Chiranjibi Nayak And Others vs State Of Odisha ..... Opposite Party
2026 Latest Caselaw 364 Ori

Orissa High Court

Chiranjibi Nayak And Others vs State Of Odisha ..... Opposite Party on 16 January, 2026

Author: A.K. Mohapatra

Bench: Aditya Kumar Mohapatra

               IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
                         CRLMC No.2832 of 2024
          (An application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973)

Chiranjibi Nayak and others                        .....                       Petitioners
                                                             Represented by Adv. -
                                                             Mr. P.K. Parhi


                                       -versus-
State Of Odisha                                   .....                 Opposite Party
                                                             Represented by Adv. -
                                                             Ms. B.K. Sahu, A.G.A.

                               CRLMC No.1017 of 2024
          (An application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973)

Rajendra Majhi                                     .....                       Petitioner
                                                              Represented by Adv. -
                                                              Mr. P.K. Parhi

                                       -versus-
State Of Odisha & Anr.                            .....               Opposite Parties
                                                             Represented by Adv. -
                                                             Ms. B.K. Sahu, A.G.A.
                                                             Mr. S.N. Nayak, Adv. for O.P
                                                             No.2

                            CORAM:
        THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ADITYA KUMAR MOHAPATRA

       Date of Hearing: 23.12.2025 : Date of Judgement: 16.01.2026

A.K. Mohapatra, J. :

1. The abovementioned CRLMC applications arise out of the self-

same F.I.R, which relates to the same incident. Therefore, for the sake of

brevity, they are taken together for adjudication. The CRLMC Nos.2832 of

2024 and CRLMC No.1017 of 2024 have been filed with a prayer to quash

the impugned order of cognizance dated 14.11.2018, at Annexure-3, passed

by the Ld. S.D.J.M.(S), Cuttack as well as to quash the entire criminal

proceeding against the Petitioners initiated in S.T. Case No.39 of 2024

corresponding to G.R. Case No.372 of 2018 now pending before the Court

of the Learned SDJM(S), Cuttack. Since both the CRLMC applications

relate to the self-same F.I.R, facts pleaded in CRLMC No.2832 is being

taken up to understand the factual background of the cases.

FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE

2. The factual background of the matter giving rise to the present

application as culled out from the FIR and the Chargesheet, in a nutshell, is

as follows; on 27.02.2018, at noon, the President, Board of Secondary

Education ("BSE"), Odisha, Cuttack, upon receiving information that some

members of ABVP were about to stage demonstration in front of the BSE

office, contacted the Mangalabag Police Station. At about 12:30pm, about

30-35 demonstrators began shouting slogans and began a dharana in front

of the BSE office gate. When the President and officials of the Board went

to the entrance, they were handed over the memorandum by one of the

demonstrators purporting to be the Secretary of ABVP. Thereafter, the

demonstrators began arguing with the President and officials of the Board

regarding the question paper leak on social media.

3. The F.I.R further reveals that soon after handing over the

memorandum, the demonstrators became unruly and began abusing the

officials in filthy language and started manhandling the staff and security

guards. They entered the office premises breaking open the entrance gate

and vandalized the office while assaulting the staff, security and police

personnel. As per the FIR, the entire ruckus lasted for around half an hour,

during which the demonstrators have inflicted injuries to the person of

some of the staff members, outraged the modesty of some female staff, and

broke several furniture, window panes, staff vehicle, tube lights and other

fixtures inside the office premises. As a result of such conduct of the

demonstrators, an FIR bearing Mangalabag PS Case No.44 of 2018 was

lodged on 27.02.2018 at the behest of the complainant, i.e. the Opposite

Party No.2-President of the Board. Eventually, on the basis of such F.I.R

and after completion of the investigation, a Chargesheet, under Annexure-

2, was filed against 21 individuals including the present Petitioners and the

magistrate has taken cognizance of the offences, under sections 147, 341,

294, 323, 332, 354, 307, 427, 506, 149 of the IPC along with section 3 of

the PDPP Act, 1984 and section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act,

