Orissa High Court
Lalit Mohan Baral vs Central Electricity Supply on 25 February, 2025
ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.1717 of 2002
In the matter of an Application under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950
***
Lalit Mohan Baral
Aged about 56 years
Son of Late Madhu Baral
Resident of Village: Nrutanga
P.S.: Mahanga, District: Cuttack,
Working as Junior Engineer
(Under Suspension)
Office of the Executive Engineer
Cuttack Electrical Division
Central Electricity Supply
Company of Orissa Limited
Cuttack.
... Petitioner
-VERSUS-
1. Central Electricity Supply
Company of Orissa Limited
Having its Registered Office
at 11 Floor, IDCO Towers, Janpath
Bhubaneswar, District: Khordha
Represented by its
Chief Executive Officer.
2. Enquiry Officer-cum-Superintending Engineer
(Enquiry and Investigation)
W.P.(C) No.1717 of 2002 Page 1 of 22
CESCO Head Quarters Office
Bhubaneswar.
3. Executive Engineer (Elect.), Cuttack
Electrical Division
Central Electricity Supply
Company of Orissa Limited
Cuttack.
4. Tata Power Central Odisha
Distribution Ltd.
TPCODL Corporate Office
Power House Square, Unit-8
Bhubaneswar, District: Khordha
Represented by its
Chief Executive Officer. ... Opposite parties
Counsel appeared for the parties:
For the Petitioner : Mr. Nirmal Chandra Mohanty,
Advocate
For the Opposite parties : Mr. Bibudhendra Dash, Advocate
P R E S E N T:
HONOURABLE
MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN
Date of Hearing : 18.02.2025 :: Date of Order : 25.02.2025
O R D E R
Challenging the imposition of major penalty by order
dated 07.08.2002 passed by Opposite Party No.1, the
petitioner has knocked the doors of this Court invoking
the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, with the following prayer(s):
"Under the circumstances, it is most humbly prayed that
the Hon‟ble Court be graciously pleased to issue Rule Nisi
calling upon the Opp. Parties to show cause as to why the
report of the Enquiry Officer in Disciplinary Proceeding
No.8 dated 02.02.2002 and the order of the opposite
party No.1 dated 07.08.2002 imposing major penalty of
dismissal should not be quashed and if the opposite
parties fail to show cause or show insufficient cause
make the said rule absolute;
And further direct the Opp.Parties to exonerate the charge
levelled against the petitioner and reinstates him in
service with all service benefits.
And/or pass any other appropriate order(s)/direction(s)
as this Hon‟ble Court thinks fit and proper;
And Admit and allow this writ application with cost;
And for which act of your kindness, the petitioner shall as
in duty bound ever pray."
Facts:
2. Facts, as adumbrated by the writ petitioner, reveal that
the petitioner, who was serving as Junior Engineer
(Electrical), Badachana Electrical Section, was placed
under suspension by Office Order dated 22.11.2001 in
contemplation of Disciplinary Proceeding.
2.1. The allegations for initiation of the Disciplinary
Proceeding, inter alia, were:
(i) Even though on 05.01.2001 one 63 KVA
Transformer was released from the store for
replacement at Jemadeipur Sub-Station, he
did not install the same till 15.10.2001.
(ii) The Petitioner collected a sum of Rs.6,000/-
from nine consumers under Jemadeipur Sub-
Station against total outstanding arrear of
Rs.93,044/-. Out of such collection of
Rs.6,000/-, a sum of Rs.5,400/- was shown
towards arrear collection and balance amount
of Rs.600/- was shown as expenses incurred
towards transportation of Transformer.
2.2. Therefore, the petitioner was charged with:
(i) Negligence in duty;
(ii) Doubtful integrity; and
(iii) Misconduct.
2.3. Responding to such charge-sheet, the petitioner
submitted his reply and the Enquiry Officer appointed
vide order dated 28.02.2002, conducted enquiry. In his
report submitted to the Opposite Party No.1 the Enquiry
Officer held the petitioner guilty of Charge No.(i), i.e.,
negligence in duty and Charge No.(iii), i.e., misconduct
and exonerated him from the charge of doubtful
integrity.
