"In view of the Resolution dated 17.09.2013, since the
respondents have already completed the required years of
continuous service/engagement and posts were created
5 The view of Division Bench has been referred to and followed in Brajendra
Kumar Jena Vrs. State of Odisha, 2024 ILR-CUT-ONLINE-785 (Single Bench).
Visiting the webportal reveals that no writ appeal against said judgment has
been preferred by the State of Odisha.
Said matter was carried to the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
S.L.P.(C) No.6851 of 2021 [State of Odisha Vrs.
Biswamitra Parida] wherein the following Order was
passed on 30.06.2021:
In this regard it may be worthy to say that so far as
engagement of employees holding contractual posts are
concerned the provisions of the Odisha Reservation of
Vacancies in Posts and Services (for Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1975 ("ORV Act", for brevity)
have got no application, as held by a Division Bench of
this Court vide Order dated 10.05.2018 passed in the
matter of State of Odisha Vrs. Jatin Kumar Das, W.P.(C)
No.6661 of 2018 6 , which pertains to regularisation in
service of Data Entry Operators engaged on contractual
basis in the Commercial Tax Organization. Following
observation made by the Division Bench of this Court in
Order dated 10.05.2018 in State of Odisha Vrs. Jatin
Kumar Das, W.P.(C) No.6661 of 2018 is noteworthy:
The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed. Pending application, if any,
stands disposed of."
Commercial Taxes Department, with all
consequential service and financial benefits.
3. Narrating the admitted factual scenario, i.e.,
engagement of IT personnel on outsourcing basis
thereafter on direct contractual basis by the
Commercial Taxes Organization Mr. Sahu, learned
Additional Government Advocate assails the
impugned order on the ground that the direction for
regular appointment of those IT personnel violates
the Government of Odisha in G.A. Department
Resolution dated 17.09.2013 fixing certain
mandatory norms for regularization of contractual
appointees. Secondly, 2 persons whose initial
appointment was on outsourcing basis, cannot come
under the regular establishment because no open
and transparent recruitment procedure has
been adopted. Thirdly, provisions of ORV Act
has not been followed while appointing them
on outsourcing and direct contractual basis.
4. Learned Tribunal, taking into consideration the facts
and circumstances of the case as well as
submissions of learned counsel for the parties, has
arrived at the aforesaid conclusion, which is clear,
cogent and well-reasoned, which hardly requires
any interference under writ jurisdiction. Therefore,
we are in agreement with the reasons assigned
and findings arrived at by learned Tribunal in
directing for regular appointment of the
contractual employees in question, including
the opposite party No.1 herein.
However, while parting with the order, we may note
that whatever may be the mode of engagement/
appointment, there is concurrence of the Finance
Department and the employees in question were
engaged in different Departments of the Government
and rendered their services uninterruptedly. Besides
that, mode of engagement adopted and selection
process followed was consciously adopted and law
prevalent at the relevant time for engagement of
contractual employees was scrupulously followed
under the aegis of Government functionaries. But,
surprisingly, after utilizing their services for
more than a decade, when question of bringing
them under regular establishment arises, they
(employees) are pushed to a corner. Government
functionaries in a welfare State should refrain
from adopting hire and fire policy. The action
taken amounts to gambling with the career of
the employees, some of whom might have been
overaged to compete for employment."
7.8. At this juncture this Court feels it apposite to examine
the provisions of the ORV Act and applicability thereof to
the fact-situation of the present case. Even if it is
assumed that the appellant was not appointed by
following the provisions of the ORV Act during the
course of selection procedure, the provisions of the Act
being not applicable to the engagees on contract basis
prior to introduction of sub-section (2) to Section 3 for
the purpose of regularisation in service. The letter of
appointment of the Appointing Authority clearly spells
out that the appellant has been engaged as Contractual
Driver. For that the State Government has introduced
amendment to Section 37 thereof by virtue of the Odisha
Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (for
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Amendment
Ordinance, 2023 [published in Odisha Gazette,
Extraordinary No.1996, dated 19.08.2023], which has
been given effect to "at once". Later said Ordinance has
been promulgated as the Odisha Reservation of
Vacancies in Posts and Services (for Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes) Amendment Act, 2023 [published
in Odisha Gazette, Extraordinary No.2543, dated
7 Section 3 of the Odisha Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (for
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1975, after insertion of sub-
section (2) would read thus:
"3. Applicability.--
(1) This Act shall apply to all appointments to the Posts and Services under
the State except--
(a) Class-I posts which are above the lowest rung thereof and meant
for conducting or guiding or directing Scientific and Technical
research;
(b) Class-I Posts which are above the lowest rung thereof and
classified as scientific posts;
(c) tenure posts;
(d) those filled up on the basis of any contract;
(e) ex-cadre posts;
(f) those which are filled up by transfer within the cadre or on
deputation;
(g) the appointment of such staff the duration of whose appointment
does not extend, beyond the term of office of the person making the
appointment and the work charged staff which are required for
emergencies like flood relief work, accident restoration and relief
etc.;
(h) temporary appointments of less than forty-five days duration;
(h-I) those which are required to be filled up by appointment of persons
under the rehabilitation assistance given to the members of the
family of the deceased or permanent disabled employees who
suffer from the disability while in service;
(i) those in respect of which recruitment is made in accordance with
any provision contained in the Constitution.
(j) Schematic posts.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), reservation shall
apply to appointment made or to be made to all tenure posts or
contractual posts or schematic posts which are to be regularized
against the sanctioned posts."
07.11.2023], which came into force with effect from
19.08.20238. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 as inserted by
virtue of said amendment does not admit of any
ambiguity. Said amendment specifies the effective date
for its enforcement as 19.08.2023 (prospective
amendment). This is clearly indicative that prior to said
date the provisions introduced by way of amendment to
the ORV Act, 1975, had no application to contractual
engagements for consideration of regularisation against
the sanctioned posts.
8 The Odisha Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (for Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Amendment Act, 2023 (Odisha Act 10 of 2023)
stands as follows:
[Be it encacted by the Legislature of the State of Odisha in the Seventy- fourth
Year of the Republic of India, as follows:
1. Short title and commencement.--
(1) This Act may be called the Odisha Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and
Services (for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Amendment Act,
2023.