vide order dated 14.11.2018 at Annexure-3. Pursuant thereto, the case has

been committed to the learned S.D.J.M(S), Cuttack and renumbered as S.T

Case No.39 of 2024.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONERS

4. Heard Mr.P.K.Parhi the learned counsel for the petitioners. At the

very outset the learned counsel has submitted that there is no evidence on

record whatsoever that the Petitioners are in any way involved in the

alleged occurrence. Moreover, the materials available on the record do not

constitute the alleged offences of which cognizance was taken by the

magistrate without applying judicial mind. Learned counsel for the

petitioners also contended that the Petitioners were neither present at the

spot nor were they named in the F.I.R and so far as the facts enumerated in

the F.I.R and the Chargesheet are concerned, it does not disclose on what

basis the Petitioners have been made accused in the present case. It was

only during the investigation that the Petitioners have been falsely and

arbitrarily entangled in the present case and have been included in the

charge-sheet amongst 21 persons.

5. Next, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioners referred to the

deposition of witnesses examined in this case and attached to the record

and submitted before this Court that none of the witnesses examined during

the trial were able to identify the Petitioners. It was stated that the

witnesses have categorically deposed that they do not know the accused-

Petitioners. Further, referring to the deposition of the informant, who has

been examined as PW No.3, the learned counsel contended that the PW

No.3 has clearly stated that she does not know any of the accused persons.

Moreover, in her cross-examination, the PW No.3 has also admitted that

her office is on the first floor of the building from where the place of

dharana was not visible. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioners

has contended that the informant cannot be said to have first-hand

knowledge of the incident and, it is clear that the allegations made in the

F.I.R are fabricated to falsely implicate the Petitioners. With regard to the

allegation that the some of the staff members of the office had sustained

injuries, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the prosecution

has not been able to produce any reliable medical documents to

substantiate such claims. Thus, it was argued that an inference could be

drawn that the allegation with regard to injury was false and exaggerated.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted before

this Court that it is a well-settled proposition of law that that the F.I.R

cannot be considered as a substantive piece of evidence. Instead, it can

only be used for the very limited purpose of contradicting and/or

corroborating statements under sections 145 or 157 of the Evidence Act. It

was also contended that in a criminal trial, the burden of proof rests solely

on the Prosecution, and, in the present case the prosecution have not been

able to establish the allegations levelled against the Petitioners beyond

reasonable doubt. Moreover, it was contended that the facts and

circumstances of the case point towards two different views, the one

favoring the accused must be adopted.

7. Furthermore, specifically with reference to CRLMC No.1017 of

2024, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioners contended that one Rajendra

Majhi, who is the Petitioner in the aforesaid CRLMC No.1017 of 2024, has

been selected as an Assistant Section Officer in Odisha Secretariat Services

(Group-B). However, the continuation of the present criminal proceeding is

bound to have a negative impact on his service career thereby affecting him

and his family adversely. In this context an interlocutory application

bearing I.A No.724 of 2024 has also been filed in the aforesaid CRLMC

application. To further corroborate his contentions, the Learned Counsel

for the Petitioners has placed reliance on the judgements of this Court in

Rajkishore Singh and another V. State of Orissa, reported in (2003) 25

OCR 445, Urmila Devi v. Balram, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC

1574, and Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao

Angre, reported in (1988) 1 SCC 692.

8. Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that

the Petitioners have clean records and are law abiding citizens. If the

present proceeding is continued, then it would not only undermine the

sanctity of the judicial process, but also tarnish the promising career and

reputation of the Petitioners. As such, it was prayed that the impugned

order taking cognizance dated 14.11.2018, at Annexure-3, and the present

criminal proceeding against the Petitioners be quashed in the larger interest

of justice.

CONTENTIONS OF THE OPPOSITE PARTY-STATE

9. Heard Ms.Babita Kumari Sahoo, learned Additional Government

Advocate and Mr.Sachidananda Nayak, learned counsel for the Opposite

Party No.2. The learned counsel for the Opposite Parties, from the very

inception, have firmly stated that the Petitioners have not made out a valid

case for quashing of the impugned order dated 14.11.2018 taking

cognizance and the present criminal proceeding against the Petitioners. It

was further contended that it is well-established proposition of law that

while adjudicating an application under section 482 of the Cr.P.C, it is not

open to the Hon'ble High Court to appreciate the evidence on record,

especially when the trial is nearing its end. As such, the adjudication of the

correctness of the facts is to be left to be decided by the learned court in

seisin over the matter. To corroborate his contentions, the learned counsels

for the Opposite Parties have placed reliance on the decision of a

coordinate Bench of this Court in Chandan Pattnayak v. State of Odisha,

bearing CRLMC No.2383 of 2019, vide judgement dated 30.11.2021, and

Nata@Natabar Behera v. State of Orissa and Ors., bearing CRLMC

No.3921 of 2016, decided vide judgement dated 23.12.2022.

