Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 9716 Ori
Judgement Date : 22 August, 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
GCRLA No. 46 of 2003
An appeal under section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
from the judgment and order dated 19.09.2000 passed by Special
Judge (Vigilance), Berhampur, Ganjam in G.R. No.35 of
1996(V)/T.R. No.42 of 1998.
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State of Odisha (Vig.) ........... Appellant
-Versus-
Pramod Kumar Panda ........... Respondent
For Appellant : - Mr. Sangram Das
Standing Counsel (Vig.)
For Respondent: - Mr. Debasis Sarangi
Advocate
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P R E S E N T:
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.K. SAHOO
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Date of Hearing and Judgment: 10.08.2023
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S.K. SAHOO, J. The respondent Pramod Kumar Panda faced trial in the
Court of learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Berhampur, Ganjam in
G.R. No.35 of 1996(V)/T.R. No.42 of 1998 for offences punishable
under section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) and under section
7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereafter 'P.C. Act')
on the accusation that on 05.07.1996 at about 1.15 p.m. at // 2 //
Tikabali Block Office room, Tikabali, he being employed as a
Junior Engineer, Tikabali in Tikabali Block and being a public
servant, by use of corrupt and illegal means and by abusing his
official position, obtained pecuniary advantage to the extent of
Rs.1000/- (rupees one thousand only) and accepted the same as
illegal gratification other than legal remuneration from Byasadev
Pradhan (P.W.5).
The learned trial Court vide impugned judgment and
order dated 19.09.2000 has been pleased to hold that in absence
of any evidence to prove the prior demand or acceptance of bribe
on demand at the time of alleged trap, mere recovery of money
as stated by P.W.4, the Vigilance constable and P.W.6, the
Tahasildar is not sufficient to bring home the charges and
accordingly, it was held that the prosecution has not been able to
establish the charges against the respondent beyond all
reasonable doubts and acquitted him of all the charges.
The State of Odisha, G.A Vigilance has preferred this
appeal challenging the aforesaid judgment and order of acquittal.
2. The prosecution case, as per the F.I.R. lodged by
Byasadev Pradhan (P.W.5) of village Birangi before the
Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Berhampur is that in the year
1994-95, P.W.5 was selected as the leader of the Village
// 3 //
Committee and he was entrusted by the B.D.O., Tikabali to
construct the building of Anganwadi Centre at village Birangi at an
estimated cost of Rs.65,000/-. It is further stated in the F.I.R.
that during the course of construction, the complainant had taken
Rs.18,700/- towards the first running bill in December, 1994, and
Rs.13,300/- towards the second running bill in the year 1995 and
after completion of work, P.W.5 approached the accused
respondent, who was the Junior Engineer of the Tikabali block to
take final measurement of the work and for payment of his final
bill. It is further stated in the F.I.R. that the respondent
demanded Rs.5,000/- to take the final measurement, but when
P.W.5 expressed his inability to pay such an exorbitant amount,
the respondent agreed to take Rs.2,000/- for the final
measurement and passing the bill, on condition that after taking
Rs.1,000/-, he would go for the final measurement and after
getting the balance amount of Rs.1,000/-, he would pass the bill.
P.W.5 reported the matter in writing to the Superintendent of
Police, Vigilance, Berhampur on 04.07.1996 for taking necessary
action against the respondent.
On the basis of such written report, the
Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Berhampur directed the officer
in-charge of the Vigilance Police Station, Berhampur to register a
// 4 //
case and accordingly, Berhampur Vigilance P.S. Case No.35 dated
04.07.1996 was registered on under section 13(2) read with
section 13(1)(d) and section 7 of the P.C. Act and Sri Kartikeswar
Jena (P.W.9), Inspector of Vigilance, Balliguda squad was directed
to lay a trap for detection of the case against the respondent and
to take up investigation of the case.
P.W.9 issued requisitions to procure the attendance of
the official witnesses to lay a trap in their presence and basing on
such requisition, the official witnesses came to the Vigilance
office, where preparation for laying the trap was made and during
such preparation, the G.C. notes produced by P.W.5 were
smeared with phenolphthalein powder and handed over to him
with specific instruction to hand over the same to the respondent
only on demand and another official witness Rajani Kanta Sadangi
(P.W.2) was asked to accompany the decoy to overhear the
conversation of the decoy with the respondent and to relay signal
by combing head after acceptance of the bribe by the respondent.
