Orissa High Court
Project Director vs Prakash Kumar Rout on 14 February, 2025
Author: S.K. Panigrahi
Bench: S.K. Panigrahi
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Designation: AR-CUM- SR. SECRETARY
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 19-Feb-2025 17:22:45
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
ARBA No.10 of 2024
Along with
ARBA No.6 of 2024
(IN ARBA No.10 of 2024)
(From the Judgment dated 23.2.2024 passed by the Ld. District Judge,
Cuttack in Arbitration Petition No.15 of 2019 arising out of award
dated 22.5.2019 passed by the Ld. Collector & District Magistrate
Cum Sole Arbitrator in ARB Misc. Case No. 1 of 2016)
Project Director, NHAI, PIU, .... Appellant (s)
Bhubaneswar & Another
-versus-
Prakash Kumar Rout .... Respondent (s)
Advocates appeared in the case throughHybrid Mode:
Appellant (s) : Mr.Ajit Patnaik, Adv.
Respondent (s) : Mr. M. K. Mishra, Sr. Adv.
Along with
Mr. J. Katikia, Adv.
(IN ARBA No.6 of 2024)
(From the Judgment dated 23.2.2024 passed by the Ld. District Judge,
Cuttack in Arbitration Petition No.16 of 2019 arising out of award
dated 22.5.2019 passed by the Ld. Collector & District Magistrate
Cum Sole Arbitrator in ARB Misc. Case No. 1 of 2016)
Prakash Kumar Rout .... Appellant (s)
-versus-
National Highways Authority of .... Respondent (s)
India and Anr.
Page 1 of 37
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Designation: AR-CUM- SR. SECRETARY
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 19-Feb-2025 17:22:45
Advocates appeared in the case throughHybrid Mode:
Appellant (s) : Mr. M. K. Mishra, Sr. Adv.
Along with
Mr. J. Katikia, Adv.
Respondent (s) : Mr.Ajit Patnaik, Adv.
CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE S.K. PANIGRAHI
DATE OF HEARING:-20.01.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT: -14.02.2025
Dr. S.K. Panigrahi, J.
1. Both the Appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‚A&C Act‛) have been filed against
the common judgment dated 23.2.2024 passed by the Ld. District Judge,
Cuttack in Arbitration Petition No. 15 of 2019 arising out of award
dated 22.5.2019 passed by the Ld. Collector & District Magistrate Cum
Sole Arbitrator in ARB Misc. Case No. 1 of 2016. As both Appeals arise
out of the same impugned judgment and raise the same questions of
law, it is considered prudent to deal with them together. Hereinafter,
the parties are referred to as their original position in the arbitration for
the sake of convenience.
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
2. For the sake of brevity, the admitted facts involved in the appeals are
pithily discussed herein:
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i. The Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport and
Highways, New Delhi issued a Notification u/s 3A of the NH Act,
1956 vide S.O. No. 679(E) dated 13.3.2013 for the purpose of
expansion of national highways expressing intention to acquire land
for construction (widening/six-laning), maintenance, management
and operation of N.H.16 (old N.H.5) on the stretch of land from 414
km to 419.2km (Bhubaneswar - Kolkata Section).
ii. The Notification dated 13.3.2013 was also published in widely
circulated local Newspapers namely, ‚the Samaj‛ and ‚the Sambad‛
on 3.4.2013 inviting objections u/s 3(C) of the NH Act, 1956 within 21
days.
iii. The Claimant herein filed his Objection on 23.4.2014 requesting the
authorities to exempt his plots from acquisition as he was running a
cattle-feed plant on the plots belonging to him that were sought to
be acquired. Upon consideration of his prayer, out of 7 plots of land
originally notified to be acquired, 4 plots were exempted from
acquisition on which he was running the said plant. The remaining 3
plots could not be exempted as they were found to be adjacent to the
National Highways and were found to be inevitable for acquisition
for the proposed expansion. The reason they were excluded was
allegedly that it was found that there were no installations of plant
or machinery on the non-exempted plots which would have any
adverse effect on his plant/industry.
iv. Thereafter, on 10.5.2014, vide S.O. No. 729(E), Notification u/s 3(D)
of the NH Act, 1956 was published for final acquisition of land.
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Thereafter, it is asserted by NHAI that the land stood vested with
the Central Government, free from all encumbrances.
v. In the meanwhile, the Special Land Acquisition Officer - cum -
Competent Authority, NH 5 invited applications for claim petitions
which was to be filed on or before, 24.5.2014. However, the Claimant
herein filed his claim petition only on 19.9.2014. A field inquiry was
made through the Amin in the presence of the Claimant and also the
value of the acquired land of the Claimant was assessed by the
Special Land Acquisition Officer - cum - Competent Authority, NH
5. Alongwith the assistance of registered valuers i.e one M/s
Harapriya Associates Private Limited.
vi. After taking all relevant factors into consideration, the compensation
amount was assessed and the amount was duly disbursed u/s 3(G)
of the NH Act, 1956, by the Competent Authority of Land
Acquisition, for a total amount of Rs.1,39,20.236/- which included
Land Value, Structure Value, Solatium @30%, Addl. Market Value
(Interest@12%) and Ex-gratia amount, as per law. The same was paid
to the Claimant on 6.5.2015.
vii. Being aggrieved by the compensation determined/awarded, the
Claimant filed a representation before the Collector, Cuttack for re-
determination of the compensation amount.
viii. The Claimant also approached this Court in W.P.(C) No. 15266 of
2015 with the prayer to direct the Collector, Cuttack to consider his
representation as an application u/s 3(G)(5) of the NH Act, 1956.
