Orissa High Court
Prasanna Kumar Sahoo & vs State Of Odisha on 7 March, 2025
Author: Biraja Prasanna Satapathy
Bench: Biraja Prasanna Satapathy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRA NO.291 of 1995
In the matter of an application under Section 374(2) of
Cr.P.C.,1973
..................
Prasanna Kumar Sahoo & .... Appellants
Another
-versus-
State of Odisha .... Respondent
For Appellant : M/s. M.K. Mohapatra,
Amicus Curiae
For Respondent : M/s. P.K. Panda,
Addl. Standing Counsel
PRESENT:
THE HONBLE JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY
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Date of Hearing:07.03.2025 and Date of Judgment: 07.03.2025
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Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J.
1. This matter is taken up through Hybrid Mode.
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
3. The present appeal has been filed inter alia challenging
the order of conviction and sentence passed against the
appellants by the learned Sessions Judge, Puri vide judgment
// 2 //
dt.21.09.1995 in Sessions Case No.46 of 1994 arising out of
G.R. Case No.130 of 1992 in the file of learned J.M.F.C,
Daspalla.
4. The Prosecution story as narrated in the F.I.R reads as
follows:
2. Prosecution came, in brief, is that Manasi Sahu
(hereinafter referred to as the deceased) is the
youngest daughter of Khetrabasi Sahu and sister-in-
law of the informant Baikunthanath Sahu. The
deceased was given in marriage to accused Prasanna
Kumar Sahu in the year 1989. Within two years of the
marriage, there was repeated quarrel and difference of
opinion between accused Prasanna and his wife
Manasi relating to some landed property and about
the house. It is alleged that every new and then, the
deceased was asked to bring the land from her father
which he promised to give at the time of marriage and
she was also being beaten by accused Prasanna. It is
averred in the F.I.R that on 6.11.1992 morning, the
informant got information about the death of Manasi
on the previous night and the inmates of the house of
Manasi cremated the dead body without informing
Khetrabasi Sahu or any other relation. It is stated in
the F.I.R. that the informant went to the village of the
father-in-law house at Jagannath Prasad and got the
information that Manasi committed suicide by hanging.
Information was lodged at the police station and the
police, after completion of investigation, submitted the
charge-sheet.
5. Learned Amicus Curiae appearing on behalf of the
appellants contended that even though the present appeal was
filed by Appellant Nos.1 & 2, but appeal filed by Appellant No.1
was abated vide order dt.27.01.2023 and the present appeal be
confined to Appellant No.2.
// 3 //
5.1. It is contended that Appellant No.2 married the deceased
in the year 1989. Basing on the F.I.R lodged by the informant
Baikuntha Sahu, P.W.1 on 06.11.1992, Kaniha P.S. Case
No.34 of 1992 was registered against four (4) nos. of accused
persons for the offence under Sections 498-A, 304-B,
201,342/34 of the Indian Penal Code. After submission of the
charge-sheet and commitment of the matter, the appellants
faced the trial along with two (2) other accused persons, for the
offence under Sections 498-A/34 of the I.P.C, 304-B/34 of the
I.P.C and 201/34 of the I.P.C.
5.2. It is contended that while accused Gopinath and
Benudhar Sahu were acquitted vide order dt.22.08.1995 in
terms of the provisions contained under Section 232 of the
Cr.P.C, but both the appellants were held guilty of the charges
for the offence under Sections 304-B, 201,498-A of the Indian
Penal Code. Both the appellants were sentenced to undergo
R.I for 10 years for the offence under Section 304-B of the I.P.C
and R.I for one year with fine of Rs.1,000/- in default, R.I for
one month for the offence under Section 201 of the Indian
Penal Code. But Appellant No.2 was sentenced in addition to
the sentence under Sections 304-B and 201 of the Indian
Penal Code for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian
// 4 //
Penal Code. Appellant No.2 accordingly was sentenced to
undergo R.I for two years for the offence under Section 498-A
of the Indian Penal Code. It was also directed that all the
sentences are to run concurrently.
5.3. It is contended that prosecution in order to establish the
case examined as many as 9 P.Ws and out of those 9 P.Ws,
P.W.1 is the Informant and P.W.8 is the father of the deceased.