Thereafter, the I.O. with other official witnesses proceeded to the
Block Office and kept their position at a little distance from the
Block Office as per the instruction of the I.O., the decoy and the
accompanying witness (P.W.2) proceeded to the office of the
respondent and after sometime getting signal from P.W.2, the
// 5 //
I.O. along with other members of the trap party rushed to the
office of the respondent, disclosed his identity before him,
challenged him for acceptance of bribe from the decoy and
thereafter took the hand wash of both the hands of the
respondent with sodium carbonate solution, in consequence of
which the colour of the solution turned to rose-pink. Thereafter,
as per the direction of the Vigilance Inspector, the respondent
brought out the tainted G.C. notes from his shirt chest pocket,
which were then handed over to the official witnesses for
verification and on verification, it was found that the number of
the said G.C. notes were tallying with the numbers noted earlier
in the paper chits. Thereafter, the pocket wash of the respondent
was taken with sodium carbonate solution for which the colour of
shirt turned to rose-pink. The I.O. seized the tainted G.C. notes,
wearing shirt of the accused and other relevant documents in
connection with construction work of Anganwadi Centre at village
Birangi and on completion of investigation, charge sheet was
submitted on 31.03.1997 against the respondent under section 7
and section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act.
3. The defence plea of the respondent was one of denial.
It is pleaded that while he was in the office, five to six persons
came to the office, caught hold of his hands and forcibly thrust
// 6 //
some money into his pocket and thereafter, he was asked to bring
out the money from his pocket and his hand wash was taken. The
respondent denied to have demanded or accepted any bribe
money from P.W.5.
4. During course of trial, in order to prove its case, the
prosecution examined nine witnesses.
P.W.1 Kalicharan Satapathy was the Senior Clerk in
the office of the Sub-Collector, Bhanjanagar, who has been
declared hostile by the prosecution.
P.W.2 Rajanikanta Sadangi was the Senior Clerk in the
office of the Tahasildar, the overhearing witness in the case. He
has been declared hostile by the prosecution.
P.W.3 Birupakhya Nanda was the Senior Clerk in the
office of the Tahasildar, Bhanjanagar has been declared hostile.
P.W.4 Bijaya Kumar Sahoo was working as Vigilance
Constable in the Vigilance office, Berhampur, was a member of
the trap laying party. He has proved the preparation report
(Ext.1) as well as the detection report (Ext.6/1).
P.W.5 Byasadeva Pradhan is the complainant in the
case. He has proved the written report vide Ext.7, but he has
been declared hostile by the prosecution.
// 7 //
P.W.6 Bhaskar Chandra Pattnaik, who was the
Tahasildar, Bhanjanagar, was a member of the trap party and he
is a witness to the preparation report (Ext.1) as well as the
detection report (Ext.6/1). He is also a witness to the seizure of
currency notes as per seizure list Ext.2 as well as a witness to the
seizure of chits marked as Ext.3, the shirt of the respondent vide
M.O. IX as per seizure list Ext.4, the seizure of calculator vide
Ext.5/1, the seizure of case records of J.E. office vide Ext.8,
seizure of measurement book as per seizure list Ext.9 and he also
proved his signature on the detection report marked as Ext.6/1.
P.W.7 Dr.Bishnu Prasad Das who was the Engineer in-
chief, Water Resources, Government of Odisha, accorded sanction
against the respondent for launching the prosecution. He proved
the forwarding letter marked as Ext.11.
P.W.8 was the Inspector of Vigilance, Phulbani, who
took over charge of investigation from P.W.9. He received the
chemical examination report from S.F.S.L., Rasulgarh as per
Ext.12 and submitted charge sheet against the respondent.
P.W.9 Kartikeshwar Jena, who was the Inspector of
Vigilance, Balliguda Squad, was the initial Investigating Officer of
the case. He stated about the entire trap formalities carried out
during the course of investigation.
