[Cites 11, Cited by 0]
Orissa High Court
Dav Public School vs State Of Odisha And Ors. .... Opposite ... on 22 January, 2026
Author: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Bench: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISS HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 22-Jan-2026 16:45:10
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) Nos.24661 of 2025
along with
Batch of Cases
(In the matters of petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, 1950).
DAV Public School, Kalinga Nagar .... Petitioner(s)
-versus-
State of Odisha and Ors. .... Opposite Party (s)
Advocates appeared in the case throughHybrid Mode:
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Suryasnata Mohapatra, Adv.
For Opposite Party (s) : Mr. Debasish Nayak, AGA
CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI
DATE OF HEARING:-09.01.2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT:-22.01.2026
W.P.(C) Nos.24661 of 2025 along with W.P.(C) Nos.24623 and
24655 of 2025
Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.
1. Since these Writ Petitions involve a common question of law, those are
heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. In the lead case i.e. in W.P.(C) No.24661 of 2025, the petitioner seeks a
direction from this Court to quash the communications dated 31.07.2025
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Location: ORISS HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
and 21.08.2025 and to declare that the petitioner school is not a motor
transport undertaking under the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, and
is not liable to compulsory registration thereunder.
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
3. The brief facts of the case are as follows:
(i) The petitioner is a private unaided CBSE-affiliated school run by DAV
College Managing Committee, New Delhi, situated within the territorial
jurisdiction of the High Court, and imparting education from Nursery to
Class XII to more than 2500 students.
(ii) For facilitating transportation of interested students and staff, the
petitioner runs a school transport facility through buses as an ancillary
service to education, and states it has around 11 vehicles operating after
obtaining permission from the Police Commissionerate (Bhubaneswar-
Cuttack) and the Commerce and Transport Department.
(iii) The State has issued a "Policy on Transport of School Children, 2016"
(Resolution No. 6395 dated 31.08.2016), stated to have been framed
pursuant to directions of the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of
India1, to regulate school children transportation within Odisha.
(iv) On 31.07.2025, Opposite Party No. 3 issued Communication Letter No.
5098/JLC, Bhubaneswar Range, directing the petitioner to apply for
registration as a "Motor Transport Undertaking" in Form-I under the
Odisha Motor Transport Workers Rules, 1966 through the PAReSHRAM
portal, alleging applicability of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961,
and warning of action under Section 32 for non-compliance.
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Location: ORISS HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
(v) The petitioner replied on 11.08.2025 disputing applicability of the Motor
Transport Workers Act, 1961, relying on policy and case law, and
requesting withdrawal/waiver of the direction to register.
(vi) On 21.08.2025, Opposite Party No. 3 issued a further Communication
Letter No. 5798/JLC reiterating the direction to register through
PAReSHRAM by 02.09.2025 and stating prosecution would be initiated
under Section 32 if the petitioner failed to comply.
(vii) The writ petition has been filed seeking quashing of the communications
dated 31.07.2025 and 21.08.2025 on the plea that the petitioner is not a
"Motor Transport Undertaking" within Section 2(g) of the Motor
Transport Workers Act, 1961.
(viii) In the counter affidavit, the deponent (Divisional Labour Commissioner,
Bhubaneswar), states he is duly authorised by Opposite Party Nos. 1 and
3, asserts the petitioner is covered by the Act, and relies on judicial
precedents and the petitioner's charging of transport fees to support
registration and regulatory enforcement.
(ix) The opposite parties additionally state that several educational
institutions in Bhubaneswar have already obtained registration under the
Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, and claim the petitioner school has
itself submitted an application in Form-I through the PAReSHRAM
portal while also filing this writ petition.
II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following
submissions in support of his contentions:
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Location: ORISS HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
(i) The impugned communications dated 31.07.2025 and 21.08.2025 directing
registration under the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 are illegal,
arbitrary, erroneous, and unsustainable, and therefore liable to be
quashed.
(ii) The petitioner is a private educational institution and not a "Motor
Transport Undertaking" under Section 2(g) because its buses are run only
as an ancillary facility to education, not as a commercial transport
business.
(iii) The statutory definition requires carriage "for hire or reward," and the
petitioner asserts there is no such commercial element in its school
transport arrangement, hence the Act is inapplicable.