P.W.9 was the I.O who registered the case in Gania P.S. Case
No.34 of 1992 and P.W.7 is the subsequent I.O who took over
the investigation and filed the charge-sheet. Learned Amicus
Curiae contended that as per the statement of P.W.8 who
happens to be father of the victim, there is no allegation of
demand of dowry and that the deceased was subjected to
cruelty & harassment by the Appellant No.2 or any of his
relative, in connection with, any demand of dowry.
5.4. It is also contended that the deceased died due to
suicidal hanging and in spite of due notice to the family
members of the victim about such death of the deceased
because of suicidal hanging, when no one came, appellant's
family was compelled to do the last rite of the deceased.
5.5. It is contended that since from the evidence of the
prosecution, no incriminating material is there that the
// 5 //
deceased soon before her death was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by appellant No.2 or any of his relative, in
connection with any demand of dowry, causing her death,
ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B and Section
498-A is not at all made out.
In support of the aforesaid submission, learned Amicus
Curiae relied on the following decisions:
1) 2017(1) SCC 101 (Baijnath & Others) Para 24
to 28 and 32.
2) CRL Appeal No.249 of 2013 (Shoor Singh &
Anr. Vrs. State of Uttarkhand decided on
20.09.2024) Para 12 & 13.
3) CRL Appeal No. 1076 of 2014 (Karan Singh vs.
State of Haryana) decided on 31.01.2025) Para 6
to 8.
5.6. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Baijnath in Para- 24 to
28 and 32 of the said judgment has held as follows:-
"24. The evidence on record and the competing
arguments have received our required attention.
As the prosecution is on the charge of the
offences envisaged in Sections 304-B and 498-A
of the Code, the provisions for reference are
extracted hereunder:
"304-B. Dowry death.--(1) Where the death of a
woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury
or occurs otherwise than under normal
circumstances within seven years of her
marriage and it is shown that soon before her
death she was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative of
her husband for, or in connection with, any
// 6 //
demand for dowry, such death shall be called
"dowry death", and such husband or relative
shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation.--For the purpose of this sub-
section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning
as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than seven years but which
may extend to imprisonment for life.
498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a
woman subjecting her to cruelty.--Whoever,
being the husband or the relative of the husband
of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty
shall be punished with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to three years and shall also
be liable to fine.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section,
"cruelty" means--
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature
as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide
or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or
health (whether mental or physical) of the
woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to coercing her or any
person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security or
is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand."
25. Whereas in the offence of dowry death
defined by Section 304-B of the Code, the
ingredients thereof are:
(i) death of the woman concerned is by any
burns or bodily injury or by any cause other than
in normal circumstances, and
(ii) is within seven years of her marriage, and
// 7 //
(iii) that soon before her death, she was
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her
husband or any relative of the husband for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry.
The offence under Section 498-A of the Code is
attracted qua the husband or his relative if she
is subjected to cruelty. The Explanation to this
Section exposits "cruelty" as:
(i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature
as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide
or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or
health (whether mental or physical), or
(ii) harassment of the woman, where such
harassment is with a view to coercing her or any
person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security or
is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.
26. Patently thus, cruelty or harassment of the
lady by her husband or his relative for or in
connection with any demand for any property or
valuable security as a demand for dowry or in
connection therewith is the common constituent
of both the offences.
27. The expression "dowry" is ordained to have
the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961. The expression "cruelty",
as explained, contains in its expanse, apart from
the conduct of the tormentor, the consequences
precipitated thereby qua the lady subjected
thereto. Be that as it may, cruelty or harassment
by the husband or any relative of his for or in
connection with any demand of dowry, to
reiterate, is the gravamen of the two offences.
