Orissa High Court
Kishore Chandra Dixit vs State Of Odisha & Others on 3 October, 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
AFR W.P.(C ) NO.32574 of 2022
In the matter of an application under Article 226
of the Constitution of India
..................
Kishore Chandra Dixit .... Petitioner
-versus-
State of Odisha & Others .... Opposite Parties
For Petitioner :M/s. D.K. Pattnaik, S. Mishra,
J.Sahoo, S.S. Parida & A. Mishra,
Advocate
For Opp. Parties : M/s. R.N. Mishra, AGA
(for Opp. Party Nos.1 & 2)
M/s. A. Behera, Advocate
(for Opp. Party No.3-OPSC)
PRESENT:
THE HONBLE JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date of Hearing: 06.07.2023 and Date of Judgment: 03.10.2023
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J.
The Present Writ Petition has been filed challenging the
order dt.22.11.2022 so passed by Opp. Party No.3 under
Annexure-15 wherein the claim of the Petitioner to get
appointment as against the post of Asst. Professor (Teacher
Education) in Educational Studies in PWD category-2 was
rejected.
// 2 //
2. It is the case of the Petitioner that pursuant to the
advertisement issued by the Orissa Public Service Commission
(hereinafter called as <The Commission=) on 27.07.2021 vide
advertisement No.9 of 2021-22 under Annexure-1, the
Petitioner made his application for the post of Asst. Professor
(Teacher Education)-Stage-1 under Annexure-2. Vide the said
advertisement, applications were invited for recruitment to 385
posts of Asst. Professor (Teacher Education) Stage-1 in different
discipline of Government Teachers Training Institute of the
State under Department of Higher Education in the scale of Pay
Scale 7-I-I-10 in the pay Matrix under ORSP (CT) Rules, 2019
with usual D.A and allowances as admissible. Out of the 385
posts so advertised, 4% of the same i.e. 15 posts were reserved
for PWD category candidates. Not only that, out of the said 385
Posts so advertised as against the discipline Teacher
Education(Educational Studies), the total vacancies were
indicated at 113 with the following break up.
25 for ST (8-women), 18-for S.C (6-women), 13 for
SEBC(4-Women) and 57 for U.R(20-Women).
2.1. As against the aforesaid 113 posts so advertised
with regard to the discipline Teacher Education (Educational
Studies), 678 applications were received by the Commission
// 3 //
and out of the same, 382 candidates were short-listed for
document verification. During verification of such documents,
candidature of further 60 candidates were rejected leaving aside
322 valid applications. Out of the 322 valid applications so
arrived at, after verification of documents, 291 candidates were
shortlisted for interview. The Petitioner is one of the candidate
who was shortlisted for such interview and the Petitioner was
noticed to appear for the interview vide Annexure-10 notice
dt.15.09.2022 fixing the date of interview to 13.10.2022.
Pursuant to the notice, Petitioner attended the interview on the
scheduled date. But vide notification No.9622 dt.19.10.2022
under Annexure-11 series, the Commission published a list of
101 successful candidates as against the total advertised
vacancies of 113 in the discipline Teacher
Education(Educational Studies) and Petitioner9s name when
was not reflected in the select list, Petitioner made a
representation to Opp. Party No.3 on 20.10.2022 under
Annexure-12 to consider his claim.
2.2. As Opp. Party No.3 did not take any action on the
representation so made on 20.10.2022, Petitioner again moved
Opp. Party No.3 along with Opp. Party Nos.1 & 2 on 25.10.2022
under Annexure-12 series. As no action was taken in
considering the grievance raised by the Petitioner under
// 4 //
Annexure-12 series, Petitioner approached this Court in WP( C)
No.28997 of 2022.
2.3. This Court vide order dt.02.11.2022 under Annexure-13
while disposing the matter directed Opp. Party No.3 to take a
decision on the Petitioner9s claim as made in his representation
within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of this order.
The order being communicated to Opp. Party No.3, the claim of
the Petitioner without proper appreciation was rejected vide the
impugned order dt.22.11.2022 under Annexure-15. Challenging
the said order, the present writ petition bas been filed.
3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that
pursuant to the advertisement issued under Annexure-1 by the
Orissa Public Service Commission vide Advertisement No.9 of
2021-22 as against the total 385 vacancies indicated in
different discipline, 113 posts were advertised as against the
discipline Teacher Education (Educational Studies). Out of the
total advertised vacancies of 385, 4% was reserved for PWD
candidates, which comes to 15 posts. Taking into account the
vacancies indicated in the discipline Teacher Education
(Educational Studies) at 113, 4% of the vacancies comes to 4
posts.
3.1. Pursuant to the advertisement issued under Annexure-
1, as against the discipline Teacher Education (Educational
// 5 //
Studies) in total 678 candidates submitted their applications.
The Commission out of the said 678 applications, shortlisted
382 candidates for the purpose of document verification. On
verification of documents of those 382 candidates,
candidature of 60 candidates were further rejected and
documents of 322 candidates were found valid. Out of the 322
applications which were found valid, the Commission
shortlisted 291 candidates and issued the notice on 15.09.2022
under Annexure-10 asking the applicants to take part in the
interview. Pursuant to the said notice, the date of interview of
the Petitioner was fixed to 13.10.2022. Even though the
Petitioner participated in the interview, but while issuing the
select list on 19.10.2022 under Annexure-11 series, out of the
total 113 vacancies in the discipline Teacher
Education(Educational Studies), 101 candidates were selected.
3.2. Not only that since out of the total 113 vacancies in the
discipline of Teacher Education(Educational Studies), 4% was
reserved for PWD candidates which comes to 4 posts, only 2
candidates were selected in the category vide notification issued
under Annexure-11 series on 19.10.2022.
Since the Petitioner was deprived from the purview of
selection as a PWD candidate, he moved Opp. Party No.3
initially claiming his appointment on 20.10.2022. As the same
// 6 //
was not considered, Petitioner again moved Opp. Party No.3 on
25.10.2022 with copy to Opp. Party Nos.1 & 2 under Annexure-
12 series. In spite of such request made by the Petitioner to
consider his case, when no action was taken, Petitioner
approached this Court in W.P.(C ) No.28947 of 2022. This
Court vide the order dt.02.11.2022 when directed Opp. Party
NO.3 to take a decision on the claim of the Petitioner, Opp.
