Orissa High Court
Sidheswar Mallik vs State Of Odisha ..... Opposite Party on 19 June, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLMC No.1124 of 2025
Application under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023.
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Sidheswar Mallik ..... Petitioner
-versus-
State of Odisha ..... Opposite Party
For Petitioner : Mr. Susant Kumar Lenka, Advocate
For Opposite Party : Mr. Udit Ranjan Jena, AGA
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CORAM:
HON'BLE MISS JUSTICE SAVITRI RATHO
JUDGMENT
19.06.2025
Savitri Ratho, J. This application has been filed with a prayer for quashing
the criminal proceeding in G.R. Case No.106 of 2025 arising out of
Sorada P.S. Case No.59 of 2025 pending in the Court of learned
J.M.F.C., Sorada, registered for commission of offences punishable
under Sections 318(4) and 336(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita
(in short, the „BNS‟).
ALLEGATIONS IN FIR
2. First Information Report (in short "FIR") has been lodged
at the Sorada Police Station by one Ramakrushna Mallik of Village
Gajalabadi on 03.02.205 and Sorada P.S. Case No 59 of 2025 has
been registered against the petitioner for commission of offences
under Sections 318(4) and 336 (3) of the BNS .
3. It has been stated in the FIR that the petitioner is working as a
Medical Attendant at Hinjilikatu CHC, Belagaon, has secured
government job by submitting fake certificate educational
qualification, fake certificate pertaining to date of birth and fake
certificate pertaining to his caste. As per information obtained
under the RTl Act, the petitioner has completed his class-VlI
during the academic year 2004-2005 at Rambha Govt. High School
with date-of-birth is 06.07.1993. But for getting employment, he
has submitted a marksheet and transfer certificate from PUP School
Dhanapur claiming that he was studying in PUPS Dhanapur and
completed Class VII in the academic year 2010-2011 and his date
of birth as 04.03.1998. As a person could not have studied in Class
VII twice within a period of six years the matter is required to be
investigated into. As per information received under the RTl Act
the petitioner Sidheswar Mallik has not studied at PUPS at
Dhanapur and he was not a student of that School. So he has
procured a government job by producing false mark-sheet and false
transfer certificate. It is further alleged that as per information
received under the RTI Act, the petitioner procured the job under
Scheduled Tribe (ST) category, but he belongs to „Pana‟ caste and
is a Christian by religion, which is under SEBC and OBC category.
As per information received through RTI, the petitioner was
enrolled at UPS Gajalabadi on 20.07.1993 with date-of-birth as
15.06.1988. The petitioner has submitted certificates containing
three different dates of birth and has pursued primary education
thrice. The information has been given by way of the following
table:-
It has also been stated in the FIR that eligible Adivasi students in
spite of hard work are not getting jobs and doing dadan labour and
tending to goats and cows, while a person who belongs to SEBC,
OBC has secured a job meant for ST candidate.