10. At this point, in order to controvert the contention of the

Petitioners that their names were not disclosed in the F.I.R, the learned

counsel for the Opposite Parties submitted before this court that the F.I.R, a

copy of which is at Annexure-1, clearly reveals the names of the

Petitioners, especially Petitioner Nos.1, 2, 9, 11 and 16. Additionally, with

respect to the Petitioners' contention that the Informant was not acquainted

with the accused persons, it was contended that even if such assertion is

taken to be hypothetically correct, the same would operate to the detriment

of the Petitioners only. The rationale being that, if the informant had no

prior acquaintance with the Petitioners, there would be no conceivable

basis to infer that the allegations were motivated by malafides or false

intent. Moreover, the learned counsel for the Opposite Parties stated that

given the age of the Petitioners, as reflected in the charge sheet, it cannot

be said that the Petitioners are actually students. In fact, it was contended

that the affidavit filed in the present petition (CRLMC No.2832 of 2024)

clearly depicts that one of the Petitioners is an entrepreneur.

11. Lastly, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the Opposite

Parties that there is nothing on record to substantiate the claims of the

Petitioners that the F.I.R is rife with malafides. Moreover, the present

CRLMC applications have been filed in the year 2024, i.e. after six years

of the incident. It was stated before this Court that at present the trial is

nearing its end, the witnesses are being examined, and the evidence is

being presented before the learned trial court. As such, it was contended

that no case for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding is made out in

favour of the Petitioners and it would not be in the larger interest of justice

to interfere with the criminal proceeding at this stage. Accordingly, it was

prayed that the present CRLMC applications at the behest of the Petitioners

be dismissed forthwith.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT

12. Heard the learned counsels for the respective parties, perused the

CRLMC applications, the documents available on record and considered

the rival submissions by the respective parties. The gravamen of the

dispute before this court is that, on the 27.02.2018 a few demonstrators

gathered at the BSE office to protest regarding the leak of question papers

on social media. When the president of the Board approached the

demonstrators, she was handed over the memorandum. Shortly thereafter,

the dharana turned unruly. It has been alleged in the F.I.R that the

demonstrators got enraged by the attitude of the authorities and forcibly

entered into the office building by breaking open the gate. The

demonstrators have also allegedly manhandled the office staff, including

some women and security guards, and have also vandalized the office

premises. Some of the office staff and security personnel have also

allegedly sustained injuries. In the meanwhile, the charge-sheet has been

filed, cognizance has been taken of the offences vide order dated

14.11.2018 by the magistrate under abovementioned sections, and trial has

commenced.

13. The main plank of the Petitioners' arguments is that neither the

F.I.R nor the deposition of witnesses reveal any material to constitute the

offences alleged against the Petitioners. They have also contended that the

prosecution has not yet been able to conclusively prove the guilt of the

accused beyond reasonable doubt. Per contra, the State-prosecution has put

forth the contention that some of the Petitioners have clearly been named in

the F.I.R and, since the trial is nearing its end the learned trial Court should

be left to finally decide the matter. It is in light of the aforesaid background

that this Court is required to determine the veracity of the relief claimed by

the Petitioners as against the touchstone of the settled principles of law

governing the field.

14. Before proceeding with the adjudication of the matter at hand, it

would be convenient to reiterate the well-established principles governing

the exercise of the inherent powers of this Court under section 482 of

Cr.P.C, to quash an F.I.R or criminal proceeding. To begin with, the

Hon'ble Apex Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, reported in 1960

SCC OnLine SC 21, while dealing with the inherent powers of the High

Court under Section 561-A of the erstwhile Cr.P.C (which is in pari

materia with Section 482 of the Code), observed that the inherent powers

of the High Court under Section 561 of the earlier Code cannot be

exercised in regard to the matters specifically covered by the other

provisions of the Code; the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be

exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse

of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It was

also held that ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused

person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court

would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory

stage. After observing thus, the Hon'ble Supreme Court then carved out

some exceptions to the above-stated rule, which are as under;

"(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the offence alleged. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category.