Further, a request was made to accord permission to the Claimant to
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file an Application before the Collector for re-measurement of the
structure existing on the acquired area. This Court vide order dated
17.11.2015, was pleased to direct for disposal of the Claimant's
representation in accordance with law.
ix. Therefore, ARB Misc. Case No. 1 of 2016 was instituted by the
Claimant before the Ld. Collector & District Magistrate Cum Sole
Arbitrator.
x. An enquiry was conducted as per the directions of Ld. Arbitrator for
joint re-measurement / reassessment of structure and Industrial Unit
under Land Acquisition on the Plot Nos.421 /423 /424 of Mouza-
Karapari in the presence of both the parties, GM DIC and Executive
Engineer.
xi. On 25.1.2017, the Ld. Arbitrator also ordered the Executive Engineer,
NH Division to convene a meeting, coordinating with all officers
and conduct a thorough inquiry after which a joint inquiry report
was directed to be submitted. The joint inspection report was
submitted on 24.8.2017.
xii. The Ld. Arbitrator in ARB Misc. Case No. 1 of 2016 vide award
dated 22.5.2019 was pleased to enhance the compensation to
Rs.23,92,20,307/- with interest.
xiii. The NHAI challenged the award dated 22.5.2019 before the Ld.
District Judge, Cuttack in ARBP 15 of 2019 and the Claimant
challenged the award dated 22.5.2019 before the Ld. District Judge,
Cuttack in ARBP 16 of 2019. The impugned award was confirmed by
the Ld. District Judge vide common judgment dated 23.2.2024. This
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judgment confirming the award is challenged herein by both the
parties.
3. Now that the facts leading up to the instant Appeals have been laid
down, this Court shall endeavour to summarise the contentions of the
Parties and the broad grounds that have been raised to seek the exercise
of this Court's limited jurisdiction available under S. 37 of the A&C Act.
II. CLAIMANT'S SUBMISSIONS:
4. The Ld. Counsel for the Claimant assails the judgment of the Ld.
District Judge mainly on the ground that the Ld. District Judge has
failed to note that the Ld. Arbitrator has not correctly calculated the
compensation due to the Claimant and erroneously rejected a part of
the claim of the Claimant. According to the Ld. Counsel for the
Claimant, the Ld. Arbitrator ought to have passed an award of
Rs.90,79,63,700/- towards additional compensation but has wrongly
directed NHAI to only pay additional compensation of Rs.
23,92,20,307/- and, therefore, the award is bad in law and liable to be set
aside.
III. NHAI's SUBMISSIONS:
5. Per contra, Ld. Counsel for the NHAI submits that the arbitral award
passed by the Ld. Collector and Arbitrator is against the evidence on
record and ought to be set aside in its entirety. The Ld. Counsel
strenuously argued that the land of the Claimant was ‚Gharabari‛
kisam of land. However, the Ld. Arbitrator has wrongly awarded
additional compensation upon erroneously holding that there was
industry/factory over the acquired land. The Ld. Counsel submits that
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as the Ld. Arbitrator has passed an award without properly applying its
mind, the same ought to shock the conscience of the court apart from
being perverse and unsustainable in law.
IV. ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
6. Having heard the parties and perused the materials available on record,
this court here has identified the following solitary issue to be
determined:
A. Whether the order of the Ld. District Judge warrants interference
keeping in mind the limitations of this court's powers under
Section 37 of the A&C Act?
V. ISSUE A: WHETHER THE ORDER OF THE LD. DISTRICT JUDGE
WARRANTS ANY INTERFERENCE KEEPING IN MIND THE
LIMITATIONS OF THIS COURT'S POWERS UNDER SECTION 37
OF THE A&C ACT?
7. This Court has given its thoughtful consideration to the submissions
advanced by the learned counsel for the parties at the bar and I have
also perused the relevant record of the case.
8. First things first, it would be apposite to refer to the provisions
of Section 34 & 37 of the Act, which provisions read as under:
‚34. Application for setting aside arbitral award. -(1) Recourse
to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an
application for setting aside such award in accordance with
subsection (2) and sub-section (3).
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if-
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(a) the party making the application establishes on the basis of
the record of the arbitral tribunal that-
(i) a party was under some incapacity; or
(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any
indication thereon, under the law for the time being in
force; or
(iii) the party making the application was not given proper
notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the
arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present
his case; or
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated
by or not falling within the terms of the submission
to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond
the scope of the submission to arbitration:
Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted
to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted,
only that part of the arbitral award which contains
decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be
set aside; or
(v.) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of
the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a
provision of this Part from which the parties cannot
derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in
accordance with this Part; or
(b) the Court finds that--
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being
in force, or
(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of
India.
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Explanation 1.--For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified
that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India,
only if,-
(i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud
or corruption or was in violation of Section 75
or Section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of
Indian law; or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or
justice.
Explanation 2.--For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to
whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy
of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the
dispute.
(2-A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than
international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by
the court, if the court finds that the award is vitiated by patent
illegality appearing on the face of the award:
Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on the
ground of an erroneous application of the law or by
reappreciation of evidence.
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after
three months have elapsed from the date on which the party
making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a
request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which
that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application
within the said period of three months it may entertain the
application within a further period of thirty days, but not
thereafter.
(4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the
Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a
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party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined
by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to
resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as
in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds
for setting aside the arbitral award.
37. Appealable orders.--(1) (Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force, an
appeal) shall lie from the following orders (and from no others)
to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from original
decrees of the Court passing the order, namely:--
((a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 8;
(b) granting or refusing to grant any measure
under Section 9;
(c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award
under Section 34.)
(2) An appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the
arbitral tribunal--
(a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-
section(3) of Section 16; or
(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure
under Section17.
(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal
under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take
away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.‛
9. On a careful perusal of Section 34 of the Act, it is clear that an arbitral
award can only be set aside by moving an application on grounds
mentioned under sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act.
An award can be interfered with, where it is in conflict with the public
policy of India, i.e., if the award is induced or affected by fraud or
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corruption or is in contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian
law, or if it is in conflict with basic notions of morality and justice.