Party No.3 without proper appreciation of the Petitioner9s
claim, rejected the same vide the impugned order dt.22.11.2022
under Annexure-15.
3.3. It is contended that only on receipt of the impugned
order, Petitioner could know that the Petitioner has not been
selected only on the ground that the Petitioner has failed to
secure the minimum 50% mark in the interview which was
fixed by the Selection Committee while conducting the interview
of 291 candidates, who were shortlisted for such interview in
the discipline Teacher Education (Educational Studies).
3.4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that the
recruitment in question for the post of Asst. Professor (Teacher
Education)-Stage-1 in different discipline was governed by the
provisions contained under the Orissa Education Service
(College Branch) Recruitment Rules, 2020 so available under
Annexure-17(In short, <the Rules=). The selection procedure for
// 7 //
direct recruitment in the rank of Asst. Professor, Stage-1 was
provided under Rule-5 of the said Rules. Rule-5(2) of the Rules
provides the selection of direct recruitment to the rank of Asst.
Professor(Stage-1) to be made by the Commission on the basis
of merit to be judged by performance in the interview of eligible
shortlisted candidates. Rule-5(6) of the Rules provides that on
the basis of result of interview, the Commission shall prepare a
subject wise merit list of successful candidates, arranged in
order of merit, equal to the number of posts to be filled up, and
furnish the same to the Government.
3.5. It is contended that as against the discipline Teacher
Education(Educational Studies), since 113 posts were
advertised vide Annexure-1 and 291 candidates were
shortlisted for the purpose of interview, as provided under Rule
5(6) of the aforesaid Rules, the Commission was required to
publish the merit list of successful candidates arranged in
order of merit equal to the number of posts to be filled up. But
in the case in hand, out of the 113 vacancies available, the
Commission published the merit list of 101 candidates. Not
only that, out of the 4 posts reserved for PWD candidates in
the discipline, only two candidates were included in the merit
list. It is accordingly contended that since the Commission has
not followed the Recruitment Rules while conducting the
// 8 //
selection with publication of the merit list under Annexure-12,
the selection so conducted by the Commission is vitiated.
3.6. It is also contended that nowhere in the 2020 Rules,
there is any provision for fixation of cut-off mark for the
purpose of interview to be conducted amongst the shortlisted
candidates. It is also contended that while issuing the
advertisement under Annexure-1, no such criteria was also
indicated that a candidate has to secure 50% marks in the
interview, otherwise he will not be found eligible for his
selection. It is accordingly contended that since neither in the
recruitment rules nor in the advertisement, there was any
stipulation for securing 50% mark in the interview or else the
candidature will be found ineligible, such a practice followed by
the Commission after conducting the interview, is not
sustainable in the eye of law.
3.7. It is also contended that in the advertisement issued
under Assnexure-1, nothing was indicated with regard to
securing of 50% cut-off mark in the interview. Not only that
while issuing notice to the shortlisted candidates to appear the
interview nor prior to conducting the interview, pursuant to the
notice issued on 15.09.2022 under Annexure-10, such a
prescription was intimated to the candidates. Since no rules/
stipulation is either provided in the Recruitment rules or in the
// 9 //
advertisement issued under Annexure-1 to secure 50% mark in
the interview, the action of the Commission in fixing a cut-off
mark of 50%to be secured by a candidate in the interview is
not sustainable in the eye of law and consequential publication
of the merit list under Annexure-12 basing on such wrong
fixation of cut-off mark.
3.8. In support of his aforesaid submission, learned counsel
for the Petitioner relied on a decision of the Hon9ble Apex Court
reported in the case of K. Manjusree Vs State of Andhra
Pradesh and another, (2008) 3 SCC 512. Hon9ble Apex
Court in Paragraph-27 of the said judgment held as follows:
27. But what could not have been done was the second change, by
introduction of the criterion of minimum marks for the interview. The
minimum marks for interview had never been adopted by the
Andhra Pradesh High Court earlier for selection of District &
Sessions Judges, (Grade II). In regard to the present selection, the
Administrative Committee merely adopted the previous procedure in
vogue. The previous procedure as stated above was to apply
minimum marks only for written examination and not for the oral
examination. We have referred to the proper interpretation of the
earlier Resolutions dated 24-7-2001 and 21-2-2002 and held that
what was adopted on 30-11-2004 was only minimum marks for
written examination and not for the interviews. Therefore,
introduction of the requirement of minimum marks for interview,
after the entire selection process (consisting of written examination
and interview) was completed, would amount to changing the rules
of the game after the game was played which is clearly
impermissible. We are fortified in this view by several decisions of
this Court. It is sufficient to refer to three of them 4 P.K.
Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India, Umesh Chandra
Shukla v. Union of India and Durgacharan Misra v. State of Orissa.
3.9. Learned counsel for the Petitioner also relied on another
decision of the Hon9ble Apex Court in the case of Goa Public
Service Commission Vs. Pankaj Rane and Others, (2022) 11
// 10 //
SCC 742. Hon9ble Apex Court in Paragraph 23 to 28 of the said
judgment held as follows.
23. In this regard, we must notice that in the facts of this case of
the 1866 candidates who appeared in the screening test/computer
test, only 7 candidates which included Respondents 1 to 3 cleared
the test. The number stood further reduced to 4 and which again
included Respondents 1 to 3. Therefore, when the question arose as
to how the interview should be conducted, the Commission decided
on 16-5-2017 to fix 26 marks out of 40 as cut-off marks. It no doubt
works out at 60% of the total marks in the interview segment. Rules
did not provide for a separate minimum for the interview. The
advertisement did not provide for a separate minimum in the
interview. It is almost a week before the interview that the
Commission took the decision in this regard.
24. We have stated these facts only to highlight that this is not a
case where the Commission was faced with the task of having to
interview a very large number of candidates. For 6 unreserved
posts and 5 reserved posts finally, only 4 emerged as candidates to
be dealt with at the final stage viz. the oral interview. This,
therefore, is distinguishable, in other words, from the judgment
relied upon by Mr Pratap Venugopal, learned counsel for the
appellant viz. M.P. Public Service Commission . That was a case
where this Court noted that the appellant Commission therein
noting the large number of applications received from the General
Category candidates against four posts decided to call only 71
applicants who had 7½ years of practice although 188 applicants
were eligible, in view of the fact that under Section 8(3)(c) of the
provisions applicable in the said case, five years of practice as an
advocate or pleader of Madhya Pradesh was a minimum
requirement.
