[Cites 10, Cited by 0]
Orissa High Court
Biswanath @ Bisa Gochhayat vs State Of Orissa And Ors. .... Opposite ... on 22 January, 2026
Author: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Bench: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISS HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 22-Jan-2026 16:45:10
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) Nos.3550 of 2025
along with
Batch of Cases.
(In the matters of petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, 1950).
(In W.P.(C) No.3550 of 2025)
Biswanath @ Bisa Gochhayat .... Petitioner(s)
-versus-
State of Orissa and Ors. .... Opposite Party (s)
Advocates appeared in the case throughHybrid Mode:
For Petitioner(s) : Ms. Rajalaxmi Biswal, Adv.
For Opposite Party (s) : Mr. Bibekananda Nayak, AGA
Mr. Haripad Mohanty, Adv.
(for O.P.4)
CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI
DATE OF HEARING:23.12.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT:-22.01.2026
W.P.(C) Nos.3550 of 2025 along with W.P.(C) Nos.3540 of 2025,
3598 of 2025, 4058 of 2025, 4511 of 2025
Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.
1. Since these Writ Petitions involve a common question of law, those are
being heard and disposed of together. The facts are being delineated with
reference to W.P.(C) No.3550 of 2025, which is treated as the leading case.
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2. In W.P.(C) No.3550 of 2025, the petitioner seeks a direction from this
Court to quash the eviction notices issued in respect of the disputed land
and to restrain the authorities from dispossessing him without first
extending rehabilitation and resettlement benefits, asserting violation of
his constitutional rights under Articles 14 and 21.
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
3. The brief facts of the case are as follows:
(i) The petitioner, an elderly person claiming to be landless and
economically weak, has approached the High Court under Articles 226
and 227 of the Constitution challenging notices of eviction issued in
respect of land situated at Gopalprasad village, Khata No. 313, Plot No.
1963, Kisama Taila, near Maa Hingula Temple, Talcher area.
(ii) The land in question forms part of the Hingula Open Cast Project of
Mahanadi Coalfields Limited and was acquired under the Coal Bearing
Areas Acquisition and Development Act through notifications issued
between 1994 and 1997, with possession stated to have been taken over
by MCL in 1999.
(iii) The petitioner asserts continuous residence in the area for nearly three
generations and claims to have been traditionally engaged in seva karya
at Maa Hingula Temple, including cleaning the premises and beating
drums, allegedly for about fifty years.
(iv) In October and December 2024, the petitioner received multiple notices
from the authorities requiring him to vacate the land on the ground that
it is government land already acquired by MCL and required urgently
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for peripheral development works of Maa Hingula Temple, for which
substantial State funds have been sanctioned.
(v) The petitioner submitted representations in response to the notices,
asserting that he had neither received compensation nor rehabilitation
benefits under the applicable Rehabilitation and Resettlement policies
and seeking protection from eviction without rehabilitation.
(vi) Counter affidavits have been filed by the State authorities and MCL
disputing the petitioner's claims, asserting that the land is government
land, that acquisition proceedings were completed decades earlier, and
that the petitioner is an unauthorized encroacher with no legal
entitlement to compensation or rehabilitation.
II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following
submissions in support of his contentions:
(i) The petitioner contends that he and his forefathers have been residing
near Maa Hingula Temple for about three generations and have been
rendering continuous traditional services to the temple, thereby
establishing long-standing residence and livelihood dependence on the
area.
(ii) It is asserted that although the surrounding village area was acquired for
the Hingula OCP project, the petitioner was neither paid compensation
nor provided any rehabilitation or resettlement despite being affected by
the acquisition and displacement.
(iii) The petitioner alleges that eviction notices have been issued mechanically
and arbitrarily, without consideration of his age, poverty, landlessness,
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traditional occupation, and representations seeking rehabilitation under
government R and R policies.
(iv) It is claimed that the impugned notices violate Article 14 due to
arbitrariness and Article 21 due to deprivation of livelihood and shelter
without due process or rehabilitation, particularly when the
displacement is for a public project.
(v) The petitioner maintains that the authorities have remained silent on his
grievances and are proceeding with eviction in a coercive manner,
leaving him homeless and without any alternative means of survival.
III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES:
5. The Learned Counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the
following submissions in support of his contentions:
(i) The opposite parties contend that the writ petition is not maintainable as
it involves disputed questions of fact regarding possession, eligibility,
and entitlement, and further on the ground that there has been
suppression of material facts since an identical writ petition has been
filed by the petitioner's son concerning the same land.
(ii) It is asserted that the land under Khata No. 313 is government land that
was validly acquired by MCL in the first phase of acquisition for Hingula
OCP, with all statutory notifications issued, awards prepared,
compensation paid to eligible awardees, and possession taken over long
back.