(2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 19th day of August,
2023.
2. Amendment of Section 3.--
In the Odisha Reservation of Vacancies In Posts and Services (for
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1975 [Odisha Act No. 38 of
1975], Section 3 shall be re-numbered as sub-section (1) thereof and in
sub-section (1) as so re-numbered, --
(i) after clause (i), the following clause shall be inserted, namely:
"(j) Schematic Posts."
(ii) after sub-section (1) so re-numbered, the following sub-section shall be
inserted, namely:
"(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), reservation
shall apply to appointment made or to be made to all tenure posts
or contractual posts or Schematic posts which are to be regularised
against the sanctioned posts."
3. Repeal and Savings.--
(1) The Odisha Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (for Scheduled
Castes and Schedule Tribes) Amendment Ordinance, 2023 [Odisha
Ordinance No.3 of 2023] is hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding the repeal under sub-section (1), anything done or any
action taken under the said Ordinance so repealed shall be deemed to
have been done or taken under this Act.]
It may be stated that recourse to a subsequent
legislation is permissible if there exists any ambiguity in
the earlier legislation for the purpose of ascertaining as
to whether by a subsequent legislation proper
interpretation has been fixed which is to be put upon the
earlier Act. [Mahim Patram Private Ltd. Vrs. Union of
India, 2007 (3) SCC 668]. Glaringly, in the present
context, the case of the appellant emanated prior to the
Odisha Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services
(for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes)
Amendment Act, 2023 came into force. Before said
amendment Act, 2023 came into effect, the appellant
had already been eligible for consideration of
regularization in service and the Odisha Administrative
Tribunal disposed of the Original Application of the
appellant prior to the amendment Act, 2023 came to
operate.
In such conspectus of the matter, the ground for
rejection of claim of the appellant by the HPC as upheld
in the impugned Judgment dated 17.12.2024 that the
provisions of the ORV Act was not followed seems to be
based on incorrect appreciation of legal impact on the
fact-situation obtained on record.
7.9. Under such delineated precinct, this Court is of the
considered view that the learned Single Judge has not
dealt with the issue by considering the legal perspective.
Legal perspective of necessity for consideration of
regularisation in service with regard to engagees having
worked for substantial number of years and cases of
irregular engagement:
8. Legal position with respect to regularisation in service on
having worked for substantial number of years has been
spelt out in very many cases.
8.1. Reference can be had to Union of India Vrs. Subhankari
Das, 2023 (III) ILR-CUT 979, wherein it has been stated
that,
"5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and
after going through the records, it is admitted that
the opposite parties are discharging their duties and
responsibilities from the date of their initial
appointment in the year 1995 and 2002. In the year
2017, their designations were changed without any
change of remuneration. Without regularising their
services, the authorities issued a circular on
15.02.2018, which is absolutely a camouflaged way
of approach to the difficulties of the opposite parties
to deprive them of the benefit of their regularisation
after utilising their services from 1995 and 2002,
i.e., for more than 23 years and 16 years by then.
6. The reliance was placed by the present petitioners
before the Tribunal on the cases of State of
Karnataka Vrs. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1;
Government of Tamil Nadu Vrs. Tamil Nadu Makkal
Nala Paniyalargal, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 393 and
Vibhuti Shankar Pandey Vrs. State of Madhya
Pradesh, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 91 and submission was
made that there was no sanctioned post available
for engagement of the opposite parties and that the
process of engagement of the opposite parties was
not in accordance with Article 14 of the Constitution
of India. Therefore, the opposite parties have no right
for regularisation.
7. The above stand of the petitioners cannot have any
application to the case of the present opposite
parties, as because, in a case of similarly situated
persons, i.e. Basanta Kumar Sahoo Vrs. Union of
India, W.P.(C) No.24759 of 2012, disposed of on
31.07.2017, relying on the decisions rendered in
Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 and State of Karnataka
Vrs. M.L. Keshari, 2010 (II) OLR (SC) 932 = (2010) 9
SCC 247, direction was issued for regularisation of
such employees. Similarly, in the case of Manoj
Kumar Jena Vrs. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 24758
of 2012, disposed of 31.07.2017, this Court also
took the similar view as was taken in the case of
Basanta Kumar Sahoo (supra). The order passed in
the case of Manoj Kumar Jena (supra) was assailed
by the authorities before the Apex Court in S.L.P.
No.35963 of 2017, which was dismissed vide order
dated 05.01.2018. Thereby, the order passed by
this Court in Manoj Kumar Jena (supra) got affirmed
in the apex Court. Here, it is worth mentioning that
in both the cases indicted above, i.e. in the case of
Basanta Kumar Sahoo and Manoj Kumar Jena
(supra), the orders have been passed by one of us
(Dr. B.R. Sarangi, ACJ). The said order having been
affirmed by the apex Court, as a consequence
thereof, the same has been implemented. The
decision of Basanta Kumar Sahoo (supra) was
referred to by the High Court of Delhi in the case of
Amrish Kumar Vrs. Indian Institute of Mass
Communication, W.P.(C) No.5906 of 2018 & CM Appl
No.23016 of 2018, disposed of on 14.02.2020 [2020
SCC OnLine Del 1915].
8. In Amrish Kumar (supra), the High Court of Delhi
observed as follows:
„In the present case too, the workmen admittedly
have been working for 23 years. It clearly
tantamount to unfair labour practice by denying
them the benefits of regular services for 23 years.
The objective of the Act is to prevent unfair labour
practice which is defined in detail in 5th Schedule of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 with reference to
Section 2A. The specific definition applicable to the
present case is clause 10 which reads as under:
„10. To employ workmen as "badlis", casuals or
temporaries and to continue them as such for
years, with the object of depriving them of the
status and privileges of permanent workmen.‟
The facts of the instant case as discussed
hereinabove clearly shows that keeping the
workmen in uninterrupted service for 23 years as
casual workmen and denying them the status and
privilege of permanent workmen, constitutes unfair
labour practice which is illegal and needs to be
quashed. Furthermore, similarly situated workmen
of the respondent who worked in its other
administrative unit in Orissa (Dhenkanal), for
roughly half a century on ad hoc basis, have been
directed by the Orissa High Court in Basanta Kumar
Sahoo Vrs. Union of India, W.P.(C) No.24759 of
2012, decided on 31.07.2017 to be regularized. The
said judgment has referred to and relied upon
Umadevi (supra) and State of Karnataka Vrs. M.L.
