[Cites 2, Cited by 0]
Orissa High Court
Kailash Panda vs Purna Khety And Another on 10 April, 2026
Author: G. Satapathy
Bench: G. Satapathy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
MACA No.178 of 2025
(In the matter of application under Section 173(1) of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988).
Kailash Panda ... Appellant
-versus-
Purna Khety and another ... Respondents
For Appellant : Mr. H.S. Mishra, Advocate
For Respondents : Mr. R.N. Debata, Advocate
(for R-1)
CORAM: JUSTICE G. SATAPATHY
DATE OF HEARING & JUDGMENT:10.04.2026(ORAL)
G. Satapathy, J.
IA No.379 of 2025 & MACA No.178 of 2025
1. This application in IA No.379 of 2025 by the
appellant-petitioner U/S.5 of Limitation Act, 1963 is for
condonation of delay of 1142 days in preferring the
appeal.
2. Heard, Mr. Himanshu Sekhar Mishra, learned
counsel for the appellant-petitioner and Mr. Rabindra
Nath Debata, learned counsel appearing for R1 virtually
and perused the record. None appears for R2/OP.2
despite valid service of notice of IA on him.
3. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant-
petitioner, however, by placing the facts as stated in
paragraph-4 of the IA No.379 of 2025 submits that since
the impugned judgment was passed without the
knowledge of the appellant-petitioner, he could not prefer
the appeal in time and once he came to know about the
passing of the impugned judgment, he has preferred this
appeal and, therefore, there is no latches or negligence
on the part of the appellant-petitioner, rather the
appellant-petitioner was prevented by sufficient cause for
not preferring the appeal in time. Mr. Mishra also
alternatively submits that the Opposite Party can be
compensated for the delay by imposing some cost on the
appellant-petitioner. In summing up his argument, Mr.
Mishra, prays to allow the IA by condoning the delay in
preferring the appeal.
3.1. On the other hand, Mr. Rabindra Nath Debata,
learned counsel appearing virtually for R1, however,
strongly opposes the prayer for condonation of delay by
contending inter-alia that the certified copy of judgment
annexed to the appeal having been made ready on
07.12.2022, the knowledge of the appellant-petitioner
can be attributed from the said date and the appellant-
petitioner having not explained the cause of delay for
around three years, the application for condonation of
delay by the appellant-petitioner merits no consideration
and may kindly be rejected.
4. After having considered the rival submissions
upon perusal of record, it appears that the appellant-
petitioner has filed this application in IA No.379 of 2025
for condonation of delay of 1142 days by averring inter-
alia the following in paragraph-4 of the IA, which reads as
under:-
"4. That on receiving the said notice, he
approached and consult Sri Pravat Mohapatra,
Advocate, Sambalpur. He handed over the
notice executed Vokalatnama and required
professional fees to appear for him in the case
and to do the needful. He had also given his
Mobile number for contact as and when
necessary. On receiving the same, the learned
Advocate assured him to look after the case
and call him as and when necessary and
assuring that nothing will happen as he is not
the owner of the vehicle."
5. The aforesaid plea of the appellant-petitioner has
been in fact challenged by the Opposite Party by filing
objection stating inter-alia therein that the impugned
copy of judgment was made ready on 07.12.2022 clearly
establishing that the appellant-petitioner had knowledge
of the impugned judgment at least from the said date and
despite such knowledge, the appellant-petitioner has
failed to file the appeal within prescribed period of
limitation. Be that as it may, the delay of 1142 days is
not a mere delay, rather it is a delay for a substantial
period, however, the delay can be condoned provided it is
found that the appellant-petitioner was prevented by
sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal in time, but
in this case, it is the plea of the appellant-petitioner that
his advocate did not communicate him about the matter,
rather he assured that nothing will happen as he is not
the owner of the vehicle. The plea as advanced by the
appellant-petitioner is mere an oral assertion, but no
document or any material has been produced to indicate
that the said advocate did not communicate to the
appellant-petitioner, however, when a litigant appears in
a litigation, onus is on him to contact his lawyer about the
proceeding/ litigation in which he is concerned and in this
case, it is not forthcoming as to when the appellant-
petitioner handed over the brief to his counsel and when
he appeared in the case, but admittedly the appellant-
petitioner has approached this Court after gap of 1142
days after the expiry of limitation for preferring the
appeal, which appears to be not bonafide in the
circumstance. It is quite easy to say that the advocate did
not contact the appellant-petitioner, but there is no
explanation as to why the appellant-petitioner remained
indolent/negligent in contacting his advocate for such a
long duration at least for around more than four and half
years of passing of the impugned judgment and even
before the passing of impugned judgment since the claim
was filed in the year 2018 and impugned judgment
therein is passed on 21.09.2021. The explanation as
offered by the appellant-petitioner does not appeal to be
conscience of the Court, rather it appears to be a mere
plea than any substance in it.
6. Law always helps the diligent, but not the
indolent and, therefore, the plea as advanced by the
appellant-petitioner for condonation of delay cannot be
countenanced inasmuch as nothing has been brought to
the notice of the Court to suggest that the appellant-
petitioner was prevented by any sufficient cause in not
preferring the appeal in time. Besides, passing the
responsibility to the conducting counsel to communicate
his client is quite easy, but it is to be required to be
established and in this case, the appellant-petitioner has
made a mere plea then producing any material to such
effect. It is also not out of place to mention that the
appellant-petitioner since being was set ex-parte in the
proceeding before the learned tribunal, he could have
approached the learned tribunal in appropriate
proceeding to establish the aforesaid plea by way of
leading evidence, but the appellant-petitioner preferred to
approach this Court with mere averment of his plea
without substantiating the same. In the aforesaid facts
and situation, this Court does not find any merit in the
plea of the appellant-petitioner for condonation of delay.
7. In the result, the application for condonation of
delay in IA No.379 of 2025 being unmerited stands
dismissed and as a consequence thereof, the appeal
being not admitted stands dismissed. As a necessary
corollary, IA No.399 of 2025 and 2594 of 2025 stand
disposed of as infructuous.
Signed by: SUBHASMITA DAS Judge
Reason: Authentication Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
Dated the 10th day of April, 2026/Subhasmita
Location: High Court of Orissa
Date: 11-Apr-2026 12:48:34