25. It was therefore, a case which though relied upon by the
appellant is distinguishable on facts. This is apart from noticing
that the appellant has not been able to inform the Court as to
whether there was a Rule in the said case similar to Rule 12 as
present in this case. As far as Yogesh Yadav is concerned, this
again is not a case which involved a rule resembling Rule 12 of the
Rules. We further may also notice that in the said case recruitment
was carried out by the employer itself and it was not done by the
recruiting body which the appellant is and which is limited by
statutory rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution.
26. Para 13 of Yogesh Yadav is extracted hereinbelow : (SCC p.
628)
<13. The instant case is not a case where no minimum marks are
prescribed for viva voce and this is sought to be done after the
written test. As noted above, the instructions to the examinees
provided that written test will carry 80% marks and 20% marks
were assigned for the interview. It was also provided that
candidates who secured minimum 50% marks in the general
category and minimum 40% marks in the reserved categories in the
written test would qualify for the interview. The entire selection was
undertaken in accordance with the aforesaid criterion which was
laid down at the time of recruitment process. After conducting the
interview, marks of the written test and viva voce were to be
added. However, since a benchmark was not stipulated for giving
// 11 //
the appointment, what is done in the instant case is that a decision
is taken to give appointments only to those persons who have
secured 70% marks or above marks in the unreserved category and
65% or above marks in the reserved category. In the absence of any
rule on this aspect in the first instance, this does not amount to
changing the <rules of the game=. The High Court has rightly held
that it is not a situation where securing of minimum marks was
introduced which was not stipulated in the advertisement,
standard was fixed for the purpose of selection. Therefore, it is not
a case of changing the rules of the game. On the contrary in the
instant case a decision is taken to give appointment to only those
who fulfilled the benchmark prescribed. The fixation of such a
benchmark is permissible in law. This is an altogether different
situation not covered by Hemani Malhotra case.
27. Though the learned counsel for the appellant did emphasise the
said observations, we are of the view that it is distinguishable at
any rate having regard to Rule 12 which we have already noticed
which is applicable to the facts of this case. In other words, we
would think that in the facts of this case, they are closer to the facts
in P.K. Ramachandra Iyer case and the judgment following the
same which we have already noted. As far as Tej Prakash Pathak
case is concerned, it again did not specifically involve a rule similar
to Rule 12.
28. It is true that there is a distinction in the facts with those in K.
Manjusree . We notice that that was a case where the requirement
of minimum marks for interview was made after the entire selection
process consisting of the written examination and interview was
completed and noticing the facts, the Court declared that it would
amount to changing the Rules after process is completed. In this
case, the stipulation as to the minimum to be obtained in the
interview was announced prior to the holding of the interview.
However, we would think that this case must fall to be decided on
the principle which has been laid down in P.K. Ramachandra Iyer
and Durgacharan Misra for the reasons which we have already
indicated.=
3.10. The decision of the Hon9ble Apex Court in the case of
Ramjit Singh Kardam and others Vs. Sanjeev Kumar and
Others (2020), 20 SCC 209 was also relied on by the learned
counsel for the Petitioner. Hon9ble Apex Court in Paragraphs
33.1,33.2,45, 45.1 & 45.2 of the said judgment has held as
follows-:
33.1. Whether the respondent writ petitioners who had participated
in the selection were estopped from challenging the selection in the
facts of the present case?
33.2. Whether the respondent writ petitioners could have
challenged the criteria of selection applied by the Commission for
selection after they had participated in the selection?
// 12 //
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
45.The Division Bench of the High Court is right in its conclusion
that the selection criteria, which saw the light of the day along with
the declaration of the selection result could be assailed by the
unsuccessful candidates only after it was published. Similarly,
selection process which was notified was never followed and the
selection criteria which was followed was never notified till the
declaration of final result, hence, the writ petitioners cannot be
estopped from challenging the selection. We, thus, hold that the
writ petitions filed by the petitioners could not have been thrown on
the ground of stopped and the writ petitioners could very well
challenge the criteria of selection applied by the Commission, which
was declared by the Commission only at the time of declaration of
the final result. We, thus, answer Points 1 and 2 as follows:
45.1. The writ petitioners, who had participated in the selection are
not estopped from challenging the selection in the facts of the
present case.
45.2. The writ petitioners could have very well challenged the
criteria of selection, which was declared by the Commission only in
the final result declared on 10-4-2010.
3.11. Making all such submissions, learned counsel for the
Petitioner contended that since the process of selection so
followed by the Commission in respect of the discipline Teacher
Education (Educational Studies) was not conducted in
accordance with the Recruitment Rules and the cut-off mark in
the interview was fixed arbitrarily and without any prior notice,
the selection process undertaken by the Commission in respect
of the discipline Teacher Education (Educational Studies)
pursuant to Annexure-1 is vitiated and calls for interference of
this Court.
4. Mr. Arnav Behera, learned counsel appearing for the
Commission on the other hand made his submission basing on
// 13 //
the stand taken in the counter affidavit so filed by Opp. Party
No.3.
Though it is not disputed by the Commission that the
recruitment process pursuant to Annexure-1 is governed under
Rule-5 of the 2020 Recruitment Rule, but it is contended that
basing on the provisions contained under Rule 5(2) of the said
Rules, the Commission adopted the system of weightage for
assessing the performance of candidates in the interview. Rule
5(2) of the Rules provides that selection for direct recruitment to
the rank of Asst. Professor (Stage-1) shall be made by the
Commission on the basis of merit to be judged by performance
in interview of eligible shortlisted candidates.
4.1. It is contended that in terms of the said provision
contained under Rule-5(2) of the Rules, the Commission adopted
the system of weightage for assessing the performance of the
candidates in the interview. The maximum weightage was
assessed at 100 and out of the said 100 mark, 40% was kept for
domain knowledge, 40% of pedagogy Skill and 20% for Quality of
Research Publications. The Commission also decided to select a
candidate in UR/SEBC category who secure 50% of the
weightage and for SC & ST category, it was fixed at 45%. The
Commission also decided to fix the percentage so fixed for
UR/SEBC candidates in respect of candidates applying under
// 14 //
horizontal reservation like Sports person, persons with disability
and ex-servicemen.
