Panu Swain And Ors vs State Of Odisha .... Opp. Party
2025 Latest Caselaw 11412 Ori

Orissa High Court

Panu Swain And Ors vs State Of Odisha .... Opp. Party on 17 December, 2025

Author: Chittaranjan Dash

Bench: S. K. Sahoo, Chittaranjan Dash

       IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
(From the judgment and order dated 06.10.2001 passed by learned Addl.
 Sessions Judge, Bhanjanagar in Sessions Case No.24 of 1999 and S.C.
                           No.30 of 1999)
                         CRA No.249 of 2001

 Panu Swain and Ors.                ....                    Appellants
                                           Mr. M. K. Panda, Advocate

                                -versus-
 State of Odisha                    ....                    Opp. Party
                                  Mr. Sarat Chandra Pradhan, A.S.C.

                              CORAM:
         THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. K. SAHOO
     THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH

                      Date of Hearing: 20.11.2025
                   Date of Judgment: 17.12.2025
Chittaranjan Dash, J.

1. The present Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 06.10.2001 passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Bhanjanagar in Sessions Case No.24 of 1999 and S.C. No.30 of 1999, whereby the present Appellants i.e. Appellant No.1-Panu Swain, Appellant No.2-Sarojini Swain, and Appellant No.3- Rankanidhi @ Santosh Kumar Swain were convicted for the offence under Section 302/34 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life along with a fine of Rs.5,000/- each, and in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. They were further convicted under Section 304-B/34 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years; under Section 498-A/34 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for three years and a fine of Rs.1,000/- each, and in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month; and under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. They were also convicted under Section 201/34 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year each, with all sentences directed to run concurrently.

It is noted that the co-accused Bijay Swain had preferred a separate appeal in CRA No.207 of 2001; however, the said appeal stood abated, due to his death, by order dated 25.07.2024.

2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the deceased-Pratima Swain (hereinafter "the Deceased"), had been married to Appellant No.3-Rankanidhi @ Santosh Kumar Swain for a short period prior to the incident, during which her matrimonial life was allegedly marred by persistent demands for additional dowry and cruelty at the hands of her husband and in-laws. It is alleged that despite substantial dowry having been given at the time of marriage, the accused persons continued to press for further payments and subjected the deceased to harassment and assault. On 12.10.1997, the parents of the Deceased received information through relatives that the Deceased had been killed in her matrimonial home during the previous night and that her body had already been cremated without any intimation to her family. Upon rushing to the village, her family members learnt that the Appellants were claiming that the Deceased had died after falling into a well situated in their backyard. The Informant, P.W.12, disbelieving this explanation and suspecting foul play, lodged a written report vide Ext.6 on

14.10.1997 at the Bhanjanagar P.S., on the basis of which the FIR No. 215 of 1997 was registered vide Ext.6/4.

3. In course of the investigation, the I.O. (P.W.14) visited the cremation site, seized half-burnt bones, ashes, and charcoal, and thereafter proceeded to the house of Appellant No.1-Panu Swain, where suspected blood-stained articles, broken bangles, and other incriminating materials were recovered. The bedrooms were examined with the assistance of the forensic team, which collected suspected blood scrapings, a blood-stained saree, a pillow cover, and other articles for chemical analysis. Dowry articles produced by witnesses were seized under zimanamas, and blood as well as nail samples of the Appellants were collected and forwarded for forensic examination. Several witnesses from the village and the family of the deceased were examined; the Appellants were arrested at different stages; site maps of both the cremation ground and the house were prepared; and the seized articles, photographs, and forensic reports were placed on record. Upon completion of the investigation, the I.O. submitted the charge-sheet against the Appellants to face trial.

4. The plea of the defence is that there was no demand for dowry at any point of time, either at the time of marriage or thereafter, and that the allegations of torture or harassment for additional dowry are false and motivated. According to the Appellants, the deceased-Pratima had been suffering from stomach pain on the night of the incident, and in a state of acute discomfort, she allegedly went out to the backyard and jumped into the well, resulting in her death.

5. To prove the culpability of the Appellants, the prosecution examined 15 witnesses in all. P.W.1 is the distant relative of the Deceased, who first informed the family of the Deceased regarding her death; P.W.2 is the goldsmith; P.Ws. 3 and 4 are the seizure witnesses who denied to have anything seized in their presence; P.W.5 is the Medical Officer of Jail hospital, Bhanjanagar; P.Ws.6, 7, 8 and 9 expressed ignorance about the entire incidence; P.W.10 is the Head Warden, Bhanjanagar Jail; P.W.11 is the village elderly of village Mandara; P.W.12 is the Informant, so also the father of the Deceased; P.W.13 is the mother of the Deceased; P.W.14 is the I.O.; and P.W.15 is the Scientific Officer, D.F.S.L., Chhatrapur.

6. The learned Trial Court held that the Deceased died an unnatural death within a short period of her marriage with Appellant No.3-Ranka and believed the evidence of her parents and relatives established consistent demands for additional dowry and cruelty by Appellant No.1-Panu, Appellant No.2-Sarojini, Appellant No.3-Ranka and her brother-in-law co-accused Bijay Swain. The learned court found that the hasty cremation of the body by Appellant No.1-Panu and AppellantNo.3-Ranka, without informing the deceased's family, indicated an attempt to conceal the circumstances of death. The defence plea that the deceased jumped into a well due to stomach pain was rejected for want of material or corroboration. Holding that the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act stood unrebutted, the Trial Court convicted all three Appellants for the offences charged.

