Orissa High Court
Susanta Kumar Patra vs Director Of Edu on 12 February, 2025
Author: Biraja Prasanna Satapathy
Bench: Biraja Prasanna Satapathy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.8614 of 2025
In the matter of an application under Articles 226 & 227 of
the Constitution of India, 1950
..................
Susanta Kumar Patra .... Petitioner
-versus-
Director of Edu., BBSR & .... Opposite Parties
Others
For Petitioner : M/s. Mr. P. Mohanty, Advocate.
For Opp. Parties : Mr. S.K. Jee, AGA
Mr.S.K. Das, Adv. for O.P.5.
PRESENT:
THE HONBLE JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY
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Date of Hearing:12.02.2025 and Date of Judgment:12.02.2025
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Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J.
1. This matter is taken up through Hybrid
Arrangement (Virtual/Physical) Mode.
2. Heard learned counsel appearing for the Parties.
3. Petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition inter
alia challenging the order dtd.31.03.2018 so passed in
// 2 //
Appeal Case No.7 of 2016 by Opposite Party No.2 under
Annexure-22. Vide the said order, appeal filed by the
present Opposite Party No.5 was allowed with a direction
on the Managing Committee to reinstate Opposite Party
No.5 in his post of Peon (Night Watchman-cum-Sweeper)
and to grant him all benefits as per law.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner
contended that though it is not disputed that private
Opposite Party No.5 was appointed as against the post of
Peon, but while so continuing he tendered his resignation
before the Secretary Managing Committee of the School
on 26.03.2014 under Annexure-4. The said resignation
letter submitted on 26.03.2014 was duly approved by the
then vividly constituted and approved Managing
Committee in its proceeding dtd.27.03.2014 under
Annexure-2-Series.
4.1. It is contended that after such acceptance of the
resignation submitted by Opposite Party No.5, the present
Petitioner was appointed as against the said post of Peon
by following due procedure of law with issuance of the
order of appointment vide order dtd.29.11.2014 under
Annexure-12.
4.2. It is contended that even though Opposite Party
No.5 resigned from his service by submitting letter of
resignation on 26.03.2014 with due appointment of the
present petitioner vide office order dtd.29.04.2014, but
// 3 //
with a plea that Opposite Party No.5 has been prevented
from discharging his duty, approached the Opposite Party
No.2 by filing Appeal No.7 of 2016.
4.3. It is contended that even though Opposite Party
No.5 tendered his resignation on 26.03.2014 with due
acceptance of the same, but without having any cogent
material available before Opposite Party No.2, Opposite
Party No.2 came to a conclusion that signature of
Opposite Party No.5 so reflected in his resignation letter is
not his signature and while holding so allowed the appeal.
4.4. It is contended that basis of such conclusion on the
part of Opposite Party No.2 in holding that signature of
Opposite Party No.5 so reflected in resignation letter
dtd.26.03.2014 is not his signature, cannot be accepted
as there was no evidence available in that regard.
4.5. It is accordingly contended that the ground on
which appeal of the private Opposite Party No.5 was
allowed vide the impugned order dtd.31.03.2018 is not
sustainable in the eye of law and it requires interference
of this Court.
4.6. It is further contended that during pendency of the
present writ petition, services of the Petitioner has been
approved as against the post in question vide office order
dtd.26.10.2023 of DEO, Nayagarh and Petitioner is
getting his salary in shape of grant-in-aid.
// 4 //
5. Mr. S.K. Das, learned counsel appearing for
Opposite Party No.5 on the other hand contended that
taking into account the signature of the private Opposite
Party No.5 available in other relevant documents in the
memo of appeal, Opposite Party No.2 after verifying such
signatures along with the signature reflected in the
resignation letter, rightly came to a conclusion that
signature of Opposite Party No.5 in the resignation letter
is not the signature of Opposite Party No.5.
5.1. It is contended that since basing on such evidence
available in the memo of appeal, such a view has been
arrived at, the same is not liable for interference by this
Court.
5.2. In support of the same, learned counsel appearing
for Opposite Party No.5 relied on the following decisions:-
1. State Bank of India vs. Ram Lal Bhaskar &
Another, reported in (2011) 10 SCC-249, Para-12 &
13.
2. Union of India & Others vs. P. Gunasekaran,
reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610, Para-12, 13 & 15.
3. State of Rajasthan & Others vs. Bhupendra
Singh, Civil Appeal Nos.8546-8549 of 2024 @
Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.12773-76 of 2021),
Para-21,23 & 24.
// 5 //
5.3. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State Bank of
India in Para-12 & 13 has held as follows:-
"12. This Court has held in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama
Rao (AIR Pp. 1726-27, para 7)
"7...The High Court is not constituted in a
proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a
court of appeal over the decision of the authorities
holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant: it is concerned to determine whether the
enquiry is held by an authority competent in that
behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed
in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural
justice are not violated. Where there is some
evidence, which the authority entrusted with the
duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which
evidence may reasonably support the conclusion
that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it
is not the function of the High Court in a petition
for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence
and to arrive at an independent finding on the
evidence."