(iii) The authorities deny that the petitioner or his forefathers were in lawful
possession prior to acquisition and contend that there is no documentary
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evidence such as ROR entries or official records showing residence or
occupation before the cut-off date for acquisition.
(iv) The opposite parties maintain that the petitioner is an unauthorized
encroacher who has constructed structures after acquisition and is
therefore not eligible for any compensation or rehabilitation benefits
under the R and R policy.
(v) It is contended that the land is urgently required for peripheral
development works of Maa Hingula Temple, including public facilities
sanctioned by the State Government, and that the petitioner's continued
occupation is obstructing public development, justifying lawful eviction
through the impugned notices.
IV. JUDGMENT AND ANALYSIS:
6. Heard Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the documents
placed before this Court.
7. The petitioner's locus and bona fides in invoking this Court's writ
jurisdiction are seriously in doubt. It transpires that the petitioner did not
disclose that an identical writ petition has been filed by his son regarding
the same land and grievance. Such suppression of a material fact strikes
at the root of maintainability.
8. The judicial precedents have consistently held that suppression of
material fact by a litigant disqualifies them from obtaining any relief.
Approaching the Court with unclean hands and multiple proceedings
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amounts to an abuse of process. In fact, the Supreme Court in the case of
SJS Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar1held as follows:
"13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a
litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief.
This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to
deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by
deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one
in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have
had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter
which was material for the consideration of the court,
whatever view the court may have taken..."
9. On this ground alone, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in limine.
Nonetheless, since arguments were addressed on merits, this Court
proceeds to examine the petitioner's claims substantively as well.
10. The record shows that Khata No. 313, Plot No. 1963 of village Gopalprasad
was acquired in the 1990s under the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and
Development) Act, 1957 for the Hingula OCP project. Upon the Section 9
declaration under that Act, the land vested absolutely in the Central
Government, and possession was taken in 1999 by Mahanadi Coalfields
Ltd (MCL). All right, title and interest of private persons in the notified
area were thereby extinguished.
11. The petitioner has no recorded title or tenancy in the revenue or temple
records; indeed, he does not dispute that the land is Government/MCL
property. His assertion of continuous residence "for three generations"
remains unsubstantiated by any documentary evidence. In the absence of
any lawful right or legal possession, the petitioner's status is essentially
AIR 2004 SUPREME COURT 2421
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that of an unauthorized occupant on public land since long after
acquisition.
12. It is well-settled that long duration of illegal occupation confers no
legality, mere passage of time or possession of identity documents
showing residence does not vest any right or create any adverse title
against the true owner. In fact, the Supreme Court in the case of Jagpal
Singh v. State of Punjab2 has emphatically held that encroachers or
trespassers cannot claim a legal right to continue on public property, and
no equity arises in their favour merely because they have erected
structures or stayed for many years. The Court held as follows:
"Long duration of such illegal occupation or huge
expenditure in making constructions thereon or political
connections must not be treated as a justification for
condoning this illegal act or for regularizing the illegal
possession. Regularization should only be permitted in
exceptional cases e.g. where lease has been granted under
some Government notification to landless labourers or
members of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes, or where
there is already a school, dispensary or other public utility
on the land."
13. Thus, the petitioner cannot seek to vitalize an illegal occupation into a
legal entitlement by citing decades of stay.
14. The eviction notices impugned are, on their face, an exercise of lawful
authority. The opposite parties have proceeded against the petitioner as
an encroacher on Government land required for a public development
project. There is no allegation that the eviction drive targets the petitioner
selectively or without jurisdiction. The notices were issued after due
AIR 2011 SUPREME COURT 1123
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sanction of a peripheral development plan for Maa Hingula Temple, for
which substantial public funds have been allocated. The petitioner was
given notice and an opportunity to represent his case, which he
admittedly did by submitting representations.
15. The fundamental requirement of natural justice, a notice and hearing, has
thus been met. The petitioner's grievance is that the eviction is arbitrary
and violates his right to livelihood and shelter since no rehabilitation is
offered. However, the material on record does not support any
arbitrariness or discrimination. The petitioner is being treated in the same
manner as any other unauthorized occupant; he has not shown that
others similarly situated were spared or compensated while only he is
picked for eviction. In fact, the urgency of clearing encroachments for the
temple's development indicates a public interest objective, leaving little
scope to allege mala fides or unequal treatment. Therefore, the Article 14
challenge on grounds of arbitrariness is unsustainable.
16. The contention based on Article 21 also does not carry the petitioner's
case far. It is undeniable that the right to life encompasses the right to
shelter and livelihood as basic human rights. This Court is not insensitive
to the fact that eviction will displace the petitioner from his shelter of
many years.
17. Nevertheless, it is equally well-settled that the right to shelter does not
translate into a right to squat on public land in perpetuity. When a State
acquisition or development project is implemented in accordance with
law, an affected person cannot invoke Article 21 to veto the project
altogether.