Kesari (2010) 9 SCC 247. The SLP against the said
judgment of the Orissa High Court was dismissed by
the Supreme Court on 05.01.2018; therefore, it has
attained finality. The case of the present petitioners
is identical. That being the position i.e. they had
worked for almost 23 years; the employer was
same; they had been working against the
sanctioned posts; they were not considered as
regular employees, therefore, the treatment meted
out to them constitutes unfair labour practice. In the
circumstances, their services too shall be regularized
from initial date of joining, with all consequential
benefits.
9. It is pertinent to mention here that the decision
rendered by the High Court of Delhi in Amrish
Kumar (supra) was challenged before the apex Court
in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 710 of 2021,
which was dismissed vide order dated 10.12.2021
and, as a consequence thereof, the same has also
been implemented. Therefore, the Central
Administrative Tribunal, relying on the said
judgment, having passed the order impugned, this
Court is not inclined to interfere with the same. As
such, the order passed by the Central Administrative
Tribunal dated 13.07.2023 in O.A. No. 260/00/163
of 2018 is hereby confirmed and the petitioners
are directed to regularise the service of the
opposite parties from initial date of their
joining with all consequential benefits within a
period of sixty days from the date of receipt of
the order."
8.2. In view of State of Jammu and Kashmir Vrs. District Bar
Association, Bandipora, MANU/SC/1566/2016 = (2017)
3 SCC 410; and Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra Vrs. State
of Odisha, (2014) 4 SCC 583 = AIR 2014 SC 1716
wherein it has been clearly laid down that in order to
ascertain whether an appointment is irregular or illegal,
the Court would have to enquire as to whether the
appointment process adopted was tainted by vice of non-
adherence to an essential prerequisite or is liable to be
faulted on account of the lack of a fair process of
recruitment. It has already been noticed in Umadevi‟s
case, (2006) 4 SCC 1, which was further explained in
State of Karnataka Vrs. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247,
that the "regularisation" in service can be permissible if
the following conditions are fulfilled:
i. The employee concerned should have worked for 10
years or more in duly sanctioned post without the
benefit or protection of the interim order of any
Court or Tribunal.
ii. In other words, the State Government or its
instrumentality should have employed the employee
and continued him in service voluntarily and
continuously for more than ten years.
8.3. The view of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India expressed in
the case of Jaggo Vrs. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 3826 = 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1032, is as follows
(extracted from SCC):
"20. It is well established that the decision in Uma
Devi (supra) does not intend to penalize
employees who have rendered long years of
service fulfilling ongoing and necessary
functions of the State or its instrumentalities.
The said judgment sought to prevent backdoor
entries and illegal appointments that circumvent
constitutional requirements. However, where
appointments were not illegal but possibly
"irregular," and where employees had served
continuously against the backdrop of sanctioned
functions for a considerable period, the need for a
fair and humane resolution becomes paramount.
Prolonged, continuous, and unblemished service
performing tasks inherently required on a regular
basis can, over the time, transform what was
initially ad-hoc or temporary into a scenario
demanding fair regularization. In a recent
judgment of this Court in Vinod Kumar Vrs. Union
of India, (2024) 1 SCR 1230, it was held that held
that procedural formalities cannot be used to
deny regularization of service to an employee
whose appointment was termed "temporary"
but has performed the same duties as
performed by the regular employee over a
considerable period in the capacity of the
regular employee. The relevant paras of this
judgment have been reproduced below:
„6. The application of the judgment in Uma Devi
(supra) by the High Court does not fit
squarely with the facts at hand, given the
specific circumstances under which the
appellants were employed and have
continued their service. The reliance on
procedural formalities at the outset
cannot be used to perpetually deny
substantive rights that have accrued
over a considerable period through
continuous service. Their promotion was
based on a specific notification for vacancies
and a subsequent circular, followed by a
selection process involving written tests and
interviews, which distinguishes their case
from the appointments through back door
entry as discussed in the case of Uma Devi
(supra).
7. The judgment in the case Uma Devi (supra)
also distinguished between "irregular" and
"illegal" appointments underscoring the
importance of considering certain
appointments even if were not made strictly
in accordance with the prescribed Rules and
Procedure, cannot be said to have been
made illegally if they had followed the
procedures of regular appointments such as
conduct of written examinations or
interviews as in the present case. ***‟
21. The High Court placed undue emphasis on the
initial label of the appellants‟ engagements and the
outsourcing decision taken after their dismissal.
Courts must look beyond the surface labels and
consider the realities of employment: continuous,
long-term service, indispensable duties, and
absence of any mala fide or illegalities in their
appointments. In that light, refusing
regularization simply because their original
terms did not explicitly state so, or because
an outsourcing policy was belatedly
introduced, would be contrary to principles of
fairness and equity.
22. The pervasive misuse of temporary
employment contracts, as exemplified in this
case, reflects a broader systemic issue that
adversely affects workers' rights and job
security. In the private sector, the rise of the gig
economy has led to an increase in precarious
employment arrangements, often characterized by
lack of benefits, job security, and fair treatment.
Such practices have been criticized for exploiting
workers and undermining labour standards.
Government institutions, entrusted with upholding
the principles of fairness and justice, bear an even
greater responsibility to avoid such exploitative
employment practices. When public sector entities
engage in misuse of temporary contracts, it not
only mirrors the detrimental trends observed in the
gig economy but also sets a concerning precedent
that can erode public trust in governmental
operations.
23. The International Labour Organization (ILO), of
which India is a founding member, has
consistently advocated for employment stability
and the fair treatment of workers. The ILO‟s
Multinational Enterprises Declaration [International
Labour Organization-- Tripartite Declaration of
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and
Social Policy] encourages companies to provide
stable employment and to observe obligations
concerning employment stability and social
security. It emphasizes that enterprises should
assume a leading role in promoting
employment security, particularly in contexts
where job discontinuation could exacerbate
long-term unemployment.
