Orissa High Court
Sanatan Panda vs State Of Orissa on 11 November, 2025
THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLA No.325 of 2006
(In the matter of an application under Section 374 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973)
Sanatan Panda ....... Appellant
-Versus-
State of Orissa ....... Respondent
For the Appellant : Mr. Jiban Ranjan Dash, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Sarathi Jyoti Mohanty,
Additional Standing Counsel
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA
Date of Hearing: 28.10.2025 :: Date of Judgment: 11.11.2025
S.S. Mishra, J. The present Criminal Appeal is directed against the
judgment and order dated 24.07.2006 passed by the learned Sessions
Judge-cum-Special Judge, Koraput, at Jeypore in Criminal Trial No.193
of 2003 (arising out of G.R. Case No.743 of 2002 corresponding to
Machkund P.S. Case No.90 of 2002). The learned trial Court found the
appellant, Sanatan Panda, guilty of offences punishable under Section
294 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short "the Act") and
sentenced him to undergo Simple Imprisonment for one month and six
months respectively, both sentences to run concurrently with the benefit
of set-off under Section 428 Cr.P.C.
2. Heard Mr. Jiban Ranjan Dash, learned counsel, for the appellant
and Mr. Sarathi Jyoti Mohanty, learned Additional Standing Counsel for
the State.
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 02.08.2002, one Smt.
Sanjukta Majhi, Sarapanch of Anakadeli Gram Panchayat, lodged an
F.I.R. alleging that on 29.07.2002, while she was near the local market
area, the appellant, who was then serving as Secretary of the Panchayat,
abused her in filthy language on the road near the hotel of Dushmant and
thereby insulted and humiliated her. On such report, Machhkund P.S.
Case No.90 of 2002 was registered under Sections 294/506 IPC read
with Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.
4. The Officer-in-Charge took up investigation, examined witnesses,
visited the spot, and submitted charge sheet against the appellant for the
aforesaid offences. The accused denied the allegations in toto and
claimed to be falsely implicated due to enmity with the informant arising
out of Panchayat affairs.
5. During the trial, the prosecution examined seven witnesses
(P.Ws.1 to 7) and proved certain documents, including the F.I.R. (Ext.1)
and caste certificate of the informant (Ext.2). The defence examined two
witnesses (D.W.1 and D.W.2) in support of its case that no such incident
had occurred and that the allegations were motivated.
6. After evaluating the evidence, the learned trial Court found
inconsistencies among the prosecution witnesses regarding the exact
abusive words and the place of occurrence but nonetheless concluded
that the appellant had indeed used abusive language in a public place
against the informant. While acquitting him of the charge under Section
506 IPC for want of proof of criminal intimidation, the trial court held
that the abusive words amounted to an offence under Section 294 IPC.
7. The learned trial Court further held that since the appellant,
admittedly not belonging to the Scheduled Tribe community, had
insulted the informant, a member of Scheduled Tribe, such conduct fell
within the ambit of Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (POA) Act, even
though no specific caste name was used. On that reasoning, the appellant
was convicted and sentenced as stated. The relevant portion of the
aforesaid judgment is extracted herein below for ready reference:-
"(8) Keeping in mind the above when the case in
hand is appreciated it is seen in this case the accused
abused the Sarpanch saying MAGIYA RANDI DESI
ANI. The Sarpanch is a lady, uttering of word MAGI
YA which is associated with sex and 'RANDI thereby
meaning prostitute. In our conservative society that
too in this part of country that could very well be said
to be obscene words. The informant has also stated
that she was annoyed and felt insulted by the
aforesaid uttering. Even in absence of her such
evidence of annoyance, utterance of the absurd words
in a public place undoubtedly must have caused
annoyance to the person present including the
informant. In such circumstances I have no hesitation
to say that the accused uttered the obscene words in a
public place which caused annoyance to others
including the informant.
So on appraisal of the aforesaid evidence would
go to show that prosecution in this case has been
abled to establish the charge under Section 294 I.P.C.
(9) Furthermore, as stated earlier the victim is a
member of Scheduled Tribe and the accused is neither
belong to Scheduled Caste nor Scheduled Tribe.