10. A plain reading of Section 34 reveals that the scope of interference by
the Court with the arbitral award under Section 34 is very limited, and
the Court is not supposed to travel beyond the aforesaid scope to
determine whether the award is good or bad. Even an award that may
not be reasonable or is non-speaking to some extent cannot ordinarily
be interfered with by the Courts.
11.It is also a well settled proposition in law that the jurisdiction of the
Court under Section 34 of the Act is neither in the nature of an appellate
remedy or akin to the power of revision. It is also well ordained in law
that an award cannot be challenged on merits except on the limited
grounds that have been spelt out in sub-sections (2), (2-A) and (3)
of Section 34 of the Act, by way of filing an appropriate application.
12.In the instant case, there is no allegation that the making of the award
was induced or affected by fraud or corruption, or was in violation of
Section 75 or Section 81. Therefore, we shall confine our exercise in
assessing as to whether the arbitral award is in contravention with the
fundamental policy of Indian law, and/or whether it conflicts with the
most basic notions of morality or justice. Additionally, in the light of the
provisions of sub-section (2-A) of Section 34, this Court shall examine
whether there is any patent illegality on the face of the award.
13.Before undertaking the aforesaid exercise, it would be apposite to
consider as to how the expressions (a) ‚in contravention with the
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fundamental policy of Indian law‛; (b) ‚in conflict with the most basic
notions of morality or justice‛; and (c) ‚patent illegality‛ have been
construed.
(a) In contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law
14.Till the Amendment, 2015 the expression ‚in contravention with the
fundamental policy of Indian law‛ was not found in the 1996 Act. Yet,
in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co.1, in the context of
enforcement of a foreign award, while construing the phrase ‚contrary
to the public policy‛, this Court held that for a foreign award to be
contrary to public policy mere contravention of law would not be
enough rather it should be contrary to: (a) the fundamental policy of
Indian law; and/or (b) the interest of India; and/or (c) justice or morality.
15.In the judicial pronouncements that followed Renusagar (supra), the
domain of what could be considered contrary to the 'public policy of
India'/'fundamental policy of Indian law' expanded, resulting in much
greater interference with arbitral awards than what the lawmakers
intended. This led to the Amendment2015 to the 1996 Act.
16.In Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI2, this Court
dealt with the effect of the Amendment, 2015. While doing so, it took
note of a supplementary report of February 2015 of the Law
Commission of India made in the context of the proposed 2015
amendments. The said supplementary report has been extracted in
(1984) 4 SCC 679
(2019) 15 SCC 131
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Date: 19-Feb-2025 17:22:45
paragraph 30 of that judgment. The key features of it are summarized
below:
‚(a) Mere violation of law of India would not be a violation of
public policy in cases of international commercial arbitrations
held in India.
(b) The proposed 2015 amendments in 1996 Act (i.e., in
Sections 34(2)(b)(ii) and 48(2)(b) including insertion of sub-
section (2-A) in Section 34) were on the assumption that the
terms, such as, ‚fundamental policy of Indian law‛ or conflict
with ‚most basic notions of morality or justice‛ would not be
widely construed.
(c) The power to review an award on merits is contrary to the
object of the Act and international practice.
(d) The judgment in ONGC v. Western Geco International
Ltd.3would expand the court's power, contrary to
international practice. Hence, a clarification needs to be
incorporated to ensure that the term 'fundamental policy of
Indian law' is narrowly construed. The applicability
of Wednesbury principles to public policy will open the
floodgates. Hence, Explanation 2 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii) has
been proposed.‛
17.After taking note of the supplementary report, the statement of objects
and reasons of the Amendment Act, 2015, and the amended provisions
of Sections 28, 34 and 48, the Apex Court held in Ssangyong (supra):
‚34. What is clear, therefore, is that the expression public
policy of India, whether contained in section 34 or in section
48, would now mean the fundamental policy of Indian law as
explained in paras 18 and 27 of Associate Builders i.e. the
fundamental policy of Indian law would be relegated
to Renusagar's understanding of this expression. This would
(2014) 9 SCC 263
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necessarily mean that Western Geco expansion has been done
away with. In short, Western Geco, as explained in Paras 28
and 29 of Associate Builders, would no longer obtain, as under
the guise of interfering with an award on the ground that the
arbitrator has not adopted a judicial approach the court's
intervention would be on the merits of the award, which
cannot be permitted post amendment. However, in so far as
principles of natural justice are concerned, as contained in
sections 18 and 34(2)(a)(iii) of the 1996 Act, these continue to
be the grounds of challenge of an award, as is contained in
para 30 of Associate Builders.
35.*****
36******
37. In so far as domestic awards made in India are concerned,
an additional ground is now available under sub-section (2-A),
added by the Amendment Act, 2015 to section 34. Here, there
must be patent illegality appearing on the face of the award,
which refers to such illegality as goes to the root of the matter,
but which does not amount to mere erroneous application of
the law. In short, what is not subsumed within the
fundamental policy of Indian law, namely, the contravention
of a statute not linked to public policy or public interest,
cannot be brought in by the back door when it comes to setting
aside an award on the ground of patent illegality.
38. Secondly, it is also made clear that reappreciation of
evidence, which is what an appellate court is permitted to do,
cannot be permitted under the ground of patent illegality
appearing on the face of the award.
39. To elucidate, para 42.1 of Associate Builders, namely, a
mere contravention of the substantive law of India, by itself, is
no longer a ground available to set aside an arbitral award.
Para 42.2 of Associate Builders, however, would remain, for if
an arbitrator gives no reasons for an award and contravenes
section 31(3) of the 1996 Act, that would certainly amount to
a patent illegality on the face of the award.