24. The landmark judgment of the United State in the
case of Vizcaino Vrs. Microsoft Corporation, 97
F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996) serves as a pertinent
example from the private sector, illustrating the
consequences of misclassifying employees to
circumvent providing benefits. In this case,
Microsoft classified certain workers as independent
contractors, thereby denying them employee
benefits. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit determined that these workers were, in fact,
common-law employees and were entitled to the
same benefits as regular employees. The Court
noted that large Corporations have increasingly
adopted the practice of hiring temporary employees
or independent contractors as a means of avoiding
payment of employee benefits, thereby increasing
their profits. This judgment underscores the
principle that the nature of the work performed,
rather than the label assigned to the worker,
should determine employment status and the
corresponding rights and benefits. It highlights
the judiciary's role in rectifying such
misclassifications and ensuring that workers
receive fair treatment.
25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary
employees, particularly in government institutions,
often face multifaceted forms of exploitation. While
the foundational purpose of temporary contracts
may have been to address short-term or seasonal
needs, they have increasingly become a
mechanism to evade long-term obligations owed to
employees. These practices manifest in several
ways:
Misuse of "Temporary" Labels:
Employees engaged for work that is essential,
recurring, and integral to the functioning of an
institution are often labeled as "temporary" or
"contractual," even when their roles mirror those of
regular employees. Such misclassification deprives
workers of the dignity, security, and benefits that
regular employees are entitled to, despite
performing identical tasks.
Arbitrary Termination:
Temporary employees are frequently dismissed
without cause or notice, as seen in the present
case. This practice undermines the principles of
natural justice and subjects workers to a state of
constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or
duration of their service.
Lack of Career Progression:
Temporary employees often find themselves
excluded from opportunities for skill development,
promotions, or incremental pay raises. They remain
stagnant in their roles, creating a systemic
disparity between them and their regular
counterparts, despite their contributions being
equally significant.
Using Outsourcing as a Shield:
Institutions increasingly resort to outsourcing roles
performed by temporary employees, effectively
replacing one set of exploited workers with
another. This practice not only perpetuates
exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate
effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular
employment.
Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits:
Temporary employees are often denied
fundamental benefits such as pension, provident
fund, health insurance, and paid leave, even when
their tenure spans decades. This lack of social
security subjects them and their families to undue
hardship, especially in cases of illness, retirement,
or unforeseen circumstances.
26. While the judgment in Uma Devi (supra)
sought to curtail the practice of backdoor
entries and ensure appointments adhered to
constitutional principles, it is regrettable that
its principles are often misinterpreted or
misapplied to deny legitimate claims of long-
serving employees. This judgment aimed to
distinguish between "illegal" and "irregular"
appointments. It categorically held that employees
in irregular appointments, who were engaged in
duly sanctioned posts and had served
continuously for more than ten years, should be
considered for regularization as a one-time
measure. However, the laudable intent of the
judgment is being subverted when institutions rely
on its dicta to indiscriminately reject the claims of
employees, even in cases where their
appointments are not illegal, but merely lack
adherence to procedural formalities. Government
departments often cite the judgment in Uma
Devi (supra) to argue that no vested right to
regularization exists for temporary
employees, overlooking the judgment's
explicit acknowledgment of cases where
regularization is appropriate. This selective
application distorts the judgment's spirit and
purpose, effectively weaponizing it against
employees who have rendered indispensable
services over decades.
27. In light of these considerations, in our opinion, it is
imperative for Government departments to lead by
example in providing fair and stable employment.
Engaging workers on a temporary basis for
extended periods, especially when their roles are
integral to the organization's functioning, not only
contravenes international labour standards but
also exposes the organization to legal challenges
and undermines employee morale. By ensuring
fair employment practices, Government
institutions can reduce the burden of
unnecessary litigation, promote job security,
and uphold the principles of justice and
fairness that they are meant to embody. This
approach aligns with international standards and
sets a positive precedent for the private sector to
follow, thereby contributing to the overall
betterment of labour practices in the country."
8.4. In the case of Shripal Vrs. Nagar Nigam, 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 221 = 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 referring to
observations rendered in Jaggo (supra), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India has been pleased to clarify that
(extracted from SCC):
"16. The High Court did acknowledge the Employer‟s
inability to justify these abrupt terminations.
Consequently, it ordered re-engagement on daily
wages with some measure of parity in minimum
pay. Regrettably, this only perpetuated
precariousness: the Appellant Workmen were
left in a marginally improved yet still
uncertain status. While the High Court
recognized the importance of their work and hinted
at eventual regularization, it failed to afford them
continuity of service or meaningful back wages
commensurate with the degree of statutory
violation evident on record.
17. In light of these considerations, the Employer‟s
discontinuation of the Appellant Workmen stands
in violation of the most basic labour law principles.
Once it is established that their services were
terminated without adhering to Sections 6E and 6N
of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that
they were engaged in essential, perennial duties,
these workers cannot be relegated to perpetual
uncertainty. While concerns of municipal budget
and compliance with recruitment rules merit
consideration, such concerns do not absolve the
Employer of statutory obligations or negate
equitable entitlements. Indeed, bureaucratic
limitations cannot trump the legitimate
rights of workmen who have served
continuously in de facto regular roles for an
extended period.
18. The impugned order of the High Court, to the extent
they confine the Appellant Workmen to future
daily-wage engagement without continuity or
meaningful back wages, is hereby set aside with
the following directions:
I. The discontinuation of the Appellant
Workmen‟s services, effected without
compliance with Section 6E and Section 6N
of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is
declared illegal. All orders or
communications terminating their services
are quashed. In consequence, the Appellant
Workmen shall be treated as continuing in
service from the date of their termination, for
all purposes, including seniority and
continuity in service.
II. The Respondent Employer shall reinstate the
Appellant Workmen in their respective posts
(or posts akin to the duties they previously
performed) within four weeks from the date
of this judgment. Their entire period of
absence (from the date of termination until
actual reinstatement) shall be counted for
continuity of service and all consequential
benefits, such as seniority and eligibility for
promotions, if any.
III. Considering the length of service, the
Appellant Workmen shall be entitled to 50%
of the back wages from the date of their
discontinuation until their actual
reinstatement. The Respondent Employer
shall clear the aforesaid dues within three
months from the date of their reinstatement.