(iv) The State's "Policy on Transport of School Children, 2016," framed
pursuant to M.C. Mehta (Supra), regulates school conveyance
comprehensively, including duties and liabilities of workers, yet it does
not mandate registration of schools under the Motor Transport Workers
Act, 1961, and the petitioner claims similarly placed schools are not
registered under the Act.
(v) The petitioner claims it is already extending statutory and welfare
benefits to bus staff such as CPF/EPF, ESI and allowances, and therefore
meets welfare objectives without being brought under the Motor
Transport Workers Act framework.
(vi) The petitioner asserts its transport service operates in deficit for FY 2024-
25, and bus fare collected is only administrative in nature; since the
activity is not profit-oriented, treating it as a motor transport undertaking
is unjustified.
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Location: ORISS HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
(vii) The opposite party's reliance on Section 38 (exemptions) is said to be
misconceived because Section 38 presupposes the existence of a "motor
transport undertaking," and since the petitioner is not one, the exemption
provision is irrelevant and cannot be used to compel registration.
(viii) The petitioner alleges violation of principles of natural justice because
despite a detailed reply dated 11.08.2025 with precedents and policy-
based objections, Opposite Party No. 3 mechanically reiterated the
direction on 21.08.2025 without proper consideration.
(ix) The petitioner contends that school bus drivers and staff are not "motor
transport workers" for the purposes of the Act as the transport is
incidental to education and not "hire or reward" in the commercial sense.
(x) The petitioner pleads that the impugned action is discriminatory and
biased as, according to it, DAV schools in Bhubaneswar were targeted
and other schools in the State were not subjected to similar directions.
(xi) The petitioner argues Opposite Party No. 3 exceeded jurisdiction by
compelling registration under an Act not applicable to schools, and that
such coercive action harms the petitioner's goodwill and burdens an
educational institution contrary to its regulated status under separate
transport rules for educational vehicles under the Motor Vehicles law
framework.
(xii) The petitioner also relies on the Motor Vehicles Act definition of "private
carrier" as being tied to carriage of goods in connection with
trade/business and argues that a school bus does not fit that concept,
supporting its case that it cannot be roped in as a "motor transport
undertaking".
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Location: ORISS HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES:
5. The Learned Counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the
following submissions in support of his contentions:
(i) The petitioner's buses and workers engaged for transporting students
and staff fall squarely within the definition of "motor transport
undertaking" under Section 2(g) of the Motor Transport Workers Act,
1961, therefore registration is mandatory and the notices are lawful.
(ii) The petitioner is not providing free transport; it is charging
transportation fees from students and staff, which constitutes carriage for
"hire or reward," bringing the undertaking within the statutory ambit.
(iii) The opposite parties rely on the Madras High Court decision in Christian
Medical College Association, Vellore v. Government of Tamil Nadu2 to
submit that when an institution provides transport services on payment,
it amounts to an undertaking covered by the Act.
(iv) Reliance is placed on the Supreme Court judgment in Municipal Council,
Raipur v. State of Madhya Pradesh3 and the Allahabad High Court
decision in Star Paper Mill, Saharanpur v. State of U.P.4 for interpreting
Section 2(g) and the meaning of "hire or reward".
(v) The "Policy on Transport of School Children, 2016" does not exempt
educational institutions from registration under the Motor Transport
Workers Act, 1961, and it is specifically denied that other schools are not
registered under the Act.
AIR 1970 SC 1923
1973 (2) LLJ 433
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Location: ORISS HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
(vi) The opposite parties assert that multiple educational institutions have
already obtained registration under the Motor Transport Workers Act,
1961, including named institutions with registration numbers, and
further state that another school has applied through the PAReSHRAM
portal.
(vii) The opposite parties contend that the petitioner's own pleadings admit
collection of bus fare, which directly satisfies the "hire or reward"
element under Section 2(g), making the registration direction legally
justified irrespective of whether the transport service runs in deficit.
(viii) It is asserted that the Motor Transport Workers Act provides welfare,
health facilities, and service conditions under Chapters IV and V which
are in addition to EPF/ESI, and denying registration indicates an intent to
avoid providing the statutory benefits available to motor transport
workers.