SUBMISSIONS
4. Mr. Susant Kumar Lenka, learned counsel for the
petitioner has submitted that that in view of the provisions of
Sections 6(2), 7(1) and 11(2) of the Odisha Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes (Regulation of Issuance
and Verification of Caste Certificates) Act, 2012 (hereinafter
referred to as „the Act'), only the scrutiny committee can enquire
into the allegation regarding genuineness of a caste certificate. He
has submitted that Section 11(2) of the Act provides that no Court
shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under this section
except upon a complaint in writing made by the Scrutiny
Committee or by any other Officer duly authorized by the Scrutiny
Committee for this purpose and hence the FIR relating to
submission of fake caste certificate is not maintainable . He has
also submitted that if the petitioner has used fabricated / forged
documents regarding date-of-birth and educational qualification,
the same is the concern of the Headmaster of the school and his
employer / appointing authority. Action can be initiated only after
the appointing authority completes an enquiry in this regard or the
Headmaster gives a complaint . But a private person has no locus
standi to lodge the FIR. He also submits that if the FIR is allowed
to stand, there is the possibility that the petitioner will be punished
for the same act twice, therefore the FIR and consequent
proceeding should be quashed. After hearing was closed on
16.05.2025, he has submitted a list of citations on 23.05.2025
(during the summer vacations). The cases are: -
1. Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India & others : AIR
2020 SC 2386
2. State of Haryana & others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal : AIR 1992
SC 604
3. Inder Mohan Goswami & others v. State of Uttaranchal &
others : (2007) 12 SCC 1
4. Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarkhand & others : (2013)
11 SCC 673
5. G. Sagar Suri & another v. State of U.P. & others : (2000)
2 SCC 636
6. Babubhai v. State of Gujarat & other : 2010 AIR SCW
7. T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala & others : (2001) 6 SCC 181
8. Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash & others : AIR 2004 SC 4320
9. Shailesh Gandhi v. The Central Information Commissioner
New Delhi & others : AIR 2015 (NOC) 1138 (BOM)
10. Prem Chand Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & another :
2020 (1) OLR (SC) 568
11. Criminal Appeal No.335/2024 (Arising out of Special
Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.2877/2021) (Mariam Fasihuddin
& another v. State by Adugodi Police Station & another)
2024 INSC 49
12. Criminal Appeal No.5478 of 2024 (Arising out of SLP
(Crl. No.8700 of 2023) P. Manikandan v. CBI & others :
2024 INSC 1007)
13. Crl. A (MD) Nos.446, 449 & 460 of 2021 (V.Eswar @
Venkatesh v. Deputy Superintendent of Police CBI/EOW,
Chennai)
5. Mr. U.R. Jena, learned Additional Government Advocate
has submitted that from a reading of the FIR, it is apparent that
apart from the allegations that the petitioner has submitted fake
caste certificate, there are allegations that the petitioner has
submitted fake marksheet and transfer certificate from a school
where he has never studied which contains a different date of birth.
He has submitted that Section 11(2) of the Act provides that
cognizance of an offence punishable under that section (Section
11(1)(a) and (b) relate to allegation of obtaining fake caste
certificate ) shall only be taken, upon a complaint in writing made
by the Scrutiny Committee or by any other Officer duly authorized
by the Scrutiny Committee for the purpose, but in the present case
the FIR in question has been registered under Sections 318(4) and
Section 336(3) of the BNS. Section 318 which relates to cheating
and Section 336 which relates to forgery and as the case has not
been has not been registered for commission of an offence under
Section 11 of the Act, no ground is made out for quashing the FIR
and the proceeding.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
6. For convenience Sections 318 and 336 of the BNS,
Section 337 of the BNSS, Article 20 of the Constitution of India
and Section 6, 11 of the Act which are relevant for deciding this
application, are quoted below.
"Section 318. (1) Whoever, by deceiving any person,
fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so
deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to
consent that any person shall retain any property, or
intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit
to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were
not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is
likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body,
mind, reputation or property, is said to cheat.
(2) Whoever cheats shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to
three years, or with fine, or with both.
(3) Whoever cheats with the knowledge that he is likely
thereby to cause wrongful loss to a person whose
interest in the transaction to which the cheating relates,
he was bound, either by law, or by a legal contract, to
protect, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to five years, or
with fine, or with both.
(4) Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the
person deceived to deliver any property to any person,
or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a
valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed,
and which is capable of being converted into a valuable
security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years,
and shall also be liable to fine."
Section 336. (1) Whoever makes any false document or
false electronic record or part of a document or
electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury,
to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or
title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to
enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent
to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed,
commits forgery.
(2) Whoever commits forgery shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
(3)Whoever commits forgery, intending that the
document or electronic record forged shall be used for
the purpose of cheating, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
(4) Whoever commits forgery, intending that the
document or electronic record forged shall harm the
reputation of any party, or knowing that it is likely to be
used for that purpose, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine."