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40. The change made in Section 28(3) by the Amendment Act
really follows what is stated in paras 42.3 to 45 in Associate
Builders, namely, that the construction of the terms of a
contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide, unless the
arbitrator construes the contract in a manner that no fair
minded or reasonable person would; in short, that the
arbitrator's view is not even a possible view to take. Also, if the
arbitrator wanders outside the contract and deals with the
matters not allotted to him, he commits an error of
jurisdiction. This ground of challenge will now fall within the
new ground added under Section 34 (2-A).
41. What is important to note is that a decision which is
perverse, as understood in paras 31 and 32 of Associate
Builders, while no longer being a ground for challenge under
‚public policy of India‛, would certainly amount to a patent
illegality appearing on the face of the award. Thus, a finding
based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital
evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and
liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality.
Additionally, a finding based on documents taken behind the
back of the parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a
decision based on no evidence inasmuch as such decision is not
based on evidence led by the parties, and therefore, would also
have to be characterized as perverse.
********* ******* *******
69. We therefore hold, following the aforesaid authorities, that
in the guise of misinterpretation of the contract, and
consequent errors of jurisdiction, it is not possible to state that
the arbitral award would be beyond the scope of submission to
arbitration if otherwise the aforesaid misinterpretation [which
would include going beyond the terms of the contract], could
be said to have been fairly comprehended as disputes within
the arbitration agreement or which were referred to the
decision of the arbitrators as understood by the authorities
above. If an arbitrator is alleged to have wandered outside the
contract and dealt with matters not allotted to him, this would
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be a jurisdictional error which could be corrected on the
ground of patent illegality, which, as we have seen, would not
apply to international commercial arbitrations that are decided
under Part II of the 1996 Act. To bring in by the back door
grounds relatable to Section 28 (3) of the 1996 Act to be
matters beyond the scope of submission to arbitration under
section 34(2)(a)(iv) would not be permissible as this ground
must be construed narrowly and so construed, must refer only
to matters which are beyond the arbitration agreement or
beyond the reference to the arbitral tribunal.‛
18.The legal position which emerges from the aforesaid discussion is that
after the '2015 amendments' in Section 34 (2)(b)(ii) and Section 48(2)(b)
of the 1996 Act, the phrase ‚in conflict with the public policy of India‛
must be accorded a restricted meaning in terms of Explanation 1. The
expression ‚in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian
law‛ by use of the word 'fundamental' before the phrase 'policy of
Indian law' makes the expression narrower in its application than the
phrase ‚in contravention with the policy of Indian law‛, which means
mere contravention of law is not enough to make an award vulnerable.
19.In order to bring the contravention within the fold of fundamental
policy of Indian law, the award must contravene all or any of such
fundamental principles that provide a basis for administration of justice
and enforcement of law in this country. Without intending to
exhaustively enumerate instances of such contravention, by way of
illustration, it could be said that (a) violation of the principles of natural
justice; (b) disregarding orders of superior courts in India or the binding
effect of the judgment of a superior court; and (c) violating law of India
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linked to public good or public interest, are considered contravention of
the fundamental policy of Indian law. However, while assessing
whether there has been a contravention of the fundamental policy of
Indian law, the extent of judicial scrutiny must not exceed the limit as
set out in Explanation 2 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii).
(b) Most basic notions of morality and justice
20.In Renusagar (supra) the Supreme Court held that an arbitral award is
in conflict with the public policy of India if it is, inter alia, contrary to
‚justice and morality‛. Explanation 1, inserted by 2015 Amendment,
makes it clear that an award is in conflict with the public policy of
India, inter alia, if it conflicts with the 'most basic notions of morality or
justice'.
21.Justice is the virtue by which the society/court/tribunal gives a man his
due, opposed to injury or wrong. Justice is an act of rendering what is
right and equitable towards one who has suffered a wrong. Therefore,
while tempering justice with mercy, the court must be very conscious,
that it has to do justice in exact conformity with some obligatory law,
for the reason that human actions are found to be just or unjust on the
basis of whether the same are in conformity with, or in opposition to,
the law. Therefore, in 'judicial sense', justice is nothing more nor less
than exact conformity to some obligatory law; and all human actions are
either just or unjust as they are in conformity with, or in opposition to,
the law.
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22.But, importantly, the term 'legal justice' is not used in Explanation 1,
therefore simple conformity or non-conformity with the law is not the
test to determine whether an award is in conflict with the public policy
of India in terms of Explanation 1. The test is that it must conflict with
the most basic notions of justice. For lack of any objective criteria, it is
difficult to enumerate the 'most basic notions of justice'. More so, justice
to one may be injustice to another. This difficulty has been
acknowledged by many renowned jurists, as is reflected in the
observations of this Court in Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh
Uban4 extracted below:
‚23. The words 'justice' and 'injustice', in our view, are
sometimes loosely used and have different meanings to
different persons particularly to those arrayed on opposite
sides. One man's justice is another's injustice [Raplph Waldo
Emerson : Essays (1803-82), First Series, 1841, ‚Circles].
Justice Cardozo said:‚The web is entangled and obscure, shot
through with a multitude of shades and colors, the skeins
irregular and broken. Many hues that seem to be simple, are
found, when analyzed, to be a complex and uncertain
blend. Justice itself, which we are wont to appeal to what as a
test as well as an ideal, may mean different things to different
minds and at different times. Attempts to objectify its
standards or even to describe them have never wholly
succeeded (Selected Writings of Cardozo, pp 223-224, Falcon
Publications, 1947).‛
(2000) 7 SCC 296
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23.In Associate Builders v. D.D.A5, while the Supreme Court was dealing
with the concept ‚public policy of India‛, in the context of a Section 34
challenge prior to 2015 amendment, it was held that an award can be
said to be against justice only when it shocks the conscience of the court.
The Apex Court illustrated by stating that where an arbitral award,
without recording reasons, awards an amount much more than what
the claim is restricted to, it would certainly shock the conscience of the
court and render the award vulnerable and liable to be set aside on the
ground that it is contrary to justice.