(ii) Where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not.

(iii) Where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence

adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained."

(emphasis supplied)

15. In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1977) 4

SCC 551, the Hon'ble Apex Court, highlighting the power of the High

Courts to do real and substantial justice, interpreted the inherent powers

under section 482 of Cr.P.C, against the old 1898 code, and observed that;

"8. Under Section 435 of the 1898 Code the High Court had the power to "call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior criminal court situate within the local limits of its.... jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself ... as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court", and then to pass the necessary orders in accordance with the law engrafted in any of the sections following Section 435. Apart from

the revisional power, the High Court possessed and possesses the inherent powers to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do the real and the substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist. In express language this power was recognized and saved in Section 561-A of the old Code. Under Section 397(1) of the 1973 Code, revisional power has been conferred on the High Court in terms which are identical to those found in Section 435 of the 1898 Code. Similar is the position apropos the inherent powers of the High Court. We may read the language of Section 482 (corresponding to Section 561-A of the old Code) of the 1973 Code. It says:

"Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

At the outset the following principles may be noticed in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions:

"(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party;

(2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice;

(3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code."

16. In Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana, reported in

(1977) 4 SCC 451, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that inherent powers

under Section 482 Cr.P.C do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the

High Court to act according to its whims or caprice. Instead, statutory

power has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in the rarest

of rare cases. Thereafter in State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy,

reported in (2004) 6 SCC 522, after considering its decisions in R.P. Kapur

(supra), Bhajan Lal (supra) and other decisions on the exercise of inherent

powers by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C, the Hon'ble Supreme

Court, in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 8 has held that the inherent power of the

High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C is exceptional and confined to

preventing abuse of process of law or securing the ends of justice, and does

not permit the Court to function as an appellate or revisional forum. It has

been emphasised that the High Court must distinguish between cases where

there is a complete absence of legal evidence and those where evidence

exists but requires appreciation, the latter being within the exclusive

province of the trial court. The power under Section 482 should neither be

used to harass an accused nor to prematurely terminate a legitimate

prosecution. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed in para 8 that

given the wide amplitude of the inherent power, it must be exercised with

great restraint and on sound principles so as not to stifle a bona fide

prosecution. Quashing is warranted only where the complaint or FIR, read

as a whole, fails to disclose the ingredients of any offence or is manifestly

frivolous or vexatious.

17. Thereafter, finally in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in

1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon'ble Apex Court upon interpretation of

the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and

established principles of law regarding the extraordinary power under

Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, laid

down the following categories of cases, by way of illustration, wherein

such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any

court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (1)Where the allegations

made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken

at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie

constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; (2)Where

the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any,

accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an

investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except

under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the

Code; (3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or

complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose

the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused;

(4)Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence

but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted

by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under

Section 155(2) of the Code; (5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or

complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which

no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient

ground for proceeding against the accused; (6)Where there is an express

legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned

Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and

continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in

the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the

grievance of the aggrieved party; (7)Where a criminal proceeding is

manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is

maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on

the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal

grudge.

18. While laying down the aforesaid guidelines, the Hon'ble Supreme

Court has also clarified that it is not possible to lay down any precise,

clearly defined inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae or to give an

exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be

exercised. It was cautioned by the Court that the power of quashing a

criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with

circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will

not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or

genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the

complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an

arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice.

19. The aforesaid principles expounded in Bhajanlal's case (supra)

have been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bharat Parikh v. CBI,

reported in (2008) 10 SCC 109, wherein it has been observed that;

"18. With regard to the second proposition regarding the High Court's powers to look into materials produced on behalf of or at the instance of the accused for the purpose of invoking its powers under Section 482 of the Code for quashing the charges framed, it has to be kept in mind that after the stage of framing charge evidence has to be led on behalf of the prosecution to prove the charge if an accused pleads not guilty to the charge and/or charges and claims to be tried. It is only in the exceptional circumstances enumerated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] that a criminal proceeding may be quashed to secure the ends of justice, but such a stage will come only after evidence is led, particularly when the prosecution had produced sufficient material for charges to be framed."