Section 337 of BNSS is extracted below.
"Section 337. (1) A person who has once been tried by
a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and
convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such
conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable
to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same
facts for any other offence for which a different charge
from the one made against him might have been made
under sub-section (1) of section 244, or for which he
might have been convicted under sub-section (2)
thereof.
(2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may
be afterwards tried, with the consent of the State
Government, for any distinct offence for which a
separate charge might have been made against him at
the former trial under sub-section (1) of section 243.
(3) A person convicted of any offence constituted by
any act causing consequences which, together with
such act, constituted a different offence from that of
which he was convicted, may be afterwards tried for
such last-mentioned offence, if the consequences had
not happened, or were not known to the Court to have
happened, at the time when he was convicted.
(4) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence
constituted by any acts may, notwithstanding such
acquittal or conviction, be subsequently charged with,
and tried for, any other offence constituted by the same
acts which he may have committed if the Court by
which he was first tried was not competent to try the
offence with which he is subsequently charged.
(5) A person discharged under section 281 shall not be
tried again for the same offence except with the consent
of the Court by which he was discharged or of any
other Court to which the first-mentioned Court is
subordinate.
(6) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of
section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 or of
section 208 of this Sanhita."
Article 20 of the Constitution of India provides as
follows:
"20. Protection in respect of conviction for offences
(1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for
violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of
the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a
penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted
under the law in force at the time of the commission of the
offence.
(2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the
same offence more than once.
(3) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself."
Sections 6 and 11 of the Odisha Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes (Regulation of Issuance
and Verification of Caste Certificates) Act, 2012 Act is extracted
below: -
"Section 6 (1) The Government shall constitute by
notification in the Official Gazette, one or more Scrutiny
Committee for verification of Caste Certificate issued by
the Competent Authorities under Sub section (1) of
Section 4 specifying in the said notification the functions
and the area of jurisdiction of each of such Scrutiny
Committee.
(2) The appointing authority of the Government, Central
Government, Local Authority, public section
undertaking, education institution. Co-operative
Societies or any other Government aided institutions
may make application, in such form and in such manner
as may be prescribed, to the Scrutiny Committee
concerned for verification of the Caste Certificate, if any
doubt arises about the genuineness of the Caste
Certificate produced by any person to get any benefit on
the basis of such Certificate.
Provided further that the person whose Caste
Certificate has been subjected to verification shall not
be debarred to avail the benefit nor shall discontinue to
avail the benefit until the Caste Certificate is cancelled
by the Scrutiny Committee.
(3) The Scrutiny Committee shall follow such procedure
for verification of the caste certificate and adhere to the
time limit for verification and grant of validity
certificate as may be prescribed.
Section 11. (1) Whoever,-
(a) obtains a false Caste Certificate by furnishing false
information or by filing false statement or documents or
by any other fraudulent means; or
(b) not belonging to any of the reserved category secures
any benefit or appointment exclusively available for
such reserved category in the Government, Local
Authority or any public sector undertaking or in any
Government aided institution, or secures admission in
any educational institution against a seat exclusively
reserved for such reserved category or is elected to any
of the elective offices of any Local Authority or Co-
operative Society against the office, reserved for such
category by producing a false Caste Certificate, shall,
on conviction, be punished with rigorous imprisonment
for a term which shall not be less than six months but
may extend to two years or with fine which shall not be
less than two thousand rupees, but may extend to twenty
thousand rupees or both.
(2) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence
punishable under this section except upon a complaint in
writing made by the Scrutiny Committee or by any other
Officer duly authorised by the Scrutiny Committee for
this purpose."
JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS RELIED ON BY THE
PETITIONER
7. Ongoing through the decisions contained in the list of
citations submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I found
they do not support the case of the petitioner. This would be
apparent from a reading of the relevant portions of the judgments
which are extracted below for convenience, in a chronological
manner.
