Saroja Kumar Dhal vs State Of Odisha
2026 Latest Caselaw 735 Ori

Orissa High Court

Saroja Kumar Dhal vs State Of Odisha on 29 January, 2026

Author: Chittaranjan Dash

Bench: Chittaranjan Dash

          IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                            W.P.(C) No.7823 of 2017

     Saroja Kumar Dhal                                 ....               Petitioner

                                          -versus-
     1. State of Odisha
                                                       ....            Opp. Parties
     2. Director of Agriculture & Food
     Production, Odisha, Bhubaneswar

     3. Director of Soil Conservation,
     Odisha, Bhubaneswar

     4. Director, Horticulture, Odisha,
     Bhubaneswar

                     Advocates Appeared in this case

               For Petitioner         -          Mr. N. C. Rout, Advocate

               For Opp. Parties -                Mr. J. Khandayatray, ASC

                                           ---
CORAM :
MR. JUSTICE DIXIT KRISHNA SHRIPAD
MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Date of Hearing & Judgment: 29.01.2026
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chittaranjan Dash, J.

1. By means of this application under Articles 226 and 227 of

the Constitution of India, the Petitioner calls in question the

legality and propriety of the common order dated 15.03.2017

passed by the learned Odisha Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack

Bench, Cuttack, in O.A. No.601(C) of 2001 and O.A. No.485(C) of

2011, whereby both the Original Applications instituted by the

Petitioner were dismissed.

2. The factual matrix, as emerges from the pleadings and the

materials placed on record, is that the Petitioner is a graduate in

Agricultural Science (B.Sc. Agriculture), having passed out in the

year 1992. The post of Junior Agriculture Officer was initially

being filled up by engaging Agriculture Graduates on

stipend/consolidated basis under the Directorate of Agriculture

and Food Production, Odisha. Subsequently, the State

Government contemplated recruitment to the said post through

the Odisha Staff Selection Commission; however, such process

did not culminate in final appointments. Taking note of the

grievances of unemployed Agriculture Graduates, the State

Government took a policy decision in the year 1998, whereby the

power of recruitment to the post of Junior Agriculture Officer

was withdrawn from the Staff Selection Commission and

restored to the respective Directors, with a clear stipulation that

recruitment would be made following the earlier practice,

namely, batch-wise clearance. The said decision was notified

vide Government Resolution dated 28.08.1998.

Earlier, the Petitioner, along with similarly situated

candidates, had approached the Odisha Administrative Tribunal

by filing O.A. No.634(C) of 1997 challenging an advertisement

issued in the year 1996. The said Original Application, along

with analogous cases, was disposed of by the Tribunal on

21.12.1999 with the observation that, whenever steps were taken

for filling up the posts of Junior Agriculture Officer in

accordance with policy, the cases of the applicants could be

considered, subject to applicable norms. Thereafter, on

22.05.2000, the State Government took a decision to fill up 76

vacant posts of Junior Agriculture Officer and directed the

competent authorities to complete the selection process by the

end of June, 2000. According to the Petitioner, despite such

decision, 73 out of the 76 vacancies were filled up by deploying

Junior Soil Conservation Officers on what was described as a

deputation/adjustment basis, purportedly to accommodate

surplus staff, leaving only three posts unfilled. The Petitioner

contends that such deployment was contrary to the Odisha

Subordinate Agricultural Service Rules, 1980 (as amended),

which prescribe the modes of recruitment and do not

contemplate filling up of vacancies in the post of Junior

Agriculture Officer by deputation.

Aggrieved by non-consideration of his case against the

remaining vacancies, the Petitioner approached the Tribunal by

filing O.A. No.601(C) of 2001 seeking a direction to consider his

candidature. During the pendency of the said Original

Application, an advertisement dated 04.02.2011 was issued for

appointment to the post of Junior Horticulture Officer without

providing age relaxation. Alleging that such denial of age

relaxation was contrary to earlier observations of the Tribunal,

the Petitioner filed another Original Application, being O.A.

No.485(C) of 2011. Both the Original Applications were heard

together and were dismissed by the learned Tribunal by a

common order dated 15.03.2017.