(ix) The registration fee is stated to be nominal under the State's fee structure
(graded by number of workers) and hence cannot be justified as a burden
affecting profit/loss; deficit is irrelevant because the Act contains no
exemption for financially loss-making activities.
(x) There is no legal provision exempting the petitioner from the Act, and
neither the Supreme Court nor the Orissa High Court has carved out any
such exemption for educational institutions running paid transport.
(xi) The opposite parties deny violation of natural justice and state the
petitioner was rightly issued notice because the Act applies, and Section
32 provides penal consequences for wilful disobedience of lawful
directions and contraventions.
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(xii) The opposite parties state that several schools and educational
institutions in Bhubaneswar were issued similar letters for registration,
and deny any bias or selective targeting.
(xiii) The opposite parties assert Opposite Party No. 3 has statutory authority
to issue notices as an Inspector under the Motor Transport Workers Act,
1961, based on a State notification dated 03.12.2018, and therefore has not
exceeded jurisdiction.
(xiv) It is contended that compliance with the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 does
not dispense with compliance under the Motor Transport Workers Act,
1961, as both are distinct enactments operating in different fields.
(xv) The writ petition is described as devoid of merit and liable to be
dismissed, with the stated object of enforcement being to extend
regulated welfare and service protections to drivers and other motor
transport workers engaged by the petitioner.
IV. JUDGMENT AND ANALYSIS:
6. Heard Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the documents
placed before this Court.
7. The core question that arises for determination is whether the petitioner
school's transport facility qualifies as a "motor transport undertaking"
under Section 2(g) of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 (hereinafter
"the Act"), thereby requiring registration and compliance with that Act.
The petitioner contends that its school bus service is purely incidental to
its educational activities and not run for any commercial purpose,
whereas the opposite parties assert that since the school transports
students for a fee, it squarely falls within the ambit of the Act.
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Location: ORISS HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
8. Section 2(g) of the Act defines a "motor transport undertaking" to mean "an
undertaking engaged in carrying passengers or goods or both by road for hire or
reward, and includes a private carrier". On a plain reading, the definition
has two elements: (1) carrying passengers or goods by road, and (2)
doing so "for hire or reward." It also expressly "includes a private carrier,"
indicating that even undertakings not engaged in public transport but
using vehicles for their own business or purpose are covered. In the
present case, it is undisputed that the petitioner school operates buses to
carry children and staff by road. The crux of the matter is whether this
carriage is "for hire or reward" as per the Act.
9. The statutory phrase "for hire or reward" is broad. It is not limited to
profit-making enterprises. In fact, a plethora of judicial precedents have
emphasized that the Motor Transport Workers Act is a welfare legislation
and its definitions should not be narrowed.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Council, Raipur (Supra)
held that even a municipal council's transport service, used to carry
garbage without charging any fee, came within the definition of a motor
transport undertaking. The Supreme Court reasoned that including
"private carriers" shows the legislature's intent to cover undertakings of a
non-commercial nature as well. In that case, although the municipality
was not carrying passengers for profit, it was using vehicles for a public
function; thus it was held to be an "undertaking" engaged in road
transport for reward. The relevant excerpts are produced below:
"The main argument which the learned counsel urges is
that the word "includes" in the definition of the expression
"motor transport undertaking" helps him because this
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shows that it is only an undertaking of a commercial nature
which was intended to be included within the definition of
"motor transport undertaking". He says that a Municipal
Council is not carrying on any business but is carrying on
statutory obligations imposed upon it and, therefore, a
Municipal Council cannot be called an undertaking. We are
unable to accept this contention. First, the Act provides for
the welfare of motor transport workers and regulates the
conditions of their work. Such beneficial acts are not, as a
rule, construed strictly. Secondly, the words of the
definition are plain and not susceptible of any reasonable
limitation. It seems to us that by using the word "includes"
the. Legislature undoubtedly intended to enlarge the
meaning of the expression "motor transport undertaking".
The words "private carrier" have been given a specific
meaning in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and it is difficult
to limit this specific meaning on any reasonable basis.