7.1 In the case of Ch. Bhajanlal (supra), the Supreme Court
held as follows:-
"146. We set aside the judgment of the High Court
quashing the First Information Report as not being
legally and factually sustainable in law for the reasons
aforementioned; but, however, we quash the
commencement as well as the entire investigation, if
any, so far done for the reasons given by us in the
instant judgment on the ground that the third appellant
(SHO) is not clothed with valid legal authority to take'
up the investigation and proceed with the same within
the meaning of Section 5A(1) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, as indicated in this judgment. Further
we set aside the order of the High Court awarding
costs with a direction that the said costs is payable to
the first respondent (Ch. Bhajan Lai) by the second
respondent (Dharam Pal). 147. In the result, the
appeal is disposed of accordingly but at the same time
giving liberty to the State Government to direct an
investigation afresh, if it so desires, through a
competent Police Officer empowered with valid legal
authority in strict compliance with S. 5A(1) of the Act
as indicated supra. No order as to costs."
7.2 In the case of G. Sagar Suri (supra), the Supreme Court
held that the dispute arose from a loan agreement, which is
inherently a civil matter. The Court emphasized that criminal
proceedings should not be initiated for matters that can be resolved
through civil remedies. It cited the case of Kurukshetra University
v. State of Haryana, where the High Court had quashed an FIR
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., and the Supreme Court upheld the
decision, stating that inherent powers should be exercised sparingly
and with circumspection. The Court further held that the High
Court had dismissed the appellants' application under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. without proper consideration, leading to a
miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court quashed the criminal
proceedings against the appellants.
7.3 In the case of T.T. Antony (supra), the Supreme Court held
that once an FIR is registered for a cognizable offence, all
subsequent information about the same incident should be treated
as part of the original investigation. A second FIR for the same
offence is impermissible under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. The
police must investigate not only the specific offence reported in the
FIR but also other connected offenses committed during the same
transaction or occurrence. If a second FIR is registered, it is
irregular, and courts can intervene to prevent abuse of the judicial
process. The third FIR registered in this case was quashed, and the
investigation based on it was held to be invalid.
7.4 In the case of Upkar Singh (supra), the Supreme Court did
not accept the contention that it had been decided in the case of
T.T. Anthony vs State of Kerala, AIR 2001 SC 2637, that once an
FIR is registered on the complaint of one party, a second FIR in the
nature of counter case is not registrable and no investigation based
on the said second complaint could be carried out. Citing the
hypothetical example that where the real accused lodges a false
FIR relating to the crime committed by him and the case is
registered, if it is held that a counter FIR relating to the same
incident cannot be filed, then the aggrieved victim of the crime will
be precluded from lodging complaint giving his version of the
incident and will be deprived of his right of bringing the real
accused to book. It held that in the case of T.T.Anthony (supra), no
such proposition of law had been laid that a Magistrate cannot
direct police at any stage to register a counter complaint and
investigate into the same and that this would not be hit by Sections
161 or 162 of the Cr.P.C.
7.5 In the case of Inder Mohan Goswami (supra) the Supreme
Court held as follows: -
"42. The following ingredients are essential for
commission of the offence under Section 467 IPC;
1. the document in question so forged
2. the accused who forged it
3. the document is one of the kinds enumerated
in the aforementioned section.
The basic ingredients of offence under Section
467 are altogether missing even in the allegations of
the FIR against the appellants. Therefore, by no stretch
of the imagination, the appellants can be legally
prosecuted for an offence under Section 467 IPC.
43. Even if all the averments prosecution under
Sections 420 made in the FIR are taken to be correct,
the case for and 467 IPC is not made out against the
appellants. To prevent abuse of the process and to
secure the ends of justice, it becomes imperative to
quash the FIR and any further proceedings emanating
therefrom.
44. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is
not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking
private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressure
the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases,
we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor
desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would
govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent
jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482
Cr.P.C though wide has to be exercised sparingly,
carefully and with caution and only when it is justified
by the tests specifically laid down in the Statute itself
and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled
legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be
sustained."