3. Mr. Rout, learned counsel for the Petitioner, submits that

the impugned common order dated 15.03.2017 is unsustainable

as the learned Tribunal failed to consider Rule 5 of the Odisha

Subordinate Agricultural Service Rules, 1980, which does not

permit filling up the post of Junior Agriculture Officer by

deputation or adjustment. Despite a clear policy decision dated

22.05.2000 to fill up 76 vacancies in accordance with the batch-

wise clearance system, the authorities arbitrarily filled 73 posts

by deploying surplus Junior Soil Conservation Officers, thereby

excluding the Petitioner from consideration. Learned counsel

contends that the Petitioner never claimed a vested right to

appointment but only sought fair consideration in terms of the

Rules and the earlier observations of the Tribunal in O.A.

No.634(C) of 1997 and analogous cases. The Tribunal, however,

failed to examine this aspect and mechanically rejected the claim.

Learned counsel further submits that the dismissal of O.A.

No.485(C) of 2011 is equally flawed, as the Tribunal ignored its

earlier observation regarding age relaxation, and erroneously

upheld an advertisement issued without extending such benefit.

The impugned order, therefore, being arbitrary and contrary,

warrants interference.

4. Learned Addl. Standing Counsel argues that the impugned

order dated 15.03.2017 is legal and does not warrant interference,

as recruitment to the post of Junior Agriculture Officer is

governed strictly by the Odisha Subordinate Agricultural Service

Rules, 1980, and the Petitioner has no vested right to

appointment. It is submitted that the adjustment of surplus

Junior Soil Conservation Officers against vacant posts was a

policy decision taken in administrative exigency and cannot be

termed illegal. It is further contended that the earlier

observations of the Tribunal did not confer any enforceable right

on the Petitioner, but merely permitted consideration if

recruitment was undertaken. Since no regular recruitment was

conducted thereafter, no right accrued in his favour. With regard

to the 2011 advertisement, learned counsel submits that age

relaxation cannot be claimed as a matter of right in absence of

any statutory provision, and therefore the Tribunal rightly

rejected the Petitioner's claim.

5. At the threshold, it is necessary to advert to paragraph 11

of the impugned order, wherein the learned Tribunal has

specifically dealt with the Petitioner's prayer for age relaxation

raised in O.A. No.485(C) of 2011.

"11. In O.A.No.485(c)/2011 the prayer of the applicant was to consider his case by relaxing the age from what has been the age stipulation in the advertisement at Annexure-l. The applicant has submitted that in the decision of the Tribunal in view of O.A.No.634(c)/1997 to O.A.No.636(c)/1997 (Annexure-4), he is entitled to such relaxation. In Annexure-4, it has been observed that "The applicant, if so advised, may represent to the Agriculture Department that whenever steps are taken for filling up the posts of Junior Agriculture Officers by the Directorate, their cases should be considered and if it is the policy of the / Department to fill up such posts on batch wise basis, it is expected that they will take suitable action on their representations keeping in mind the reservation provisions. Similarly the decision in O.A.No.3657(c)/2000 at Annexure- 5 it has been observed that "It is, therefore, expected that whenever the next direct recruitment for the posts of JAO, is held, the applicant's upper age limit will be relaxed in accordance with the above provision and they will not be debarred from taking part in the selection." It is to be noted that Rule 2 of the OCS (Fixation of Upper Age

Limit, Rule 1989 is no more in force. Besides the averment has been made that the vacancies, for which the recruitment test at Annexure-l was initiated was as per the Labour and Employment department Notification No.7963 dated 8.6.1999 and it is "beyond the preview" of respondents to relax in violation of this resolution. However the applicant appeared in the said recruitment test as per the interim order of this Tribunal, but did not succeed as per letter dated 2.5.2016 of respondent No.4. Hence, the prayer of the applicant has become furious"

6. Before examining the correctness of the reasoning adopted

by the learned Tribunal in the above context, this Court deems it

appropriate to take note of the settled legal position governing

recruitment processes, particularly with respect to eligibility

conditions and age relaxation. In this regard, reference may be

made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tej

Prakash Pathak & Ors. v. Rajasthan High Court & Ors., 2024

INSC 847, which is a larger Bench decision, rendered with

reference to the earlier judgment reported in (2013) 4 SCC 540.

The Court has authoritatively reiterated the principle that the

"rules of the game" cannot ordinarily be altered midstream and

that eligibility conditions, must be governed strictly by the

applicable statutory rules and recruitment notifications. The

exposition of law contained in paragraph 42 of the said judgment

is of particular relevance to the issue at hand.

