Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 6093 Ori
Judgement Date : 20 June, 2025
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 20-Jun-2025 17:52:08
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.10677 of 2025
along with
W.P.(C) No.11001 of 2025
(In the matters of applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, 1950).
Basanti Banjara .... Petitioner(s)
(in W.P.(C) No.10677 of 2025
Chamru Parabhua @ Parabhoi @
Lohar
(In W.P.(C) No.11001 of 2025)
-versus-
Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, .... Opposite Party (s)
Lower Indra Irrigation Project,
Khariar
Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Krushna Chandra Dash, Adv.
For Opposite Party (s) : Additional Standing Counsel
CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE S.K. PANIGRAHI
DATE OF HEARING:-05.05.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT:-20.06.2025
Dr. S.K. Panigrahi, J.
1. In both the Writ Petitions, the Petitioners seek a direction from this
Court to set aside the orders dated 06.12.2023 and 17.05.2024 rejecting
their restoration applications and to revive the land acquisition
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
reference proceedings for adjudication on merits under Section 18 of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE: 2. The brief facts of the case are as follows: (i) The present Writ Petitions arise from the acquisition of agricultural
lands belonging to the petitioners' respective families in Mouza
Konabira, District Nuapada, for construction of the Lower Indra
Irrigation Project pursuant to a notification issued in 2001 by the
Special Land Acquisition Officer, Khariar.
(ii) The petitioners were awarded compensation amounts of ₹3,32,981/-
and ₹4,50,256/- respectively, including solatium and interest, which
were accepted under protest as being grossly inadequate and
unreflective of the true market value and the potential of the acquired
lands, including the value of fruit-bearing trees.
(iii) Dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation, the petitioners or
their predecessors filed protest petitions, which were referred under
Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the Court of the
learned Senior Civil Judge, Nuapada, and registered as LAR Case
Nos. 170 of 2010 and 196 of 2010.
(iv) The petitioners are legal heirs of the recorded tenants and were
pursuing the reference proceedings after the demise of the original
landowners, who were illiterate and unaware of legal procedures.
(v) Due to extreme financial hardship and lack of legal literacy, the
petitioners could not appear in court regularly and had to migrate for
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
labour work, while relying on their lawyers to manage the
proceedings.
(vi) In LAR Case No. 196 of 2010, the petitioner's counsel had filed a time
petition on 16.09.2014 seeking adjournment for adducing evidence,
which was rejected by the court, and the reference was closed
arbitrarily the same day without deciding the compensation claim,
and the file was returned to the LAO.
(vii) In LAR Case No. 170 of 2010, the petitioner's counsel appeared on
19.12.2017 and sought a short adjournment which was similarly
rejected, following which the court closed the case and returned the
reference to the LAO without adjudication or notice to the petitioner.
(viii) The closure of the references was never communicated to the
petitioners either by the court, the lawyers, or the LAO, leaving the
petitioners completely unaware of the case status for a considerable
period of time.
(ix) Upon learning of the closures from local sources and after verifying
the same from the office of the LAO, the petitioners promptly filed
restoration applications, CMA No. 279 of 2017 and CMA No. 01 of
2020, seeking revival of the LAR cases for adjudication.
(x) Despite the fact that the references were never answered on merits,
both restoration petitions were dismissed solely on the ground of
delay by orders dated 06.12.2023 and 17.05.2024, which are impugned
in the present writ petitions.
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS:
3. Learned counsel for the Petitioners earnestly made the following
submissions in support of his contentions:
(i) Both petitioners argue that closing a reference case without deciding
compensation violates their right to equality, life, and property. They
stress that procedural technicalities (delay) should not override their
substantive right to just compensation.
(ii) In both cases, the reference was not adjudicated on merits but was
closed due to non-appearance/time petitions. Such closure without
adjudication is argued to be impermissible in law, especially when
Section 18 of the L.A. Act imposes a duty on the referral court to
determine compensation.
