Ramesh Chandra Mohanty vs Union Of India And Others
2025 Latest Caselaw 11444 Ori

Orissa High Court

Ramesh Chandra Mohanty vs Union Of India And Others on 18 December, 2025

Author: Murahari Sri Raman

Bench: Murahari Sri Raman

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
                          W.A. No. 241 of 2025

Ramesh Chandra Mohanty                             ....                   Appellant

                                     -Versus-
Union of India and others                          ....               Respondents


Advocates appeared in this case:
For Appellant              : Mr. Manoj Kumar Mohanty, Advocate

For Respondents            : Mr. P.K. Parhi, Deputy Solicitor General of India
                             Mr. Millan Kumar, Central Government Counsel


                       CORAM:
             HON' BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
                         AND
       HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN

                            JUDGMENT

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Date of hearing and Judgment: 18th December, 2025

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HARISH TANDON, CJ.

1. The writ petition being W.P.(C) No.466 of 2025

challenging the article of charges served through a memorandum

dated 10th December, 2024 was filed by the petitioner (the

appellant herein) raising several grounds, some of which touches

upon the merit of the case and some on the applicability of the

relevant rules. By the impugned order dated 8th January, 2025, the

writ petition was dismissed with categorical observation that the

petitioner will participate in the proceeding initiated on the basis of

the said article of charges and shall also cooperate in bringing the

same to its logical conclusion. Correspondingly, the department

was also directed to give a sufficient opportunity to the petitioner

to put forth his defense and an independent finding would be

arrived at in an impartial manner.

2. The memorandum containing the article of charges is

solely founded upon an allegation that the appellant, at the time of

securing the employment to the post of Constable/GD in the

Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), falsely represented

himself as an Other Backward Class (OBC) candidate, which

tantamounts to a grave misconduct.

3. Mr. Manoj Kumar Mohanty, learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the appellant submits that Rule 36 of the Central

Industrial Security Force Rules, 2001 (in short, 'the Rules')

postulates that at the time of drawing up or causing to draw up the

substance of imputation, the requirements indicated therein have to

be strictly followed and having not followed the same, the article

of charges is per se illegal, defective, invalid and, therefore, no

impediment is caused in the writ Court to quash and set aside the

same. He further submits that if the article of charges is framed and

served upon the delinquent after inordinate delay, the same shall

not be treated as a sustainable action by the authority and are liable

to be quashed and set aside at such stage.

3.1. To support the aforesaid contention, reliance is placed

upon the judgments of the apex Court in case of State of Madhya

Pradesh v. Bani Singh, reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 738, State of

Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan, reported in (1998) 4 SCC

154 and P.V. Mahadevan v. MD, T.N. Housing Board, reported in

(2005) 6 SCC 636.

3.2. Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the appellant

vociferously submits that the definition of "Socially and

Educationally Backward Classes" (SEBC) in Section 2(e) of the

Odisha Reservation of Posts and Services (For Socially and

Educationally Backward Classes) Act, 2008 means the backward

classes as defined in 2(a) of the Odisha State Commission for

Backward Classes Act, 1993 and, therefore, the stand of the

authority as taken in the article of charges is unsustainable.

4. Mr. P.K. Parhi, learned Deputy Solicitor General of India

(DSGI) submits that there is no infirmity and/or illegality in the

judgment of the learned single Judge in relegating the appellant to

participate in a Disciplinary Proceeding, which is still pending and,

therefore, the appeal deserves dismissal. It is further submitted that

the Court should not interfere at this stage of the framing of the

article of charges or a service thereof upon the delinquent, as the

scope and the jurisdiction exercised by the writ Court under Article

226 of the Constitution of India in this regard is very limited. He

fervently submitted that mere framing and service of the article of

charges cannot be construed as a final opinion expressed by the

Disciplinary Authority, but is a preliminary stage of determining

the issues concerning the misconduct, obviously after affording

adequate opportunity to the delinquent to disclose his defense to it.

Lastly, it is submitted that the authorities have not conclusively

opined against the delinquent and, therefore, the writ Court should

not readily interfere at this nebulous stage.

5. On the conspectus of the aforesaid factual matrix,

undeniably, the writ petition came to be filed at the behest of the

appellant assailing the article of charges containing the alleged

misconduct and inviting the appellant to put forth his defense to

such alleged misconduct. Time and again, the Court, including the

apex Court has laid down the proposition of law that the writ Court

should refrain itself from interfering with the show-cause notice or

the articles of charges framed and served upon the delinquent

unless the article of charges is unambiguous, not capable of

percolating the clear intention of the alleged misconduct or is

issued by the authority not competent in this regard or is actuated

by malice. If the arbitrariness in the show-cause notice or the

article of charges is perceived from the face of the record without

any roving inquiry or assimilation of the facts from the voluminous

documents, it may also be a ground to interfere.