7. Mr. M. K. Panda, learned counsel for the Appellants, submitted that the Trial Court had failed to properly appreciate the

evidence on record and had proceeded on assumptions unsupported by reliable material. He contended that there was no credible proof of any demand for dowry either at the time of marriage or thereafter, and that the allegations of cruelty were based entirely on interested testimonies of the deceased's relatives, without any independent corroboration. He argued that the prosecution witnesses had made material improvements before the Court, and several were hostile, thereby weakening the prosecution case. Mr. Panda further submitted that the prosecution failed to establish the essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC, particularly the requirement of cruelty "soon before death," and that the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act could not have been invoked in the absence of foundational facts. He further argued that the defence explanation that the deceased, suffering from stomach pain on the night of the occurrence, accidentally or impulsively jumped into the backyard well was a plausible version that the Trial Court failed to consider. According to him, the mere fact that the cremation took place early in the morning could not be treated as incriminating, especially when the death had occurred during the night and the family acted in a state of confusion. It was emphasised that the prosecution failed to prove that the death was homicidal and that the medical and forensic evidence did not support any theory of violence. On these grounds, Mr. Panda submitted that the conviction was unsustainable and the Appellants were entitled to benefit of doubt.

8. Mr. S. C. Pradhan, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the State, supported the judgment of the Trial Court and submitted

that the prosecution had clearly established all essential ingredients of the offences charged. He argued that the evidence of the parents and close relatives of the deceased consistently demonstrated that Appellant-Ranka, Appellant-Panu, and Appellant-Sarojini had been demanding further dowry and subjecting the deceased to sustained cruelty soon before her death. According to him, the testimonies of these witnesses were natural, cogent, and remained unshaken in material particulars, and the minor discrepancies pointed out by the defence did not affect the core of the prosecution case. Learned ASC further contended that the conduct of the Appellants in hurriedly cremating the deceased without informing her parents was a highly incriminating circumstance, clearly indicative of an attempt to suppress the true nature of her death. He submitted that the defence plea of the deceased jumping into a well due to stomach pain was not only unsupported by any evidence but also contrary to the physical circumstances found during investigation, including the recovery of suspected bloodstains and broken bangles from the bedroom. He argued that once the prosecution proved that the death was unnatural and that the deceased was subjected to cruelty for dowry soon before her death, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act was rightly drawn. On these premises, he urged that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court warranted no interference.

9. Before examining the rival submissions, it is necessary to briefly note the evidence of the relevant prosecution witnesses. A concise summary of their depositions is accordingly set out below.

P.W.1, Adikanda Naik is stated to be the brother of Accused-Sarojini. About three years back the deceased Pratima had married the son of Sarojini, and a year ago he heard from someone that Pratima has been killed by her in-laws at Mandara. When he reached Mandara he found Accused-Panu, Accused-Rankanidhi, Accused-Sarojini and Accused-Bijay in their house. Accused- Sarojini told him that the Deceased died by falling in the well. He protested about cremating her without informing the family since they resided at a little distance. When the police came Accused- Bijay took them to the cremation ground where the dead body of the Deceased was still burning. Accused-Bijay poured two buckets of water to extinguish the fire. Thereafter, the police seized some burnt flesh, bones and ash. Accused-Bipra, Accused-Rankanidhi and Accused-Sarojini brought out the dowry articles given during the wedding, which was seized by the police in P.W.1's presence.

In his cross-examination P.W.1 stated that the Deceased is the near relative. He denied the suggestions of not informing the police regarding the statement made by him in the examination-in- chief.

P.W.2, Bulu Acharya, stated to have weighed some gold and silver ornaments on the request of the police.

P.W.5, B.K. Khandei, is the Medical Officer, Jail Hospital, Bhanjanagar. On 25.10.1997, he took blood samples and nail clippings of Accused-Panu, Accused-Sarojini, Accused-Rankanidhi and Accused-Bijay, and handed over to the S.I. who seized them vide Ext.4 on the orders by the learned S.D.J.M., Bhanjanagar.

P.W.6, Narsu Nayak, stated to have known all the accused persons, and that he heard about the death of the Deceased from the villagers. He was declared hostile after this.

In his cross-examination by the A.P.P., he stated to have stated before the police regarding many articles and cash given by the Deceased family at the time of the wedding.

P.W.11, Madhusudan Panda is the president of Jubaka Sanghha of Mandara stated to have known all the accused persons. After two to three months after the wedding, Accused-Panu complained to him regarding his Daughter-in-law (the Deceased) misbehaving with the entire family and hence requested P.W.11's interference. Upon visiting the house of Accused-Panu, the Deceased instead complained to him of being tortured by her in- laws, who were demanding to fulfil the balance dowry amount, for which she wanted to go back to her parental house, which the in- laws did not permit. On the evening of ashtami or dashami puja, the Deceased had gone to Durga Mandap of the village and returned with some Prasad. After sometime P.W.11, heard shouting noises coming from the house of Accused-Panu. Some of the villagers including P.W.11 proceeded to the house to ascertain what had happened. Upon reaching, the Deceased complained that the Prasad brought by her was thrown out and she was assaulted by her parents-in-law (Accused-Panu and Accused-Sarojini), the husband (Accused-Rankanidhi) and brother-in-law (Accused-Bijay). The villagers advised the family to not make a scene and to go to sleep. Early in the morning P.W.11 received the information of a body being cremated. Upon reaching the cremating ground, he found

Accused-Panu, Accused-Bijay and some other people. Upon asking he was told by Accused-Panu and Accused-Bijay that the Deceased died in the night due to stomach problems and henceforth they were cremating her. P.W.11 went back to the village to call others. The police came at about 10:00 a.m. and seized ash, kerosene bottle, some burnt bones, earth from the place where the Deceased was being cremated. P.W.11 and Accused-Panu went back to the Accused's house with the police, and found some broken glass bangles, lying scattered outside the room and there were blood stains on the walls of the bed room, and its floor was washed, which was also seized by the police vide Ext.-5.

In his cross-examination, he explained about his up- bringing and life in Mandara. He denied the suggestions of not informing the police regarding the statement made by him in the examination-in-chief.