2.4. Consequent upon such report, the petitioner was
instructed to show-cause why punishment of dismissal
from service would not be inflicted as disciplinary
measure.
2.5. The Opposite Party No.1 accepted the finding of Enquiry
Officer and imposed penalty of dismissal from service
vide Office Order dated 07.08.2002. Before the said
dismissal order could be served on the petitioner, the
petitioner approached this Court enclosing copy of the
said Office Order dated 07.08.2002 issued by the Chief
Executive Officer, CESCO, Bhubaneswar. In the present
writ petition, this Court on 27.08.2002 passed the
following order:
"Heard Mr. N.C. Mohanty, learned counsel for the
petitioner.
Issue notice to the opposite parties by registered post with
A.D. returnable within six weeks. Steps shall be taken by
29.8.2002.
In the meanwhile, the impugned order of dismissal
dated 07.08.2002 shall remain stayed and the
petitioner will be allowed to work as Junior
Engineer (Electrical) as before and shall be paid his
salary.
Urgent certified copy of the order be granted on proper
application."
2.6. By virtue of the aforesaid interim order of this Court, the
petitioner continued in service till he attained the age of
superannuation on 31.03.2004.
2.7. However, after retirement, the petitioner was re-
appointed as Engineering Resource Personnel by
GRIDCO and posted at Grid Sub-Station, Kendrapara on
02.11.2004. On 21.04.2005, the petitioner's service was
extended for a further period of six months.
Hearing:
3. Responding to the notice issued, the opposite parties
have filed counter affidavit. Pleadings, being completed
and exchanged among the counsel for respective parties,
on their consent, this matter is taken up for final
hearing.
3.1. Accordingly, heard Sri Nirmal Chandra Mohanty,
learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri
Bibudhendra Dash, learned counsel appearing for the
opposite parties and the matter stood reserved for
preparation and pronouncement of Order.
Rival contentions and submissions:
4. Sri Nirmal Chandra Mohanty, learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner submitted that though charge was
issued against the petitioner for "doubtful integrity", the
same could not be substantiated by the Enquiry Officer
which has been accepted by the Disciplinary Authority.
The only charge which proceeded further in the
Disciplinary Proceeding was collection of Rs.6,000/-.
Against such charge, it was explained by the petitioner
that such a fact was within the knowledge of Indenting
Officer and the Releasing Officer. On collection of
Rs.5,400/-, the petitioner was compelled to replace the
Transformer as per the instructions of the Sub-
Divisional Officer. So far as the collection of Rs.600/-
from the consumers separately towards transportation
expenses is concerned, it was clarified that the
consumers on their own arranged a tractor and
transported the Transformer to the spot and handed
over Rs.600/- to the petitioner for payment to the tractor
owner. It is explained that such payment of
transportation charges by the consumers is the
prevailing practice in CESCO as the same was being
utilised for benefit of the Company. The Enquiry Officer
has recorded the following facts:
"Five years before the Super Cyclone, the L.T. conductor
inside the village had been removed due to non-payment
of arrears. After super cyclone, during restoration of lines,
the L.T. conductor had been restrung but due to burning of
Transformer again they had been without supply since
September, 2000. After they knew that one 63 KVA
Transformer has been released for their Substation, they
have collected Rs.600/- each and paid to the J.E.,
Badachana towards their arrear dues for which they
have received the money receipt from the J.E. And further
they have paid Rs.600/- to the J.E. for transportation of
the repair transformer for installation in Jemdeipur S/S
by hiring private vehicle (Tractor) and that some outsiders
have made false allegations in the name of their village
(Exhibit No.6). From this it is seen that the nine consumers
of Jemadeipur village have paid Rs.5400/- towards
revenue arrears and paid Rs.600/- (Privatel to J.E.) for
hire of private vehicle and transporting the 63 KVA
transformer to the site by the J.E. Sri Baral. This fact is
also admitted by Sri Baral, J.E. (Elec) (C.O.) in his
statement. From this it is clear that Rs.5,400/- collected
towards arrear Revenue collection from 9 consumers of
Jemadeipur village had been duly accounted for by the
J.E. on 03.10.2001."