// 8 //
The prosecution exhibited twelve documents. Ext.1 is
the preparation report, Exts.2 to 4, 5/1, 8 and 9 are the seizure
lists, Ext.6/1 is the detection report, Ext.7 is the F.I.R., Ext.7/4 is
the formal F.I.R., Exts.9/2 and 9/3 are the measurement books,
Ext.10 is the sanction order, Ext.11 is the forwarding letter and
Ext.12 is the chemical examiner's report.
The material objects i.e. solution bottles have been
marked as M.O.I to M.O.VIII, the shirt of the respondent as
M.O.IX and the currency notes as M.O.X on behalf of the
prosecution.
No witness was examined on behalf of the defence.
5. After analyzing the evidence on record, the learned
trial Court has been pleased to hold that there is no reliable and
credible evidence to show that the respondent demanded
Rs.2,000/- from the complainant for taking the final measurement
prior to the alleged trap nor there is any evidence to show that on
the date of the trap, the appellant demanded and accepted the
tainted G.C. notes from the complainant. It is further held that
admittedly not an iota of evidence has been adduced by the
prosecution to show if there was any prior demand of bribe by the
respondent from P.W.5 to take final measurement and there is
absolutely no evidence to show if at the time of alleged trap, the
// 9 //
respondent demanded and accepted the tainted G.C. notes from
P.W.5 and mere recovery of the tainted G.C. notes from the
possession of the respondent is not sufficient to hold the
respondent guilty under section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d)
and section 7 of the P.C. Act and on that ground, the learned trial
Court acquitted the respondent of all the charges.
6. Mr. Sangram Das, learned Standing Counsel for the
Vigilance Department challenging the impugned judgment and
order of acquittal of the respondent contended that even though
in this case the decoy (P.W.5) and the overhearing witness
(P.W.2) have not supported the prosecution case and have been
declared hostile by the prosecution, but the evidence of the TLO
(P.W.9) is very clinching and it proves the recovery of the tainted
money from the possession of the respondent and when the
comparison of the numbers of the tainted notes have been made
with the numbers earlier noted down and it got tallied, it proves
that the tainted money were accepted by the respondent for
which it was recovered from his possession. Learned counsel
further submitted that as the respondent attempted to obtain the
tainted bribe money which was recovered from his possession, it
is presumed under section 20 of the P.C. Act that the appellant
obtained the recovered money as a motive as mentioned in
// 10 //
section 7 of the P.C. Act. Learned Standing Counsel further
submitted that change of colour of the solution of the handwash
as well as pocket wash of the respondent to pink coupled with the
chemical examination report (Ext.12) substantiates that the
respondent after accepting the same kept it in his shirt pocket
and therefore, even though the two vital witnesses of the
prosecution have not supported the prosecution case, it can be
said that the prosecution has established the charges against the
respondent and the judgment of acquittal was not proper and
justified. In support of such contention, he has relied upon the
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Neeraj
Dutta -Vrs.- State (Government of NCT of Delhi) reported
in (2023) 4 Supreme Court Cases 731.
Mr. Debasis Sarangi, learned counsel for the
respondent, on the other hand, supported the impugned
judgment and contended that in a case of this nature, to
successfully establish the charges, the prosecution has to prove
all the three aspects, i.e., demand, acceptance and recovery of
the tainted notes and since the decoy and overhearing witness
being examined as P.W.5 and P.W.2 respectively have not
supported the prosecution case, the demand as well as
acceptance part is not proved and merely because the TLO
// 11 //
(P.W.9) stated about the recovery part, the same is not sufficient
to hold the respondent guilty of the offences charged. Learned
counsel further argued that from the evidence of the TLO, it
appears that when the respondent was challenged about
acceptance of bribe amount of Rs.1,000/- from the decoy, he
stated that the money was forcibly inserted in his pocket and the
same plea he has taken in his accused statement and therefore,
the plea taken by the respondent right from the beginning is
consistent and in view of the statement made, it is admissible as
res gestae as per section 6 of the Evidence Act and in view of the
scope of interference in a case of appeal against the order of
acquittal, since the learned trial Court has assigned clinching
reasons for the same, it cannot be said that the findings are
perverse. He further submitted that if at this stage almost after
twenty seven years of the date of occurrence and more than two
decades of pronouncement of the impugned judgment, the order
of acquittal is interfered with, it would cause serious miscarriage
of justice and therefore, the GCRLA should be dismissed.