P.W.12, Mala Rout, is the father of the Deceased. He stated that his daughter was married to Accused-Rankanidhi on 18.05.1997. Before the marriage, Accused-Panu and his family had demanded ₹80,000 as dowry. He paid ₹60,000 at the time of marriage and agreed to pay the remaining ₹20,000 within six months. He also gave household articles, cot, quilts, gold ornaments worth over ₹2 lakhs, and two term-deposit certificates of ₹10,000 and ₹50,000 in his daughter's name. About one and a half months after marriage, his daughter informed him that her husband had an illicit relationship elsewhere and that the accused family members were demanding more dowry and assaulting her. She stayed with him at Rourkela for two months, during which Accused-Panu came

to collect the remaining dowry amount. P.W.12 borrowed money from his elder brother and handed ₹10,000 to Accused- Panu in the presence of others, who gave him a receipt (later seized by police). Accused-Panu was assured that his daughter would not be tortured further. On 12.10.1997 at about 10:30 p.m. when he returned to his house after his duty, his wife and children informed to have received a telephonic information for P.W.1 that his daughter has been killed by her in-laws and her body is being cremated. On 14.10.1997, P.W.12 came to his village Jiruli and found out from P.W.1 that the cremation took place without anybody's knowledge. P.W.12 lodged a written report vide Ext.6 on the same day. P.W.12 went with the police to the village padar, where burnt bones, half- burnt flesh, and charcoal were seized. He then visited the house of the accused and asked them about his daughter's death. They claimed that Pratima had committed suicide by jumping into the backyard well. He expressed disbelief, stating that the well was too small for such an act. Police later released to him, in zimanama, the ornaments given to Pratima except a two-tola necklace and some costly sarees.

In his cross-examination, he explained with regard to the family of his daughter's in-laws and the construction of their house. He further stated that the written report vide Ext.6 was scribed by his son Dhruba Raut. He stated to have given the list of dowry articles given to his daughter at the time of wedding. He also explained about whoever were engaged in different works at the time of the wedding but he could not name everyone. He too was the witness to the seizure of ash, kerosene bottle, some burnt bones,

earth from the place where the Deceased was being cremated. He denied the suggestions of not informing the police regarding the statement made by him in the examination-in-chief.

P.W.13, Sarojini Rout, is the mother of the Deceased. she stated that at the time of marriage, she had given ten tolas of gold, two tolas of gold ornaments for the groom, T.V., furniture, cash of ₹60,000, and other household items as dowry. She further stated that after a few months of marriage, when the Deceased visited her at Jiruli and was later taken to Rourkela, she often cried. On being asked, she informed her that she was being assaulted by her husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law, and brother-in-law due to their demand for an additional ₹20,000 as dowry. She and P.W.12 refused to send her back with her father-in-law, but the relations of Accused-Panu from Rourkela convinced them. On their insistence, they borrowed ₹10,000 from P.W.12's elder brother, Khali Raut, and handed it over to Accused-Panu, who then agreed to take Pratima back. About one month and ten days later, Accused-Panu left Rourkela with Pratima. On the night of her death, their neighbour received a phone call from P.W.1, who informed that Pratima had been killed in her in-laws' house and her body had already been cremated. She informed P.W.12 of this on his return from duty. The next morning, they travelled towards their village and reached Jiruli, from where P.W.12 went to the police outpost with his son Dhruba to report the incident.

In cross-examination, P.W.13 stated that he had heard about his daughter's torture and death from P.W.1. She denied the

suggestions of not informing the police regarding the statement made by him in the examination-in-chief.

P.W.15, Surath Bisoi is the Scientific Officer, DFSL, Chhatrapur. He stated that upon receiving a requisition from the Bhanjanagar police, he visited the house of Appellant-Ranka at village Mandara, accompanied by S.I. Niranjan Patro. In the southern bedroom of the house, he detected suspected bloodstains on the floor and wall, as well as on a saree kept in the southeastern corner and on a pillow-cover lying on the cot. He also noticed stool stains on the saree and broken glass bangles scattered in the north- western corner of the room. He collected scrappings of the suspected stains from the wall and floor, along with the broken bangles, the saree, and the pillow cover, packed them separately, and handed them over to the S.I. for chemical examination. He identified his report, signature, and the sketch map prepared during the visit, stating that a preliminary benzidine test indicated the presence of blood. He further deposed that the house was locked when he arrived and was opened by the Investigating Officer. He admitted not sealing the packets but denied suggestions of fabrication. Upon recall, he confirmed having taken photographs of the rooms, identified the enlarged photographs and negatives, and stated that he dispatched them to the Belaguntha Outpost by registered post, denying the suggestion that no photographs were taken.

10. Having regard to the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and the broad outline of the prosecution and defence cases, it is not in dispute that the death of the deceased Pratima

occurred within a short span of her marriage with Appellant-Ranka and while she was residing in her matrimonial home. The defence itself does not assert a natural death but attributes the same to an alleged fall into a well, thereby acknowledging that the death was sudden and abnormal. The evidence of P.W.15, the Scientific Officer, assumes significance at this stage, as his testimony establishes the presence of suspected bloodstains on the floor and wall of the bedroom, on the saree and pillow cover found therein, along with broken glass bangles scattered inside the room. The preliminary benzidine test conducted at the spot indicated the presence of blood. These circumstances, taken together, do not support the defence version of an accidental fall into a well and, at the very least, render the cause and manner of death doubtful and inconclusive. Owing to the hurried cremation of the body, no medical evidence could be adduced to conclusively determine the cause of death; however, the surrounding circumstances clearly establish the corpus delicti, namely, that the deceased died an unnatural death within the confines of her matrimonial home. Once the factum of an unnatural death is established, even in the absence of direct medical evidence, the Court is legally justified in proceeding to examine the remaining evidence to ascertain the agency responsible for such death. In such circumstances, the case necessarily falls to be examined on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Reference may be made to Raveendran and Anr. vs. State of Kerala, reported in 1994 Cri LJ 3562, on proof of corpus delicti in cases resting on circumstantial evidence, as follows:

"4. At the outset, it is necessary to observe that the entire case of prosecution is rested on inferential

evidence which is otherwise called 'circumstantial evidence. The matrix of the case is that the first accused murdered his wife Yeshoda and the deadbody was recovered from ravine after a period of about one month. It Was in a decomposed state when it was recovered and hence the identification of the deadbody was not immediately possible. Therefore, what is required primarily in the instant case is to find out the proof regarding 'corpus delicti' literally means the 'body of the offence', that is to say, the facts which constitute it. Until the proof regarding 'corpus delicti' is established, the question as to the identity of the culprit may not arise. Legally 'corpus delicti' means the crime apart from the criminal - the deed apart from the doer. In order to establish 'corpus delicti' the Court is bound to examine whether the dead body discovered in this case was that of Yeshoda. It was P.W. 1 who had happened to see the dead body first in the ravine near a place called Nedumpoyil. His evidence has higher degree of probative, value when compared to the evidence of other witnesses in as much as he is the first person who saw the dead body. His testimony bestows somewhat vivid picture of the dead body and the materials found on it. He said, it was a dead body of a woman having long hair. He had seen blouse (M.O. 2), skirt (M.O. 1), padasaram on the light leg (M.O. 4) and bangle on the right hand (M.O.

5). P.W. 35 Investigating Officer had of course recovered in addition to the above articles, M.O. 3 (brassiers), M.O. 6 (plastic cord) and M.O. 7 (match box). P.W. 1 being a stranger will not normally go very near the dead body and take note of all the articles found on it. However, at present we are concerned with the articles noticed by P.W. 1 on the dead body namely,! M.O. 1, M.O. 2, M.O. 4 and M.O.

5. The probative value of rest of the articles recovered by P.W. 35 will be dealt with later, as we are not immediately concerned with those articles. P.W. 6 Sivaraman is the direct brother of the deceased and P.W. 16 is the mother. Both were brought by P.W. 35 to the office of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tellicherry where the aforesaid articles, were kept.

They easily identified the aforesaid articles noticed by

P.W. 1 on the dead body as that of the deceased. They have also tendered evidence in the trial Court in this regard while they were examined. The inference that could be drawn from the oral evidence of P.Ws. 1,6 and 16 coupled with the recovery of M.Os. 1,2,4 and 5 is that the dead body recovered from ravine was that of deceased Yeshoda. Of course, this is only an inferential evidence and not direct evidence. It is apposite to say here that the old rule enunciated by Sir Mathew Hale and Lord Coke js, to the effect that nothing short of direct evidence is sufficient to establish 'corpus delicti'. Sir Mathew Hale held the view "I will never convict any person of murder or manslaughter unless the facts were proved to be done or at least the body found." Lord Coke warns the danger of proceeding on 'bare presumptions'. As against this rule of strictness, Sir John Stephen said:

"If the circumstances are such as to make it morally certain that a crime has been committed, the inference that it was so committed is as safe as any other inference." Straight, J. in Empress of India v. Bhagirath, (1881) 1 LR 3 All 383 departed from the rule of strictness and observed that such a rule once admitted would in some instances render the administration of justice impossible. Therefore, the Court said ...it is not imperatively essential, in order to justify a conviction for murder, that the 'corpus delicti' should be forthcoming.

The law as to the proof of "corpus delicti" has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Sevaka Perumal v. State of Tamil Nadu, thus:

In a trial for murder, it is not absolute necessity or an essential ingredient to establish corpus' delicti. The fact of death of the deceased must be established like any other fact,. Corpus delicti in some cases may not be possible to be traced or recovered.

The Apex Court further said that there should be reliable and acceptable evidence that the offence of murder like any other factum of death was committed and it must be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence although the dead body may not be traced."

11. In view of the above, this Court now proceeds to examine the evidence on record keeping in mind the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1622, in order to determine whether the findings recorded by the Trial Court warrant interference, bearing in mind that the case rests substantially on circumstantial evidence.

"3:3. Before a case against an accused vesting on circumstantial evidence can be said to be fully established the following conditions must be fulfilled as laid down in Hanumant's v. State of M.P. [1953] SCR 1091.

1. The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established;

2. The facts so established should be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;

3. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;

4. They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and

5. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.

These five golden principles constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence and in the absence of a corpus deliciti.

Hanumant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh [1952] SCR 1091; Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1969] 3 SCC 198; Ramgopal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1972 SC 656; and Shivaji Sahabrao Babode & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra [1973] 2 SCC 793 referred to.

3:4. The cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence is that a case can be said to be proved only when there is certain and explicit evidence and no pure moral conviction."

12. While addressing the circumstance relating to dowry demand and cruelty, it is necessary to examine whether the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the foundational facts so as to attract the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The evidence of the material prosecution witnesses, particularly the close relatives of the deceased, assumes central importance in this regard. P.W.12, the informant and father of the deceased, categorically deposed that prior to the marriage, Appellant-Panu and other family members had demanded a substantial amount as dowry, a part of which was paid at the time of marriage with an assurance that the balance would be paid later. His testimony further reveals that within a short period after the marriage, the deceased complained of ill-treatment and renewed demands for dowry, which compelled him to arrange and pay an additional amount to Appellant-Panu in the presence of others. This evidence is not limited to a mere assertion of demand but also reflects compliance under pressure, lending assurance to its credibility.