28. Section 113-B of the Act enjoins a statutory
presumption as to dowry death in the following
terms:
"113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.--When
the question is whether a person has committed
the dowry death of a woman and it is shown
that soon before her death such woman has
// 8 //
been subjected by such person to cruelty or
harassment for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that
such person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation.-- For the purposes of this section,
"dowry death" shall have the same meaning as
in Section 304-B of the Penal Code, 1860."
xxx xxx
xxx
32. This Court while often dwelling on the scope
and purport of Section 304-B of the Code and
Section 113-B of the Act have propounded that
the presumption is contingent on the fact that the
prosecution first spell out the ingredients of the
offence of Section 304-B as in Shindo v. State of
Punjab [Shindo v. State of Punjab, (2011) 11 SCC
517 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 394] and echoed in
Rajeev Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rajeev
Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 16 SCC 640 :
(2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 346] . In the latter
pronouncement, this Court propounded that one
of the essential ingredients of dowry death
under Section 304-B of the Code is that the
accused must have subjected the woman to
cruelty in connection with demand for dowry
soon before her death and that this ingredient
has to be proved by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt and only then the Court will
presume that the accused has committed the
offence of dowry death under Section 113-B of
the Act. It referred to with approval, the earlier
decision of this Court in K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla
Srinivasa Rao [K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla
Srinivasa Rao, (2003) 1 SCC 217 : 2003 SCC
(Cri) 271] to the effect that to attract the provision
of Section 304-B of the Code, one of the main
ingredients of the offence which is required to be
established is that "soon before her death" she
was subjected to cruelty and harassment "in
connection with the demand for dowry".
5.7. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shoor Singh in Para-
12 & 13 of the said judgment has held as follows:-
// 9 //
"12. To constitute a 'dowry death', punishable
under Section 304-B7 IPC, following ingredients
must be satisfied:
i. death of a woman must have been caused by
any burns or bodily injury or it must have
occurred otherwise than under normal
circumstances;
ii. such death must have occurred within seven
years
of her marriage;
iii. soon before such death, she must have been
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her
husband or any relative of her husband; and iv.
such cruelty or harassment must be in
connection with any demand for dowry.The
phrase 'otherwise than under normal
circumstances' is wide enough to encompass a
suicidal death.
13. When all the above ingredients of 'dowry
death' are proved, the presumption under
Section 113-B8 of the Evidence Act is to be
raised against the accused that he has
committed the offence of 'dowry death'. What is
important is that the presumption under Section
113-B is not in respect of commission of an act of
cruelty, or harassment, in connection with any
demand for dowry, which is one of the essential
ingredients of the offence of 'dowry death'. The
presumption, of offence of 'dowry death' by the
accused when all the essential ingredients of
'dowry death' are proved beyond reasonable
doubt by ordinary rule of evidence, which means
that to prove the essential ingredients of an
offence of 'dowry death' the burden is on the
prosecution".
5.8. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Karan Singh in Para- 6
to 8 of the said judgment has held as follows:-
"6. The following are the essential ingredients of
Section 304-B:
a) The death of a woman must have been caused
by any burns or bodily injury, or must have
occurred otherwise than under normal
circumstances;
// 10 //
b) The death must have been caused within seven
years of her marriage;
c) Soon before her death, she must have been
subjected to cruelty or harassment by the husband
or any relative of her husband; and
d) Cruelty or harassment must be for, or in
connection
with, any demand for dowry.
7. If the aforesaid four ingredients are established,
the death can be called a dowry death, and the
husband and/or husband's relative, as the case
may be, shall be deemed to have caused the dowry
death. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
provides that dowry means any property or
valuable security given or agreed to be given either
directly or indirectly by one party to a marriage
Criminal Appeal No. 1076 of 2014 Page 5 of 11 to
the other party to the marriage or by the parents of
either party to a marriage or by any other person,
to the other party to the marriage or to any other
person. The dowry must be given or agreed to be
given at or before or any time after the marriage in
connection with the marriage of the said parties.
The term valuable security used in Section 2 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 has the same meaning
as in Section 30 of IPC.
8. In this case, there is no dispute that the death of
the
appellant's wife occurred within seven years of the
marriage. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act reads
thus:
"113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the
question is whether a person has committed the
dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon
before her death such woman had been subjected
by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in
connection with, any
demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that
such person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this section,
"dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in
Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."
The presumption under Section 113-B will apply
when it is established that soon before her death,
the woman has been subjected by the accused to
// 11 //
cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with,
any demand for dowry. Therefore, even for
attracting Section 113-B, the prosecution must
establish that the deceased was subjected by the
appellant to cruelty or harassment for or in
connection with any demand of dowry soon before
death. Unless these facts are proved, the
presumptions under Section 113-B of the Evidence
Act cannot be invoked".