7. Adverting to the contentions raised by the learned
counsel for both the parties, law is well settled as held in the case
of Chandrappa and others -Vrs.- State of Karnataka
// 12 //
reported in (2007) 4 Supreme Court Cases 415 by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows:-
"42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of Appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an Appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an Appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasize the reluctance of an Appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
// 13 //
(4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."
Therefore, this Court can reconsider and re-appreciate
the evidence on record and can reach its own conclusion, both on
questions of fact and of law. As an Appellate Court, there is no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of power of
reconsideration and re-appreciation of evidence on record and
also the reasoning given by the trial Court. This Court has as wide
powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order
of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of
conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of
innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial Court
// 14 //
continues even up to the appellate stage. Once the appeal is
entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court is
entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence independently and
come to its own conclusion. An appellate Court while dealing with
an appeal against acquittal passed by the learned trial Court, is
required to bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of
innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of
criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be
innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law.
Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and
strengthened by the trial Court.
8. Now, on the basis of the aforesaid rival legal
contentions urged on behalf of the parties, the following points
would arise for consideration of this Court:-
i) Whether the demand, acceptance and recovery of gratification are proved by the prosecution and whether the presumption of offence alleged to have been committed by the respondent would arise in this case?
ii) Whether the findings and reasons recorded on the charges by the learned trial Court are based on
// 15 //
proper appreciation of legal evidence on record and within the legal parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court in its decisions?
In a case of this nature, there is no dispute that the
prosecution has to successfully prove the foundational facts i.e.
the demand, acceptance of bribe money and recovery of the same
from the accused and then only the statutory presumption under
section 20 of the P.C. Act against the guilt of the accused would
arise and the accused has to adduce evidence relating to the
rebuttal of such presumption. Demand of illegal gratification is
sine qua non for constituting the offence under section 7 and
section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act. Mere
recovery of amount by the accused is not sufficient to fasten the
guilt, in the absence of any evidence with regard to demand and
acceptance of the amount as illegal gratification. Mere recovery of
tainted money from the possession of the accused is not sufficient
to convict him, unless there is evidence to prove payment of bribe
or to show that the money was taken voluntarily as bribe.
In the case of P. Satyanarayana Murthy -Vrs.- The
Dist. Inspector of Police and others reported in (2015)10
Supreme Court Cases 152), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as
follows:-
// 16 //
"23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) & (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder.
26. In reiteration of the golden principle which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases, this Court in Sujit Biswas
-Vrs.- State of Assam reported in (2013) 12 SCC 406 had held that suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof and the prosecution cannot afford to rest its case in the realm of "may be" true but has to upgrade it in the domain of "must be" true in order to steer clear of any possible surmise or conjecture. It was held, that the Court must ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided and if in the facts and circumstances, two views are plausible, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused."
// 17 //
In the case of B. Jayaraj -Vrs.- State of A.P.
reported in (2014)13 Supreme Court Cases 55), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held as follows:-
"7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration reference may be made to the decision in C.M.
Sharma -Vrs.- State of A.P. reported in (2010) 15 SCC 1 and C.M. Girish Babu -Vrs.- C.B.I. reported in (2009) 3 SCC 779.
8....We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial Court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive
// 18 //
insofar as the offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established."
In the case of K. Shanthamma -Vrs.- The State of
Telangana reported in (2022)4 Supreme Court Cases 574,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
"7....The offence under Section 7 of the PC Act relating to public servants taking bribe requires a demand of illegal gratification and the acceptance thereof. The proof of demand of bribe by a public servant and its acceptance by him is sine quo non for establishing the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act."