When the aforesaid abuse is hurled at the informant
injured coupled with EA KUNO SARPANCH
HOICHI TO UNDER RE MU ROHIBI", in my
opinion it can very well be said that the aforesaid act
of the accused was in order to insult the informant
injured who is a Sarpanch with intention to humiliate
her in the view of the public. Of course, the learned
counsel for the accused argued that since the
aforesaid abuse was not hurled at the victim injured
taking her tribe or caste into consideration, the
ingredients of the offence charged is not made out. I
am afraid such a contention has any sanction of law.
Once the insult and humiliation is proved on a
member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe by an
member of non-scheduled caste or Scheduled Tribe
the same attracts the ingredients of the offence under
Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
Tribe, as there is nothing to show that unless the
accused taking the tribe and caste into consideration
does any act on a member of Scheduled caste or
Scheduled Tribe, though he is not a Scheduled Caste
or Scheduled Tribe the offence is not made out. So the
contention advanced in this regard must fail.
(10) Hence, the aforesaid apprisal of the evidence on
record leads me to draw an irresistible conclusion in
this case to hold that prosecution has proved the
charge under Section 294 I.P.C. and Section 3(1)(x)
of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe
(prevention of Atrocities) Act, but it has failed to
establish the charge under Section 506 I.P.C.
(11) Resultantly, the accused is held not guilty of the
charge under Section 506 I.P.C. but guilty of the
charge under Section 294 I.P.C. and 3(1)(x) of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of atrocities) Act. So while acquitting the accused of
the charge under Section 506 I.P.C. I convict him of
the charges under Section 294 I.P.C. and 3(1)(x) of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(prevention of Atrocities) Act."
8. Mr. Dash, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the
impugned judgment suffers from serious infirmities, both in fact and
law. It was urged that the prosecution failed to prove the basic
ingredients of Section 294 IPC, inasmuch as no evidence was led to
show that the alleged abusive words were uttered at a public place
causing annoyance to others. It was further argued that the trial court
erred in convicting the appellant under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act,
despite the absence of any allegation or evidence that the appellant used
the caste name of the informant or intentionally humiliated her on the
ground of caste.
9. Mr. Dash, the learned counsel, also highlighted the delay of four
days in lodging the F.I.R. without any explanation and the perfunctory
investigation wherein no spot map was prepared. Also, no independent
witnesses from the alleged market area were examined.
10. A further submission was made that several incriminating
statements relied upon by the trial court were never put to the appellant
during his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., thereby violating the
mandate laid down in State of Odisha vs. Shrinibash @ Anama Dehury,
reported in 2020 (Suppl.) OLR 936 and Basanta Kumar Das vs. State of
Odisha, reported in 2022(II) OLR 651, and hence the conviction cannot
sustain. It was lastly urged that the trial Court failed to appreciate the
defence evidence, which clearly demonstrated that the allegations were
false and borne out of personal rivalry.
11. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the
learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned counsel for the
State, and perused the entire lower Court records, including the
depositions of the prosecution witnesses and the reasoning assigned by
the learned trial Court.
12. To constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(x) (as it stood at the
time of occurrence), three elements must be satisfied: the victim must be
a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, the accused must
intentionally insult or intimidate the victim, and the insult or intimidation
must occur in public view and reference the victim's caste name.
13. In the present case, the F.I.R., as well as the deposition of P.W.1
(informant), are completely silent on any utterance of caste-related
words. The alleged abusive terms, even if accepted, do not relate to or
make reference to her caste or tribe. Exhibit-2, the caste certificate
produced by the prosecution, shows that P.W.1 belongs to the "Gadba"
tribe. The expression "Adivasi" used in evidence does not denote any
specific caste or tribe but is a generic reference to a tribal person or
community. It is settled law that unless the abusive words make specific
reference to the caste or tribe of the complainant, the provisions of
Section 3(1)(x) of the Act are not attracted. The learned trial Court, in
paragraph 9 of its judgment as reproduced above, erred in holding that
any insult or humiliation to a member of SC/ST by a non-SC/ST person
automatically attracts the provision, which is a clear misinterpretation of
the law.
14. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the occurrence took place in
public view. No independent persons from the alleged market area were
examined. Hence, the prosecution failed to establish the foundational
facts required to invoke the penal provisions under the Act.
15. It is a well-settled principle that every incriminating circumstance
appearing against an accused must be put to him during his examination
under Section 313 Cr.P.C., so as to afford an opportunity to explain. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sujit Biswas v. State of Assam, reported in
(AIR 2013 SC 3817), reiterated that the circumstances not put to the
accused cannot be used against him and must be excluded from
consideration. It was held that: -
"12. It is a settled legal proposition that in a criminal
trial, the purpose of examining the accused person
under Section 313 Cr.P.C., is to meet the requirement of
the principles of natural justice, i.e. audi alterum
partem. This means that the accused may be asked to
furnish some explanation as regards the incriminating
circumstances associated with him, and the court must
take note of such explanation. In a case of
circumstantial evidence, the same is essential to decide
whether or not the chain of circumstances is complete.
No matter how weak the evidence of the prosecution
may be, it is the duty of the court to examine the
accused, and to seek his explanation as regards the
incriminating material that has surfaced against him.
The circumstances which are not put to the accused in
his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., cannot be
used against him and must be excluded from
consideration. The said statement cannot be treated as
evidence within the meaning of Section 3 of the
Evidence Act, as the accused cannot be cross-examined
with reference to such statement."
This principle is also further affirmed in several judgments,
such as State of Odisha vs. Shrinibash @ Anama Dehury, reported in
2020 (Suppl.) OLR 936 and Basanta Kumar Das vs. State of Odisha,
reported in 2022(II) OLR 651. In the case at hand, the record reveals that
the statements of P.Ws.1, 2, 3 and 6 forming the basis of conviction were
not specifically put to the appellant during his examination under Section
313 Cr.P.C. Therefore, reliance on such unconfronted evidence to sustain
conviction amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice,
rendering the conviction unsustainable in law.
16. To attract Section 294 IPC, the prosecution must establish (i) that
the accused uttered obscene words in a public place, and (ii) that such
words caused annoyance to others. The term "obscene" has not been
defined in the Code, and therefore, its import depends on the context,
time, and social standards of morality.
17. In the present case, the prosecution alleged that the appellant used
the abusive words "MAGIA RANDI DESIANI" in public. However,
none of the witnesses could specify whether the place of occurrence was
indeed public or whether such utterance caused annoyance to the public.
No spot map was prepared, and no independent witnesses from the
market or locality were examined. The so-called witnesses P.W.2 and
P.W.6 were subordinates to the informant and therefore interested.
Moreover, their versions varied, P.W.2 claimed the words "DESIANI
ADIVASI TUI KEE SARAPANCH" were used, differing from the
F.I.R. version. These inconsistencies go to the root of the matter.
18. The learned trial Court, without evaluating these contradictions,
accepted the prosecution's case mechanically. Given the absence of
corroboration from independent persons and the lack of evidence to
establish that the words were uttered at a public place causing
annoyance, conviction under Section 294 IPC cannot be sustained.
19. From the above discussion, it is evident that the prosecution failed
to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant uttered
obscene words in a public place causing annoyance or that he insulted or
humiliated the informant by making reference to her caste or tribe. The
inconsistencies in the statements of prosecution witnesses, absence of
independent corroboration, non-examination of spot witnesses,
unexplained delay in F.I.R., and non-compliance with Section 313
Cr.P.C. cumulatively create reasonable doubt as to the veracity of the
prosecution case.
20. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
conviction of the appellant under Section 294 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of
the SC/ST (POA) Act cannot be sustained. The judgment of conviction
dated 24.07.2006 passed by the learned Sessions Judge-cum-Special
Judge, Koraput at Jeypore in Criminal Trial No.193 of 2003 is hereby set
aside. Bail bonds, if any, stand discharged.
21. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is allowed.
(S.S. Mishra)
Judge
The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack.
Dated the 11th November, 2025/ Swarna
Designation: Senior Stenographer
Location: High Court of Orissa