Further, s. 38 of the Act, which exempts certain transport
vehicles, also proceeds on the basis that a private carrier who
is carrying on activities which are not commercial would be
included within the expression "motor transport
undertaking"."
11. Similarly, the Allahabad High Court in Star Paper Mill, Saharanpur
(Supra) found that a company using its own fleet of lorries to haul raw
materials for its business was a motor transport undertaking, even
though this was ancillary to its main business of manufacturing paper.
12. These rulings highlight that the existence of a "hire or reward" element
does not require a profit motive, any form of carrying passengers or
goods for some consideration or as part of one's business can suffice.
13. In the present case, the school admittedly collects transportation fees
from students who avail of the bus service. Learned counsel for the
petitioner argued that this fee is charged merely to cover costs and that
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the transport facility runs at a deficit, implying the service is not run for
profit. However, the Act does not condition its applicability on the
transport activity being profitable. Charging any amount as a
consideration for providing transportation means the service is being
provided "for hire or reward" in the legal sense.
14. The Madras High Court, in Christian Medical College (Supra), held that
once is shown that the institution charges a fee for transporting its own
students or employees, it would definitely fall within the definition of a
motor transport undertaking, dehors the fact that its principal activity is
education and not transport. The relevant excerpts are produced below:
"Though such a categorical averment has been made in the
counter affidavit, filed in the Writ Petition itself, the
appellant has not come forward to deny the same by filing a
rejoinder. Therefore, the aforesaid averment relating to levy
of charges, by the appellant, for offering transport services
to its students/ doctors / employees stands uncontroverted.
Once it is found that the appellant Institution charges a fee
for transporting its own students / doctors / employees, it
would definitely be a Motor Transport Undertaking within
the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Motor Transport Workers
Act 1961, in view of the categorical pronouncement of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Municipal Council Raipurs case,
and that of the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in
Star Paper Mills's case, referred to supra, dehors the fact
that its principal activity is Education and not transport of
passengers."
15. In other words, if an educational institution provides transport and
recovers a fee (even if nominal or to defray expenses), that activity is
transportation for reward. This Court finds that reasoning persuasive.
The petitioner's buses are not carrying students gratis or as a purely
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charitable courtesy; they operate against payment of a bus fee, bringing
the service within the ambit of "hire or reward.".
16. The petitioner strenuously contended that its main object is to impart
education, not to run a transport enterprise, and that ferrying students is
only an incidental facility without any commercial flavour. Indeed,
courts have recognized that the core character of an educational or
industrial establishment is not transportation. However, the critical
distinction is the presence of a hire or reward element. Where no fare at
all is collected and the service is purely incidental (essentially a free
amenity), it strengthens the claim that the institution is not engaged in
transport "for hire or reward".
17. In the petitioner's case, however, this Court has already found that a fare
is levied on students. That sets the case apart from those where
transportation was provided free of cost. Once a charge is imposed, the
activity cannot be regarded as a purely incidental charitable act; it
becomes a service rendered for consideration. The incidental nature of
the transport service to the school's primary purpose does not, in law,
exempt it from the Act if the service meets the statutory definition. Thus,
the focus is on the character of the activity, not the primary business of
the employer. Here, the petitioner's transport activity has the character of
a paid service, bringing it within the scope of the Act's protective regime
for motor transport workers.
V. CONCLUSION:
18. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the petitioner's transport facility satisfies the statutory
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ingredients of a "motor transport undertaking" under Section 2(g) of the
Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961. The collection of transportation
charges from students, irrespective of the quantum or profitability,
constitutes carriage for hire or reward in the legal sense, thereby
attracting the applicability of the Act.
19. The fact that transportation is ancillary to the petitioner's primary
educational function does not dilute the character of the activity where
consideration is admittedly levied. Being a welfare legislation, the Act
warrants a broad and purposive interpretation so as to extend its
protective umbrella to motor transport workers engaged in such
undertakings. Consequently, the petitioner cannot seek exemption from
statutory compliance on the ground of its non-commercial or educational
character.
20. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed.
21. Accordingly, all the connected Writ Petitions are dismissed.
22. Interim order, if any, passed earlier in any of the above-mentioned Writ
Petitions stands vacated.
(Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
Dated 22nd Jan., 2026/
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