9. Coming to the evidence of the decoy, who has been
examined as P.W.5 in this case, he stated that he has taken the
work in question in Tikabali block in the year 1994-95 at an worth
of Rs.65,000/- and he got some payments and for the balance
dues, he approached the Junior Engineer, who is none else than
the respondent in this appeal, who told him to look after the
matter by the Assistant. He stated that report was lodged before
the Vigilance Officer and the Vigilance Officer drafted the report
and he copied the same and the same was not written with his
// 19 //
consent. The witness was declared hostile by the learned Public
Prosecutor and leading questions were allowed to be put to him,
but P.W.5 denied to have made any statement regarding demand,
acceptance and recovery of the bribe money from the possession
of the respondent. In the cross-examination by the learned
defence counsel, he stated that the B.D.O. himself passes the
final bill and after completion of the work, they used to inform the
B.D.O., who gives instruction to the Junior Engineer for making
necessary measurement and after measurement, bill is prepared
by the Accountant. He further stated that he was caught by the
Vigilance Officer and asked to sit in a room where the documents
were prepared and he was asked to put his signature on different
documents and then, he was asked to accompany them to
Baliguda and at the place of detection after arrival of the Vigilance
Officer, they caught hold of the hands of the respondent and he
did not know what else happened. He specifically stated that
except signing on the documents, he did not give any statement
before the Vigilance Officer. Therefore, from the evidence of the
decoy (P.W.5), there is nothing either about demand or
acceptance or recovery of any tainted money from the possession
of the respondent.
// 20 //
Similarly, the overhearing witness being examined as
P.W.2 has stated that in the IB where preparation was made,
when he arrived there, P.W.5 was introduced to all of them and
then P.W.5 explained that he was to get some money towards his
bill and the respondent, who was the J.E. told him to pay some
money for getting the dues, but he stated that he did not know
anything else of the case. He was also declared hostile by the
learned Public Prosecutor and the learned trial Court allowed the
learned Public Prosecutor to put leading questions to him.
However, in cross-examination by the prosecution also, he denied
to have been examined by the I.O. or stated anything regarding
demand, acceptance or recovery of bribe money from the
possession of the respondent. In cross-examination by the
defence, P.W.2 stated that the preparation report and the
detection report were not read over and explained to him and he
merely put his signatures on different documents as required and
instructed by the Vigilance Officer. Therefore, the evidence of
P.W.2 is also in no way helpful to the prosecution. It is the settled
principle of law that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be
totally thrown out of the board and the prosecution or the
accused can rely on the evidence whichever is helpful to their
respective cases. However, the learned Public Prosecutor by
// 21 //
cross-examining two important witnesses i.e. P.W.5 and P.W.2
has not brought out anything which would help the prosecution in
substantiating the charges against the respondent.
The evidence of the TLO (P.W.9) no doubt indicates
that when he got the signal from P.W.2, he along with other
members of the trap party rushed to the office of the respondent
and after arrival, they disclosed their identity and the respondent
was challenged to have accepted Rs.1000/- towards bribe from
P.W.2, but the respondent remained mum for some time and then
stated that money was forcibly inserted in his pocket. It comes
out from the evidence of P.W.9 that the hand wash of both the
hands of the appellant was taken in two separate glasses of
sodium carbonate solution due to which the colour of solution
turned to rose-pink colour, which were collected in two separate
bottles. The evidence of P.W.9 further indicates that tainted
currency notes were brought out from the chest shirt pocket of
the respondent and the numbers of such notes were verified with
the earlier noted down numbers and it got tallied and the G.C.
notes were seized under seizure list Ext.2 and then the pocket
wash of the shirt was taken with sodium carbonate solution which
also turned to rose-pink colour and the solution was collected in a
separate bottle. The chemical examination report which has been
// 22 //
marked as Ext.12 indicates that phenolphthalein was detected in
each of the bottles which were sent for examination, but the
evidence of P.W.9 coupled with the chemical examination report
substantiates only the recovery part. The contention of the
learned Standing Counsel that once there is recovery, acceptance
part is to be presumed, is not correct. For example, if someone
keeps the tainted money in the ignorance of a person in his
pocket or in the official file or thrust the same into his pocket
from where it was recovered, it cannot be said that the person
concerned from whom recovery was made has accepted it
voluntarily. Clinching evidence relating to acceptance is to be
adduced by the prosecution in a case of this nature.
In the case of Neeraj Dutta (supra), the question
which came up for consideration before the Five-Judge Bench was
as follows :
"In the absence of evidence of complainant/ direct or primary evidence of demand of illegal gratification, is it not permissible to draw inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant Under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution."