4.2. It is contended that as was decided by the Commission,
PWD candidates have also to secure the minimum weightage as
fixed for UR/SEBC candidates, as PWD reservation is a
horizontal one. Since the Petitioner out of the 50% cut-off marks
so fixed by the Commission, only secured 35 weightage mark in
the interview, his name was not included in the select list so
published under Annexure-11. When the Petitioner moved the
Commission for consideration of his claim pursuant to the order
passed by this Court in the earlier Writ Petition, his claim was
considered and was rejected as the Petitioner has failed to
secure the cut-off mark so fixed by the Commission. The
Petitioner out of the cut-off 50% mark has secured only 35
marks and accordingly, he is not eligible to get the benefit of
selection and appointment.
4.3. Learned counsel appearing for Opp. Part NO.3 however
contended that though as provided under Clause-6 of the
Resolution dt.25.02.2021 so issued by the State Government in
the Deptt. Of Social Security and Empowerment of Persons with
Disability, the authorities have been vested with the discretion to
relax the standard in respect of P.W.D candidates, but with
regard to the recruitment process so undertaken pursuant to
// 15 //
Annexure-1., the Commission decided not to give any such
relaxation to PWD candidates. It is accordingly contended that
since the Petitioner failed to secure the minimum cut-off mark,
so fixed by the Commission in the interview and only secured 35
marks, out of the cut-off marks fixed at 50, his candidature has
been rightly rejected vide the impugned order under Annexure-
15 and it needs no interference.
4.4. In support of his aforesaid submission, learned counsel
for Opp. Party No.3 relied on the decision of the Hon9ble Apex
Court in the case of K.H. Siraj Vs. High Court of Kerala and
Others (2006) 6 SCC 395, Hon9ble Apex Court in Paragraphs-
11,14,24,48,49,50 and 57 of the said judgment has held as
follows:.
11. The Kerala Judicial Service Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to
as <the Rules=) were made in exercise of the powers conferred by
Articles 234 and 235 of the Constitution of India and sub-section (1)
of Section 2 of the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968 (19 of 1968).
Rule 7 of the Rules reads thus:
<7. Preparation of lists of approved candidates and reservation
of appointments.4(1) The High Court of Kerala shall, from time to
time, hold examinations, written and oral, after notifying the
probable number of vacancies likely to be filled up and prepare a
list of candidates considered suitable for appointment to Category
2. The list shall be prepared after following such procedure as the
High Court deems fit and by following the rules relating to
reservation of appointments contained in Rules 14 to 17 of Part II of
the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958.
(2) The list consisting of not more than double the number of
probable vacancies notified shall be forwarded for the approval of
the Governor. The list approved by the Governor shall come into
force from the date of the approval and shall remain in force for a
period of two years or until a fresh approved list is prepared,
whichever is earlier.=
xxx xxx xxx xxx
14. According to Mr L.N. Rao, Rule 7 of the Rules has to be
interpreted in the following manner:
// 16 //
The High Court of Kerala shall hold examinations written and
oral and prepare a list of suitable candidates for appointment to
category 2. The wording written and oral means the suitability of a
candidate eligible for appointment has to be considered by the
aggregate marks of written examination and oral examination. The
legislative intention is to take the aggregate marks of both written
examination and oral examination to decide the suitability of the
candidate. List has to be prepared after following such a procedure
as the High Court deems fit. Procedure means the manner of doing
things and not substantive. Fixing a separate minimum cut-off
marks is not procedural which is an additional eligibility for the
post which is contrary to Rule 7. Rule 7 is silent as to the fixation of
cut-off marks which is for relaxation from time to time for the
purpose of reservation. The wording procedure deems fit does not
confer any power on the Selection Authority so as to take away a
right provided elsewhere, reported in Raja Ram Mahadev Paranjype
case , followed in Babulal Nagar v. Shree Synthetics Ltd. The
Selection Authority cannot follow any procedure not in violations of
the rule of reservation.
Xxx xxx xxx xxx
24. According to Mr L.N. Rao, the following questions which are
posed for the consideration of this Court in these appeals/petitions
are as under:
1. In the absence of specific legislative mandate under Rule 7(i)
of the Kerala Judicial Service Rules, 1991 prescribing cut-off marks
in oral examination whether the fixing of separate minimum cut-off
marks in the interview for further elimination of candidates after a
comprehensive written test touching the required subjects in detail
is in violation of the statute.
2. Whether the select list (Annexure P-2) is prepared in violation
of the principles of reservation as provided under Rules 14 to 17 of
the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958?
3. Whether the first respondent the High Court has the power to
decide that the reserved posts are to be dereserved to carry
forward in the absence of a decision taken by the Government in
this regard?
4. Whether Annexure P-2 list is liable to be struck off at its
entirety?
xxx xxx xxx xxx
48. In this background, two questions raised by Mr L.N. Rao have
to be considered:
1. The prescription of minimum mark for the oral examination as
a condition of eligibility for selection as Munsif Magistrate is not
authorised by Rule 7 of the Kerala Judicial Service Rules, 1991;
2. The select list has not been prepared in accordance with
Rules 14 to 17 of the KSSSR, 1958.
49. So far as the first submission is concerned, we have already
extracted Rule 7 in paragraph supra. Rule 7 has to be read in this
background and the High Court's power conferred under Rule 7 has
to be adjudged on this basis. The said rule requires the High Court
firstly to hold examinations written and oral. Secondly, the
mandate is to prepare a select list of candidates suitable for
appointment as Munsif Magistrates. The very use of the word
<suitable= gives the nature and extent of the power conferred upon
the High Court and the duty that it has to perform in the matter of
selection of candidates. The High Court alone knows what are the
requirements of the subordinate judiciary, what qualities the
judicial officer should possess both on the judicial side and on the
administrative side since the performance of duties as a Munsif or
// 17 //
in the higher categories of Subordinate Judge, Chief Judicial
Magistrate or District Judge to which the candidates may get
promoted require administrative abilities as well. Since the High
Court is the best judge of what should be the proper mode of
selection, Rule 7 has left it to the High Court to follow such
procedure as it deems fit. The High Court has to exercise its powers
in the light of the constitutional scheme so that the best available
talent, suitable for manning the judiciary may get selected.
