Orissa High Court
State Of Odisha & Ors vs Rabinarayan Panda & Ors on 18 September, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
F.A.O. NO. 252 OF 2018
From the judgment dated 20.10.2017 of the State Education Tribunal,
Bhubaneswar in GIA Case No. 720 of 2012.
State of Odisha & Ors. .... Appellants
-Versus-
Rabinarayan Panda & Ors. .... Respondents
Advocates appeared in this case:
For Appellants : Mr. S.B. Mohanty,
Addl. Government Advocate
For Respondents : M/s M.K. Mohanty, M.R. Pradhan &
T. Pradhan, Advocates
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DIXIT KRISHNA SHRIPAD
JUDGMENT
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Date of hearing & judgment :: 18.09.2025
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PER DIXIT KRISHNA SHRIPAD,J.
This appeal, by the State and its Director of Higher Education, is
filed under section 24-B of the Orissa Education act, 1969 for laying a
challenge to the judgment dated 20.10.2017, whereby the State Education
Tribunal, Bhubaneswar, having favoured respondents' G.I.A. Case
No.720 of 2012, has directed the appellants herein as under:-
"This G.I.A. application is allowed. The order of release of
grant-in-aid under Annexure-3 be modified. The Opposite
parties are directed to fix the salary. of the applicants in
terms of the resolution of the Government in the Education
and Youth Department No.9760, dated 17.3.1979 w.e.f.
1.3.1988, The Opposite parties are further directed to
release the differential arrear salary in favour of the
applicants w.e.f. 1.11.2009 within four months from the
date of communication of this order."
2. Learned AGA appearing for the appellants seeks to falter the
impugned judgment contending that the Tribunal has ignored the mandate
of Section 7-C(1) of the Orissa Education Act, 1969 to the effect that
Grant-in-Aid is not a matter of right, inasmuch as it depends on the purse
size of the State; merely because the eligibility conditions are complied
with, no right to grant would become choate enough to cast a correlative
duty on the Government of the day; the Tribunal wrongly construed the
Government Resolution No.9760 dated 17.03.1979, which provides that
the eligibility to receive the minimum Grant-in-Aid is four years after the
year of presentation of candidates in the final High School Certificate
Examination, with minimum pupil strength of 200 or 140, as the case
may be; the Tribunal erred in construing the Government Resolution
No.400045 dated 23.09.1981 to the effect that the non-Government Aided
High Schools are not liable to be subjected to qualitative assessment of
the performance, especially when the said resolution was with
retrospective effect. Lastly, the Tribunal grossly erred in construing the
rulings cited on either side.
3. After service of notice, the private respondents, having entered
appearance through their Advocates, resist the appeal making submission
in justification of the impugned judgment and the reasons on which it has
been constructed. Learned counsel refutes the submission of AGA that
the Tribunal wrongly construed rulings cited at the Bar.
4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused
the appeal papers, this Court declines indulgence in the matter for the
following reasons:
4.1. The contention of learned AGA that the State is under no
obligation to bestow Grant-in-Aid to the Schools even if all criteria are
satisfied, appears to be too farfetched a proposition. Firstly, the Grant-in-
Aid is regulated by Section 7-C(1) of 1969 Act and therefore, an
argument which presupposes absolute discretion, offends the Rule of
Law, which is a basic feature of Constitution of India, as held by the
Apex Court in Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala,
AIR 1973 SC 1461. Lord Halsbury in SHARP v. WAKEFIELD, (1891)
AC 173 in more than a century back observed that discretion means,
according to rules of reason & justice and not whims & fancies of the
authorities. After all, discretion is not Mogul discretion, ours being a
constitutionally ordained Welfare State. Secondly, although it is true that
the purse size of the Government of the day limits the grant, no statistical
data have been furnished as to adjudge pleaded paucity of funds. Thirdly,
right to education partakes the character of fundamental right both under
Articles 21 & 21A of the Constitution. Added, there is Right to
Education Act, 2009 enacted by the Parliament. Section 7-C(1) of the
1969 Act thus cannot be chanted to justify contention of the kind. Even
in the matters of privilege, State & its instrumentalities under Article 12
have to be just, reasonable & non-discriminatory.
4.2. There is no dispute that the School in question was established in
the year 1980 and it secured provisional recognition for opening of Class-
VIII vide order dated 24.09.1983, regular recognition was granted by the
Board of Secondary Education on 19.02.1983 for presenting the first
batch of students in the High School Certification Examination-1984.
Since then, students are regularly appearing in the said examination. It is
also not in dispute that during the relevant period the School in question
was the only High School in the Gram Panchayat. Obviously, it is
governed by Resolution dated 17.03.1979 that provides for minimum
Grant-in-Aid four years after the presentation of the students in the High
School Certification Examination. As on 01.03.1988, it had done it for
four consecutive years. The Government, vide Resolution No.400045
dated 23.09.1981, dispensed with the requirement of qualitative
assessment. Therefore, the contention as to non-compliance of requisite
condition, is liable to be rejected.
4.3. The vehement submission of learned AGA that the Tribunal
grossly erred in construing a slew of decisions cited from the side of
appellants, is bereft of merits. The Tribunal has considered as many as
three rulings of the Apex Court in Laxman Dundappa Dhamanekar v.
Management of Vishwa Bharata Seva Samiti, AIR 2001 SC 2836, Union
of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) SCC (L&S) 765 & State of MP v.
Jogendra Srivastava, 2009 (7) Supreme Today 163. What is that actual
error the Tribunal has committed in granting relief to the respondents
herein has not been demonstrated.
In the above circumstances, this appeal, being devoid of merits, is
liable to be dismissed and accordingly it is, costs having been made easy.
Appellants to implement the order of the Tribunal within an outer limit of
three weeks, in letter & sprit. If delay is brooked, the respondents may
move an appropriate application for taking punitive action against the
errant officials, which may include heavy exemplary cost payable by
them from their pocket.
Web copy of judgment to be acted upon by all concerned.
Dixit Krishna Shripad
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
The 18th day of September, 2025/Prasant
Signed by: PRASANT KUMAR SAHOO