The evidence of P.W.13, the mother of the deceased, substantially corroborates the version of P.W.12. She spoke of the articles, ornaments, and cash given at the time of marriage and further stated that the deceased would often cry and complain of physical assault and harassment by Appellant-Ranka, Appellant- Panu, Appellant-Sarojini, and the brother-in-law on account of the balance dowry amount. Her testimony also brings out that the

deceased was initially reluctant to return to her matrimonial home due to such treatment and was persuaded only after further payment was made. The consistency between the depositions of P.W.12 and P.W.13, both natural witnesses with no apparent motive to falsely implicate the Appellants, strengthens the prosecution case on this aspect.

P.W.11, an independent village witness and President of the local Juhaka Sangha, provides important corroboration from a non- interested source. He deposed that Appellant-Panu and his family members had approached him complaining about the conduct of the deceased, following which he intervened. During this intervention, the deceased herself disclosed to him that she was being tortured by her husband and in-laws due to dowry demands and was not even permitted to visit her parental home. His testimony further reveals that shortly thereafter, information was received about the sudden death of the deceased and her cremation, thereby connecting the cruelty complained of with the timing of the death. The evidence of this witness lends independent support to the allegation that the deceased was subjected to cruelty in connection with dowry demands.

13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Parvati Devi vs. The State of Bihar and Ors., reported in MANU/SC/1280/2021, has clarified the position of law with regard to the existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned, as follows:

"15. The import of the aforesaid provisions has been explained in several decisions of this Court. In Bansi Lal vs. State of Haryana1, it has been held that:

"17. While considering the case under Section 498-A (Sic. Section 304-B), cruelty has to be proved during the close proximity of time of death and it should be continuous and such continuous harassment, physical or mental, by the accused should make life of the deceased miserable which may force her to commit suicide."

16. In Maya Devi and Anr. vs. State of Haryana2, it was held that:

"23. To attract the provisions of Section 304-B, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that "soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty or harassment "for, or in connection with the demand for dowry". The expression "soon before her death" used in Section 304-IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. In fact, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that there is no proximity for the alleged demand of dowry and harassment. With regard to the said claim, we shall advert to while considering the evidence led in by the prosecution. Though the language used is "soon before her death", no definite period has been enacted and the expression "soon before her death" has not been defined in both the enactments. Accordingly, the determination of the period which can come within the term "soon before her death" is to be determined by the courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the said expression would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. In other words, there must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and

(2011) 11 SCC 359

(2015) 17 SCC 405

has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the women concerned, it would be of no consequence."

[Also refer to G.V. Siddaramesh v. State of Karnataka3 and Ashok Kumar vs. State of Haryana4]

17. Section 304B IPC read in conjunction with Section 113B of the Evidence Act leaves no manner of doubt that once the prosecution has been able to demonstrate that a woman has been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry, soon before her death, the Court shall proceed on a presumption that the persons who have subjected her to cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand for dowry, have caused a dowry death within the meaning of Section 304B IPC. The said presumption is, however, rebuttable and can be dispelled on the accused being able to demonstrate through cogent evidence that all the ingredients of Section 304B IPC have not been satisfied."

14. The testimonies of the witnesses, viewed cumulatively, establish that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment for dowry and that such cruelty was not remote in time but continued proximate to her death. Once it is shown that the death occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of marriage and that the deceased was subjected to dowry- related cruelty soon before her death, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act necessarily comes into operation. At this stage, the prosecution has laid the necessary factual foundation for invoking this presumption.

15. The next circumstance that requires careful scrutiny is the conduct of the Appellants in the immediate aftermath of the death of the deceased, which the prosecution relies upon as indicative of

(2010) 3 SCC 152

(2010) 12 SCC 350

guilt and an attempt to suppress the true cause of death. The evidence on record consistently shows that the body of the deceased was cremated in haste without any prior intimation to her parental family, who were residing at a reasonably accessible distance. P.W.1 specifically stated that on receiving information about the death, he rushed to the village and was informed by the inmates of the house that the deceased had died after falling into a well. He questioned the propriety of the cremation having been performed without informing the maternal relatives and further deposed that he saw Appellant-Panu and the brother-in-law of the deceased carrying bones to the cremation ground. His testimony also refers to the recovery of burnt bones, ashes, and half-burnt flesh, which were subsequently seized by the police.

This version finds corroboration from P.W.11, who deposed that upon receiving information that a body was being cremated early in the morning, he went to the village tope and found the brother-in-law of the deceased and others cremating the body. On enquiry, he was told that it was the body of the daughter-in-law of Appellant-Panu who had died during the previous night. P.W.12 further stated that when he enquired about the death after reaching the village, the explanation offered by the Appellants was that the deceased had committed suicide by jumping into a small backyard well, a version which he found inherently improbable. The Investigating Officer also seized burnt remains from the cremation ground, thereby lending objective support to the assertion that the cremation had already been carried out before any formal reporting of the incident.

16. It is apposite to refer to the scope and limits of invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act have been authoritatively clarified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Balvir Singh vs. State of Uttarakhand, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine 1261, as follows:

"42. Section 106 cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the prosecution to produce evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused. This section cannot be used to support a conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by proving all the elements necessary to establish the offence. It does not absolve the prosecution from the duty of proving that a crime was committed even though it is a matter specifically within the knowledge of the accused and it does not throw the burden of the accused to show that no crime was committed. To infer the guilt of the accused from absence of reasonable explanation in a case where the other circumstances are not by themselves enough to call for his explanation is to relieve the prosecution of its legitimate burden. So, until a prima facie case is established by such evidence, the onus does not shift to the accused.

43. Section 106 obviously refers to cases where the guilt of the accused is established on the evidence produced by the prosecution unless the accused is able to prove some other facts especially within his knowledge which would render the evidence of the prosecution nugatory. If in such a situation, the accused gives an explanation which may be reasonably true in the proved circumstances, the accused gets the benefit of reasonable doubt though he may not be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the truth of the explanation. But if the accused in such a case does not give any explanation at all or gives a false or unacceptable explanation, this by itself is a circumstance which may well turn the scale against him. In the language of Prof. Glanville Williams:

"All that the shifting of the evidential burden does at the final stage of the case is to allow the jury (Court) to take into account the silence of the accused or the absence of satisfactory explanation appearing from his evidence."