IV. The Respondent Employer is directed to
initiate a fair and transparent process for
regularizing the Appellant Workmen within
six months from the date of reinstatement,
duly considering the fact that they have
performed perennial municipal duties akin to
permanent posts. In assessing
regularization, the Employer shall not impose
educational or procedural criteria
retroactively if such requirements were never
applied to the Appellant Workmen or to
similarly situated regular employees in the
past. To the extent that sanctioned vacancies
for such duties exist or are required, the
Respondent Employer shall expedite all
necessary administrative processes to
ensure these long time employees are not
indefinitely retained on daily wages contrary
to statutory and equitable norms."
8.5. It is apt to refer to the anxious consideration shown by
the Madras High Court in N. Karunanidhi Vrs. Union of
India, W.P. No. 12887 of 2016, vide Judgment dated
22.04.2022 rendered with respect to exploitation of
service. The following benevolent observation has been
made by said Court in favour of the employees, whose
services have been utilized by the Government for a
substantial length of time:
"18. If the Courts cannot give direction for their
regularisation of service, in the constrained legal
scenario what other remedies that are available to
these unfortunate employees, who have been
engaged in service for public purpose, without
having any definite future to hold on? These
petitioners cannot be kept on the tenterhooks
of their employment for years together, by
brushing aside and discarding their concerned
yearning for a definite future, with
unresponsive indifference.
19. A welfare State grounded on constitutional
values, cannot come up with apathetic and
callous stand that despite continued
employment of these petitioners for years
together, no semblance of right is available to
them. Such stand by the State is opposed to
constitutional values as enshrined in Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. The Courts of course have
held that equal opportunity must be provided in
public employment and entry through back door
should be discountenanced. When Article 21, being
violated by the State, action towards its servants,
the consideration of the Government must primarily
be focussed on alleviating legitimate grievances of
its employees. Even assuming that the recruitment of
these writ petitioners had not been fully in
consonance with the procedure for appointment in
Government services, the fact remained that these
persons have been consciously appointed by the
Government for implementing public projects and the
work has been extracted from them continuously for
several years. It is therefore, not open to the
Government after a period of time to turn around
and contend that these writ petitioners have no right
at all to seek any kind of guarantee for their future.
20. In the opinion of this Court, continued
employment for several years, even on a
projects meant to serve the State as a whole,
certain rights would definitely accrue to them,
atleast to the extent of making a claim for
formulation of a scheme/towards their
absorption. This Court is quite conscious of the fact
that the Government has been benevolent and had
come up with several schemes in the past and
directed regularisation of services of thousands of
employees over a period of time. Such benevolence
ought to permeate to the lowest levels to take within
its sweep the desperate cry of the petitioners as
well. As in the sublime words of the father of nation,
Mahatma Gandhi, „A nation‟s greatness is measured
by how it treats its weakest members‟. Merely
because these writ petitioners have been employed
in the projects, the policy makers may not shut their
mind and close their eyes to their precarious plight
having to serve public purpose but left in the lurch
and unprotected, at the end of the day."
8.6. In Sheo Narain Nagar Vrs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2017)
11 SCR 138, the Hon'ble Supreme Court recognized such
employment on temporary status as on exploitative
terms. The pertinent observation made in the said case
is quoted hereunder:
"8. When we consider the prevailing scenario, it is
painful to note that the decision in Uma Devi
(Supra) has not been properly understood and
rather wrongly applied by various State
Governments. We have called for the data in the
instant case to ensure as to how many employees
were working on contract basis or ad-hoc basis or
daily-wage basis in different State departments. We
can take judicial notice that widely aforesaid
practice is being continued. Though this Court has
emphasised that incumbents should be
appointed on regular basis as per rules but
new devise of making appointment on contract
basis has been adopted, employment is offered
on daily wage basis etc. in exploitative forms.
This situation was not envisaged by Uma Devi
(supra). The prime intendment of the decision was
that the employment process should be by fair
means and not by back door entry and in the
available pay scale. That spirit of the Uma Devi
(supra) has been ignored and conveniently over
looked by various State Governments/
authorities. We regretfully make the
observation that Uma Devi (supra) has not be
implemented in its true spirit and has not been
followed in its pith and substance. It is being
used only as a tool for not regularizing the services
of incumbents. They are being continued in service
without payment of due salary for which they are
entitled on the basis of Article 14, l6 read with
Article 34(1)(d) of the Constitution of India as if they
have no constitutional protection as envisaged in
D.S. Nakara Vrs. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130
from cradle to grave. In heydays of life they are
serving on exploitative terms with no guarantee of
livelihood to be continued and in old age they are
going to be destituted, there being no provision for
pension, retiral benefits etc. There is clear
contravention of constitutional provisions and
aspiration of down trodden class. They do have
equal rights and to make them equals they
require protection and cannot be dealt with
arbitrarily. The kind of treatment meted out is not
only bad but equally unconstitutional and is denial
of rights. We have to strike a balance to really
implement the ideology of Uma Devi (supra). Thus,
the time has come to stop the situation where Uma
Devi (supra) can be permitted to be flouted, whereas,
this Court has interdicted such employment way
back in the year 2006. The employment cannot be
on exploitative terms, whereas Uma Devi
(supra) laid down that there should not be back
door entry and every post should be filled by
regular employment, but a new device has been
adopted for making appointment on payment
of paltry system on contract/adhoc basis or
otherwise. This kind of action is not permissible,
when we consider the pith and substance of true
spirit in Umadevi (supra).
9. Coming to the facts of the instant case, there was a
direction issued way back in the year 1999, to
consider the regularization of the appellants.
However, regularization was not done. The
respondents chose to give minimum of the pay scale,
which was available to the regular employees, way
back in the year 2000 and by passing an order, the
appellants were also conferred temporary status in
the year 2006, with retrospective effect on
2.10.2002. As the respondents have themselves
chosen to confer a temporary status to the
employees, as such there was requirement at
work and posts were also available at the
particular point of time when order was
passed. Thus, the submission raised by learned
counsel for the respondent that posts were not
available, is belied by their own action. Obviously,
the order was passed considering the long
period of services rendered by the appellants,
which were taken on exploitative terms.