5.9. It is contended that in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex
Court as cited supra and taking into account the evidence laid by
the P.Ws, there is no material that the deceased was subjected to
cruelty and harassment on the ground of demand of dowry just
prior to her death. It is accordingly contended that since ingredient
of Section 304-B has not been made out, order of conviction and
sentence passed against the appellant for the offence under Section
304-B and 498-A is not at all maintainable.
5.10. Learned Amicus Curiea brought to the notice of this
Court, the evidence of P.Ws.1 & 8 to prove his point that the
deceased was never subjected to cruelty or harassment on the
ground of demand of dowry just prior to her death.
P.W.1 in his evidence has stated as follows:
" I know the accused persons. I am brother-
in-law of the deceased Manasi. She married
accused Prasanna. Manasi died 2 to 2 ½
hears back. She married 4 to 5 years. They
pulled on well for year as husband and wife.
But thereafter, Manasi told me that she was
being beaten by the accused Prasanna. My
// 12 //
home is 4 to 5 miles from the house of
Prasanna.
2. I am informant of this case. I verbally
reported at the P.S. One writer (scribe) was
called. A report was written according my
instruction, in my presence marked Ext.1.
She is my signature marked Ext.1/1.
3. Cross-Examination:
Accused Biswanath Has been adopted
by my grandfather (maternal). So he is
enjoying all his properties. Had he not been
adopted, I would have got the property of
anybody selected by my grandfather. It is not
a fact that I am inimical to accused
Biswanath as I am deprived of my
grandfather's properties.
4. I am married to the eldest daughter of
my father-in-law. Manasi is the youngest
daughter. The other two daughters are
married at distant places. I do not remember
that actual date of marriage of Manasi.
It was an arranged marriage. Manasi was
blessed with a daughter. It is not a fact that
Manasi was not married 4 to 5 years back
only.
5. Manasi had complained to me on 2 to
3 occasions about assault by the accused
Prasanna on her. I cannot give its details.
Kasinath Sahu, who is the brother of
Biswanath Sahu informed about the death of
Manasi to my father-in-law. Jagannath
Prasad will come on the way to Gania from
my village. It is not a fac that Manasi had
never complained to me about her being
assaulted by the accused.
6. My mother-in-law expired prior to
Manasi's marriage. My father-in-law has no
son. My father-in-law at times lives in the
home at Prasanna. I cannot say if accused
Prasanna looked after the Siba puja of deity
in behest of my father-in-law after his
marriage. Accused Prasanna cultivated his
land. It is not a fact that I became inimical to
Prasanna as he cultivated the land of my
father-in-law. I cannot say if my father-in-
law got married to another lady within 35
days of Manasí's death. It is not a fact
// 13 //
Manasi was opposing the second marriage of
my father in law . It is not a fact that I
supported my father-in-law in his second
marriage. It is not a fact that I have filed the
case falsely to wreak vengeance against
Prasanna.
P.W.8 in his evidence has held as follows:
I am the father of the deceased Manasi. About 6
years back, late Manasi was married to accused
Prasanna Kumar Sahu. I know all the accused
persons. Manasi died about three years back. At
the time of death, Manasi was staying with her
husband accused Prasanna in his house.
Prasanna and his brother were staying jointly
with their parents.
2. Manasi and her husband lived in happily for
about one year. A daughter was born out of their
wedlock. After one year the relationship became
strained late Manasi used to tell me the reason as
to why I am not executing a sale deed for the land
for which she was being tortured by her husband.
When Manasi was not treated well by the accused
Biswanath and his son Prasanna I promised to
Manasi that I would execute a sale within two
months.
3. I executed a sale deed in the name of my
daughter Manasi for 34 decimals of land without
taking any consideration. I executed a sale deed
in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Dalpalla. Ext.4
is the sale deed and Ext.4/1 is my signature.