(iii) Petitioners cite poverty, illiteracy, out-migration, and lack of legal
awareness as reasons for the delay in seeking restoration. They claim
they were not intentionally negligent, and had no knowledge of the
closure due to communication gaps with lawyers.
(iv) Since no adjudication was done and no enhanced compensation was
awarded, the cause of action continues. They argue that law of
limitation should not bar such cases involving fundamental and
statutory rights.
III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES:
4. The Learned Counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the
following submissions in support of his contentions:
(i) The Government Pleader, representing the State, opposed both
restoration petitions without filing any written objection. It was
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
contended that the petitioners had been afforded multiple
opportunities by the referral court to lead evidence and substantiate
their claim for enhanced compensation. However, despite repeated
adjournments, they failed to prosecute the cases, which led the court
to reasonably conclude that the petitioners were satisfied with the
compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer.
Consequently, the references were closed after due consideration.
Accordingly, it was contended that the restoration pleas lacked merit
and were not maintainable either before the referral court or in writ
jurisdiction.
IV. FINDINGS OF THE CIVIL JUDGE- CMA NO. 279 OF 2017 (LAR NO.
196/2010) AND CMA NO. 01 OF 2020 (LAR NO. 170/2010)
5. The Court held in both cases that the petitioners were granted
sufficient opportunities to prosecute their reference cases and lead
evidence. However, they repeatedly failed to do so.
6. In LAR Case No. 196/2010, the Court noted that the petitioner's
counsel filed a time petition citing illness (fever) on 16.09.2014, while
in the restoration application, the excuse was migration for livelihood,
a contradiction that, according to the Court, undermined their
credibility.
7. In LAR Case No. 170/2010, the Court found that the petitioner had
claimed prolonged illness, joint pain, and rheumatism as reasons for
absence on 19.12.2013 but failed to substantiate this with evidence.
8. In both matters, the Court held that non-prosecution and repeated
absence indicated that the claimants were "satisfied with the award.
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
9. The Court further held that the restoration petitions were filed beyond
the prescribed period of limitation and the petitioners failed to
provide any sufficient cause to justify the delay. It observed that no
credible evidence was led to substantiate the claims of illness or
genuine inability to appear on the relevant hearing dates. The Court
clarified that the reference cases were not dismissed for default, but
were closed after a judicial assessment of the petitioners' repeated
failure to prosecute the matters despite being granted ample
opportunities.
10. Consequently, the Court ruled that the petitions were not
maintainable under Section 151 CPC, and refused to exercise inherent
powers to restore the reference cases.
V. COURT'S REASONING AND ANALYSIS:
11. Heard Learned Counsel for parties and perused the documents placed
before this Court.
12. The petitioners seek restoration of land acquisition reference
proceedings under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
which were closed without adjudication by the referral court on
16.09.2014 and 19.12.2013 respectively. Their writ petitions challenge
the dismissal of restoration applications (CMA Nos. 279/2017 and
01/2020) solely on the ground of delay. While the petitioners invoke
constitutional rights and the doctrine of continuous cause of action, a
close reading of the record, the conduct of the petitioners, and the
findings of the Civil Court shows that the referral court acted within
the bounds of judicial discretion.
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
13. The Civil Judge rightly recorded that both petitioners were given
ample opportunity over multiple years to prosecute their respective
LAR cases, yet consistently failed to adduce any evidence despite
repeated adjournments granted at their request. This sustained
pattern of inaction goes beyond mere procedural lapse and reflects a
clear abdication of prosecutorial responsibility. In LAR 196/2010, the
petitioner's counsel filed a time petition on 16.09.2014 citing illness
(fever), yet in the restoration petition, the explanation offered was that
the family had migrated out of the locality for labour, two mutually
exclusive narratives that materially undermine the credibility of the
petitioner's case. In LAR 170/2010, the petitioner claimed prolonged
illness, rheumatism, and old age as reasons for his absence on
19.12.2013, yet brought forth neither medical certificates, witness
testimony, nor any cogent material on record to substantiate those
claims.