10. The High Court dismissed the writ application
relying on the decision in Umadevi (supra). But the
appellants were employed basically in the year
1993; they had rendered service for three
years, when they were offered the service on
contract basis; it was not the case of back door
entry; and there were no Rules in place for
offering such kind of appointment. Thus, the
appointment could not be said to be illegal and in
contravention of Rules, as there were no such Rules
available at the relevant point of time, when their
temporary status was conferred with effect from
02.10.2002. The appellants were required to be
appointed on regular basis as a one-time
measure, as laid down in paragraph 53 of
Umadevi (supra). Since the appellants had
completed 10 years of service and temporary
status had been given by the respondents with
retrospective effect in the 02.10.2002, we
direct that the services of the appellants be
regularized from the said date i.e. 02.10.2002,
consequential benefits and the arrears of pay
also to be paid to the appellants within a
period of three months from today."
8.7. It is manifest from record that by now the petitioner-
Appellant, being appointed by duly authorized
Appointing Authority, has completed more than 10 years
of service, which is requisite length of service for
consideration of regularization in service as per Umadevi
(3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 [although the Government of Odisha
has accepted six years of satisfactory service for
regularization in terms of Resolution dated 17.09.2013
read with Resolution dated 16.01.2014] and the
authorities of the Regional Transport Officer employed
the petitioner-Appellant and extended his terms in
service voluntarily and continuously for more than ten
years.
8.8. It is trite that where the appointments are not made or
continued against sanctioned posts or where the persons
appointed do not possess the prescribed minimum
qualifications, the appointments will be considered to be
illegal. But in the instant case, as there is no complaint
with respect to possession of the prescribed
qualifications and the appellant has been working
against sanctioned post on being selected by undergoing
the process of selection, such appointment could neither
be said to be illegal nor irregular.
8.9. Noteworthy to refer to the Order dated 06.12.2021
passed in W.A. No.231 of 2016 [Vice Chairman, State
Council for Technical Education & Vocational Training,
Odisha Vrs. Braja K. Mohanty] and batch, wherein it has
been observed as follows:
"In each of these appeals, the respondent has worked as
contractual watchman for over ten years. It is also stated
in the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition in
paragraph 13 by the present appellants that there were in
fact five vacancies in sanctioned posts of watchman. The
only distinction sought to be made is that for benefiting by
the decision in Secretary, State of Karnataka Vrs.
Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1, their appointments had to be
merely „irregular‟ and not „illegal‟. The fact remains that
the respondents have been working continuously as
watchmen. It is not the case of the appellant that they are
not qualified to be employed as watchman. Given the
fact that the respondents have worked as watchmen
on contract basis for over ten years, it is obvious
that the appellant requires their services. In the
circumstances, this Court is not inclined to interfere with
the impugned order of the learned Single Judge requiring
the appellants to consider the cases of the respondents for
regularization. The appeals are dismissed."
8.10. Noticing the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others Vrs.
Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1, in Niranjan Nayak Vrs.
State of Odisha & Others, 2023 (I) OLR 407 the
observation of this Court runs as follows:
"12. Similarly, in the case of Amarendra Kumar
Mahapatra and Others Vrs. State of Odisha and
Others, (2014) 4 SCC 583 = AIR 2014 SC 1716, the
Supreme Court was of the opinion that the
appellants were entitled to regularization in service
having regard to the fact that they have rendered
long years of service on ad hoc basis.
13. In the case at hand, it can be ascertained that the
petitioner was appointed against a substantive
vacant post and he had been discharging his
duties in the said post since 1993. The
appointment was made on an ad hoc basis and was
extended from time to time. Since the petitioner was
appointed against substantive vacancy and the post
was sanctioned by higher authorities, the petitioner
should have been extended the benefit of
regulatisation like other similarly situated persons."
8.11. In the case at hand there is nothing placed on record
except contemplation of the HPC to revoke the order of
regularisation in service being made in respect of four
persons out of fourteen Contractual Drivers.
Nevertheless, having not challenged the Order dated
12.01.2018 passed in OA No.1234 of 2016 (Prafulla
Kumar Behera Vrs. State of Odisha) the respondents
allowed the same to attain its finality, and at this belated
stage they cannot take the same stand for adjudication
afresh which fell for consideration before the learned
Odisha Administrative Tribunal. Reading of counter
affidavit filed by the Under Secretary on behalf of STA in
W.P.(C) No.2157 of 2020 (Krodapati Saraf Vrs. State of
Odisha) the contentions and grounds justifying rejection
of claim of the appellant appears to be contrary to what
is reflected in the letter of recommendation vide No.IX-
29/2016-- 16925/TC, dated 31.10.2016 of Under-
Secretary, STA, Odisha, Cuttack and observations and
directions contained in Order dated 12.01.2018 passed
in O.A. No.1234 of 2016 by the Odisha Administrative
Tribunal, and thereby, such a course adopted by the
respondents is hit by the principles of estoppel on the
anvil of proposition of law laid down in Bikash Mahalik
Vrs. State of Odisha, 2022 (I) ILR-CUT 108.
8.12. In such view of the matter, this Court cannot
countenance the reasons assigned by the learned Single
Judge to uphold the denial of the regularisation in
service of the appellant by the HPC. There was no
occasion for the HPC to consider the same grounds
which had already been addressed to and decided by
referring to counter affidavit filed by the respondents
before the learned Odisha Administrative Tribunal in
O.A. No.1234 of 2016 (supra).
Conclusion:
9. Given the above factual matrix and circumstances
coupled with legal perspective, the following norms set
forth by the Constitution Bench in State of Karnataka
Vrs. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 does require to be
adhered to:
"53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be
cases where irregular appointments (not illegal
appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa,
(1967) 1 SCR 128 = AIR 1967 SC 1071, R.N.
Nanjundappa, (1972) 1 SCC 409 = (1972) 2 SCR 799
and B.N. Nagarajan, (1979) 4 SCC 507 = (1979) 3
SCR 937 and referred to in para 15 above, of duly
qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant
posts might have been made and the employees
have continued to work for ten years or more
but without the intervention of orders of the
courts or of tribunals. The question of
regularisation of the services of such employees may
have to be considered on merits in the light of the
principles settled by this Court in the cases above-
referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that
context, the Union of India, the State Governments
and their instrumentalities should take steps to
regularise as a one-time measure, the services of
such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten
years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under
cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and
should further ensure that regular recruitments are
undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that
require to be filled up, in cases where temporary
employees or daily wagers are being now employed.