...

54. In the aforesaid context, we must look into the decision of this Court in the case of Deonandan Mishra v. The State of Bihar reported in AIR 1955 SC 801. In the said decision, there is a very important passage in which, the learned Judges deal with the effect of failure of the accused to offer any explanation for circumstances appearing in evidence against him in a prosecution based upon circumstantial evidence. At the cost of repetition, the law is very clear that the accused is not bound to offer any explanation, that there is no burden cast upon him to do so and that the onus of proof does not shift in respect of the vital matter of guilt at any stage of a criminal trial. But as stated by this Court:

"It is true that in a case of circumstantial evidence not only should the various links in the chain of evidence be clearly established, but the completed chain must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. But in a case where the various links have been satisfactorily made out and the circumstances point to the accused as the probable assailant, with reasonable definiteness and in proximity to the deceased as regards time and situation, and he offers no explanation, which, if accepted, though not proved, would afford a reasonable basis for a conclusion on the entire case consistent with his innocence, such absence of explanation or false explanation would itself be an additional link which completes the chain."

(Emphasis supplied) ...

58. We should also look into the decision of this Court in the case of Sawal Das v. State of Bihar reported in (1974) 4 SCC 193. In the said case the trial court had come to the conclusion that, upon the established circumstances listed above, no other inference was left open to the Court except that the appellant and his father and stepmother had conjointly committed the murder of the deceased Smt. Chanda Devi on the morning of 28.05.1965 and that the appellant and his father had then hastily and stealthily disposed off the body in order to

conceal the commission of the offence. It had also taken into account, in coming to this conclusion, the fact that the appellant had unsuccessfully set up a plea, in his written statement, that, Smt. Chanda Devi, who was alleged by him to be wearing a nylon Saree said to have caught fire accidentally while she was using a kerosene stove in her room, died of extensive burns on her body and collapsed. The appellant had alleged that Smt. Chanda Devi was debilitated and kept bad health due to frequent pregnancies and was also suffering from asthma, a weak heart, and abdominal complaints. She had given birth to six children.

59. In view of the aforesaid facts, this Court held as under:

"8. We think that the burden of proving the plea that Smt. Chanda Devi died in the manner alleged by the appellant lay upon the appellant. This is clear from the provisions of Sections 103 and 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. Both the trial Court and the High Court had rightly pointed out that the appellant had miserably failed to give credible or substantial evidence of any facts or circumstances which could support the pleas that Smt. Chanda Devi met her death because her Nylon Saree had accidentally caught fire from a kerosene stove. The trial Court had rightly observed that the mere fact that some witnesses had seen some smoke emerging from the room, with a kitchen nearby at a time when food was likely to be cooked, could not indicate that Smt. Chanda Devi's saree had caught fire. Neither the murdered woman nor the appellant nor any member of his family was shown to have run about or called for help against a fire.

9. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that Section 106 of the Evidence Act could not be called in aid by the prosecution because that section applies only where a fact relating to the actual commission of the offence is within the special knowledge of the accused, such as the circumstances in which or the intention with which an accused did a particular act alleged to constitute an offence. The language of Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not, in our

opinion, warrant putting such a narrow construction upon it. This Court held in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1956 SC 460 : (1956) Cri LJ 827] that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him. It is a different matter that the quantum of evidence by which he may succeed in discharging his burden of creating a reasonable belief, that circumstance, absolving him from criminal liability may have existed, is lower than the burden resting upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.

10. Neither an application of Section 103 nor of 106 of the Evidence Act could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or, which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. The crucial question in the case before us is : Has the prosecution discharged its initial or general and primary burden of proving the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt?"

(Emphasis supplied) ...

62. These appeals remind us of what this Court observed in the case of Dharam Das Wadhwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh: "The rule of benefit of reasonable doubt does not imply a frail willow bending to every whiff of hesitancy. Judges are made of sterner stuff and must take a practical view of legitimate inferences flowing from evidence, circumstantial or direct." The role of courts in such circumstances assumes greater importance and it is expected that the courts would deal with such cases in a more realistic manner and not allow the criminals to escape on account of procedural technicalities, perfunctory investigation or insignificant lacunas in the evidence as otherwise the criminals would receive encouragement and the victims of crime would be totally

discouraged by the crime going unpunished. The courts are expected to be sensitive in cases involving crime against women."

17. Where the death of a married woman occurs inside the matrimonial home under abnormal circumstances, the facts relating to the manner and cause of such death are matters especially within the knowledge of the inmates of the house, namely Appellant- Ranka, Appellant-Panu, and Appellant-Sarojini. It is equally well settled, as clarified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, that Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not dispense with the primary burden resting upon the prosecution and cannot be invoked to cure any fundamental deficiency in the prosecution case. However, once the prosecution has been able to establish the foundational facts, namely, that the death was unnatural, that it occurred within the matrimonial home, and that the Appellants were residing therein at the relevant point of time, the duty shifts upon the Appellants to offer an explanation which is at least reasonably probable and consistent with the surrounding circumstances. In such a situation, the explanation furnished by the accused is required to be tested on the touchstone of credibility and coherence with the proved facts.

