Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 9194 Ori
Judgement Date : 14 August, 2023
ORISSA HIGH COURT: CUTTACK
AFR W.P(C) NO. 7681 OF 2023
In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India.
---------------
Shiv Prasad Bhagat ..... Petitioner
-Versus-
State of Odisha & Ors. ..... Opp. Parties
For petitioner : Mr. P.K. Rath, Senior Advocate along with M/s. S. Rath, P.
Nayak, S. Mohapatra, A. Behera, S.K. Behera, S. Das and P.K.
Basantia, Advocates
For opp. parties : Mr. P.P. Mohanty, Addl. Govt. Advocate
P R E S E N T:
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE B.R.SARANGI AND THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN
Date of hearing: 10.08.2023 :: Date of judgment: 14.08.2023
DR. B.R. SARANGI,J. The petitioner, by means of this writ
petition, seeks to quash the order dated 01.10.2022
under Annexure-1, by which the Government of Odisha
in Excise Department has rejected the representation of
the petitioner despite recommendation made by the // 2 //
Commissioner of Excise for re-opening of IMFL "ON"
shop in its existing site, and further to quash the orders
dated 27.06.2018 and 01.01.2019 under Annexure-2 &
Annexure-3 respectively passed by the Government, as
well as the order dated 25.01.2019 under Annexure-4
passed by the Collector, Angul rejecting the
representation of the petitioner regarding relocation of
the shop, and further to issue direction to opposite
party no.1/Government to grant permit for reopening of
the "ON" shop in its original location, i.e., Mouza-Nisha
of Nisha Gram Panchayat in the district of Angul within
a stipulated period.
2. The factual matrix of the case, in brief, is
that the petitioner is the licensee in respect of the IMFL
"ON" (Restaurant) shop at Hotel Modern, Nisha, Angul
situated over Plot No.1359/1850 and Khata
No.205/420 of Mouza-Nisha, PS-Nisha in the district of
Angul. But his "ON" shop was closed pursuant to
decision of the Government in compliance of the
judgment dated 15.12.2016 of the apex Court in State // 3 //
of Tamilnadu v. K. Balu, (2017) 2 SCC 281, the
operative part of which was to the following effect:-
"29. We, accordingly, hereby direct and order as follows:
29.1. All States and Union Territories shall forthwith cease and desist from granting licenses for the sale of liquor along National and State highways.;
29.2. The prohibition contained in Para 29.1 above shall extend to and include stretches of such highways which fall within the limits of a municipal corporation, city, town or local authority;
29.3. The existing licenses which have already been renewed prior to the date of this order shall continue until the term of the license expires but no later than 1-4- 2017;
29.4. All signage and advertisements of the availability of liquor shall be prohibited and existing ones removed forthwith both n National and State highways;
29.5 No shop for the sale of liquor shall be
(i) visible from a national or State highways;(ii) directly accessible from a national or State highways; and (iii) situated within a distance of 500 m of the outer edge of the national or State highway or of a service lane along the highway.
29.6 All States and Union Territories are mandated to strictly enforce the above directions. The Chief Secretaries and Directors General of Police shall within one month chalk out a plan for enforcement in consultation with the State Revenue and Home Departments. Responsibility shall be assigned, inter alia, to District Collector and Superintendents of police and other competent authorities. Compliance shall be strictly monitored by calling for fortnightly reports on action taken.
// 4 //
29.7 These directions issue under Article 142 of the Constitution."
In view of aforesaid judgment of the apex Court, all the
States and the Union Territories were to forthwith cease
and desist from granting licenses for the sale of liquor
along National and State highways and such
prohibition was to extend to and include stretches of
such highways, which fall within the limits of a
municipal corporation, city, town or local authority.
Therefore, giving effect to the said judgment, the liquor
shop in question was closed with effect from
01.04.2017.
2.1 The aforesaid judgment of the apex Court
was reviewed from time to time. The apex Court, vide
order dated 11.07.2017 passed in SLP (C) No.10243 of
2017 (Arrive Safe Society of Chandigarh v. The
Union Territory of Chandigarh), reported in (2017) 7
SCR 369, granted some relaxations. Paragraph-7 of the
said order reads as under:-
"7.The purpose of the directions contained in the order dated 15 December 2016 is to deal with the sale of liquor along and in proximity of highways properly understood which provide connectivity between cities, towns and villages. The order does not // 5 //
prohibit licensed establishments within municipal areas. This clarification shall govern other municipal areas as well. We have considered it appropriate to issue this clarification to set at rest any ambiguity and to obviate repeated recourse to IAs, before the Court."
Again the apex Court, vide order dated 23.02.2018
passed in Civil Appeal Nos.12164-12166 of 2016 (The
State of Tamil Nadu Rep. By Sec. and Ors. v. K.
