastan and Others Vs.

Dayalal and Others. Hon'ble Apex Court in the said

judgment in Para-12 has held as follows:-

// 17 //

"12. We may at the outset refer to the following well-settled principles relating to regularisation and parity in pay, relevant in the context of these appeals:

(i) The High Courts, in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution will not issue directions for regularisation, absorption or permanent continuance, unless the employees claiming regularisation had been appointed in pursuance of a regular recruitment in accordance with relevant rules in an open competitive process, against sanctioned vacant posts. The equality clause contained in Articles 14 and 16 should be scrupulously followed and Courts should not issue a direction for regularisation of services of an employee which would be violative of the constitutional scheme.

While something that is irregular for want of compliance with one of the elements in the process of selection which does not go to the root of the process, can be regularised, back door entries, appointments contrary to the constitutional scheme and/or appointment of ineligible candidates cannot be regularised.

(ii) Mere continuation of service by a temporary or ad hoc or daily-wage employee, under cover of some interim orders of the court, would not confer upon him any right to be absorbed into service, as such service would be "litigious employment". Even temporary, ad hoc or daily- wage service for a long number of years, let alone service for one or two years, will not entitle such employee to claim regularisation, if he is not working against a sanctioned post. Sympathy and sentiment cannot be grounds for passing any order of regularisation in the absence of a legal right.

(iii) Even where a scheme is formulated for regularisation with a cut-off date (that is a scheme providing that persons who had put in a specified number of years of service and continuing in employment as on the cut-off date), it is not possible to others who were appointed subsequent to the cut-off date, to claim or contend that the scheme should be applied to them by extending the cut-off date or seek a direction for framing of fresh schemes providing for successive cut-off dates.

(iv) Part-time employees are not entitled to seek regularisation as they are not working against any sanctioned posts. There cannot be a direction for absorption, regularisation or permanent continuance of part-time temporary employees.

(v) Part-time temporary employees in government-run institutions cannot claim parity in salary with regular employees of the Government on the principle of equal pay for equal work. Nor can employees in private

// 18 //

employment, even if serving full time, seek parity in salary with government employees. The right to claim a particular salary against the State must arise under a contract or under a statute."

5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties,

considering the submissions made and the fact that

petitioner is continuing as a contractual Peon w.e.f.

31.12.2010 and the submission of the learned Senior

Counsel appearing for the petitioner that save and

except the petitioner, all 7 (seven) other contractual

Peons have already been regularized in the meantime,

this Court placing reliance on the decision in the case

of Jaggo, Shripal, Dharam Singh and Bhola Nath

and the provisions contained under Repeal Rule so

notified on 14.11.2022, while disposing the Writ

Petition, directs Opp. Party No.2 to take a decision on