4. As I had no sufficient fund, I took two
months time to execute another sale deed in
respect of balance seven Gunths of land in the
name of my daughter. I could not execute the
sale deed in respect of 7 gunths of land as
promised by me as Manasi died. Regarding the
ill-treatment and torture made to my daughter
Manasi, I submitted a written report before Sarat
Sahu President of our Community.
5. The Committee decided that Prasanna and his
father accused Biswanath would relinquish two
decimals of land out of 34 decimals of land
covered under Ext.4 and I would execute a sale
deed in respect of 7 gunths of land as promised
by me earlier.
6. Despite the decision of the caste meeting
relationship of deceased Manasi was strained
with her husband Prasanna and her father in law
Biswanath.
// 14 //
7. At the time of death of Manasi, in her in
laws house I was at Daspalla. The brother of
accused Biswanath informed me about the death
of my daughter Manasi. When I was going to
Gania P.S to lodge a report about the death of my
daughter Manasi, Kasinath Sahu dissuaded me
not to lodge report in Gania P.S and promised for
a settlement. When I reached the house of
Biswanath Sahu, the cremation of my daughter
had already been over.
8. When I enquired from Kasinath Sahu
about the reason and circumstance of the death
of my daughter, the latter informed me that
Manasi committed suicide by hanging herself.
Cross-examination behalf of the
accused person:-
9. I am staying at Daspalla for last three years.
I am not staying with my elder son in law
Baikunthanath Sahu.
10. I have got four daughters and deceased
Manasi was the youngest one. My wife died just
about 7byears before the marriage of Manasi. I
have got no son. As my wife was dead, long
before the marriage of Manasi, I decided that
after the marriage of Manasi, I would bring the
son in law to my house so that he would look
after the property of myself.
11. At the time of marriage, I was decided that
accused Prasanna will remain in my house as
illatum son. P.W.5, Madhaba Sahu were
present during the itme of the aforesaid talk.
Since my house was broken and unfit for my
occupation, Prasanna and Manasi stayed in the
house of Biswnath after the marriage. After the
marriage, I also stayed for about one year in the
house of Biswanath. During my stay in the
house of Biswanath, Prasanna and Manasi used
to look after me.
12. It is not a fact that I insisted to bring a
second wife. It is not a fact that I lef the house
of accused persons and Manasi when they did
not agree to my proposal of taking a second
wife.
It is not a fact that when I decide to take divorcy
as my second wife, deceased Manasi became
angree on me. I have contracted a second
marriage to take a divorce after the death of
Manasi.
13. Ext.4 was executed after one year after the
marriage of Manasi, and at that time I was
staying in the house of accused Prasanna. My
relationship between accused Prasanna and
// 15 //
Manasi was good at the time of execution of sale
deed Ext.4. The relationship between the
accused Prasanna and Manasi was good at the
time of execution of the sale deed. The contents
of the sale deed Ext.4 was written by Jugala
Behera as per my instruction. I have mentioned
in the sale deed Ext.4 about the passing of
consideration of Rs.5000/- intentionally lest
other daughters would demand share from my
property. I have sold the land under Ext.4 to
my daughter my Manasi. It is not a fac that I
have taken Rs.5000/- towards the consideration
of Ext.4 from my daughter Manasi.
14. I left the house of Manasi to my own
house of the same village within one month of
the execution of the sale deed Ext.4. When
Prasanna and Manasi did not keep contact or
look after the affairs of three daughters, I left
the house of Prasanna. After I left the house of
accused Prasanna after execution of the sale
deed Ext.4, they did not look after my affairs.
Other three daughters used to look after me
when I was staying in my own house. During
my stay in my house after execution of sale
deed, my relationship with Manasi and
Prasanna was not good.
15. Deceased Manasi informed me about
one month prior to her death about the ill-
treatment meted to her by Prasanna and his
father Biswanath. I lodged a written report
before Sarat Sahu, President of our Community
regarding ill-treatment meted to my daughter by
her husband and his father Biswanath. The
Committee held its meeting at Dasapalla.
16. It is not a fact that I have not informed
Sarat Sahu, President of our Community about
the ill-treatment meted to Manasi by her in-
laws. I returned to my village 15 days after the
caste meeting.
17. It is not a fact that there was no ill-
feeling or strained relationship between accused
Prasanna and Manasi. I did not inform my
eldest daughter or her husband about the death
of Manasi.