24.In Ssyangyong (supra), which dealt with post 2015 amendment
scenario, it was observed that an argument to set aside an award on the
ground of being in conflict with 'most basic notions of justice', can be
raised only in very exceptional circumstances, that is, when the
conscience of the court is shocked by infraction of some fundamental
principle of justice. Notably, in that case the majority award created a
new contract for the parties by applying a unilateral circular, and by
substituting a workable formula under the agreement by
another, dehors the agreement. Thus, in the view of the Supreme Court,
breached the fundamental principles of justice, namely, that a unilateral
addition or alteration of a contract can never be foisted upon an
unwilling party, nor can a party to the agreement be liable to perform a
bargain not entered with the other party. However, a note of caution
was expressed in the judgment by observing that this ground is
(2015) 3 SCC 49
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available only in very exceptional circumstances and under no
circumstance can any court interfere with an arbitral award on the
ground that justice has not been done in the opinion of the court
because that would be an entry into the merits of the dispute.
25.In the light of the discussion above, in Court's view, when it is talked
about justice being done, it is about rendering, in accordance with law,
what is right and equitable to one who has suffered a wrong. A trained
judicial mind may dispense justice in a manner different from what a
person of ordinary prudence would do. This is so, because a trained
judicial mind is likely to figure out even minor infractions of law/norms
which may escape the attention of a person with ordinary prudence.
Therefore, the placement of words ‚most basic notions‛ before ‚of
justice‛ in Explanation 1 has its significance. Notably, at the time when
the 2015 Amendment was brought, the existing law with regard to
grounds for setting aside an arbitral award, as interpreted by this Court,
was that an arbitral award would be in conflict with public policy of
India, if it is contrary to : (a) the fundamental policy of Indian law; (b)
the interest of India; (c) justice or morality; and/or is (d) patently illegal.
As we have already noticed, the object of inserting Explanations 1 and
2 in place of earlier explanation to Section 34(2)(b)(ii) was to limit the
scope of interference with an arbitral award, therefore the amendment
consciously qualified the term 'justice' with 'most basic notions' of it. In
such circumstances, giving a broad dimension to this categorywould be
deviating from the legislative intent. In my view, therefore, considering
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that the concept of justice is open- textured, and notions of justice could
evolve with changing needs of the society, it would not be prudent to
cull out ‚the most basic notions of justice‛. Suffice it to observe,
they ought to be such elementary principles of justice that their
violation could be figured out by a prudent member of the public who
may, or may not, be judicially trained, which means, that their violation
would shock the conscience of a legally trained mind. In other words,
this ground would be available to set aside an arbitral award, if the
award conflicts with such elementary/fundamental principles of justice
that it shocks the conscience of the Court.
26.The other ground is that of morality. On the question of morality,
in Associate Builders (supra), the Supreme Court, after referring to the
provisions of Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872; and Indian Contract
Act by Pollock and Mulla, held that judicial precedents have confined
morality to sexual morality. And if 'morality' were to go beyond sexual
morality, it would cover such agreements as are not illegal but would
not be enforced given the prevailing mores of the day. The court also
clarified that interference on this ground would be only if something
shocks the court's conscience.
(c) Patent Illegality
27.Sub-section (2-A) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, which was inserted by
2015 Amendment, provides that an arbitral award not arising out of
international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the
Court, if the Court finds that the award is visited by patent illegality
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appearing on the face of the award. The proviso to subsection (2-A)
states that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an
erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.
In ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes6while dealing with the phrase 'public
policy of India' as used in Section 34, the Supreme Court took the view
that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns
public good and public interest. If the award, on the face of it, patently
violates statutory provisions, it cannot be said to be in public interest.
Thus, an award could also be set aside if it is patently illegal. It was,
however, clarified that illegality must go to the root of the matter and if
the illegality is of trivial nature, it cannot be held that award is against
public policy.
28.In Associate Builders (supra), the Supreme Court has held that an
award would be patently illegal, if it is contrary to:
(a) substantive provisions of law of India;
(b) provisions of the 1996 Act; and
(c) terms of the contract.
29.The Supreme Court of India has clarified that if an award is contrary to
the substantive provisions of law of India, in effect, it is in contravention
of Section 28(1)(a)51 of the 1996 Act. Similarly, violating terms of the
contract, in effect, is in contravention of Section 28(3) of the 1996 Act.
(2003) 5 SCC 705
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30.In Ssangyong (supra)the Supreme Court specifically dealt with the 2015
Amendment which inserted sub-section (2-A) in Section 34 of the 1996
Act. It was held that ‚patent illegality appearing on the face of the award‛
refers to such illegality as goes to the root of matter, but which does not
amount to mere erroneous application of law. It was also clarified that
what is not subsumed within ‚the fundamental policy of Indian law‛,
namely, the contravention of a statute not linked to 'public policy' or
'public interest', cannot be brought in by the backdoor when it comes to
setting aside an award on the ground of patent illegality. Further, it was
observed, re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible under this
category of challenge to an arbitral award.
(d) Perversity as a ground of challenge
31.Perversity as a ground for setting aside an arbitral award was
recognized in Western Geco (supra). It was observed therein by the
Supreme Court that an arbitral decision must not be perverse or so
irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same. It
was observed that if an award is perverse, it would be against the
public policy of India.
32.In Associate Builders (supra) certain tests were laid down to determine
whether a decision of an arbitral tribunal could be considered perverse.
In this context, it was observed that where : (i) a finding is based on no
evidence; or (ii) an arbitral tribunal takes into account something
irrelevant to the decision which it arrives at; or (iii) ignores vital
evidence in arriving at its decision, such decision would necessarily be
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perverse. However, by way of a note of caution, it was observed that
when a court applies these tests, it does not act as a court of appeal and,
consequently, errors of fact cannot be corrected. It was held that a
possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as
the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of
evidence to be relied upon. It was also observed that an award based on
little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up in quality to a
trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on that score alone.