7.6 In the case of Babubhai (supra) the Supreme Court held that
the High Court's decision to quash the charge-sheets on ground of
irregularities in investigation was not justified. The Court
emphasized that the power to quash charge-sheets should be
exercised cautiously and only in cases where there is a manifest
miscarriage of justice. The Court directed that the investigation be
conducted afresh by an independent agency to ensure fairness and
transparency.
7.7 In the case of Paramjeet Batra (supra), the accused persons
had filed application under Section - 482 of the Cr.P.C for
quashing the order of cognizance and proceedings against them
under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 447, 448 read with Section
34 of the IPC, which was dismissed by the High Court. Holding
that the dispute was essentially civil in nature and essentially about
the profit of the hotel business and its ownership and the pending
civil suit would take care of all the issues as well as the allegations
that the forged and fabricated document to file similar complaint
had failed and the appellant had been acquitted in another case
under Section 406 of the IPC, the Supreme Court quashed the entire
proceedings and order of cognizance.
7.8 In the case of Shailesh Gandhi (supra), the Bombay High
Court held that records maintained by income-tax department in
respect of individual assessee cannot be said to be public record.
Such records are exempted from disclosure under Section 8(1)(j)
and such information can only be disclosed when applicant makes
out a case for disclosure of information on public interest. It held
that "there are adequate provisions in the Representation of the
People Act under which the information sought is to be provided to
the Parliament to the extent mentioned in the said provisions and
therefore reliance cannot be placed on the proviso to Section 8(1)
(j) to contend that the exemption provided in the said Section would
not operate."
7.9 In the case of Arnab Ranjan Goswami (supra), the petitioner
Editor-in-Chief of an English television news channel, Republic
TV, Managing Director of ARG Outlier Media Asianet News
Private Ltd, which owned and operated a Hindi television news
channel by the name of R Bharat had filed the writ petition under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India before the Supreme Court
(Writ Petition (Crl) No. 130 of 2020), praying for:-
(i) Quashing all the complaints and FIRs lodged
against the petitioner in multiple States and Union
Territories;
(ii) A writ direction that no cognisance should be taken
of any complaint or FIR on the basis of the cause of
action which forms the basis of the complaints and
FIRs which have led to the present writ proceedings;
and
(iii) A direction to the Union Government to provide
adequate safety and security to the petitioner and his
family as well as to his colleagues at Republic TV and
R Bharat.
Another writ petition was filed by him under Article 32 of
the Constitution of India (Writ Petition (Crl) Diary No. 11189 of
2020) , as another FIR was registered against the petitioner under
Sections 153, 153A, 295A, 500, 505(2), 511, 505 (l)(c) and 120B of
the IPC. Challenging the FIR, the petitioner had prayed for
quashing the FIR and for a writ directing that no cognisance should
be taken on any complaint or FIR on the same cause of action
thereafter.
The Supreme Court rejected the prayer for transfer the
investigation to the C.B.I. but quashed 14 FIRs and complaints filed
by different persons relating as all the FIRS related to the same
broadcast and therefore the same cause of action. The FIR already
transferred from the Police Station Sadar, District Nagpur City to
NM Joshi Marg Police Station in Mumbai renumbered as FIR No.
164 of 2020 was directed to be investigated by the NM Joshi Marg
Police Station in Mumbai, but the offence under Section 499 IPC
would not be investigated into. The interim protection granted to
the petitioner was extended by three weeks to enable him to avail
the remedies available under law; the Commissioner of Police,
Mumbai was directed to consider the request of the petitioner for
providing security at his residence and at his business
establishment.
7.10. In the case of Prem Chand Singh (supra) holding that the
subject matter of both the FIRs was the same general power of
attorney dated 02.05.1985 and the sales made by the appellant in
pursuance of the same and mere addition of Sections 467, 468 and
471 in the subsequent FIR cannot be considered as different
ingredients to justify the latter FIR and as the appellant had already
been acquitted of the charge of forging general power of attorney of
the respondent, prosecution on the basis of the subsequent FIR
was unsustainable.