50. What the High Court has done by the notification dated 26-3-
2001 is to evolve a procedure to choose the best available talent. It
cannot for a moment be stated that prescription of minimum pass
marks for the written examination or for the oral examination is in
any manner irrelevant or not having any nexus to the object sought
to be achieved. The merit of a candidate and his suitability are
always assessed with reference to his performance at the
examination and it is a well-accepted norm to adjudge the merit
and suitability of any candidate for any service, whether it be the
Public Service Commission (IAS, IFS, etc.) or any other. Therefore,
the powers conferred by Rule 7 fully justified the prescription of the
minimum eligibility condition in Rule 10 of the notification dated 26-
3-2001. The very concept of examination envisaged by Rule 7 is a
concept justifying prescription of a minimum as benchmark for
passing the same. In addition, further requirements are necessary
for assessment of suitability of the candidate and that is why
power is vested in a high-powered body like the High Court to
evolve its own procedure as it is the best judge in the matter. It will
not be proper in any other authority to confine the High Court within
any limits and it is, therefore, that the evolution of the procedure
has been left to the High Court itself. When a high-powered
constitutional authority is left with such power and it has evolved
the procedure which is germane and best suited to achieve the
object, it is not proper to scuttle the same as beyond its powers.
Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of this
Court in Union of India v. Kali Dass Batish wherein an action of the
Chief Justice of India was sought to be questioned before the High
Court and it was held to be improper.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
57. The qualities which a judicial officer would possess are
delineated by this Court in Delhi Bar Assn. v. Union of India [(2002)
10 SCC 159 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 85] . A judicial officer must, apart
from academic knowledge, have the capacity to communicate his
thoughts, he must be tactful, he must be diplomatic, he must have a
sense of humour, he must have the ability to defuse situations, to
control the examination of witnesses and also lengthy irrelevant
arguments and the like. Existence of such capacities can be brought
out only in an oral interview. It is imperative that only persons with
a minimum of such capacities should be selected for the judiciary
as otherwise the standards would get diluted and substandard
stuff may be getting into the judiciary. Acceptance of the contention
of the appellant-petitioners can even lead to a postulate that a
candidate who scores high in the written examination but is totally
inadequate for the job as evident from the oral interview and gets
zero marks may still find a place in the judiciary. It will spell
disaster to the standards to be maintained by the subordinate
judiciary. It is, therefore, the High Court has set a benchmark for
the oral interview, a benchmark which is actually low as it requires
30% for a pass. The total marks for the interview are only 50 out of
a total of 450. The prescription is, therefore, kept to the bare
minimum and if a candidate fails to secure even this bare
minimum, it cannot be postulated that he is suitable for the job of
// 18 //
Munsif Magistrate, as assessed by five experienced Judges of the
High Court.
4.5. With regard to the provisions contained under Rule 5(6)
which mandates that the Commission shall prepare a subject-
wise merit list of successful candidates equal to the number of
posts to be filled up, learned counsel for the Commission
contended that the word 8shall9 so reflected under Rule 5(6)
cannot always be treated as 8shall9 and it may be read as 8may9 in
some of the cases.
In support of his aforesaid stand that the word 8shall9 so
reflected under Rule-5 (6) of the Rules in the present case be
treated as 8may9, learned counsel for the Commission relied on
a decision of the Hon9ble Apex Court reported in the case of PEC
Limited Vs. Austbulk Shipping SDN. BHD., (2019) 11 SCC
620. Hon9ble Apex Court in Para 14 to 24 of the said judgment
has held as follows:
14. Admittedly, an authenticated copy of the arbitration
agreement was not placed on record by the Respondent at
the time of filing of the application for enforcement. It is clear
from the record that the Appellant placed the arbitration
agreement along with its reply and thereafter the Respondent
also filed the original arbitration agreement in the Court. The
submission made by the Appellant is that production of the
arbitration agreement at the time of filing of the application is
mandatory, the non-compliance of which ought to have
resulted in the dismissal of the application. The Appellant
sought support for this submission from the word <shall=
appearing in Section 47. We do not agree with the submission
made by the learned counsel for the Appellant. We are of the
opinion that the word <shall= appearing in Section 47 of the
Act relating to the production of the evidence as specified in
the provision at the time of application has to be read as
<may=.
// 19 //
15. The word <shall= in its ordinary import is <obligatory=.
But there are many decisions wherein the Courts under
different situations construed the word to mean <may= . The
scope and object of a Statute are the only guides in
determining whether its provisions are directory or
imperative. It is the duty of the Courts of Justice to try to get
at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending
to the whole scope of the statute to be construed.
16. The word <shall=, though prima facie gives an impression
of being of mandatory character, is required to be considered
in light of the intention of the legislature by carefully
attending to the scope of the Statute, its nature and design
and the consequences that would flow from the construction
thereof one way or the other. The Court is required to keep in
mind the mischief that would ensue by the construction of the
word <shall= as <may=. Whether the public convenience would
be subserved or whether public inconvenience or general
inconvenience may ensue if it is held mandatory.
17. Section 46 of the Act makes a foreign award enforceable
under the Act as binding on the persons between whom it is
made. Article III of the New York Convention provides for
recognition of arbitral awards by each contracting State as
binding. Enforcement of the arbitral awards shall be in
accordance with the rules and procedure of the territory where
the award is sought to be enforced. Article III restricts
imposition of substantial onerous conditions for enforcement of
the arbitral awards. Article IV requires the party applying for
recognition and enforcement to file an authenticated original
award or duly certified copy thereof and the original
agreement referred to in Article II or a duly certified copy
thereof at the time of the application. It is relevant to mention
that the work <shall= is employed in Article IV.
Mohan Singh v. International Airport Authority of India, (1997)
9 SCC132
Ed. Para 17 corrected vide Official corrrigendun
No.F3/Ed.BJ./79/2018 dated 15-1-2019
"5. Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards
as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of
procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon,
under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There
shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or
higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of
arbitral awards to which this Convention applies than are
imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral
awards.
"IV. 1. To obtain the recognition and enforcement mentioned in
the preceding article, the party applying for recognition and
enforcement shall, at the time of the application, supply:
(a) The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified
copy thereof;
(b) The original agreement referred to in article II or a duly
certified copy thereof.