4.1. However, the Enquiry Report though did not find fault
with the collection of Rs.5,400/-, it is stated that the
Superintending Engineer of the Circle should have
arranged for private vehicle on the requisition of the
Field Officer in the event no vehicle was available for
transportation. However, the utilization of Rs.600/- paid
by the consumers for the purpose of transportation was
irregular. Such being the fact, the Enquiry Officer has
recorded the following conclusion:
"Thus, it is observed that the charge leveled against Sri
L.M. Baral, J.E. (C.O) that he has neglected in his duty is
established due to the fact he had violated CESCO
procedure by accepting Rs.600/- from the consumers for
transporting on hired vehicle the department (sic) and that
he has replaced the burnt transformer in Jemadeipur
Substation without collecting sufficient arrear revenue
and only collecting Rs.5400/- out of outstanding of
Rs.93,044/-.
In the observations about it is nowhere seen that Sri
Baral, J.E. has collected illegal money from any source for
his own, and now here he has availed personal benefit.
Hence doubtful integrity of the charged officer does not
stand."
4.2. It is submitted that though there was failure to
substantiate the allegation of "doubtful integrity" for
procedural violation, the collection of Rs.600/- from the
consumers for payment to the tractor owner towards
transportation charges has been viewed adversely
against the petitioner leading to awarding punishment of
dismissal from service vide Office Order dated
07.08.2002 issued by the Chief Executive Officer,
CESCO, Bhubaneswar.
4.3. Sri Nirmal Chandra Mohanty, learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner vehemently contended that the
punishment of dismissal from service does not
commensurate with the alleged charges; as such the
punishment runs contrary to ratio laid down in B.C.
Chaturvedi Vrs. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 and
Bhaskar Chandra Mohapatra Vrs. The Disciplinary
Authority, UCO Bank, 2015 (II) OLR 1042.
5. Sri Bibudhendra Dash, learned counsel appearing for
the opposite parties submitted that approaching this
Court directly circumventing alternative remedy
available to the petitioner warrants dismissal of this writ
petition. Sri Dash, learned counsel submitted that by
virtue of the order of dismissal being stayed, the
petitioner continued till 31.03.2004, i.e., the date on
which the petitioner retired from service on attaining the
age of superannuation. Since the Enquiry Officer found
the petitioner guilty of misconduct and negligence in
duty, the order of dismissal is justified which needs no
interference by this Court.
5.1. It is submitted by Sri Bibudhendra Dash, learned
counsel for the opposite parties that under judicial
review, there is little scope for interference in the
imposition of penalty as a result of Disciplinary
Proceeding. He strenuously contended that if this Court
finds the punishment awarded is shockingly
disproportionate to the charges proved, the Disciplinary
Authority is required to be afforded an opportunity to
revisit the punishment.
Discussion and conclusion:
6. This Court heard the rival contentions advanced by the
learned counsel for the respective parties.
7. The objection as to maintainability of writ petition as
raised by Sri Bibudhendra Dash, learned counsel for the
opposite parties is taken up first.
7.1. It is contended by the opposite parties that existence of
alternative remedy shall be a bar for entertainment of
the writ petition. Per contra, it is the submission of the
counsel for the petitioner that such a dictum cannot be
construed as rigid principle inasmuch as availability of
alternative remedy cannot be, in every circumstance,
pose as absolute bar for entertainment of writ petition.
7.2. The record reveals that this Court on 27.08.2002, even
prior to service of order of dismissal (Annexure-10) on
the petitioner, granted interim order of stay. Pursuant to
such order, the petitioner continued in service till he
attained the age of superannuation. It is borne on record
that even after the petitioner got retired on the aforesaid
date, he was re-engaged in service till 31.10.2005. Such
a fact presupposes that the allegation against the
petitioner has been obliterated by the employer.
7.3. It is also matter of record and not disputed by either of
the parties that the petitioner has been granted
provisional pension (Annexure-11).
7.4. Nonetheless, this Court having issued notice and kept
the matter pending since 2002, it would unjust and
cause serious impact on the petitioner, who had been
retired since 31.03.2004. After twenty-two years of
pendency, it would be imprudent to relegate the
petitioner to avail alternative remedy.