33.In Ssangyong (supra), which dealt with the legal position post 2015
amendment in Section 34 of the 1996 Act, it was observed that a
decision which is perverse, while no longer being a ground for
challenge under ‚public policy of India‛, would certainly amount to a
patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. It was pointed out
that an award based on no evidence, or which ignores vital evidence,
would be perverse and thus patently illegal. It was also observed that a
finding based on documents taken behind the back of the parties by the
arbitrator would also qualify as a decision based on no evidence in as
much as such decision is not based on evidence led by the parties, and
therefore, would also have to be characterized as perverse.
34.The tests laid down in Associate Builders (supra) to determine
perversity were followed in Ssyanyong (supra) and later approved by a
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three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Patel Engineering
Limited v. North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Limited7.
35.In a recent three-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Delhi
Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd.8,
the ground of patent illegality/perversity was delineated in the
following terms:
‚40. In essence, the ground of patent illegality is available for
setting aside a domestic award, if the decision of the arbitrator
is found to be perverse, or so irrational that no reasonable
person would have arrived at it; or the construction of the
contract is such that no fair or reasonable person would take;
Or, that the view of the arbitrator is not even a possible view.
A finding based on no evidence at all or an award which
ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be
perverse and liable to be set aside under the head of patent
illegality. An award without reasons would suffer from patent
illegality. The arbitrator commits a patent illegality by
deciding a matter not within its jurisdiction or violating a
fundamental principle of natural justice.‛
Scope of interference with an arbitral award
36.The aforesaid judicial precedents make it clear that while exercising
power under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the Court does not sit in appeal
over the arbitral award. Interference with an arbitral award is only on
limited grounds as set out in Section 34 of the 1996 Act. A possible view
by the arbitrator on facts is to be respected as the arbitrator is the
ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied
(2020) 7 SCC 167
2024 INSC 292
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upon. It is only when an arbitral award could be categorized as
perverse, that on an error of fact an arbitral award may be set aside.
Further, a mere erroneous application of the law or wrong appreciation
of evidence by itself is not a ground to set aside an award as is clear
from the provisions of subsection (2-A) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
37.In Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd.9, a three-Judge
Bench of the Supreme Court of India held that Courts need to be
cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards are not to be interfered with in
a casual and cavalier manner, unless the court concludes that the
perversity of the award goes to the root of the matter and there is no
possibility of an alternative interpretation that may sustain the arbitral
award. It was observed that jurisdiction under Section 34 cannot be
equated with the normal appellate jurisdiction. Rather, the approach
ought to be to respect the finality of the arbitral award as well as party's
autonomy to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum as
provided under the law.
38.It is also a settled proposition that errors of fact cannot be corrected by
the court while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 34 of the A&C
Act as it does not sit in appeal over the award. In Parsa Kente Collieries
Ltd. v. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd.10, it was further
inter alia held that a possible view by the Arbitrator on facts has
necessarily to pass muster as the Arbitratoris the ultimate master of the
(2019) 20 SCC 1
(2019) 7 SCC 236
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quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his
arbitral award. It was further observed that an award based on little
evidence or on evidence which does not measure up in quality to a
trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on this score.
Reliance can also be placed upon NHAI v. ITD Cementation (India)
Ltd.11, and SAIL v. Gupta Brother Steel Tubes Ltd.12. The view was
reiterated in Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. (supra) wherein it was inter alia
held that the courts should not interfere with an award merely because
an alternative view on facts and interpretation of contract exists. It was
reminded that the court should defer to the view taken by the Arbitral
Tribunal even if the reasoning provided in the award is implied unless
such an award portrays perversity unpardonable under Section 34 of
the A&C Act. In South East Asia Marine Engg. & Constructions Ltd.
[SEAMAC Limited] v. Oil India Ltd.13 , it was inter alia held that the
courts should not interfere with an award merely because an alternative
view on facts and interpretation of the contract exists.
39. This Court may also place further reliance on the Apex Court's
judgment in Madnani Construction Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Union of
India14wherein it was held that:
‚20. It is well settled that the arbitrator is the master of facts.
When the arbitrator on the basis of record and materials which
are placed before him by the Railways came to such specific
(2015) 14 SCC 21
(2009) 10 SCC 63
(2020) 5 SCC 164
(2010) 1 SCC 549
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findings and which have not been stigmatised as perverse by
the High Court, the High Court in reaching its conclusions
cannot ignore those findings. But it appears that in the instant
case, the High Court has come to the aforesaid finding that the
items mentioned above are excepted matters and non-
arbitrable by completely ignoring the factual finding by the
arbitrator and without holding that those findings are
perverse.‛
40. Therefore, to reiterate, the scope of interference in proceedings under
section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has been laid
down by the courts time and time again, more recently summarised in
the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Indian Railways Catering and
Tourism Corp Ltd. v. Brandavan Foods Products15. The operative
portion of which reads as under:
‚42. The scope of examination of an arbitral award under
Section 34 of the Act can be traced, more significantly so,
in Associate Builders v. DDA, 2024 : DHC : 6114
O.M.P. (COMM) 495/2022 & Conn. matters (2015) 3
SCC 49, SsangyongEngg. & Construction Co.
Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131and Delhi Airport
Metro Express (P) Ltd. v. DMRC, (2022) 1 SCC
131.Reliance is also placed upon, inter alia, Dyna
Technologies (P) Ltd. v.Crompton Greaves Ltd. (2019) 20
SCC 1; UHL Power Co. Ltd. v. State of H.P. (2022) 4
SCC 116; South East Asia Marine Engineering &
Constructions Ltd. v. Oil India Ltd. (2020) 5 SCC
164; Patel Engineering Ltd. v.North Eastern Electric
Power Corporation Ltd. (2020) 7 SCC 167; PSA SICAL
Terminals (P) Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of V.O.