The process must be set in motion within six months
from this date. We also clarify that regularisation, if
any already made, but not sub judice, need not be
reopened based on this judgment, but there should
be no further bypassing of the constitutional
requirement and regularising or making permanent,
those not duly appointed as per the constitutional
scheme."
9.1. Culling out above paragraph from Umadevi (supra), in
the case of Vinod Kumar Vrs. Union of India, (2024) 1
SCR 1230 = 2024 INSC 332 it has been indicated as
follows:
"4. The appellants have approached this Court arguing
that the High Court erred in its judgment by failing
to recognize the substantive nature of their duties,
which align with regular employment rather than the
temporary or scheme-based roles they were
originally appointed for. Furthermore, their
promotion by a regularly constituted Departmental
Promotional Committee, the selection process they
underwent, and the continuous nature of their
service for over a quarter of a century underscored
their argument for regularization and that the High
Court has incorrectly applied the principles from the
case of Uma Devi (supra) to their situation.
***
8. In light of the reasons recorded above, this Court
finds merit in the appellants‟ arguments and holds
that their service conditions, as evolved over time,
warrant a reclassification from temporary to regular
status. The failure to recognize the substantive
nature of their roles and their continuous
service akin to permanent employees runs
counter to the principles of equity, fairness,
and the intent behind employment
regulations."
9.2. After taking note of judgments rendered in Secretary,
State of Karnataka Vrs. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1, State
of Karnataka Vrs. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247, &c. the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Neelima Srivastava
Vrs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 8 SCR 167 = 2021
SCC OnLine SC 610 observed:
"32. The Division Bench of the High Court proceeded as if
it was hearing an appeal against the judgment
dated 23.01.2006 of the learned Single Judge which
had already attained finality. Appeal filed under the
Rules of the Court was filed against the judgment
dated 15.05.2014 rendered in Writ Petition No. 8597
of 2010. It is a well settled principle of law that
a Letters Patent Appeal which is in
continuation of a Writ Petition cannot be filed
collaterally to set aside the judgment of the
same High Court rendered in an earlier round
of litigation ignoring the principles of res-
judicata and doctrine of finality.
33. By a majority decision in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar
Vrs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1 has laid
down the law in this regard as under:
„When a Judge deals with matters brought before
him for his adjudication, he first decides questions,
of fact on which the parties are at issue, and then
applies the relevant law to the said facts. Whether
the findings of fact recorded by the Judge are right
or wrong, and whether the conclusion of law drawn
by him suffers from any infirmity, can be considered
and decided if the party aggrieved by the decision of
the Judge takes the matter up before the appellate
Court.
34. In Rupa Ashok Hurra Vrss. Ashok Hurra & Anr.,
(1999) 2 SCC 103, while dealing with an identical
issue this Court held that reconsideration of the
judgment of this Court which has attained finality is
not normally permissible. The decision upon a
question of law rendered by this Court was
conclusive and would bind the Court in subsequent
cases. The Court cannot sit in appeal against its
own judgment.
35. In Union of India & Ors. Vrs. Major S.P. Sharma &
Ors., (2014) 6 SCC 351, a three-judge bench of this
Court has held as under:
„A decision rendered by a competent court cannot be
challenged in collateral proceedings for the reason
that if it is permitted to do so there would be
confusion and chaos and the finality of proceedings
would cease to have any meaning.‟
36. Thus, it is very well settled that it is not permissible
for the parties to re-open the concluded judgments of
the Court as the same may not only tantamount to
an abuse of the process of the Court but would have
far reaching adverse effect on the administration of
justice."
9.3. In N. Ramachandra Reddy Vrs. State of Telangana,
(2019) 11 SCR 792 it has been restated as follows:
"43. Further, in the case of Management of Narendra &
Company Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Workmen of Narendra &
Company, (2016) 3 SCC 340, while considering the
scope of the intra-Court appeal, this Court has held
that, unless Appellate Bench concludes that findings
of the learned Single Judge are perverse, it shall not
disturb the same."
9.4. In Management of Narendra & Company Pvt. Ltd. Vrs.
Workmen of Narendra & Company, (2016) 3 SCC 340 it
has been observed as follows:
"Be that as it may, in an intra-court appeal, on a finding
of fact, unless the appellate Bench reaches a conclusion
that the finding of the Single Bench is perverse, it shall
not disturb the same. Merely because another view or a
better view is possible, there should be no interference
with or disturbance of the order passed by the Single
Judge, unless both sides agree for a fairer approach on
relief."
9.5. In Wander Ltd. Vrs. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp. SCC
727 following is the observation:
"14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against
the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In
such appeals, the appellate Court will not interfere
with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first
instance and substitute its own discretion except
where the discretion has been shown to have been
exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or
where the court had ignored the settled principles of
law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory
injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion
is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court
will not reassess the material and seek to reach a
conclusion different from the one reached by the
court below if the one reached by that court was
reasonably possible on the material. The appellate
court would normally not be justified in interfering
with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely
on the ground that if it had considered the matter at
the trial stage it would have come to a contrary
conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by
the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner
the fact that the appellate court would have taken a
different view may not justify interference with the
trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to
these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers
(Mysore) Private Ltd. Vrs. Pothan Joseph, (1960) 3
SCR 713 = AIR 1960 SC 1156: (SCR 721)
„*** These principles are well established, but as has
been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles
Osenton & Co. Vrs. Jhanaton,1942 AC 130:
„*** the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of
an order made by a judge below in the exercise of
his discretion is well established, and any difficulty
that arises is due only to the application of well
settled principles in an individual case.‟ ***'***"
9.6. In Anindita Mohanty Vrs. The Senior Regional Manager,
H.P. Co. Ltd., Bhubaneswar, 2020 (II) ILR-CUT 398 this
Court had the occasion to examine the scope of intra-
Court appeal and observed as follows:
"*** Let us first examine the power of the Division Bench
while entertaining a Letters Patent appeal against the
judgment/order of the Single Judge. This writ appeal has
been nomenclature as an application under Article 4 of
the Orissa High Court Order, 1948 read with clause 10 of
the Letters Patent Act, 1992. Letters Patent of the Patna
High Court has been made applicable to this Court by
virtue of Orissa High Court Order, 1948. Letters Patent
Appeal is an intra-Court appeal where under the Letters
Patent Bench, sitting as a Court of Correction, corrects its
own orders in exercise of the same jurisdiction as vested
in the Single Bench. (Ref: (1996) 3 SCC 52, Baddula
Lakshmaiah Vrs. Shri Anjaneya Swami Temple). The
Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal should not disturb
the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Single Judge
of the Court unless it is shown to be based on no
evidence, perverse, palpably unreasonable or inconsistent
with any particular position in law. This scope of
interference is within a narrow compass. Appellate
jurisdiction under Letters Patent is really a corrective
jurisdiction and it is used rarely only to correct errors, if
any made.