7.11 In the case of Mariam Fasihuddin (supra) the Supreme
Court quashed the FIR lodged by Respondent No.2 (husband)
alleging that his signatures had been forged on the application for
passport of their son where the case had been registered against the
appellants (his wife and father-in-law) under Sections 420, 468, 471
read with Section 34 IPC, holding as follows: -
"It is undeniable that despite the evident discord
between the Appellants and Respondent No.2, resulting
in numerous complaints and legal proceedings, the
issue at hand has adversely impacted the rights and
interests of the minor child. The right to travel abroad
is a fundamental right of and individual, albeit not
absolute, and subject to established legal procedures.
The conduct exhibited by Respondent No.2 infringes
upon the best interests of the minor child, which
necessitates the child's travel abroad for the realisation
of opportunities and intrinsic value, aligning with the
child's dignity, as enshrined by the Constitution."
7.12 In the case of Criminal Appeal No.5478 of 2024 (Arising
out of SLP (Crl. No.8700 of 2023 (P. Manikandan v. CBI &
others), a case had been registered against the appellants under
Sections 364A and 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The
appellant had been convicted by the trial Court. The High Court
allowed the appeal and set aside his conviction but directed the CBI
to conduct de novo investigation and if required proceed against
him in accordance with law. The CBI submitted charge-sheet
against him under Sections 364 and 302 of the IPC. Application
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C challenging the charge-sheet was
dismissed by the High Court holding that the appellant had not
challenged the earlier direction of the High Court for fresh
investigation. The Supreme Court held that as the subsequent was a
fresh proceeding where the appellant for the second time was
sought to be prosecuted and punished for the same offence and
same set of facts, his right enshrined in Article 20(2) of the
Constitution of India was violated and quashed the proceedings.
7.13 In the case of Crl. A (MD) Nos.446, 449 & 460 of 2021
(V.Eswar @ Venkatesh v. Deputy Superintendent of Police
CBI/EOW, Chennai), the appellants had challenged their
conviction under Sections 120-B, 420, 468 and 471 of the IPC and
Section - 13 (2) r/w 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
The Madras High Court after discussing the evidence on record and
the findings of the trial court acquitted them of all the charges. The
allegations did not relate to false caste certificate or forgoing
fabrication of caste certificate or educational certificates.
OTHER RELEVANT JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS
Locus Standi
8.1 In the case of A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1984 SC
718, the Supreme Court has held:
"It is well recognized principle of criminal jurisprudence
that anyone can set or put the criminal law into motion
except where the statute enacting or creating an offence
indicates to the contrary. Locus standi of the complainant is
a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence save and except
that where the statute creating an offence provides for the
eligibility of the complainant by necessary implication the
general principle gets excluded by such statutory provision.
Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being
one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger
good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be
whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a
strait-jacket formula of locus stand unknown to criminal
jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception."
Quashing of FIR
8.2 In the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal : 1992 Suppl.
(1) SCC 335, the Supreme Court has laid down guidelines for
quashing of FIR, holding as follows:
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted
and reproduced above, we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview
of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated
under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is
a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge."