18. I lodged the report in the Gania P.S two
days after the death of my daughter. After
lodging the report in the P.S., I went to
Daspalla. It is not a fac that I have sworn an
affidavit before the Executive Magistrate,
Kendrapara. My signature in a paper was taken
by Kailash, one of my c-villager. It is not a fact
that I have sworn an affidavit on 21.12.1992
// 16 //
before the Executive Magistrate, Khandapara. It
is not a fact that bail was moved on behalf of
accused Prasanna before the Executive
Magistrate, Khandapara. It is not a fact that
bail was moved on behalf of accused Prasanna
before the Hon'ble Court at my behest on
21.12.1993. It is not a fact that I have attached
the copy of the affidavit sworn by me before the
Executive Magistrate, Khandapara in the bail
application. Since my signature were taken on
a blank paper, I do not know the contents of the
paper. It is not a fact that I have mentioned in
the affidavit that the relationship of accused
Prasanna and Manasi was cordial and good and
my daughter died due to suffering from fever. It
is not a fact that I have mentioned in the
affidavit that my eldest son in law Baikuntha at
the instance of inimical persons lodged the F.I.R
much less stated in the affidavit that Baikuntha
was inimically disposed of towards accused
Prasanna.
19. It is not a fact that I have been
maintained by eldest son in law Baikuntha
P.W.1. It is not a fact that Manasi died on
account of suffering from fever. It is not a fac
that I am deposing falsely at the instance of
eldest son in law about the strained relationship
of Manasi with accused Prasanna. It is not a
fact that I did not enquire from accused
Biswanath about the reason of the death of
Manasi. It is not a fact that accused Biswanath
did not inform me that Manasi Committed
suicide by hanging.
5.11. It is also contended that since in spite of due notice to
the victim's family about the death of the deceased since
nobody came forward, the appellants had no other option
than to do the last rite of the victim in their village.
Accordingly, no offence under Section 201 of the Indian Penal
Code can also be attracted against the appellants.
// 17 //
5.12. In support of the aforesaid submission, reliance was
placed to the statement of P.W.5. Statement of P.W.5 reads as
follows:
P.W.5. I know all the accused persons. I know
Khetrabasi father of Manaswi. They are all my co-
villagers. Khetrabasi Sahu has four daughters and
had no son.
Khetrabasi had given 12 Gunthas of land to Manasi
at the time of her marriage. Since Khetrabasi did
not execute any document in respect of the land
given in the name of Manasi at the time of
marriage. Prasanna submitted an application
before Sarat, gudia by caste a President of our
community. I am the Behera of my hamlet. As
requested by this President. I enquired from
Khetrabasi the reasons as to why he has not
executed the document in respect of the land to
Manasi as promised at the time of marriage.
Khetrabasi had also executed document in respect
of the land and homestead land. Khetrabasi ujsed
to stay in the house of Prasanna as Manasi was the
youngest to other. I sued to visit the house of
Prasanna very frequently. There was cordial
relationship between Manasi and her in-laws.
2. Khetrabasi brought a divorce from village
Bhumula and stayed at Daspalla for about 10 to 15
days. I cannot say how and under what
circumstances Manasi died. On the next day of the
death of Manasi, I had been to the house of accrued
Biswanath, on his request. When I enquired from
Biswanath the reason of death, the later informed
that Manasi was suffering. ON being asked by the
police I had been to the burial ground where from
the police seized ashes. Police prepared a seizure
list and I had signed on it. Ext.2 is my signature in
the seizure list.
Cross examined by the defence:-
3. I am the cousin of Khetrabasi. Khetrabasi was
widower. Wife of Khetrabasi was not there at the
time of marriage of Manasi. Before the marriage it
was decided that accused Prasanna and Manasi
would look after the affairs of Khetrabasi. After the
marriage, Manasi stayed in the house of her father
in law. Khetrabasi stayed in the house of his in-law
for about 3 years after the marriage. Both Prasanna
and Manasi used to look after the welfare of
Khetrabasi during his stay in their house. There
// 18 //
was ill feeling between Manasi and her father as the
later brought a divorce from the village Dhuamula.