// 23 //
While answering to the above question, it has been
held as follows:
"88. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under:
88.1(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the Accused public servant Under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.2(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the Accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence.
88.3(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.
88.4 (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:
// 24 //
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.
(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence Under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence Under Section 7 or Section 13(1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, Under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence.
// 25 //
Similarly, a prior demand by the public
servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment Under Section 13(1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.5 (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the Accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.
88.6 (f) In the event the complainant turns 'hostile', or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the Accused public servant.
// 26 //
88.7 (g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.8(h) We clarify that the presumption in law Under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature."
Since the decoy as well as the overhearing witness
has not supported the prosecution case, there is no evidence
relating to offer to pay by bribe giver and there is also no
evidence of acceptance of the offer and therefore, section 7 of the
P.C. Act will not be attracted in view of the ratio laid down in
Neeraj Dutta (supra). Similarly, when the evidence relating to
demand made by the public servant and acceptance of the
demanded amount from the bribe giver is missing, the ingredients
of the offence under section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) of the P.C. Act are not
attracted. The question of presumption under section 20 of the
// 27 //
P.C. Act that illegal gratification was for the purpose of motive or
reward as mentioned in the section can only be for the offence
under section 7 of the P.C. Act and not for the offence under
section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) of the P.C. Act. When the basic ingredients
to attract the offence under section 7 of the P.C. Act is lacking in
this case, the question of raising presumption under section 20 of
the P.C. Act does not arise. Mere recovery of tainted money from
the possession of the respondent, in my humble view, would not
be sufficient to sustain the charges under section 7 and 13(2)
read with section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act.
It cannot be lost sight of the fact that when the
respondent was first challenged by the TLO (P.W.9) to have
received the bribe money from the decoy (P.W.5), he stated that
the money was forcibly inserted in his pocket. In the accused
statement, to question no. 24, the respondent has stated that
while he was in the office, five to six persons came to the office,
caught hold of his hands and forcibly thrust some money into his
pocket and thereafter, he was asked to bring out the money from
his pocket and then, his hand wash was taken. The statement
made by the respondent at the first instance that money was
forcibly inserted in his pocket comes within res gestae which is
admissible under section 6 of the Evidence Act and it cannot be
// 28 //
said that there was hardly any time for concoction of defence plea
to be taken during the course of trial. Excited utterances are
closely connected with the event in time and the excitement flows
from the event. Excited utterances have been considered part of
action and therefore, admissible despite the rule of hearsay. The
learned trial Court seems to have discussed the evidence on
record carefully and came to the conclusion that there is absence
of any evidence to prove prior demand or acceptance of bribe or
demand at the time of alleged trap and mere recovery of money
as stated by P.W.4, the Vigilance Constable and P.W.6 the
Tahasildar is not sufficient to bring home the charge under section
13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) and section 7 of the P.C. Act.
Law is well settled as held in case of Babu -Vrs.-
State of Uttar Pradesh reported in A.I.R. 1983 Supreme
Court 308 that in appeal against acquittal, if two views are
possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the
conclusions arrived at by the trial Court unless the conclusions are
not possible. If the finding reached by the trial Judge cannot be
said to be unreasonable, the appellate Court should not disturb it
even if it were possible to reach a different conclusion on the
basis of the material on the record because the trial Judge has the
advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses and the initial
// 29 //
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is not
weakened by his acquittal. The appellate Court, therefore, should
be slow in disturbing the finding of fact of the trial Court and if
two views are reasonably possible on the evidence on the record,
it is not expected to interfere simply because it feels that it would
have taken a different view if the case had been tried by it.
After going through the impugned judgment and the
materials available on record, I am of the humble view that there
is no perversity in the impugned judgment passed by the learned
trial Court and it has been rightly held that the prosecution has
failed to establish the charges under section 13(2) read with
section 13(1)(d) and section 7 of the P.C. Act.
10. Accordingly, the GCRLA being devoid of merits, stands
dismissed.
The trial Court records with a copy of this judgment
be sent down to the concerned Court forthwith for information.
.................................
S.K. Sahoo, J.
Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 10th August 2023/PKSahoo
Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: PRAMOD KUMAR SAHOO Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA Date: 22-Aug-2023 14:39:11
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