5.1. The show-cause notice or the article of charges is prelude

to initiation of a proceeding and reflects prima facie misconduct

perceived from the documents and the materials available to the

authority, which is mere tentative and cannot be said to be

conclusive in all respect. Ordinarily, the writ Court should not

interfere with the charge sheet in a routine manner as held by the

apex Court in the case of The Secretary of Ministry of Defense v.

Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, reported in (2012) 6 SCR 182 in the

following:

"9. Law does not permit quashing of charge sheet in a routine manner. In case the delinquent employee has any grievance in respect of the charge sheet he must raise the issue by filing a representation and wait for the decision of the disciplinary authority thereon. In case the charge sheet is challenged before a court/tribunal on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings or delay in concluding the proceedings, the court/tribunal may quash the charge sheet after considering the gravity of the charge and all relevant factors involved in the case weighing all the facts both for and against the delinquent employee and must reach the conclusion which is just and proper in the circumstance. (Vide: The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh & Anr., AIR 1990 SC 1308; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570; Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Faizabad v. Sachindra Nath Pandey & Ors., (1995) 3 SCC 134; Union of India & Anr. v. Ashok Kacker, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 180; Secretary to Government, Prohibition & Excise Department v. L. Srinivasan, (1996) 3 SCC 157; State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan, AIR 1998 SC 1833; Food Corporation of India & Anr. v. V.P. Bhatia, (1998) 9 SCC 131;

Additional Supdt. of Police v. T. Natarajan, 1999 SCC

(L&S) 646; M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 3475; P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 2064; and Government of A.P. & Ors. v. V. Appala Swamy, (2007) 14 SCC 49)."

5.2. In the aforesaid report, the Supreme Court further

deprecates the entertainability of the writ petition against the

charge sheet or a show-cause notice as it does not tend to adversely

affect the delinquent nor can it be construed as the imposition of

penalty in the following:

"11. Ordinarily a writ application does not lie against a charge sheet or show cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order which affects the right of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction/competence to do so. A writ lies when some right of a party is infringed. In fact, charge sheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a charge sheet or show cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the Court. (Vide: State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma, AIR 1987 SC 943; Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh & Ors., (1996) 1 SCC

327; Ulagappa & Ors. v. Div. Commr., Mysore & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 3603 (2); Special Director & Anr. v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse & Anr., AIR 2004 SC 1467; and Union of India & Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, AIR 2007 SC 906)."

5.3. Ultimately, in paragraph 13 of the said report, the apex

Court held that a proceeding initiated by the authorities on the

basis of a charge sheet should not be dismissed or quashed

simpliciter on the ground of delay or could not be concluded

within the reasonable time unless the delay causes a greater

prejudice in the following:

"13. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that charge sheet cannot generally be a subject matter of challenge as it does not adversely affect the rights of the delinquent unless it is established that the same has been issued by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the charge sheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the issues. Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the grounds that proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged

misconduct is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings."

5.4. It is pertinent to note that the Bench rendering the

judgment in Prabhash Chandra Mirdha (supra) took note of the

judgment rendered in the cases of Bani Singh (supra) and N.

Radhakishan (supra) as relied upon by the appellant and

distinguished the same on such score.

5.5. The three-Judge bench of the apex Court in case of State

of Madhya Pradesh v. Akhilesh Jha, reported in (2021) 6 SCR

146 was dealing with the cases when one of the accused who was

taken into custody died, and a charge sheet was issued upon the

delinquent therein treating the same as an act of indiscipline and

insubordination. The said charge sheet was challenged by the said

delinquent before the Tribunal, which declined to interfere

therewith and passed a direction to give adequate opportunity to

the delinquent to defend the same. Subsequently, another

application was filed before the Tribunal challenging the charge

sheet on the ground that there has been an inordinate delay, the

charges are ambiguous and, therefore, is liable to be quashed. In

the backdrop of the above, the three-Judge Bench held that mere

delay cannot be a ground to vitiate the entire inquiry or the

proceedings and it would be proper that the delinquent must be

afforded adequate opportunity to defend his case and the authority

to take a fair, transparent and impartial decision based upon the

materials produced before it.

5.6. In such view of the matter, the judgments cited by Mr.

Mohanty, learned counsel for the appellant do not appear to

support the case and having been dealt by a subsequent Bench and

a proposition of law is laid down, it appears that the same has to be

given effect or assume the binding precedent in conjunction

therewith.

