Orissa High Court

M/S New India vs Kandedi Patamajhi on 30 June, 2025

Author: V. Narasingh

Bench: V. Narasingh

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
              MACA No.956 of 2005

 In the matter of an application under Section 173(1) of the
 Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

M/s New India           ....               Appellant
Assurance Company
Limited, Main Road,
Phulbani, PO/PS-
Phulbani, Dist-
Kandhamal, Now
represented through the
Sr. Divisional
Manager, New India
Assurance
Company Limited, D.O-
Il, Cantonment
Road, Cuttack.

                     -versus-

1. Kandedi Patamajhi
2. Gajendra Patamajhi       ....       Respondents


     For Appellant : Mr. G.P Dutta, Advocate



           CORAM: JUSTICE V. NARASINGH

     Date of hearing & Judgment : 30.06.2025

              MISC. Case No.742 of 2006




                                                   Page 1 of 8
 V. Narasingh, J.

Heard learned counsel for the Appellant.

1. This is an appeal Under Section 173(1) of the MV Act, 1988 (in short "the Act") by the appellant- Assurance Company challenging the impugned judgment dated 16.09.2003 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge-cum-MACT, Phulbani in M.A.C Case No.46 of 1998.

2. The MACA was filed on 17.11.2005 with a delay of 1year 338 days. Admittedly, it was not accompanied by any petition for condonation of delay which was filed on 29.06.2006. Hence, the delay in this case is infact 1year 563 days.

3. The MACA has been filed assailing the award of Rs.80,000/- as compensation for the death of 12 years old boy with the interest rate of 9% per annum from the date of claim petition i.e. 31.01.1997.

4. It is the submission of Mr. Dutta, learned counsel for the Appellant, that the Petition for condonation of delay can be filed at any stage and therefore there was no illegality and much less irregularity in filing of the same in the case at hand.

5. In the case of Mrs. Sandhya Rani Sarkar Vrs. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi and Others; AIR 1978 SC 537, the Apex Court has reiterated that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation

Act should be liberally construed only when "negligence or any inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed resulting in the delay in filing of the appeal.

6. On a bare perusal of the said judgment, it can be seen that the Apex Court has emphasized that while evaluating the grounds of condonation of delay each case has to be examined in its peculiar factual matrix and that there cannot be any straight jacket formula.

7. On the touch stone of the law laid down by the Apex Court, it has to be examined whether "sufficient cause" has been shown for condoning the delay of (1563) one year five hundred sixty-three days in filing this appeal.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the delay in filing the appeal in the first instance and the further delay in filing the petition for condonation of delay is because of unavoidable Administrative Procedures. For which, it cannot be said that the same is deliberate. Hence, the delay may be condoned in the interest of justice.

9. It is trite that there is no gain for the Appellant to approach this Court in a belated manner. Paragraphs 3 to 10 of the Misc. Case No.742 of 2006

deal with the reasons for the delay. For convenience of ready reference, the same is extracted hereunder:

"xxx xxx xxx

3. That after receipt of the order, the same was forwarded to the counsel for opinion and the Counsel submitted his opinion vide opinion dated 18.10.2003.

4. That as the Learned Tribunal has not dealt with the contention raised by the Petitioner, the petitioner decided to file review application so as to enable the Divisional office to finally dispose of the case at their level.

5. That the Petitioner after receipt of the opinion requested the counsel file a review application and accordingly the counsel filed the same.

6. That is submitted by the petitioner that though the review application /was rejected on dtd. 21.12.04 but the dealing counsel intimated the petitioner about the same vide letter dtd. 10.02.2005.

7. That the petitioner after receiving the copy of the order, sought for explanation from the counsel about the delay in

intimating the disposal of review application.

8. That there after the Divisional office prepared the note and after obtaining necessary Administrative Sanction vide note dtd.22.02.05 forwarded the file to the Regional office for filing appeal.

9. That the Regional office though received the file but inadvertently the file got mixed up with the bunch of disposal file for which no immediate action could be taken.

10. That the Regional office after tracing the file processed it and after obtaining necessary Administrative sanction from the competent Authority, forwarded it to the Cuttack Divisional office vide Letter dt.07.07.05 for filing appeal.

xxx xxx xxx"

10. The MACA in question is filed in terms of the Section 173(1) of Motor Vehicle Act, 1998. For convenience of ready reference the said Section 173(1) of M.V. Act is extracted hereunder:

                 "xxx           xxx          xxx
      173.      Appeals.-(1)       Subject           to     the

provisions of sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims

Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court:

Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court, unless he has deposited with it twenty-five thousand rupees or fifty per cent. of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court:

Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.

xxx xxx xxx"

11. On a bare perusal of second proviso to Section 173(1) of the M.V Act, it can be seen that the appeal has to be presented within 90 days, failing which the same can be entertained by the High Court on the Appellant satisfying the Court that it was prevented by "sufficient cause" from preferring the appeal in time.

12. On a conjoint reading of Section 173(1) of the M.V. Act and its second proviso, it is manifestly clear that once the appeal is not presented on time, the limitation begins to run and it gets arrested only on filing of the petition for condonation of delay.

13. On a bare perusal of the same, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the appellants have acted in a casual manner in pursuing the matter and the reasons as stated in the petition for condonation of delay cannot be classified as "sufficient cause" for condoning the delay of 1 year 563 days.

14. This Court has evaluated the matter with respect to delay in preferring the appeal and on consideration of materials on record is not inclined to condone the delay. As such, this Court does not intend to delve into the merits of the appeal.

15. On perusal of the operative part of the award, it is seen that Rs.50,000/- has already been disbursed as interim compensation. Hence, the Appellant- Assurance Company is directed to deposit the balance Rs.30,000/- with the interest as directed within the period of eights weeks hence and on production of receipt evidencing such deposit, the statutory deposit along with accrued interest be refunded to the Appellant-Assurance Company.