"42. We, therefore, answer the reference in the following terms:

(1) Recruitment process commences from the issuance of the advertisement calling for applications and ends with filling up of vacancies;

(2) Eligibility criteria for being placed in the Select List, notified at the commencement of the recruitment process, cannot be changed midway through the recruitment process unless the extant Rules so permit, or the advertisement, which is not contrary to the extant Rules, so permit. Even if such change is permissible under the extant Rules or the advertisement, the change would have to meet the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution and satisfy the test of non-arbitrariness; (3) The decision in K. Manjusree (supra) lays down good law and is not in conflict with the decision in Subash Chander Marwaha (supra). Subash Chander Marwaha (supra) deals with the right to be appointed from the Select List whereas K. Manjusree (supra) deals with the right to be placed in the Select List.

The two cases therefore deal with altogether different issues;

(4) Recruiting bodies, subject to the extant Rules, may devise appropriate procedure for bringing the recruitment process to its logical end provided the procedure so adopted is transparent, non-

discriminatory/ nonarbitrary and has a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. (5) Extant Rules having statutory force are binding on the recruiting body both in terms of procedure and eligibility. However, where the Rules are non-existent, or silent, administrative instructions may fill in the gaps;

(6) Placement in the select list gives no indefeasible right to appointment. The State or its instrumentality for bona fide reasons may choose not to fill up the vacancies. However, if vacancies exist, the State or its instrumentality cannot arbitrarily deny appointment to a person within the zone of consideration in the select list."

7. Applying the aforesaid legal position to the facts of the

present case, this Court finds no infirmity in the approach

adopted by the learned Tribunal of the impugned order. The

Tribunal has correctly noted that the Petitioner's claim for age

relaxation was founded essentially on earlier observations made

in O.A. No.634(C) of 1997 and connected matters, as well as in

O.A. No.3657(C) of 2000. However, those observations were

clearly contingent in nature and did not confer any indefeasible

or enforceable right upon the Petitioner to claim age relaxation

as a matter of course. The learned Tribunal has also rightly taken

note of the fact that Rule 2 of the Odisha Civil Services (Fixation

of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 1989, which was sought to be relied

upon by the Petitioner, was no longer in force at the relevant

point of time. In absence of any subsisting statutory provision

enabling relaxation of the upper age limit, the respondents could

not have granted such relaxation dehors the governing rules or

the terms of the recruitment notification.

8. Further, the recruitment process initiated pursuant to the

notification dated 08.06.1999 of the Labour and Employment

Department was governed by the conditions stipulated therein,

and the respondents had no authority to relax the age criteria in

violation of the said notification. Significantly, the Petitioner was

permitted to participate in the recruitment process pursuant to

an interim order of the Tribunal, but admittedly did not succeed

in the selection, as communicated vide letter dated 02.05.2016. In

such circumstances, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the

Petitioner's prayer had, in any event, become infructuous.

9. Further, it is well settled that participation in a recruitment

process pursuant to an interim order or otherwise does not

create any vested or enforceable right in favour of a candidate.

At best, it only affords an opportunity to compete, which by

itself does not translate into finality or entitlement to

appointment. Selection alone confers a right to be considered for

appointment, subject always to fulfillment of the statutory

requirements and merit position.

10. In the present case, the Petitioner was permitted to appear

in the recruitment process pursuant to an interim order of the

Tribunal, but admittedly did not succeed. Mere participation,

therefore, could not have matured into any legal right, nor could

it be pressed into service to claim age relaxation or appointment

dehors the applicable rules. The learned Tribunal was thus

justified in holding that the Petitioner's grievance, even

otherwise, did not survive.

11. In the light of the principles enunciated by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Tej Prakash Pathak (supra), particularly

paragraph 42 thereof, the insistence of the Petitioner on age

relaxation, unsupported by any statutory rule or recruitment

notification, cannot be sustained. The learned Tribunal has thus

applied the correct legal tests and has arrived at a conclusion

which is neither arbitrary nor perverse.

12. Accordingly, the impugned common order dated

15.03.2017 does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of

the record or any jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference

by this Court.

(Chittaranjan Dash) Judge

(Dixit Krishna Shripad) Judge

A.K.Pradhan/Bijay/Sarbani

Designation: Junior Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK Date: 04-Feb-2026 12:26:53