7.5. In this regard, the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of State of U.P. Vrs. Ehsan, 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 1331 may be pertinent to be referred to. At
paragraph-28 of the said judgment, the following
observation is made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of
India:
"28. We are conscious of the law that existence of an
alternative remedy is not an absolute bar on exercise
of writ jurisdiction. More so, when a writ petition
has been entertained, parties have exchanged
their pleadings/affidavits and the matter has
remained pending for long. In such a situation
there must be a sincere effort to decide the
matter on merits and not relegate the writ
petitioner to the alternative remedy, unless
there are compelling reasons for doing so. One
such compelling reason may arise where there is a
serious dispute between the parties on a question of
fact and materials/evidence(s) available on record
are insufficient/inconclusive to enable the Court to
come to a definite conclusion."
7.6. In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vrs. Uttar Pradesh
Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh Samiti, (2008) 12
SCC 675, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India at
paragraph-38 observed as follows:
"38. With respect to the learned Judge, it is neither the
legal position nor such a proposition has been laid
down in Suresh Chandra Tewari, AIR 1992 All 331
that once a petition is admitted, it cannot be
dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. It is
no doubt correct that in the headnote of All India
Reporter (p. 331), it is stated that "petition cannot be
rejected on the ground of availability of alternative
remedy of filing appeal". But it has not been so held
in the actual decision of the Court. The relevant para
2 of the decision reads thus : (Suresh Chandra
Tewari case, AIR 1992 All 331, AIR p. 331)
„2. At the time of hearing of this petition a
threshold question, as to its maintainability
was raised on the ground that the impugned
order was an appealable one and, therefore,
before approaching this Court the petitioner
should have approached the appellate
authority. Though there is much substance
in the above contention, we do not feel
inclined to reject this petition on the
ground of alternative remedy having
regard to the fact that the petition has
been entertained and an interim order
passed.‟
Even otherwise, the learned Judge was not right in
law. True it is that issuance of rule nisi or passing of
interim orders is a relevant consideration for not
dismissing a petition if it appears to the High Court
that the matter could be decided by a writ court. It
has been so held even by this Court in several
cases that even if alternative remedy is
available, it cannot be held that a writ petition
is not maintainable. In our judgment, however, it
cannot be laid down as a proposition of law that
once a petition is admitted, it could never be
dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. If
such bald contention is upheld, even this Court
cannot order dismissal of a writ petition which ought
not to have been entertained by the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution in view of
availability of alternative and equally efficacious
remedy to the aggrieved party, once the High Court
has entertained a writ petition albeit wrongly and
granted the relief to the petitioner."
7.7. Having had regard to the facts of the present case vis-à-
vis the proposition of law as enunciated by Courts, this
Court considering that the employer-CESCO, which did
dismiss the petitioner, is no more in existence and at
present TPCODL (opposite party No.4) has taken over
said company. It is pertinent to take cognizance of the
fact that the petitioner has been extended the benefit of
pension after retirement and he was also given extension
in service post-retirement.
7.8. Under the above premise, the objection raised by Sri
Bibudhendra Dash, learned counsel appearing for the
opposite parties against entertainment of this writ
petition is rejected.
8. Thus, this Court takes up the issue whether the
punishment of dismissal from service awarded to the
petitioner is disproportionate to the proved allegations.
8.1. Though charge of "doubtful integrity" was levelled
against the petitioner, the same could not be proved by
the Enquiry Officer. Such fact was also accepted by the
Disciplinary Authority without any variation.
8.2. The only allegation, on which the major punishment has
been inflicted, as conceded by the learned counsel for
both sides, that collection of Rs.600/- towards
transportation of Transformer and payment being made
to the Tractor owner. The facts are not disputed.