In the present case, the explanation put forth by the Appellants is that the deceased, while suffering from stomach pain, jumped into the backyard well and died. This explanation, however, does not inspire confidence when examined in the light of the surrounding circumstances brought on record by the prosecution. There is no medical evidence whatsoever to establish that the deceased was suffering from any acute abdominal ailment on the relevant night, nor is there any independent witness who speaks

about such a condition. More importantly, the explanation appears wholly incompatible with the objective circumstances noticed during investigation, particularly the presence of suspected bloodstains and broken bangles inside the bedroom, as spoken to by the Scientific Officer, and the conduct of the Appellants in hurriedly cremating the body without informing the parental family. In this backdrop, the explanation offered by the Appellants does not appear to be a reasonably true or probable version but rather an attempt to provide a convenient alternative narrative. Consequently, while Section 106 is not being invoked to substitute proof, the absence of a believable explanation, despite the facts being within the exclusive knowledge of the Appellants, assumes relevance as an additional circumstance to be weighed along with the other proved facts.

18. The recovery of incriminating materials from inside the bedroom of the matrimonial home constitutes another significant circumstance in the chain of events. The Scientific Officer, examined as P.W.15, deposed that upon visiting the house of Appellant-Ranka, he detected suspected bloodstains on the floor and walls of the bedroom, on a saree kept inside the room, and on a pillow cover lying on the cot. He further noticed broken glass bangles scattered within the room, which, in the ordinary course of human conduct, are not expected to be found intact if the death had occurred elsewhere, particularly in a well situated outside the house. The preliminary benzidine test conducted at the spot indicated the presence of blood, lending prima facie forensic support to the prosecution case. These recoveries, taken together,

suggest that some form of struggle or violent incident had taken place inside the bedroom itself, a circumstance which stands in stark contrast to the defence plea of the deceased voluntarily jumping into a well due to stomach pain.

The evidentiary value of these recoveries cannot be diluted merely on the ground that the exact cause of death could not be medically determined owing to the cremation. The presence of bloodstains and broken bangles inside the bedroom constitutes a strong incriminating circumstance pointing towards an unnatural occurrence within the house. When viewed alongside the hurried disposal of the body, this circumstance acquires enhanced probative value and renders the defence version increasingly improbable.

19. The defence explanation further falters when examined in the context of the condition and location of the alleged backyard well. The prosecution witnesses, including the informant, have stated that the well was a small one, making the theory of the deceased accidentally or impulsively jumping into it inherently doubtful. There is no evidence on record to show that the well was of such dimensions or depth as would ordinarily result in death by drowning, nor is there any material to suggest that the deceased was seen near the well on the night of the occurrence. The absence of any contemporaneous conduct such as alarm being raised, attempts at rescue, or immediate intimation to neighbours further weakens the defence version. In these circumstances, the theory of death by jumping into the well does not appear to be a natural or probable explanation but one that is inconsistent with both the physical setting and the surrounding conduct of the Appellants.

Viewed cumulatively, the recovery of bloodstained articles and broken bangles from the bedroom, coupled with the doubtful nature of the defence explanation relating to the well, constitutes a coherent set of circumstances which significantly undermine the credibility of the version put forth by the Appellants. These circumstances, when read in conjunction with the earlier findings relating to dowry-related cruelty and post-occurrence conduct, form vital links in the chain of circumstantial evidence.

20. In view of the foregoing discussion and the circumstances proved on record, this Court is satisfied that the prosecution has established, beyond reasonable doubt, that the death of the deceased Pratima was not only unnatural but was the result of a culpable act committed within the matrimonial home, coupled with sustained cruelty for dowry soon before her death. The chain of circumstantial evidence, as analysed hereinabove, is complete and unbroken and leads only to the hypothesis of the guilt of the Appellants, ruling out any reasonable possibility of innocence. The homicidal nature of the death stands established through surrounding circumstances, including forensic evidence, conduct of the Appellants, and the absence of any credible alternative explanation.

21. So far as the conviction under Section 302 IPC is concerned, this Court finds that the circumstances proved on record are sufficient to bring the case within the ambit of murder. The presence of bloodstains and broken bangles inside the bedroom, the absence of any evidence supporting the defence theory of accidental death, and the hurried cremation of the body without informing the

parental family cumulatively establish that the death was caused by an act of violence inside the matrimonial home. The conviction of Appellant-Ranka, Appellant-Panu, and Appellant-Sarojini under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, therefore, calls for no interference.

At the same time, the prosecution has independently established the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B IPC. The evidence on record proves that the deceased died within seven years of her marriage, that such death occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances, and that she was subjected to cruelty and harassment in connection with dowry demands soon before her death. The statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act was rightly invoked, and the Appellants have failed to rebut the same by any cogent or credible evidence.

22. In this regard, it must be clarified that the offences under Sections 302 and 304-B IPC are not mutually exclusive. As authoritatively held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Smt. Shanti and Another vs. State of Haryana, reported in 1990 SCR Supl. (2) 675, the two provisions operate in distinct fields, as follows:

"The view of the High Court that Sections 304-B and 498-A I.P.C are mutually exclusive Is not correct. Sections 304-B and 498-A cannot be held to be mutually exclusive. These provisions deal with two distinct offences. It is true that "cruelty" is a common essential to both the Sections and that has to be proved. The Explanation to Section 498-A gives the meaning of "cruelty". In Section 304-B there is no such explanation about the meaning of "cruelty" but having regard to the common background to these offences, the meaning of "cruelty or harassment" will

be the same as found in the explanation to Section 498-A under which "cruelty" by itself mounts to an offence and is punishable. Under Section 304-B, it is the "dowry death" that is punishable and such death should have occurred within seven years of the marriage. No such period is mentioned in Section 498- A and the husband or his relative would be liable for subjecting the woman to "cruelty" any time after the marriage. Further a person charged and acquitted under section 304-B can be convicted under Section 498-A without charge being there, if such a case, is made out. But from the point of view of practice and procedure and to avoid technical defects it is necessary in such cases to frame charges under both the Section and if the case is established they can be convicted under both the Sections but no separate sentence need be awarded under Section 498-A in view of the substantive sentence being awarded for the major offence under Section 304-B."