Chidambranar Port Trust Tuticorin, 2021 SCC OnLine
2024 : DHC : 6114
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SC 508; and Army Welfare Housing
Organisation v. Sumangal Services (P) Ltd. (2004) 9
SCC 619.
43. For the sake of brevity, the principles delineated in the
aforesaid cases are summarised hereinafter.
44. The award can be set aside on the ground of patent
illegality if : a) the view taken by the arbitral tribunal is
impossible or such that no reasonable person could arrive
at it; b) if the arbitral tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction by
going beyond the contract, and adjudicating upon issues
not referred to it; c) the finding of the arbitral tribunal is
based on no evidence or it ignores material evidence.
Rewriting of contractual terms by the Arbitrator is
completely prohibited, and an Award which suffers from
such perversity is liable to be set aside. The illegality
must go to the root of the matter and does not include
mere erroneous application of law or a contravention of
law which is unrelated to public policy or public interest.
If two views are possible, the Court will not interfere with
the view of the arbitral tribunal if it has taken one of the
two views. Reappreciation of evidence is also
impermissible.
45. The award can also be set aside on the ground of it
being in contravention with public policy of India, the
scope of which includes : a) fraud or corruption; b)
violation of Sections 75 and 81 of the Act; c) any
contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law;
d) violation of the most basic notions of justice or
morality, so as to shock the conscience of the Court. The
Court does not function as a Court of appeal, and errors
of fact cannot be corrected. The arbitrator's findings
on facts must be accepted, as the arbitrator is the
ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence in
making the award.
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46. It is also relevant to note that the Court cannot
modify or rewrite the Award, and can only set it aside,
post which the parties can re-initiate arbitration
proceedings, if they so choose. However, partial setting
aside is valid and justified, if the part proposed to be
annulled is independent and can be removed without
affecting the rest of the award. For this, reliance is placed
upon McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard
Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181; S.V. Samudram v. State of
Karnataka (2024) 3 SCC 623 and National Highways
Authority of India v. TrichyThanjavur Expressway
Ltd. 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5183.‛
41.Moreover, on the aspect of the Ld. Arbitrator being the master of facts,
the Supreme Court has recently in NTPC Ltd. v. Deconar Services (P)
Ltd.16, has held as under:
‚12. Further, it is also a settled proposition that where the
arbitrator has taken a possible view, although a different view
may be possible on the same evidence, the court would not
interfere with the award. This Court in Arosan Enterprises
Ltd. v. Union of India [Arosan Enterprises Ltd. v. Union of
India, (1999) 9 SCC 449], held as follows : (SCC p. 475, paras
36-37)
‚36. Be it noted that by reason of a long catena of cases, it
is now a well-settled principle of law that reappraisal of
evidence by the court is not permissible and as a matter of
fact exercise of power by the court to reappraise the
evidence is unknown to proceedings under Section 30 of
the Arbitration Act. In the event of there being no reasons
in the award, question of interference of the court would
not arise at all. In the event, however, there are reasons,
the interference would still be not available within the
(2021) 19 SCC 694
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jurisdiction of the court unless of course, there exist a
total perversity in the award or the judgment is based on
a wrong proposition of law. In the event however two
views are possible on a question of law as well, the court
would not be justified in interfering with the award.
37. The common phraseology ‚error apparent on the face
of the record does not itself, however, mean and imply
closer scrutiny of the merits of documents and materials
on record. The court as a matter of fact, cannot substitute
its evaluation and come to the conclusion that the
arbitrator had acted contrary to the bargain between the
parties. If the view of the arbitrator is a possible view the
award or the reasoning contained therein cannot be
examined.‛‛
42.It is well recognized in Arbitration jurisprudence that the scope of
interference by the Courts in arbitration proceedings and arbitral
awards is narrow. In fact, the Courts ought to be cautious and
circumspect in interfering with any award which is passed by an
arbitral tribunal which has been appointed pursuant to an agreement
between the parties to the dispute. The exceptions of the
aforementioned rule finds place in Section 34 and Section 37 of the Act
wherein certain instances have been outlined where the Courts can
interfere with any award passed by arbitral tribunals and set it aside.
This court therefore shall also examine the award with the aforesaid
restrictive mandate of law.
43.Furthermore, this Court is cognizant that Section 37 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act which provides a statutory forum for appeal, inter
alia, against an order either setting aside or refusing to set aside an
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arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act. The scope of such an appeal
is inherently limited to the grounds enumerated under Section 34,
thereby ensuring that the appellate process remains confined to the
specific parameters established by the statute.
44.In view of the foregoing, this Court shall carefully examine the
arguments advanced by the counsel for the Appellant, wherein it is
asserted that the claims upheld by the Arbitrator are inconsistent with
the terms of the contract or that the impugned Award lacks any
supporting material or evidence.
45.Prima facie, a perusal of the impugned judgment and Award
unequivocally demonstrates that the Arbitrator relied upon written
submissions, documentary evidence, and the statements of the parties
involved in the transaction to determine and quantify the claims.