8.3 In the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, the Supreme Court has
observed as follows: -
"Conclusions:
80. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above,
our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether
the High Court would be justified in passing an interim
order of stay of investigation and/or "no coercive steps to
be adopted", during the pendency of the quashing petition
under Section 482 Cr.P.C and / or under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India and in what circumstances and
whether the High Court would be justified in passing the
order of not to arrest the accused or "no coercive steps to
be adopted" during the investigation or till the final
report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C.,
while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not
quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in
exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final
conclusions are as under:
i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the
relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to
investigate into a cognizable offence;
ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the
cognizable offences;
iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or
offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information
report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go
on;
iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly
with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the rarest
of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the
context of death penalty).
v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which
is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR/complaint;
vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the
initial stage;
vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception
rather than an ordinary rule;
viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the
jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the
State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one
ought not to tread over the other sphere;
ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are
complementary, not overlapping;
x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would
result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial
process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of
offences;
xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not
confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act
according to its whims or caprice;
xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia
which must disclose all facts and details relating to the
offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the
police is in progress, the court should not go into the
merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be
permitted to complete the investigation. It would be
premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy
facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be
investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law.
After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that
there is no substance in the application made by the
complainant, the investigating officer may file an
appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate
which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in
accordance with the known procedure;
xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide,
but conferment of wide power requires the court to be
more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty
on the court;
xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit,
regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the
self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the
parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of
R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the
jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;
xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the
alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether
the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a
cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to
consider on merits whether or not the merits of the
allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court
has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate
the allegations in the FIR;
xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or
the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the
High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing
petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
However, an interim order of stay of investigation during
the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with
circumspection. Such an interim order should not require
to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically.
Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the
facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not
before the High Court, the High Court should restrain
itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or "no
coercive steps to be adopted" and the accused should be
relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section
438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court
shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of
not to arrest and/or "no coercive steps" either during the
investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or
till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section
173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing
petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article
226 of the Constitution of India.
xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of
the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for
grant of interim stay of further investigation, after
considering the broad parameters while exercising the
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article
226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove,
the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an
interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed
so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the
Court and the higher forum can consider what was
weighed with the High Court while passing such an
interim order.
xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High
Court of "no coercive steps to be adopted" within the
aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what
does it mean by "no coercive steps to be adopted" as the
term "no coercive steps to be adopted" can be said to be
too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood
and/or misapplied."
( Emphasis supplied)
8.4 In the case of Kim Wansoo vs State of Uttar Pradesh and
others : 2025 INSC 8, the Supreme Court on a perusal of the FIR
found that the same did not disclose commission of offence(s) as
alleged. It also found that the other allegations, even if taken as
true, would not disclose the commission of any offence .While
quashing the FIR, it held as follows: -
"8. In regard to quashing of criminal proceedings at the
investigation stage itself, this Court in Eastern Spg. Mills
v. Rajiv Poddar : AIR 1985 SC 1668 , held that the High
Court could interfere with the investigation, if non-
interference would result in miscarriage of justice.
9. In State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy : (2004)6
SCC 522 : 2004 INSC 404, this Court again held that
where an FIR did not disclose the commission of an
offence without anything being added or subtracted from
the recitals thereof, the said FIR could be quashed."
"11. In the contextual situation, it is also relevant to refer to
the decision of this Court in Mohammad Wajid and
Another v. State of U.P. and Anr : 2023 SCC Online SC
951; 2023 INSC 683, whereunder this Court, in so far as
it is relevant, held thus: -
"34.........it will not be just enough for the
Court to look into the averments made in the
FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients
to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or
not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the
Court owes a duty to look into many other
attending circumstances emerging from the
record of the case over and above the averments
and, if need be, with due care and
circumspection try to read in between the lines.
The Court while exercising its jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of
the Constitution need not restrict itself only to
the stage of a case but is empowered to take into
account the overall circumstances leading to the
initiation/registration of the case as well as the
materials collected in the course of
investigation...."
Exercise of Inherent Power to quash an FIR
8.5 In the case of Jagmohan Singh vs Vimlesh Kumar: 2022
SCC Online Sc 2418 , the Supreme Court set aside the order of the
High Court quashing the FIR, holding that :-
" .... The Court interferes in criminal proceedings, in
exercise of the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., in
rare and exceptional cases, to give effect to the provisions of
the Cr.P.C. or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court
or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C., the High Court should not ordinarily embark upon
an enquiry into whether there is reliable evidence or not. The
jurisdiction has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with
caution only when such exercise is justified by the specific
provisions of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. itself. The criminal
proceedings can be said to be in abuse of the process of
Court, to warrant intervention under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,
when the allegations in the FIR do not at all disclose any
offence or there are materials on record from which the
Court can reasonably arrive at a finding that the
proceedings are in abuse of the process of the Court."