23. Section 302 IPC punishes the act of murder, whereas Section 304-B IPC addresses the social offence of dowry death. Where the evidence establishes both homicidal death and dowry- related cruelty, conviction under both provisions is legally permissible. The legislative intent behind Section 304-B IPC is not to dilute liability under Section 302 IPC where direct or circumstantial evidence of murder exists, but to ensure that dowry- related deaths do not escape penal consequences merely due to absence of direct evidence. The above position has been further reaffirmed in Vijay Pal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, reported in (2014) 15 SCC 163, wherein the Supreme Court has clarified that Section 304-B IPC is not a substitute for Section 302 IPC and that where evidence supports a charge of murder, the court is duty- bound to record a conviction under Section 302 IPC, even while simultaneously sustaining a conviction under Section 304-B IPC if

its ingredients are also satisfied. The text of the decision is produced below:

"18. However, it is generally seen that in cases where a married woman dies within seven years of marriage, otherwise than under normal circumstances, no inquiry is usually conducted to see whether there is evidence, direct or circumstantial, as to whether the offence falls under Section 302 of IPC. Sometimes, Section 302 of IPC is put as an alternate charge. In cases where there is evidence, direct or circumstantial, to show that the offence falls under Section 302 of IPC, the trial court should frame the charge under Section 302 of IPC even if the police has not expressed any opinion in that regard in the report under Section 173(2) of the Cr.PC. Section 304B of IPC can be put as an alternate charge if the trial court so feels. In the course of trial, if the court finds that there is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, and proof beyond reasonable doubt is not available to establish that the same is not homicide, in such a situation, if the ingredients under Section 304B of IPC are available, the trial court should proceed under the said provision. In Muthu Kutty and another v. State by Inspector of Police, T.N.5, this Court addressed the issue and held as follows:

"20. A reading of Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B, Evidence Act together makes it clear that law authorises a presumption that the husband or [pic]any other relative of the husband has caused the death of a woman if she happens to die in circumstances not normal and that there was evidence to show that she was treated with cruelty or harassed before her death in connection with any demand for dowry. It, therefore, follows that the husband or the relative, as the case may be, need not be the actual or direct participant in the commission of the offence of death. For those that are direct participants in the commission of the offence of death there are already provisions incorporated in

(2005) 9 SCC 113

Sections 300, 302 and 304. The provisions contained in Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-

B of the Evidence Act were incorporated on the anvil of the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the main object of which is to curb the evil of dowry in the society and to make it severely punitive in nature and not to extricate husbands or their relatives from the clutches of Section 302 IPC if they directly cause death. This conceptual difference was not kept in view by the courts below. But that cannot bring any relief if the conviction is altered to Section 304 Part II. No prejudice is caused to the accused-appellants as they were originally charged for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC along with Section 304- B IPC."

19. In a recent decision, this Court in Jasvinder Saini and others v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi)6, observed thus:

"15. It is common ground that a charge under Section 304-B IPC is not a substitute for a charge of murder punishable under Section 302. As in the case of murder in every case under Section 304-B also there is a death involved. The question whether it is murder punishable under Section 302 IPC or a dowry death punishable under Section 304-B IPC depends upon the fact situation and the evidence in the case. If there is evidence whether direct or circumstantial to prima facie support a charge under Section 302 IPC the trial court can and indeed ought to frame a charge of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC, which would then be the main charge and not an alternative charge as is erroneously assumed in some quarters. If the main charge of murder is not proved against the accused at the trial, the court can look into the evidence to determine whether the alternative charge of dowry death punishable under Section 304-B is established. The ingredients constituting the two offences are different, thereby demanding appreciation of evidence from the perspective

(2013) 7 SCC 256

relevant to such ingredients. The trial court in that view of the matter acted mechanically for it framed an additional charge under Section 302 IPC without adverting to the evidence adduced in the case and simply on the basis of the direction issued in Rajbir case. The High Court no doubt made a half-hearted attempt to justify the framing of the charge independent of the directions in Rajbir case7, but it would have been more appropriate to remit the matter back to the trial court for fresh orders rather than lending support to it in the manner done by the High Court."

24. Applying these principles, this Court finds that the convictions of the Appellants under both Sections 302/34 and 304- B/34 IPC are legally sustainable and well founded. The conviction under Section 498-A IPC also stands independently established, in view of the consistent and cogent evidence of cruelty inflicted upon the deceased by the Appellants in connection with dowry demands. In line with the principle laid down in Smt. Shanti (supra), although Section 498-A constitutes a distinct offence, no interference is warranted with the sentence awarded thereunder, particularly as all sentences have been directed to run concurrently.

The conviction under Section 201 IPC is equally justified, as the evidence unmistakably demonstrates that the Appellants caused the hurried cremation of the deceased with the intention of screening the offence and preventing the discovery of the true cause of death. Such conduct squarely attracts the ingredients of Section 201 IPC.

25. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no merit in the appeal. The judgment and order dated 06.10.2001

(2010) 15 SCC 116

passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in Sessions Case No.24 of 1999 and S.C. No.30 of 1999 convicting Appellant-Ranka, Appellant-Panu, and Appellant-Sarojini for the offences under Sections 302/34, 304-B/34, 498-A/34 and 201/34 of the IPC and under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act are hereby affirmed. Accordingly, the Appeal fails and the CRA is dismissed.

26. The Appellants, who are stated to be on bail, are directed to surrender within three weeks before the learned Trial Court to serve the remaining period of their sentences. In the event of failure to do so, the learned Trial Court shall take appropriate steps in accordance with law to secure their custody and ensure due execution of the sentences.

(Chittaranjan Dash) Judge

I, Agree.

(S. K. Sahoo) Judge

Sarbani

Designation: Junior Stenographer

Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK Date: 18-Dec-2025 11:18:41