In the case of B. Venkatamuni Vrs. C.J. Ayodhya Ram
Singh reported in (2006) 13 SCC 449, it is held that in an
intra-Court appeal, the Division Bench undoubtedly may
be entitled to reappraise both questions of fact and law,
but entertainment of a letters patent appeal is
discretionary and normally the Division Bench would not,
unless there exist cogent reasons, differ from a finding of
fact arrived at by the Single Judge. Even a Court of first
appeal which is the final Court of appeal on fact may
have to exercise some amount of restraint. Similar view
was taken in the case of Umabai Vrs. Nilkanth Dhondiba
Chavan reported in (2005) 6 SCC 243. In the case of
Commissioner of Income Tax Vrs. Karnataka Planters
Coffee Curing Work Private Limited reported in (2016) 9
SCC 538, it is held that the jurisdiction of the Division
Bench in a writ appeal is primarily one of adjudication of
questions of law. Findings of fact recorded concurrently
by the authorities under the Act concerned (Income Tax
Act) and also in the first round of the writ proceedings by
the learned Single Judge are not to be lightly disturbed.
Thus a writ appeal is an appeal on principle where the
legality and validity of the judgment and/or order of the
Single Judge is tested and it can be set aside only when
there is a patent error on the face of the record or the
judgment is against established or settled principle of
law. If two views are possible and a view, which is
reasonable and logical, has been adopted by a Single
Judge, the other view, howsoever appealing may be to the
Division Bench; it is the view adopted by the Single
Judge, which would, normally be allowed to prevail. If the
discretion has been exercised by the Single Judge in good
faith and after giving due weight to relevant matters and
without being swayed away by irrelevant matters and if
two views are possible on the question, then also the
Division Bench in writ appeal should not interfere, even
though it would have exercised its discretion in a different
manner, were the case come initially before it. The
exercise of discretion by the Single Judge should
manifestly be wrong which would then give scope of
interference to the Division Bench."
9.7. With such delineated scope laid down with respect to
consideration of writ appeal, this Court finds that there
is factual perversity as well as legal flaw apparent on the
face of Judgment dated 17.12.2024 of the learned Single
Bench. Therefore, it is felt expedient to show indulgence
in said judgment.
10. For the reasons ascribed supra and in the light of
discussions made in the foregoing paragraphs and
bearing in mind the scope for interference while sitting
in intra-Court appeal filed under Article 4 of the Orissa
High Court Order, 1948 read with Clause 10 of the
Letters Patent constituting the High Court of Judicature
at Patna and Rule 6 of Chapter-III and Rule 2 of
Chapter-VIII of the Rules of the High Court of Orissa,
1948, this Court sets aside the Judgment dated
17.12.2024 rendered in W.P.(C) No.2160 of 2020.
11. As a consequence of such order, needless to say that the
Order of disengagement of Contractual Drivers, so far as
the appellant is concerned, vide Letter No.IX-29/2020--
658/TC, dated 14.01.2020 (Annexure-1 of writ petition)
and Office Order bearing No.13642/TC, dated
24.11.2018 issued from the Office of the Transport
Commissioner-cum-Chairman, State Transport
Authority, Odisha, Cuttack (Annexure-2 of writ petition)
declining to regularise services of the appellant on the
grounds that "High Power Committee has considered the
matter and decided not to regularise services of the
applicant as he was not engaged against contractual
post created with concurrence of Finance Department
and no post of regular Driver was abolished for the
purpose and provisions of ORV Act was not followed"
stand quashed, being contrary to facts stated in
recommendation in the Letter No.IX-29/2016--
16925/TC, dated 31.10.2016 of Under-Secretary, STA,
Odisha, Cuttack issued from the above said Office of
STA as well as the findings, observations and directions
contained in Order dated 12.01.2018 passed in O.A.
No.1234 of 2016 by the learned Odisha Administrative
Tribunal in the case of present appellant, titled Prafulla
Kumar Behera Vrs. State of Odisha.
11.1. As is ex facie manifest from the Counter-Affidavit sworn
to by Under Secretary, State Transport Authority, filed
on behalf of the State Transport Authority in the writ
petition being W.P.(C) No.2157 of 2020 (which was
disposed of vide common Judgement dated 17.12.2024),
is hit by estoppel, inasmuch as the Order dated
12.01.2018 passed in O.A. No.1234 of 2016 by the
learned Odisha Administrative Tribunal attained its
finality being not challenged before higher Court(s).
11.2. Ergo, it is directed that the respondents shall take a
decision within three months from date in the light of
the observations made herein above keeping in view the
legal position discussed in this Judgment and comply
with the direction contained in Order dated 12.01.2018
passed in O.A. No.1234 of 2016 by the learned Odisha
Administrative Tribunal.
12. In the result, this writ appeal is allowed; so also the writ
petition as a consequence thereof; and all pending
Signature Not
Verified interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand disposed
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASWINI KUMAR
SETHY
Designation: Personal Assistant
of, but in the circumstances, there shall be no order as
(Secretary-in-Charge)
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
to costs.
Date: 19-Jun-2025 17:24:40
I agree.
(HARISH TANDON) (MURAHARI SRI RAMAN)
CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE
High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
The 19th June, 2025//Aswini/MRS