5.7. Even in the case of Bani Singh (supra), the challenge was

made for quashing the adverse entry in the ACR, to provide a

retrospective promotion in the selection grade and also promotion

to the post of the Super Time Scale. The said promotion was

withheld or not extended because of the initiation of the

disciplinary proceedings after a considerable delay in framing the

article of charges. In the backdrop of the above, it was observed

that the delay in framing the charges cannot be held to be proper as

the person who acquires the right to be considered for promotion

cannot be denied such right and, therefore, the observations made

in the said judgment has to be read in the perspective of the context

in which it is so used and cannot have an omnibus application in

all eventuality or the situations. It is the ardent duty of the Court

while considering the ratio laid down in a judgment to find out the

parity in facts to some extent and should not apply the same in

abstract manner.

5.8. In P.V. Mahadevan (supra), the apex Court was

considering incidentally identical facts as discerned in Bani Singh

(supra) where the promotion was denied because of the belated

charge sheet and/or a disciplinary proceeding having initiated. The

judgment rendered in N. Radhakishan (supra) is also in relation to

a denial of promotion because of the belated charge sheet and/or a

disciplinary proceeding to be initiated and in those perspective, the

delay in issuance of the charge sheet or the show cause was

considered to be a vital aspect.

5.9. The instant case relates to securing the job/employment on

the basis of a certificate which was found by the authorities to be

false and not in commensurate with the relevant statutory

provisions. Once the employment is secured adopting a dubious

means, it invites a serious allegation and the consequences to

follow, which cannot be equated with the case of denial of

promotion. Precisely, for such reason, the Supreme Court, in

Prabhash Chandra Mirdha (supra), distinguished the

aforementioned cases relied upon by the appellant, having no

application in a case where the serious charges of misconduct be it

taking a bribe or accepting gratification or securing the job by

using the false certificate.

6. However, a plea has been taken that Rule 36 of the Central

Industrial Security Force Rules, 2001 has not been strictly adhered

to while issuing the show-cause notice. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 36 of

the said Rules, which applies in the instant case, is quoted as

under:

"36. Procedure for imposing major penalties.- (3). Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against an enrolled member of the Force under this rule the disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up-

(i) the substance of the imputation of misconduct or misbehavior into definite and distinct articles of charge;

(ii) a statement of the imputation of misconduct or misbehavior in support of each article of charge, which shall contain-

(a) a statement of all relevant facts including any admission or confession made by the enrolled member of the Force,

(b) a list of documents by which, and a list of witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained."

6.1. It postulates that in the event the authorities proposed to

hold an inquiry against an enrolled Armed Force Member, the

substance of the imputation of misconduct should be disclosed in a

definite and a distinct article of charge, and the statement of

imputation containing the relevant facts and the list of the

documents and the list of the witnesses should also be disclosed.

We are not unmindful of the proposition of law that if the statutory

provision mandates a procedure to be adhered to, the authorities

cannot override the same. The moment a thing is required to be

done in a particular manner, it cannot be done dehors the same and

in the event it is found by the Court that the authorities have acted

contrary to the statutory provision, there is no inhibition in the

Court not to interfere with the said action of the authority.

6.2. Though the aforesaid plea has been taken, but we feel that

it has to be tested on the basis of the given facts, more particularly,

whether the authorities have violated or acted contrary to sub-rule

(3) of Rule 36 of the said Rules. The memorandum containing the

article of charges vividly reflects the documents annexed

therewith. The article of charges upon a bare reading does not

invite any ambiguity or uncertainty in understanding the allegation

and the explicit and the clarity in this regard is manifested

therefrom. The imputation of the article of charges containing the

statement of misconduct is also included in the said memorandum,

defining what is the fact which the appellant has to meet cannot be

said to be obscure or ambiguous.

6.3. The memorandum dated 10th December, 2024 clearly

reflects the copy of the listed documents shown in Annexure-3 to

the disclosure and also the list of the witnesses in Annexure-4

thereof. The moment all such documents are included therein, we

do not find that the authorities have acted in departure to the

mandate given under Rule 36(3) of the said Rules. The contention

of the petitioner in this regard is also not sustainable.

7. We, thus, do not find any illegality and/or infirmity in the

ultimate decision of the learned single Judge in not entertaining the

writ petition.

8. The appeal, therefore, sans merit and is accordingly

dismissed. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands

disposed of.

(Harish Tandon) Chief Justice

(M.S. Raman) Judge

S. Behera

Designation: Senior Stenographer

Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 23-Dec-2025 13:12:58