8.3. There is no allegation of misappropriation of said
amount by the petitioner. It is alleged that there was
procedural irregularity. The circumstance under which
such collection being made was explained by the
petitioner during course of enquiry as well as before the
Disciplinary Authority. It appears from the record that
such a factual explanation has not been considered in
its right earnest. Therefore, this Court on appraisal of
facts and perusal of record is persuaded to discern that
the allegation of collection of Rs.600/- is on flimsy
ground. It is not the case of the opposite parties that
after collecting Rs.6,000/-, the petitioner did not deposit
Rs.5,400/- towards arrear dues of consumers and paid
Rs.600/- to the tractor owner for transportation of
transformer.
8.4. Therefore, this Court is of considered view that the order
of major punishment does not commensurate with the
charges levelled and established/proved.
8.5. This Court is fortified by the observations made by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in B.C. Chaturvedi Vrs.
Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749. Reference be had to
B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), wherein it has been observed as
follows:
"18. A review of the above legal position would establish
that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the
appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities
have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a
view to maintain discipline. They are invested with
the discretion to impose appropriate punishment
keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the
misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while
exercising the power of judicial review, cannot
normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty
and impose some other penalty. If the punishment
imposed by the disciplinary authority or the
appellate authority shocks the conscience of
the High Court/Tribunal, it would
appropriately mould the relief, either directing
the disciplinary/appellate authority to
reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten
the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and
rare cases, impose appropriate punishment
with cogent reasons in support thereof.
22. The aforesaid has, therefore, to be avoided and I
have no doubt that a High Court would be within its
jurisdiction to modify the punishment/penalty by
moulding the relief, which power it undoubtedly has,
in view of a long line of decisions of this Court, to
which reference is not deemed necessary, as the
position is well settled in law. It may, however, be
stated that this power of moulding relief in cases of
the present nature can be invoked by a High Court
only when the punishment/penalty awarded shocks
the judicial conscience.
23. It deserves to be pointed out that the mere fact that
there is no provision parallel to Article 142 relating to
the High Courts, can be no ground to think that they
have not to do complete justice, and if moulding of
relief would do complete justice between the parties,
the same cannot be ordered. Absence of provision
like Article 142 is not material, according to me. This
may be illustrated by pointing out that despite
there being no provision in the Constitution
parallel to Article 137 conferring power of
review on the High Court, this Court held as
early as 1961 in Shivdeo Singh Vrs. State of
Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909 that the High Courts
too can exercise power of review, which inheres
in every court of plenary jurisdiction. I would
say that power to do complete justice also inheres in
every court, not to speak of a court of plenary
jurisdiction like a High Court. Of course, this power
is not as wide as which this Court has under Article
142. That, however, is a different matter."
8.6. It is also relevant to have reference to the following
observations rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Rathin Ghosh Vrs. West Bengal State
Electricity Distribution Company Limited (2021) 16 SCC
695:
"20. We are conscious of the scope of judicial review by
the High Court and this Court in reference to
disciplinary proceedings. A three-Judge Bench of
this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi Vrs. Union of India,
(1995) 6 SCC 749, in para 18 has laid down
parameters of judicial review in the disciplinary
proceedings to the following effect:
„18. ***‟
21. There cannot be any dispute to the proposition
that disciplinary authority has exclusive power
to impose appropriate punishment keeping in
view the magnitude and gravity of misconduct.
The punishment to be imposed on a
delinquent employee has to be
proportionate to the charge and in event
punishment is disproportionate, the
delinquent has to be held to be given
discriminatory treatment violating Article
14. The test as has been approved by this
Court is that the High Court and this Court can
interfere with the punishment imposed by the
disciplinary authority when it shocks the
conscience of the Court. The present is a case
where the punishment is so
disproportionate to the charge that it
clearly shocks the conscience of the Court.
The charges which were held to be proved
were not any such charges on which
punishment of dismissal could have been
imposed. Further, when the payment of air
ticket which was got prepared by travel agent
of M/s Secure Meters was ultimately made by
the appellant, which was not disbelieved in the
proceedings and no other material or evidence
extending any benefit to M/s Secure Meters
were on the record, there was no occasion of
awarding extreme punishment."