14. Courts have repeatedly held that a vague or unsubstantiated plea
does not constitute "sufficient cause" under law, especially where the
conduct of the party reflects indifference or procedural abuse.
Specifically, the Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and Anr. vs.
Special Land Acquisition Officer1 holding that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts
and circumstances of each case, stated the following:
"The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond
(2013) 14 SCC 81.
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
15. The consistent inaction of the petitioners, despite the court granting
multiple opportunities, cannot be trivialized as mere inadvertence.
Judicial time and process cannot be indefinitely held hostage to a
litigant's procedural indifference. While the right to fair compensation
under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is indeed a substantive
entitlement, it does not exempt a claimant from prosecuting the
reference with reasonable diligence. Once a reference is made, the
burden to lead evidence lies squarely on the claimant, and repeated
adjournments, without justifiable cause or substantive progress,
frustrate the very object of the reference proceedings. Courts are not
obligated to accommodate delay as a matter of right. Procedural
indulgences, if abused, become counterproductive to judicial
efficiency and fairness to the opposite party.
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
16. The law is clear that while discretion exists to grant adjournments, it
must be exercised judiciously and not in a manner that allows a
litigant to subvert process by passive conduct. Any further indulgence
in such circumstances would render court proceedings vulnerable to
procedural abuse and undermine the finality of adjudication. In fact,
the Supreme Court, in the case of Ishwarlal Mali Rathod v. Gopal2,
while dealing with a litigant's repeated misuse of adjournments and
failure to cross-examine despite multiple final opportunities, held as
follows:
"Therefore, the court shall be very slow in granting adjournments and as observed hereinabove they shall not grant repeated adjournments in routine manner. Time has now come to change the work culture and get out of the adjournment culture so that confidence and trust put by the litigants in the Justice delivery system is not shaken and Rule of Law is maintained."
17. In this context, the court cannot be faulted for exercising restraint in
restoring reference proceedings that were allowed to languish for
years without any demonstrable effort on part of the petitioners to
advance their claim. The consistent disregard for court directions,
coupled with unsubstantiated and conflicting excuses, defeats the
very rationale of invoking equitable jurisdiction under Article 226.
Courts are bound not only by a duty to ensure access to justice, but
also by a parallel responsibility to safeguard the integrity and
(2021) 12 SCC 612.
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
efficiency of adjudicatory processes. Litigants cannot claim equity
while remaining in breach of procedural discipline.
18. Thus, while the petitioners may rightly feel aggrieved at being denied
higher compensation, the referral court's orders cannot be faulted for
declining to restore references that were closed after years of
inactivity and contradiction in pleadings. The judicial conscience of
the court was exercised; the failure lies in the petitioners' procedural
conduct, not in the court's decision-making.
VI. CONCLUSION:
19. Though this Court is unable to grant the reliefs prayed for in the
present Writ Petitions, it cannot remain unmindful of the structural
disadvantages faced by the petitioners. The record indicates that they
are agricultural labourers and small landholders who, owing to
financial distress, were compelled to migrate for subsistence work.
With limited education, legal literacy, and economic means, they were
ill-equipped to engage meaningfully with formal legal systems that
presuppose sustained access, procedural familiarity, and continuity.
Their prolonged absence from the proceedings, though procedurally
fatal, appears less a result of willful neglect and more a consequence
of economic compulsion and systemic vulnerability, potentially
compounded by inadequate legal guidance. It is unclear whether they
were ever properly informed of the legal consequences of non-
prosecution or whether their legal representation acted with the
diligence expected in such circumstances.
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
20. Accordingly, while dismissing both the Writ Petitions, this Court
deems it appropriate to direct the District Legal Services Authority,
Nuapada, to examine whether the Petitioners were provided effective
legal assistance during the reference proceedings and to extend
necessary legal counselling or support henceforth. The Collector,
Nuapada, is also at liberty to consider the Petitioners' grievance
administratively in light of their economic and social circumstances,
without this order being treated as binding on the merits.
21. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.
(Dr.S.K. Panigrahi) Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated the 20th June, 2025/
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