46.In his petition, the Claimant has claimed additional compensation of
Rs.90,79,63,700/-on different heads. After considering the evidence
adduced by the Claimant and hearing arguments from both the sides
the learned Arbitrator refused to grant additional compensation to the
extent as claimed by the Claimant.However, the learned Arbitrator did
award additional compensation on some statutory grounds, as follows:
i. The Ld. Arbitrator noted that after payment of compensation
amount of Rs.1,39,20,236/- on 6.5.2015, the Claimant was
instructed by the Competent Authority to shift his plant and
machinery failing which they will dispossess the Claimant
from the land as per law. Therefore, the Ld. Arbitrator
concluded that the Claimant is entitled to get 100% solatium
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instead of 30% which comes to Rs. 1,97,89,793/-. Out of the
100% solatium the Petitioner has already been paid
Rs.1,39,20,236/- and he is entitled for enhanced compensation
of Rs.58,69,557/-along with an interest of 9% per annum u/s3-H
(5) of the N.H.Act, 1956 on this head.
ii. In addition to that the Ld. Arbitrator calculated the additional
compensation with regard to the developmental cost @ 30%
i.e.Rs.3,87,450/-, and denied the claim advanced by the
Claimant of Rs.1,49,76,000/- on this head.
iii. Besides that the Ld. Arbitrator opined that the Claimant is
entitled to get compensation for the damage sustained for his
dispossession and consequential effect resulted thereof. On
this head, the Ld. Arbitrator awarded compensation with
regard to the industrial unit for civil cost, cost of plant and
machinery and other charges, installation of electrical fittings
and other items which combined comes to Rs.22,74,73,300/-.
iv. Furthermore, it appears that the Ld. Arbitrator refused to pay
any additional compensation on the head "mental agony", but
has awarded Rs.94.9 lakhs towards the consequential loss
incurred by the Claimant from the date of acquisition till the
shifting and construction of new factory taking into the profit
made by the Claimant during the financial year 2016-17 as
against the claim of Rs.3,11,00,000/- under column-F-1 of the
petition.
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v. Finally in toto the Ld. Arbitrator awarded Rs. 23,92,20,307/-
along with interest u/s 3-H(5) at 9% per annum with effect
from 15.1.2015 till the date of deposit of the additional
compensation by the N.H.A.I.
47.But, it is pertinent to note that, the learned Arbitrator has not accepted
the claim of the claimant that the valuation of the land acquired should
have been assessed taking the same as 'industrial' kisam land and not as
'Gharabari' kisam land. The Ld. Arbitrator found nothing wrong in
awarding the compensation four times higher than the bench mark
value of mouza in question and the claim to enhance the compensation
was rejected with the finding that the approach of the Competent
Authority was in accordance with law. The claim advanced by the
Claimant to award the cost of registration @ 7% of the land
cost,consequential loss, shifting cost, mental agony are also not accepted
by the Ld. Arbitrator.So far as the claim towards development cost@30%
of land cost calculated by the claimant at Rs1,49,76,000/- taking the
bench mark value of the land at Rs.80 lakhs per acre isconcerned, the
Ld. Arbitrator did not accept the same and on its own calculation at the
rate of bench mark value fixed by the Competent Authority awarded
additional compensation of Rs.3,87,450/- which according to it was just
and proper.
48.In any arbitration proceeding, the role of the arbitrator is pivotal as the
final decision-maker. This role involves not just interpreting and
applying the law, but also determining the facts that underpin the
dispute at hand. The arbitrator's ultimate responsibility is to resolve the
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dispute by making an award that reflects a thorough understanding of
the facts, the law, and the parties' arguments. The process by which the
arbitrator evaluates facts is highly discretionary, and this discretion
must pass muster in the sense that it aligns with legal standards and
fundamental principles of fairness.
49.Unlike in a courtroom trial, the arbitrator has a much broader scope of
discretion in assessing facts. Arbitrators are not bound by rigid rules of
evidence as would be the case in a civil or common law court. Their
duty is to examine the evidence presented by the parties, evaluate its
credibility, and decide which pieces of evidence should be accepted or
rejected. This discretion is not without limitation. While the arbitrator
enjoys wide-ranging authority in fact-finding, it is not an untrammelled
power. For instance, there are fundamental principles of justice,
transparency, and fairness that undergird the arbitration process. The
arbitrator's decision must be based on the evidence presented and
should not be arbitrary or capricious. The arbitrator's findings must be
justifiable on the record. In this sense, while the arbitrator is the
ultimate master of fact, their decisions must be reasoned and consistent
with the evidence on record.
50.Therefore, the arbitrator's role as the ultimate master of the quantity
and quality of evidence is central to the arbitration process. The
principle that a court does not sit in appeal over an arbitrator's findings
of fact is a cornerstone of the arbitration process. This fundamental
concept ensures that the arbitration process remains efficient and final,
distinguishing it from the conventional judicial process. One of the
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primary reasons for this is that courts are generally not permitted to re-
appreciate or re-evaluate the evidence presented to the arbitrator. The
rationale behind this limitation is rooted in the understanding that the
arbitrator, as the chosen adjudicator by the parties, is the ultimate
authority on matters of fact and evidence.
51.A perusal of the arbitral award would elucidate that the sole Arbitrator
has considered the facts of the case, the contentions of both the parties
and other documentary and oral evidence on record to take a decision.
Now, even if one might feel that the evidence could be clearer and its
quality could be higher to buttress the award, however, the same does
not by itself warrant interference by this Court given the restrictive
scope of this Court's powers u/s 37 of the A&C Act.
VI. CONCLUSION:
52.In light of the discussion above, keeping the settled principles of law in
mind and for the reasons given above, this Court is of the considered
view that judgment dated 23.2.2024 passed by the learned District
Judge, Cuttack in Arbitration Petition Nos.15 and 16 of 2019 arising out
of award dated 22.5.2019 passed by the Ld. Collector & District
Magistrate-cum- Sole Arbitrator in ARB Misc. Case No. 1 of 2016 is not
liable to be interfered with.
53.Consequently, the award dated 22.5.2019 passed by the Ld. Collector &
District Magistrate-cum-Sole Arbitrator in ARB Misc. Case No. 1 of 2016
is confirmed accordingly.
Designation: AR-CUM- SR. SECRETARY
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 19-Feb-2025 17:22:45
54.ARBA No.6 of 2024 and ARBA No.10 of 2024 are disposed of on the
abovementioned terms. No order as to costs.
(Dr.S.K. Panigrahi)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
Dated the 14th February, 2025/