20. Likewise, more recently in Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v.

State of Maharashtra, reported in (2021) 19 SCC 401, Ajay Malik v. State

of Uttarakhand, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, and Punit

Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983,

the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that that the power to quash a

complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection and

while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and

allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly

held that except in exceptional cases where non-interference would result

in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not

interfere at the stage of investigation of offences.

21. It has also been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the

High Courts, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C,

is not intended to conduct a mini-trial. Instead, the High Court is required

to restrict its inquiry to whether the allegations made in the complaint or

FIR, if accepted as true on their face, constitute a prima facie offence

(reference, in this regard, may be had to the Apex Court's dictum in CBI vs

Aryan Singh, reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 379, Dhruvaram

Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2019) 18 SCC 191

and M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd v. State of Maharashtra &

Others, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 180). Having said that, it must also be

borne in mind that primary object of the F.I.R is to set the criminal

investigation into motion. It may not set out the case in every minute detail

with unmistakable precision. It is not the encyclopedia of all the facts and

circumstances of the case on which prosecution relies, and, as such, the

FIR is not considered a substantive evidence and its evidentiary value is

limited to corroboration and contradiction of the evidences (see Nisar

Ali v. State of U.P., reported in 1957 SCC OnLine SC 42, Bandlamuddi

Atchuta Ramaiah v. State of A.P., reported in (1996) 11 SCC 133,

Kirender Sarkar v. State of Assam, reported in (2009) 12 SCC 342, and

Bable Alias Gurdeep Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2012)

11 SCC 181). Therefore, the primary focus while considering an

application for quashing of an F.I.R/ criminal Proceeding must always be

to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends

of justice

22. Reverting back to the facts of the present case, we can see that the

Petitioners are alleged to be amongst the group of demonstrators present at

the BSE Office on the date of occurrence. Additionally, some of the

Petitioners have also been named in the F.I.R. On perusal of the copy of

deposition, it is revealed that the deponents have testified that the

demonstrators forcibly entered into the office premises and have damaged

some office properties. Also, some of the witnesses have deposed that they

have sustained injuries due to a broken tube light falling on their head

during the ruckus created by the demonstrators. In this context, the learned

counsel for the Petitioners contends that the prosecution has been unable to

provide any reliable medical documents to substantiate their claim of

injuries sustained by the witnesses. Furthermore, on a thorough scrutiny of

the record, particularly the final order dated 26.11.2022 of the Juvenile

Justice Board, Cuttack, in J.J.C No.17/2018, it can be seen that one of the

demonstrators has been tried as a CICL by the Principal Magistrate,

Juvenile Justice Board, Cuttack. The learned magistrate has taken into

account the deposition of the PW Nos.1, 2, 3 and 4, who happen to be the

same witnesses whose depositions have been produced on record in the

present CRLMC applications. After a careful consideration of the

depositions of prosecutions witnesses, and the factual background of the

case and the evidence adduced on behalf of the Prosecution, the learned

Magistrate has observed that the Prosecution has failed to establish a case

against the CICL beyond all reasonable doubt. As a result, the accused-

CICL has been acquitted under Section 255(1) of the Cr.P.C.

23. Having regard to the aforesaid factual background of the present

matter, this Court observes that initially out of the 30-35 demonstrators that

had gathered in front of the BSE office for staging a dharana against the

leak of matriculation question paper, the F.I.R was lodged and charge-sheet

was filed against 21 individuals who were in their early-to-mid-twenties at

the time of occurrence. Such dharana later turned unruly and allegedly

resulted in injuries to the office staff, though there is no such supporting

medical evidence. With regard to said allegation of injuries allegedly

sustained by the staff members, it is revealed from the deposition of PW

Nos.1 and 2 that they have sustained some injuries due to a broken tube

light falling on their heads. The final form also depicts that the

Investigating Officer had sent the injured staff of the BSE office and

injured police personnel to the City Hospital, Cuttack and Police Hospital,

Cuttack respectively. Thereafter, the IO has received the injury report

wherein the Medical Officer has opined that the injured have sustained

simple injuries caused by "hard and blunt force". Further, on perusal of the

medical examination report relating to three individuals, filed at Flag-1 in

CRLMC No.2832 of 2024, it can be seen that the injured have sustained

simple injuries on their persons (arms/ shoulders).