13. Thus, in a proceeding under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the High Court does not sit as an appellate
authority over the findings of the disciplinary authority
and so long as the findings of the disciplinary authority
are supported by some evidence the High Court does not
reappreciate the evidence and come to a different and
independent finding on the evidence. This position of law
has been reiterated in several decisions by this Court
which we need not refer to, and yet by the impugned
judgment the High Court has reappreciated the evidence
and arrived at the conclusion that the findings recorded by
the enquiry officer are not substantiated by any material
on record and the allegations levelled against Respondent
1 do not constitute any misconduct and that Respondent 1
was not guilty of any misconduct".
5.4. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of P. Gunasekaran
in Para-12, 13 & 15 has held as follows:-
// 6 //
"12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully
disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an
appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings,
reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer.
The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary
authority and was also endorsed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the
High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first
appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not
venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court
can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in
conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching
a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the
evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could
ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to
admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India,
the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the
same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to
be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it
shocks its conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
15. In State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao [(1975) 2 SCC
557 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 349 : AIR 1975 SC 2151] , the
// 7 //
principles have been further discussed at paras 21-24,
which read as follows : (SCC pp. 561-63)
"21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental
inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions
were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree
Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723] . First, there is no warrant
for the view that in considering whether a public officer is
guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed
in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless
proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the
satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not
applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in
a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not
competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court
of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a
public servant. The Court is concerned to determine
whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in
that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in
that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are
not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which
the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry
has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support
the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the
charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the
evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the
evidence. The High Court may interfere where the
departmental authorities have held the proceedings
against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the
rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities
have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by
some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the
merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the
conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and
capricious that no reasonable person could ever have
arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities
are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole
judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on
which their findings can be based, the adequacy or
reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be
permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a
proceeding for a writ under Article 226.
22. Again, this Court in Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh
[(1969) 1 SCC 502 : (1969) 3 SCR 548] said that the High
// 8 //
Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the
disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported
by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable
person could have reached such a finding. In Niranjan
Singh case [(1969) 1 SCC 502 : (1969) 3 SCR 548] this
Court held that the High Court exceeded its powers in
interfering with the findings of the disciplinary authority
on the charge that the respondent was instrumental in
compelling the shutdown of an air compressor at about
8.15 a.m. on 31-5-1956. This Court said that the Enquiry
Committee felt that the evidence of two persons that the
respondent led a group of strikers and compelled them to
close down their compressor could not be accepted at its
face value. The General Manager did not agree with the
Enquiry Committee on that point. The General Manager
accepted the evidence. This Court said that it was open to
the General Manager to do so and he was not bound by
the conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held
that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority
should prevail and the High Court should not have
interfered with the conclusion.
23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under
Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court
exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact
reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the
appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in
writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the
face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an
error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard
to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be
issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the
tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and
material evidence, or had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned
finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence,
that would be regarded as an error of law which can be
corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded
by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that
the relevant and material evidence adduced before the
Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding.
The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and
the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. (See Syed
Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC 477] .)
24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire
evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court
was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the
// 9 //
High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground
that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the
evidence in the present case which was considered by the
Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify
the conclusion that there is no evidence which would
justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did
not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its
conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that
no reasonable person could have arrived at these
conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence,
reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as
no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in
exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should
not do."
5.5. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bhupendra
Singh in Para-21, 23 & 24 has held as follows:-
"21. Having considered the matter, the Court finds
that the Impugned Judgment cannot be sustained. On
a prefatory note, we would begin by quoting what the
Division Bench has noted on page No.7:164 [2024] 8
S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports„It is well settled
preposition (sic) of law that courts will not act as an
Appellate Court and re-assess the evidence led in
domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that
another view was possible on the material on record. If
the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and
findings are based on evidence, the question of
adequacy of evidence or reliable nature of the evidence
will be no ground for interfering with the finding in
departmental enquiry. However, when the finding of
fact recorded in departmental enquiry is based on no
evidence or where it is clearly perverse then it
willinvite the intervention of the court.‟
XXX XXX XXX
23. The scope of examination and interference under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter
referred to as the „Constitution‟) in a case of the
present nature, is no longer res integra. In State of
Andhra Pradesh v S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC
1723, a3-Judge Bench stated:
„7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding
under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal
// 10 //
over the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is
concerned to [2024] 8 S.C.R. 165 The State of
Rajasthan & Ors. v. Bhupendra Singh determine
whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent
in that behalf, and according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of
natural justice are not violated. Where there is some
evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty
to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence
may reasonably support the conclusion that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the
function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under
Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an
independent finding on the evidence. The High Court
may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental
authorities have held the proceedings against the
delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a
fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the
evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing
themselves to be influenced by irrelevant
considerations or where the conclusion on the very face
of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no
reasonable person could ever have arrived at that
conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the
departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is
otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if
there be some legal evidence on which their findings
can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that
evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be
canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a
writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.‟
24. The above was reiterated by a Bench of equal
strength in State Bank of India v Ram Lal Bhaskar,
(2011) 10 SCC 249. Three learned Judges of this Court
stated as under in State of Andhra Pradesh v Chitra
Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557:
„21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with
departmental inquiries has come up before this Court.
Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State
of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723: (1964)
3 SCR 25: (1964) 166 [2024] 8 S.C.R. Digital Supreme
Court Reports 2 LLJ 150]. First, there is no warrant for
// 11 //
the view that in considering whether a public officer is
guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule
followed in criminal trials that an offence is not
established unless proved by evidence beyond
reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must
be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic
tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to
declare the order of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a
court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of
the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against
a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine
whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent
in that behalf and according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of
natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is
some evidence which the authority entrusted with the
duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which
evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that
the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not
the function of the High Court to review the evidence
and to arrive at an independent finding on the
evidence. The High Court may interfere where the
departmental authorities have held the proceedings
against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with
the rules of natural justice or in violation of the
statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or
where the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair decision by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case
or by allowing themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on
the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious
that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at
that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if
the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges
of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which
their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability
of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted
to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding
for a writ under Article 226".
5.6. It is also contended that in view of the provisions
contained under the relevant rules, approval of the
// 12 //
resignation made by the Opposite Party No.5 on
26.03.2017, could not have been made on 27.03.2014
and such an approval is not an approval in the eye of law.
5.7. It is accordingly contended that the impugned order
has been rightly passed and it requires no interference.
6. Mr. S.K. Jee, learned Addl. Government Advocate for
the State on the other hand contended that since the
matter in dispute is inter se in between the Petitioner and
Opposite Party No.5 and Opposite Party No.2 has allowed
the appeal, this Court basing on the available materials
can pass appropriate order. However, in terms of the
order dtd.29.11.2024 of this Court and the instruction
received, it is contended that the decision taken by the
Managing Committee under Annexure-2-Series has been
taken by the Managing Committee duly approved and
continuing at the relevant point of time.
7. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the
Parties and considering the submissions made, this Court
finds that Petitioner was appointed as against the
vacancy caused due to the resignation of Opposite Party
No.5 on 26.03.2014 Petitioner was so appointed vide
order dtd.29.04.2024 under Annexure-12. As further
found from the record, Opposite Party No.5 with the plea
that he was prevented from discharging his duty,
approached the appellate authority i.e. Opposite Party
// 13 //
No.2 on 26.04.2014. But subsequently the appeal has
been renumbered as Appeal No.7/2016.
7.1. This Court after going through the impugned order
finds that Opposite Party No.2 without any sufficient
materials available with him came to a wrong conclusion
that signature of Opposite Party No.5 so reflected in his
resignation letter dtd.26.03.2014 is not his signature.
Since Opposite Party No.2 prior to coming such a
conclusion has not been bestowed with any such
material / evidence, it is the view of this Court that
Opposite Party No.2 should not have come to such a
conclusion basing on the materials available in the
appeal.
7.2. Since the dispute revolves around the signature of
the Opposite Party No.5 so reflected in the resignation
letter dtd.26.03.2014, it is the view of this Court that
prior to coming to a such a conclusion Opposite Party
No.2 should have referred the matter to a handwriting
expert to verify the signature of Opposite Party No.5 so
reflected in his resignation letter vis-à-vis the signature in
other documents available in the memo of appeal. Since
without following that principle, Opposite Party No.2 on
his own came to a conclusion that the signature of
Opposite Party No.5 is not his signature in the resignation
letter, this Court is unable to accept the said view. Since
no such supporting evidence was available with the
// 14 //
Opposite Party No.2 to come to such a conclusion,
decisions relied on by the learned counsel appearing for
Opposite Party No.2 is also not applicable to the facts of
the present case.
7.3. Therefore, in view of such irregularity and illegality
apparent on the face of the order, this Court is inclined to
quash order dtd.31.03.2018, so passed by Opposite Party
No.2 in Appeal Case No.7/2016 under Annexure-22.
While quashing the same and since it is contended in the
bar that Opposite Party No.2 is no more the appellate
authority and Opposite Party No.1 is to decide the appeal,
this Court directs Opposite Party No.1 to re-decide the
appeal. But prior to taking a fresh decision in the appeal,
Opposite Party No.1 is directed to refer the signature of
the present Opposite Party No.5 so available in the
resignation letter dtd.26.03.2014 along with his other
signatures available in the memo of appeal to the
handwriting expert. This Court directs Opposite Party
No.1 to refer the signature to the handwriting expert
within a period of four (4) weeks from the date of receipt
of this order. On receipt of the report from the
handwriting expert, if it will be found that Opposite Party
No.5 has not put his signature in letter dtd.26.03.2014,
then order passed on 31.03.2018 be revived. If some
contrary view comes out, then a fresh order be passed in
accordance with law, in which case this Court expresses
no opinion.
// 15 //
8. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the
Writ Petition stands disposed of.
(Biraja Prasanna Satapathy)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
Dated the 12th February, 2025/Subrat
Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