8.7. This Court in the case of Bhaskar Chandra Mohapatra
Vrs. The Disciplinary Authority, UCO Bank, 2015 (II) OLR
1042 having taken note of many observations in catena
of decisions including that of B.C. Chaturvedi (supra),
held in paragraphs-15 and 16 as follows:
"15. Reliance has been placed on Lucknow K. Gramin
Bank Vrs. Rajendra Singh, AIR 2013 SC 3540 by the
opposite party-Bank, wherein the apex Court has
held that punishment which is to be awarded to the
delinquent is for the Disciplinary Authority to decide
not for the Court. The quantum of punishment even if
found disproportionate matter has to be referred
back to disciplinary authority to take fresh decision
and Court cannot usurp jurisdiction of disciplinary
authority and decide the punishment subject to
exception laid down in the said judgment.
16. Considering the above law laid down by the apex
Court and this Court and taking into consideration
the factual matrix of the case in hand, this Court is
of the considered view that since there is non-
compliance of the provisions contained in sub-
Regulation 13 of Regulation 6, the authorities have
acted in utter disregard to the provisions of law
governing the field, the order of punishment imposed
by the Disciplinary Authority vide Annexure-7 dated
24.06.2008 and confirmation made thereof by
Appellate Authority vide order dated 03.02.2010 in
Annexure-10 cannot sustain in the eye of law and
accordingly, the same are quashed. The matter is
remitted back to the Disciplinary Authority to re-
enquire into the matter in consonance with the 1976
Regulations. While conducting such enquiry the
authority may take into consideration the inspection
report referred to in Annexure-12 and dispose of the
same as expeditiously as possible preferably within
a period of four months from the date of receipt of a
copy of this judgment by affording opportunity to the
parties. Needless to say that during pendency of the
writ petition since the petitioner has already
attained the age of superannuation, both the parties
are directed to cooperate for early disposal of the
proceeding within the time stipulated by this Court.
It is further directed that pendency of this
proceeding cannot disentitle the petitioner to get his
legitimate claim as due and admissible to him in
accordance with law."
9. It is next contended by Sri Bibudhendra Dash, learned
counsel appearing for the opposite parties, as has been
already taken note of, that in the event this Court feels
that major punishment awarded to the petitioner is
disproportionate to the charges proved, the matter could
be remanded to the Disciplinary Authority for fresh
consideration as has been held in Bhaskar Chandra
Mohapatra (supra). This Court is not inclined to accede
to such a request made by the learned counsel for the
opposite parties simply for the reason that the awarded
punishment is made way back in the year 2002 by the
Chief Executive Officer, Central Electricity Supply
Company, Bhubaneswar and at this length of time, the
CESCO is no more in existence and in its place, opposite
party No.4-Tata Power Central Odisha Distribution
Limited (TPCODL) has taken over the said Company.
This apart, this Court takes cognizance of the fact that
after the petitioner is allowed to work pursuant to an
interim order dated 27.08.2002 of this Court, he
continued till the date of attainment of superannuation.
The petitioner was also re-engaged to work as
Engineering Resources Personnel (Junior Executive) till
31.10.2005. This Court appreciates the fact, as revealed
from Annexure-11 enclosed to the additional affidavit
dated 17.08.2017 that the petitioner has been granted
provisional pension acknowledging the fact by the
CESCO authority that the petitioner had worked since
11.11.1972 till 31.03.2004 (31 years, 4 months and 20
days), which is apparent in the pension calculation
sheet. In such view of the matter, this Court repels the
prayer of the learned counsel appearing for the opposite
parties for passing order of remit for fresh consideration
by the Disciplinary Authority.
10. Having diligently considering the rival contentions and
each point raised before this Court during the course of
hearing, this Court is, thus, inclined to set aside the
order dated 07.08.2002 (Annexure-10) passed by
Opposite Party No.1. Having thus set aside the order
dated 07.08.2002 imposing major penalty of dismissal
from service, it is needless to say that all consequential
service as also financial benefits shall be extended to the
petitioner by the opposite parties.
11. In the result, this writ petition stands disposed of.
(MURAHARI SRI RAMAN)
Signature Not JUDGE
Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASWINI KUMAR
SETHY
Designation: Personal
Assistant (Secretary-in-
Charge)
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH
COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 25-Feb-2025 16:31:48
High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
The 25th February, 2025//Aswini/MRS/Laxmikant