// 20 //
2. If the said award or agreement is not made in an official
language of the country in which the award is relied upon, the
party applying for recognition and enforcement of the award
shall produce a translation of these documents into such
language. The translation shall be certified by an official or
sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent.
<II.1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in
writing under which the parties undertake to submit to
arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which
may arise between them in respect of a defined legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject
matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
2. The term <agreement in writing= shall include an arbitral
clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the
parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.
3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action
in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an
agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the
request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration,
unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed.
18. The object and purpose of the New York Convention as
summarized by the Guide to Interpretation of the New York
Convention issued by the International Council for Commercial
Arbitration is as follows:
<The Convention is based on a pro-enforcement
bias. It facilitates and safeguards the enforcement
of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards and
in doing so it serves international trade and
commerce. It provides an additional measure of
commercial security for parties entering into cross-
border transactions=.
19. The object and purpose of the New York Convention is to
facilitate the recognition of the arbitration agreement within its
purview and the enforcement of the foreign arbitral awards.
This object and purpose must, in the first place, be seen in the
light of enhancing the effectiveness of the legal regime
governing international commercial arbitration.
20. According to the ICCA Guide, the approach of the Court for
enforcement should be having a strong pro enforcement bias, a
pragmatic, flexible and non formalist approach. The Courts in
several countries have been liberal in interpreting the formal
requirements of Article IV of the New York Convention.
Excessive formalism in the matter of enforcement of foreign
awards has also been deprecated.
21. It is relevant to take note of the Preamble of the Act wherein
it is mentioned that the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has adopted the
UNCITRAL Model law on International Commercial Arbitration
(<Model Law=) in 1985 and that the Act is made taking into
account the Model law and Rules. Chapter VIII of the Model
Law governs the recognition and enforcement of
Awards. Article 35 (2) 14 provides that the party applying for
enforcement of the award shall supply the original award or a
// 21 //
copy thereof. The Model Law does not lay down procedural
details of recognition and enforcement, which are left to
national procedudral laws and practices. However, Article
35(2) was amended in 2006 to liberalise formal requirements.
Presentation of a copy of the arbitration agreement is no longer
required under Article 35(2).
22. The object of the New York Convention is smooth and swift
enforcement of foreign awards. Keeping in view the object and
purpose of the New York Convention, we are of the view that
the word <shall= in Section 47 of the Act has to be read as
<may=. The opposite view that it is obligatory for a party to file
the arbitration agreement or the original award or the evidence
to prove that the award is a foreign award at the time of filing
the application would have the effect of stultifying the
enforcement proceedings. The object of the New York
Convention will be defeated if the filing of the arbitration
agreement at the time of filing the application is made
compulsory. At the initial stage of filing of an application for
enforcement, non-compliance of the production of the
documents mentioned in Section 47 should not entail in
dismissal of the application for enforcement of an award. The
party seeking enforcement can be asked to cure the defect of
non-filing of the arbitration agreement. The validity of the
agreement is decided only at a later stage of the enforcement
proceedings.
23. It is relevant to note that there would be no prejudice
caused to the party objecting to the enforcement of the Award
by the non-filing of the arbitration agreement at the time of the
application for enforcement. In addition, the requirement of
filing a copy of the arbitration agreement under the Model Law
which was categorized as a formal requirement was dispensed
with. Section 48 which refers to the grounds on which the
enforcement of a foreign award may be refused does not
include the non-filing of the documents mentioned in Section 47.
An application for enforcement of the foreign award can be
rejected only on the grounds specified in Section 48. This would
also lend support to the view that the requirement to produce
documents mentioned in Section 47 at the time of application
was not intended to be mandatory.
24. Reading the word <shall= in Section 47 of the Act as <may=
would only mean that a party applying for enforcement of the
award need not necessarily produce before the Court a
document mentioned therein <at the time of the application=. We
make it clear that the said interpretation of the word <shall= as
<may= is restricted only to the initial stage of the filing of the
application and not thereafter. It is clear from the decisions
relied upon by the counsel for the Appellant that Courts in
certain jurisdictions have taken a strict view regarding the filing
of the documents for enforcement of a foreign award. Courts in
many other jurisdictions have taken the opposite view that the
application for enforcement of the foreign awards does not
warrant rejection for non-filing of the relevant documents
including the award and the arbitral agreement. We need not
adjudicate on this issue as the subject matter of this case does
not relate to the non-filing of the arbitration agreement during
the enforcement proceedings. There is no dispute that the
arbitration agreement has been brought on record by both the
parties.=
// 22 //
4.6. Mr. Behera also relied on another decision of the
Hon9ble Apex Court in the case of Sureshkumar Lalitkumar
Patel and others vs. State of Gujarat and others 2023 Live
Law (S.C ) 137. Hon9ble Apex Court in paragraph 22 & 23 of
the said judgment has held as follows=
22. We are dealing with the recruitment process by which the
posts pertaining to each of the separate categories is to be filled
up by only one mode, i.e., written examination. The cut-off
marks have been fixed with a distinct clarification that it would
not be tinkered with by facilitating anyone to be considered, if
the candidate acquired lesser marks. There is a difference
between qualification for making an application, and the
eligibility to be determined in the process of selection. We are
not concerned with the qualification for making an application in
the present case, but rather an eligibility after the examination is
conducted.
23. Another unique feature of the present case is that the
Selection Committee has reduced the marks to facilitate the
horizontal reservation by treating it as a vertical reservation.
Admittedly, the rules do not provide for such reservation to be
treated as a vertical one. Likewise, the rules do not fix any cut-
off marks. An advertisement, made pursuant to a notification,
binds the parties. It has got all the trappings of a statutory
prescription, unless it becomes contrary to either a rule or an Act.
A change, if any, can only be brought forth by way of an
amendment and nothing else. Such an amendment even if it is
permissible can be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. It cannot be introduced to give an entry to
a special reservation, in a case where a right becomes accrued
to a candidate, under a policy decision reduced in the form of an
advertisement, to be considered for a post in the absence of any
eligible candidate from the horizontal category.
4.7. It is also contended that the Commission being the
selecting authority, it is competent to fix the cut-off mark in
order to assess the suitability of the candidates. Since the post
in question is with regard to the post of Asst. Professor in
Teacher Education, the Petitioner having not been able to secure
the minimum 50% mark in the interview, he has no right to
claim the benefit of such appointment. The Commission
// 23 //
accordingly has rightly rejected the claim of the petitioner vide
the impugned order which requires no interference.