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18. The Supreme Court, in this regard, has held the following in the case of
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India3:
"62. The displacement of the tribals and other persons
would not per se result in the violation of their fundamental
or other rights. The effect is to see that on their
rehabilitation at new locations they are better off than what
they were. At the rehabilitation sites they will have more
and better amenities than those they enjoyed in their tribal
hamlets. The gradual assimilation in the mainstream of the
society will lead to betterment and progress."
19. Article 300A of the Constitution guarantees that no person is to be
deprived of property save by authority of law, and here the deprivation
was effectuated by a legal acquisition process decades ago. Thus, the
petitioner's ousting from Government land pursuant to a valid
acquisition and public project cannot be characterized as
unconstitutional, provided due process is observed. The record reflects
due process via notices; and no fundamental right to occupy acquired
land indefinitely can be claimed by the petitioner.
20. The pivotal issue then is whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief in
the nature of rehabilitation or compensation, given his assertion that he
received neither when the area was acquired. In principle, displaced
persons should be provided resettlement and rehabilitation as per the
prevailing policy, as a matter of fairness and good governance.
21. The Supreme Court in the case of State of MP v. Narmada Bachao
Andolan4 stressed that rehabilitation is meant for those rendered
destitute by acquisition, authorities must explore avenues of
(2000) 10 SCC 664
(2011) 7 SCC 639
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rehabilitation by way of employment, housing, or identification of
alternate land for such persons. At the same time, the law stops short of
making rehabilitation an absolute right enforceable by writ in every case.
The Court held as follows:
"26. It is desirable for the authority concerned to ensure
that as far as practicable persons who had been living and
carrying on business or other activity on the land acquired,
if they so desire, and are willing to purchase and comply
with any requirement of the authority or the local body, be
given a piece of land on the terms settled with due regard to
the price at which the land has been acquired from them.
However, the State Government cannot be compelled to
provide alternate accommodation to the oustees and it is for
the authority concerned to consider the desirability and
feasibility of providing alternative land considering the facts
and circumstances of each case."
22. Rehabilitation benefits flow from Government policies and schemes, not
directly from the Constitution. Here, the Odisha Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Policy, 2006 (and earlier policies) do extend certain
benefits, such as allotment of house-sites, cash assistance, or
employment, to "displaced families" of projects. However, to claim
under these policies, the petitioner must fall within their ambit. For
example, as a recorded resident or dependent in the project area at the
relevant cut-off date.
23. The opposite parties categorically assert that the petitioner was not an
identified project displaced person at the time of acquisition, he was not
in the list of awardees or beneficiaries because his occupation was not
officially recognized. The petitioner has brought forth no evidence that
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he or his forefathers were acknowledged in any survey or award related
to the Hingula OCP acquisition. Thus, on the records, he cannot be
treated as a "displaced family" under the R&R policy, but rather as an
encroacher who settled (or remained) on the land after it vested in the
State.
24. In the circumstances, the Court finds no legal mandate to postpone or
condition the petitioner's eviction on the grant of rehabilitation. Unlike
cases where land-losers or genuine oustees were not paid due
compensation (in which courts have intervened to secure their
entitlements), the petitioner's claim is of a different nature: he admittedly
has no title, and essentially seeks a benevolent protection from eviction
on account of his poverty and long association with the place. While the
Court is sympathetic to the petitioner's plight as an elderly, landless
person, it cannot grant relief contrary to law or outside the policy
framework.
25. Protection of livelihood under Article 21 does not mean that an
encroacher gets a perpetual right to occupy public land, especially when
that land is urgently needed for a legitimate public purpose. Therefore,
the petitioner's prayer to quash the eviction notices or to direct
rehabilitation as a pre-condition to eviction cannot be granted by this
Court in exercise of its limited writ jurisdiction. No prima facie illegality
or constitutional infirmity in the eviction proceedings has been
demonstrated.
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V. CONCLUSION:
26. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court finds that the writ
petition is vitiated by suppression of material facts and, even otherwise,
is devoid of merit on facts and law. The petitioner has failed to establish
any legal right, entitlement, or enforceable claim either to continue in
occupation of the acquired land or to insist upon rehabilitation as a
condition precedent to eviction. The impugned eviction notices are found
to have been issued in exercise of lawful authority, in furtherance of a
legitimate public purpose, and in compliance with the requirements of
due process. No violation of Articles 14, 21, or 300A of the Constitution is
made out.
27. Consequently, the Writ Petition stands dismissed.
28. Accordingly, all the connected Writ Petitions are dismissed.
29. Interim order, if any, passed earlier in any of the above-mentioned Writ
Petitions stands vacated.
(Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
Dated the 22nd Jan., 2026/
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