ANALYSIS
9. From a reading of the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that
for quashing an FIR, the Court has to consider the following
factors:-
i) Whether the case of petitioner falls within any of the parameters
laid down in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra)?
ii) Whether on a plain reading of the FIR, without adding or
subtracting anything, any offence is made out?
iii) Whether there is any statutory bar for registration of the FIR or
carrying out investigation?
iv) Whether the informant had the locus standi to lodge FIR i.e
whether the impugned FIR could have been registered at the
instance of the informant?
v) Whether Section 337 of BNSS (earlier Section 300 of the
Cr.P.C) or Article 20 (2) of the Constitution will be a bar for the
investigation to proceed?
10. There is no bar in criminal law against registration of an
FIR for setting the law into motion, at the instance of a person who
is not a victim or affected by the action of the accused (a third
party), as most offences are considered to be against society with
exception of only a few which have been specified in the Statute
(defamation, matrimonial, offences) with restrictions contained in
Sections 195 and 199 of the Cr.P.C. (Sections 215 and 222 of the
BNSS) and IPC which require the complainant to be the aggrieved
party.
11. Section 154 of the Cr.P.C (Section 173 of the BNSS) does
do not prescribe any qualification for a person to lodge an FIR in
respect of a cognizable offence. The Court also has the power to
take suo motu cognizance of the facts constituting an offence if it
comes to learn about the same. So the contention that the FIR at the
instance of the informant could not be registered or investigated
into and only the employer could have lodged FIR, has no merit.
12. As a reading of the FIR prima facie reveals commission of
cognizable offences, the FIR cannot be quashed when investigation
is at the nascent stage.
13. The ingredients of the offence under Section-11 of the Act
and the offences alleged in the impugned FIR which has been
registered for commission of offences under the BNS are totally
different. Apart from the allegations that the caste certificate was
illegally obtained, there are also the allegations that the transfer
certificate containing a different date of birth, and the mark-sheet,
both obtained from PUPS Dhanapur are fake as the petitioner had
never studied in that school and he has utilized these fake
certificates containing different age of birth and year of completing
Class VII, utilizing the same for securing employment.
14. In cases where the accused has faced trial involving the
same allegations or offences and has been acquitted then a second
complaint / prosecution on same or similar allegations has been
quashed, in view of the bar under Section 300 of the Cr.P.C
(Section 337 of the BNSS) and / or Article 20 (2) of the
Constitution. In the present case, the petitioner has not faced any
trial for the offences alleged in the impugned FIR for which there is
no bar for the investigation to proceed.
15. Whether any enquiry or proceedings will be conducted by
the employers of the petitioner does not have any bearing on the
investigation which commences after registration of an FIR. The
Investigating Authority may in fact bring this to the notice of the
employer of the petitioner during investigation.
16. The allegation is that by utilizing fake documents, the
petitioner has got employment, which constitutes a criminal offence
and is not a civil dispute, hence the FIR cannot be quashed on this
ground.
17. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds no ground
to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS
to quash the FIR at this stage, as the contentions raised by the
petitioner do not satisfy the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal
(supra) nor do they disclose any legal bar under the BNSS, the Act
or the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
18. In view of the aforesaid discussion, in my considered
view, no case is made out for quashing the FIR.
19. The CRLMC being devoid of merit is dismissed.
20. The petitioner is at liberty to raise his contentions before the
appropriate forum, after completion of investigation and filing of
charge-sheet, if any.
...........................
(Savitri Ratho)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack.
The 19th June, 2025/RKS