4.8. Making all such submissions and relying on the
decisions as cited (supra) learned counsel for the Opp. Party
No.3 contended that in order to assess the suitability of the
candidates, the Commission decided to fix the cut-off mark at
50% in the interview and since the Petitioner participated in the
interview without raising any such objection, he cannot
challenge the same after becoming unsuccessful in the selection
process.
5. To the aforesaid submissions of the learned counsel
appearing for the Commission, Mr. Pattanaik, learned counsel
for the Petitioner made further submission so taken by him in
the rejoinder affidavit.
5.1. It is contended that under Rule 5(6) of the 2020
Recruitment Rules, there is no such provision to fix any cut-off
mark in the interview and the Commission suo motu evolved
such a principle in the midst of the selection process and
without issuing any notice to the shortlisted candidates prior to
conducting the interview.
5.2. It is also contended that as provided under Clause-6(D)
of the advertisement issued under Annexxure-1, selection for
recruitment to the rank of Asst. Professor-Stage-1 shall be made
// 24 //
on the basis of the result of the interview and the Commission
shall prepare a subject wise merit list of successful candidates
arranged in order of merit equal to the number of posts to be
filled up and furnish the same to the Government. Since neither
in the recruitment Rules nor in the advertisement, there was any
such prescription fixing 50% cut-off mark to be obtained by a
candidate in the interview, such a practice followed by the
Commission in the midst of the selection process and that too
without issuing any notice prior to conducting the interview, is
not permissible and sustainable in the eye of law.
5.3. It is also contended that as admitted by the Opp. Party-
Commission though there is provision to relax the cut-off mark
in respect of the candidate belonging to PWD category in terms
of the provisions contained under Clause-6 of the Resolution
dt.25.02.2021 issued by the State Government in the
Department of Social Security and Empowerment of persons
with disability, but the Commission did not follow the resolution
by relaxing the provision in respect of the Petitioner who belongs
to PWD category.
5.4. It is also contended that since out of the 113 vacancies
in the discipline of Teacher Education (Educational Studies),
four posts were reserved for PWD candidates and only two
candidates have been selected, the Petitioner is eligible and
// 25 //
entitled to get the benefit of appointment as against the available
two posts which has not yet been filled up. It is accordingly
contended that the impugned order needs interference of this
Court with passing of an appropriate order in the matter.
6. I have heard Mr. D. K. Pattanaik, learned counsel
appearing for the Petitioner, Mr. A. Behera, learned Counsel for
the Opp. Party-Commission and Mr. R.N. Mishra, learned
Additional Government Advocate appearing for the State-Opp.
Parties.
On the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the
parties with due exchange of the pleadings, the matter was
heard at the stage of admission and disposed of by the present
order.
7. This Court after going through the materials placed by
the respective parties finds that the Commission issued
advertisement vide Advertisement No.9 of 2021-22 under
Annexure-1 inviting applications for recruitment of 385 posts of
Asst. Professor (Teacher Education)-Stage-1. Out of the total
vacancies so advertised, 113 posts were to be filled up in the
discipline Teacher Education (Educational Studies). Since 4% of
385 posts is reserved for P.W.D candidates, taking into account
the vacancies in the discipline of Teacher Education
(Educational Studies) at 113, the same comes to 4.
// 26 //
7.1. As found from the record, the Petitioner made his
application in the discipline Teacher Education (Educational
Studies) as a PWD candidate. As found from the record as
against 113 vacancies, 678 applications were received in total
and the commission shortlisted the same to 382, for verification
of documents. After such verification of documents, further 60
applications were rejected and 322 valid applications were
found. Out of the said 322 valid applications, 291 candidates
were shortlisted for the purpose of interview and the
Commission issued the notice on 15.09.2022 fixing the date of
interview of such shortlisted candidates under Annexure-10.
After conducting the interview on the date fixed, Opp. Party No.3
vide notification dt.19.10.2022 under Annexure-11 series
published the select list of 101 candidates in the discipline Asst.
Professor (Teacher Education).
7.2. The Petitioner when was deprived from such selection
and appointment, approached the Opp. Party No.3 for
consideration of his case by making necessary application under
Annexure-12 series and this Court in W.P.(C ) No.28997 of 2022
directed Opp. Party No.3 to take a decision on the Petitioner9s
claim. As found from the impugned order, the claim of the
Petitioner was rejected on the ground that the Petitioner has
failed to secure the 50% cut-off mark, so fixed by the
// 27 //
Commission and to be obtained by a candidate in the interview.
It is not disputed by either of the parties that the selection to the
post of Asst. Professor (Teacher Education) Stage-1 in different
discipline is covered by the provisions contained under the
Orissa Education Service (College Branch) Recruitment Rules,
2020. Under Rule-5 of the said Rules, the selection process to
be followed by the Commission for direct recruitment in the
rank of Asst. Professor, Stage-1 is provided. Rule-5 (2) of the
Rules, provides the discretion on the Commission to select
candidates for direct recruitment to the rank of Asst. Professor ,
Stage-1 on the basis of merit to be judged by the performance in
interview of eligible shortlisted candidates.
7.3. As provided under Rule 5(6) of the Rules, on the basis of
the result of the interview, the Commission shall prepare a
subject wise merit list of successful candidates arranged in order
of merit equal to the number of posts to be filled up and furnish
the same to the Government. It is found that nowhere in the
Recruitment Rules, nor in the advertisement issued under
Annexure-1, the Commission at any point of time, prior to
conducting the interview, pursuant to the notice issued under
Annexure-10, fixed the cut-off mark at 50% with due intimation
to the candidates who were called to attend the interview after
the short listing.
// 28 //
7.4. Placing reliance on the decisions cited by the learned
counsel for the Petitioner as well as Opp. Party No.3, though this
Court is of the view that the Commission in view of the
provisions contained under Rule 5(2) of the Rules is competent
to judge the merit of the candidates, taking into account the
performance in the interview and to publish the merit list on the
basis of such interview, but in the present case, the Commission
at no point of time prior to conduct of the interview in terms of
the notice issued under Annexure-10, fixed the cut-off mark
with due intimation to all the candidates. In view of the decision
of the Hon9ble Apex Court in the case of K. Manjushree as cited
(supra), fixation of cut-off mark can only be done in advance i.e.
prior to conduct of the interview. Since the principle laid down
in the case of K. Manjushree has not been followed in the
instant case, it is the view of this Court that rejection of the
petitioner9s claim on the ground that the petitioner has failed to
secure the cut-off mark is not sustainable in the eye of law.