Ketrabasi cancelled the deed in respect of the house
which he had executed in favor of Manasi and
stayed in that house. The village punch decided
that Manasi would surrender the house in favour of
her father and father would give 12 gunth of land to
Manasi.
4. Mai Sahu and Kailash went to Daspalla to
inform Khetrabasi about the death of Manasi.
Khetrabasi did not come to the house of Biswanath
despite information given to him. Our guida caste
excommunicated Khetrabasi due to his marriage. It
is not a fact that I am deposing falsely that Manasi
surrendered the homestead in favour of the father
and Khetrabasi had executed 12 gunthas of land in
favour of Manasi.
5.13. It is accordingly contended that order of conviction and
sentence passed against the appellants for the offence under
Sections 304-B,498-A of the Indian Penal Code and so also
under Section 201 of the I.P.C is not at all made out and the
impugned judgment is liable to be set aside by this Court.
6. Mr. Pravat Kumar Panda, learned Addl. Standing
Counsel while supporting the judgment contended that since
the deceased died within 3 years of her marriage with appellant
No.2 under unnatural circumstances and the appellants in
order to disown their liability, disposed of the dead-body of the
victim, the order of conviction and sentence has been rightly
passed.
6.1. It is also contended that in view of the statement of
P.W.8, demand of dowry and harassment caused to the victim
// 19 //
just prior to her death is well proved. It is accordingly
contended that in view of the evidence laid by the prosecution
through P.W.8 and so also P.W.1, order of conviction and
sentence passed against the appellant for the offence under
Section 304-B, 498-A /201 of the I.P.C is well made out and it
requires no interference.
7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and
considering the materials available on record, this Court finds
that Appellant No.2 got married to the victim in the year 1989.
For the unnatural death of the victim, Gania P.S. Case No.34
of 1992 was registered, basing on the F.I.R lodged by P.W.1,
who happens to be the brother-in-law of the deceased.
Appellants along with 2 other accused persons were charged
for the offence under Sections 304-B,498-A,201/34 of the
I.P.C. But as found, two of the accused persons were acquitted
vide order dt.22.08.1995. But Appellant Nos.1 & 2 were found
guilty of the charges for the offence under Section 304-B and
201 of the Indian Penal Code and Appellant No.2 in addition
thereto, for the Offence under Section 498-A of the I.P.C.
7.1. Since during pendency of the appeal, Appellant No.1
died, the appeal filed by appellant No.1 was abated vide order
dt.27.01.2023.
// 20 //
7.2. This Court after going through the materials available on
record and more particularly, the evidence of P.Ws.1 & 8, finds
that no evidence has been laid by the prosecution that the
deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment on the
ground of demand of dowry just prior to her death. Therefore,
placing reliance on the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court as
cited (supra), this Court is of the view that the ingredients of
the offence under Section 304-B of the I.P.C is not at all made
out against the appellants.
7.3. Since there is no allegation of demand of dowry just prior
to the death of the deceased, nor there is any allegation of
demand of dowry after marriage of the deceased with Appellant
no.2, this Court is also of the view that offence under Section
498-A of the I.P.C is not made out. It is also found from the
record that in spite of due notice when the members of the
victim's family did not come to attend the last rites of the
deceased, such rites were performed by the appellants' family.
Therefore, it is the view of this Court that offence under
Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out.
7.4. Taking into account the materials available on record,
this Court is of the view that prosecution has failed miserably
in bringing out any material against the Appellants for the
// 21 //
offence under Section 304-B, 498-A and 201 of the Indian
Penal Code. Therefore, this Court is inclined to set aside the
impugned order of conviction and sentence passed vide
judgment dt.21.09.1995. While setting aside the same, this
Court allows the appeal. Appellant No.2 be discharged from
the bail-bond so furnished by him.
The CRA accordingly stands disposed of. This Court
while fixing the professional fees of the learned Amicus Curiae
at Rs.5000/-, direct the Registry to pay the same.
(Biraja Prasanna Satapathy)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
Dated the 7th March, 2025/sangita
Reason: authentication of order
Location: high court of orissa, cuttack
Date: 27-Mar-2025 12:06:01