24. In a similar vein, with regard to the allegation in the F.I.R that the

demonstrators have vandalised the office premises and broken the office

gate, the final form reveals that the IO has indeed recovered broken chairs,

table, tube lights and lathis wrapped in ABVP flag from the spot of

occurrence. However, there is nothing on record which clearly links the

aforesaid acts of vandalism, or the items recovered, to the accused-

Petitioners. Even after seven years of the occurrence nothing has been

advanced from the side of the Prosecution which would clearly implicate

the Petitioners, beyond any reasonable doubt, in the abovementioned

offences, particularly in view of the fact that the allegation in the F.I.R is

largely omnibus in nature and only five Petitioners i.e. Petitioner Nos.1, 2,

9, 11 and 16 have been named in the F.I.R out of the twenty-one charge-

sheeted persons. In a similar vein, on perusal of the 'Additional Document'

at Flag-H to CRLMC No.1017 of 2024, it is borne out that the Petitioner in

the said CRLMC application, i.e. one Rajendra Majhi, who has also not

been named in the F.I.R, has been appointed to various posts in the OSSC,

OSSSC, PR&DW Department, Government of Odisha, and DFCCIL.

However, due to the pendency of the present criminal proceeding he is

unable to join his postings. Moreover, as per the letter dated 09.09.2025, a

copy of which forms a part of the aforesaid CRLMC, the IIC, Mangalabag

has intimated the Advocate General of Odisha, Cuttack that the Petitioner

does not have any criminal antecedent except the present criminal

proceeding.

25. So far as the decisions relied on by the State-Opposite Party are

concerned, on perusal of the judgment in Nata@Natabara Behera's case

(supra), it appears that the case involved allegations of blows by the

accused to the head of the injured with a sword. There was also an eye-

witness in the case who was threatened by the accused. It also appears that

both the informant and the injured have supported the Petitioner's prayer to

quash the proceeding. Likewise, in Chandan Pattnayak's case (supra), it

can be seen that the accused had assaulted the injured on the head by

means of a hammer and as a result he was charged with section 307 of the

IPC. Therefore, upon an examination of the judgements relied by the

Opposite Parties, this Court is of the view that they are both clearly

distinguishable from the facts constituting the present case. As such, they

are not of much help to the Opposite Parties.

26. In view of the foregoing analysis of the factual matrix and the

governing legal principles, this Court is of the considered opinion that,

insofar as the Petitioners who have not been named in the F.I.R. are

concerned, no prima facie case is made out against them so as to constitute

the offences alleged under the aforementioned provisions. The case of such

Petitioners, therefore, falls squarely within the third category enunciated in

BhajanLal's case (supra). Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in

holding that the present criminal proceeding, being S.T. Case No. 39 of

2024 corresponding to G.R. Case No. 372 of 2018, arising out of

Mangalabag P.S. Case No. 44 of 2018, constitutes a fit case for exercise of

inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. Consequently, the said

criminal proceeding, along with the order of cognizance dated 14.11.2018

(Annexure-3), is hereby quashed qua the present Petitioners, except

Petitioner Nos. 1, 2, 9, 11, and 16 in CRLMC No. 2832 of 2024.

27. So far as Petitioner Nos. 1, 2, 9, 11, and 16 in CRLMC No. 2832

of 2024 are concerned, having regard to the fact that more than seven years

has elapsed since the date of occurrence, the learned Court in seisin of the

matter is directed to make every endeavour to conclude the trial in respect

of such named accused persons as expeditiously as possible, preferably

within a period of six months from the date of this judgment.

28. Accordingly, the CRLMC applications are disposed of. However,

there shall be no order as to costs.

(A.K. Mohapatra) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 16th January, 2026/Sisir/P.A.

Designation: Personal Assistant