7.5. However, since the selection process as contended by
the learned counsel appearing for the Opp. Party No.3 has
already been finalized, but taking into account the submissions
of learned counsels appearing for the parties that as against the
4 posts meant for PWD candidates, two posts have not been
filled up as yet, this Court placing reliance on the relaxation
// 29 //
provisions contained in the Resolution dt.25.02.2021 issued by
the State Government in the Department of Social Security and
Empowerment of Persons with Disability and the decision of the
Allahabad High Court in the case of Manoj Kumar Pandey &
Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another as well as the
decision of the Hon9ble Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Singh
& Another Vs. U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad &
Another, (2007) 3 SCC 720, is of the view that the
Commission needs to relax the provisions in the case of the
Petitioner and provide him appointment as against the post of
Asst. Professor (Teacher Education) Educational Studies, Stage-
1. This Court is also unable to accept the contention raised by
the learned Counsel appearing for Opp. Party No.3 that some
meritorious candidates are there above the Petitioner in PWD
category as it is the Petitioner who has approached this Court,
challenging the process of selection. Allahabad High Court in
Paragraphs-2,9 & 10 of the order in the case of Manoj Kumar
Pandey has held as follows:
"2. Learned counsel for the Petitioners has submitted that
all the petitioners had appeared in the written examination and
were also called for interview. The final select list was
declared on 20th March, 1999 and even though the names of
the Petitioners were not included in the main select list, but
they are hopeful that their names would be included in the
waiting list. The State Government had sent a requisition to the
Commission to recommend the names of the candidates next in
order of merit, as certain candidates did not join the post, but
the Commission expressed its inability as the life of the waiting
list had expired. This decision of the Commission was
challenged by 11 candidates by filing a writ petition in this
Court which was dismissed. The Supreme Court however
// 30 //
granted relief to them by directing that they shall be considered
by the Commission and the State Government, and would be
appointed if otherwise found suitable and eligible. The said
decision was rendered n Sheo Shyam & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
& Others., (2004) 2 ESC 256. The Supreme Court in the said
decision held that the life of the waiting list which is of one year
should be reckoned from the last date when the
recommendation was made by the State Government.
However, in view of the fact that after the decision of the
Commission not to send the names to the State Government as
the waiting list had expired, which decision was the subject
matter of the writ petition before the High Court, the State
Government itself had sent a requisition of 56 posts, including
11 posts to which the dispute related, and examinations were
held subsequently on 9th November, 2003, the Supreme Court
observed that the career of 11 candidates cannot be
jeopardized, and therefore in these peculiar circumstances, it
directed that the appointment shall be considered by the
Commission and the State Government.
Xxx xxx xxx
9. The Hon'ble Apex Court while considering the case has
granted relief only to those persons who had approached the
Court and those were the persons who had filed the writ
petition before this Court within one year from the date on
which the last recommendation had been made. Therefore,
those persons had approached the Court when the select
list/merit list was alive. The case of the petitioners is quite
distinguishable as they have approached this Court after more
than two months of the expiry of the select list. Therefore,
Petitioners cannot claim the relief which had been granted to
other persons by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
10. If some person has taken a relief from this Court by
filing a Writ Petition immediately after the cause of action had
arisen, Petitioners cannot take the benefit thereof by filing a
writ petition belatedly. They cannot take any benefit thereof at
such a belated stage for the reason that they cannot be
permitted to take the impetus of the order passed at the behest
of some diligent person.=
7.6. Similarly Hon9ble Apex Court in Paragraph-53 of the
judgment in the case of Sanjay Singh has held as follows:
<53. However, in so far as the petitioners are concerned, we
deem it proper to issue the following directions to do complete
justice on the facts of the case :
a) If the aggregate of raw marks in the written examination and
the marks in the interview of any petitioner is less than that of
the last selected candidate in the respective category, he will not
be entitled to any relief (for example, the petitioners in WP(C) No.
165/2005 belonging to the Category 'BC' have secured raw
marks of 361 and 377 respectively in the written examinations,
whereas the last five of the selected candidates in that category
have secured raw marks of 390, 391, 397, 438 and 428
respectively. Even after adding the interview marks, the marks
of the petitioners in W.P. (C ) No.165/2005 is less than the
marks of the selected candidates).
// 31 //
b) Where the aggregate of raw marks in the written examination
and the interview marks of any petitioner, is more than the
aggregate of the raw marks in the written examination and
interview marks of the last selected candidate in his category,
he shall be considered for appointment in the respective
category by counting his appointment against future vacancies.
(For example, we find that petitioner Archna Rani, one of the
petitioners in WP (C) No. 467/2005 has secured 384 raw marks
which is more than the raw marks secured by the last five
selected candidates [347, 337, 336, 383 and 335] under the SC
category and even after adding the interview marks, her marks
are more than the five selected candidates. Hence, she should
be considered for appointment). This relief will be available only
to such of the petitioners who have approached this Court and
the High Court before 31st August, 2005=
7.7. This Court taking into account the entirety of the facts
and placing reliance on the decision in the case of K.
Manjushree and others decisions relied on by the learned
counsel appearing for the Petitioner and the decision of the
Allahabad High Court in the case of Manoj Kumar Pandey as
well as the decision of the Hon9ble Apex Court in the case of
Sanjay Singh & Another, directs Opp. Party No.3 to relax the
cut-off mark to the case of the Petitioner and provide him
appointment as against the post of Asst. Professor (Teacher
Education) Educational Studies, Stage-I as against the available
2(two) number of vacancies in PWD category. This Court directs
Opp. Party No.3 to complete the entire exercise within a period of
2(two) months from the date of receipt of the order. However,
there shall be no order as to cost.
The Writ Petition is accordingly disposed of.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed (Biraja Prasanna Satapathy)
Signed by: SANGITA PATRA
Reason: authentication of order Judge
Location: HighCourt of orissa, Cuttack
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
Date: 03-Oct-2023 13:13:49 Dated the 3rd Oct.,2023/sangita