Balu & Anr.), reported in (2018) 1 SCR 665, clarified
the matter. Paragraph-8 of the said order is quoted
below:
"8. Having regard to these directions, we are of the view that the state governments would not be precluded from determining whether the principle which has been laid down by this Court in the order dated 11 July 2017 in Arrive Safe Society (supra) should also apply to areas covered by local self governing bodies and statutory development authorities. We are inclined to allow the state governments to make this determination since it is a question of fact as to whether an area covered by a local self-governing body is proximate to a municipal agglomeration or is sufficiently developed as to warrant the application of the same principle. In deciding as to whether the principle which has been set down in the order dated 11 July 2017 should be extended to a local self-governing body (or statutory development authority) the state governments would take recourse to all relevant circumstances including the nature and extent of development in the area and the object underlying the direction prohibiting the sale of liquor on national and the state highways. The use of the expression 'municipal areas' in the order dated 11 July 2017 does not prevent the // 6 //
state governments from making that determination and from taking appropriate decisions consistent with the object of the orders passed by this Court. We leave it open to individual licensees to submit their representations to the competent authorities in the state governments if they are so advised upon which appropriate decisions may be taken by the state governments. We have issued this general direction to obviate both litigation before the High Courts and repeated recourse to applications to this Court.
2.2 By virtue of clarification issued by the apex
Court, the relaxation as is applicable to the municipal
area is also applicable to the area coming within local
self-governing bodies and statutory development
authority areas subject to conditions; (i) whether the
area covered by a local self government body is
proximate to the municipal agglomeration; or (ii)
sufficiently developed as to warrant application of the
same principle. Further, the apex Court, vide order
dated 23.02.2018 in Civil Appeal Nos.12164-12166 of
2016, specifically clarified that wherever the liquor
shops are existing either in the close proximity to the
municipal agglomeration or location sufficiently
developed, the shop qualifies to be permitted to operate.
The location in question is coming in the second
category, i.e., the area, where the 'ON' shop was in // 7 //
operation, is sufficiently developed, though it is located
within the jurisdiction of local self-governing body as
well as statutory government authority, i.e., Talcher-
Angul-Meramundali Development Authority (TAMDA).
So far as TAMDA is concerned, the location is coming
within the statutory authority. The location of the 'ON'
shop qualified to be within sufficiently developed area,
because it is adjacent to M/s. Jindal Steel & Power
Limited (JSPL) and other industrial units in and around
the locations. Therefore, the petitioner submitted a
representation to the Government on 15.03.2018 to
permit reopening of the 'ON' shop, which was closed
since 01.04.2017, and the Government, vide letter
dated 11.05.2018, forwarded the said representation to
the Collector, Angul for necessary enquiry.
2.3 Pursuant to letter dated 11.05.2018 issued
by the Government, the Collector, Angul submitted a
report on 31.05.2018 clearly stating therein that the
location in question is coming within the area, which
has been developed a lot with the establishment of JSPL
and other giant factories. Taking into consideration the // 8 //
scenario, the Government prepared a guideline dated
27.06.2018 fixing distance factor of 3 KMs from
municipal area so as to warrant reopening and re-
location of the shop. The said guideline is not applicable
to the petitioner's shop.
2.4 The apex Court, vide order dated 23.02.2018,
has also provided two pre-requisites for the purpose of
operation of the licensed establishment within local self-
governing body area subject to the location is either in
close proximity to municipal corporation area or the
same is sufficiently developed. The petitioner qualifies
the second criteria. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the
Government to permit reopening of the shop in
compliance of the orders passed by the apex Court. The
petitioner's shop is existing within the limit of local self-
governing body area as well as statutory development
authority area, namely, "TAMDA". Therefore, the
Government is required to consider the application for
reopening of the "ON" shop of the petitioner in its
original location where it was functioning before its
closure.
// 9 //
2.5 Challenging the inaction of the Government,
earlier the petitioner had approached this Court by
filing W.P.(C) No.12053 of 2018, which was disposed of
vide order dated 11.12.2018 with a direction to the
Principal Secretary to the Government of Odisha,
Department of Excise, to decide the representation of
the petitioner by a speaking order in accordance with
law within a period of four weeks from the date of
receipt of the order with an observation that it would be
open to the petitioner to challenge that decision by way
of appropriate proceedings. The said order was also
communicated to the Government and thereafter, the
Government passed the order dated 01.01.2019 under
Annexure-3 directing the Collector, Angul to consider
the case limiting to 3 KMs criteria. Such limitations
provided by the Government under Annexures-2 & 3
cannot be sustained in the eye of law.
2.6 Since there was a wrong quoting of prayer in
W.P.(C) No.12053 of 2018, I.A. No.18180 of 2018 was
filed for modification of the order dated 11.12.2018,
which was also allowed vide order dated 08.01.2019. As // 10 //
the petitioner's "ON" shop was lying closed since
01.04.2017, he sustained heavy loss. In the meantime,
the Government passed the order dated 01.10.2022,
which is contrary to the ratio decided by the apex
Court. But the petitioner, challenging the orders passed
under Annexures-2, 3 and 4, approached this Court by
filing W.P.(C) No.1254 of 2019 and during pendency of
the said writ petition, the Commissioner of Excise,
Odisha made recommendation to the Government for
re-opening of the "ON" shop in its previous location,
which is in terms of the orders dated 11.07.2017 and
23.02.2018 passed by the apex Court. The
Commissioner of Excise, Odisha further mentioned that
the impugned notification dated 27.06.2018 under
Annexure-2 is not applicable in respect of petitioner's
IMFL "ON" shop.
2.7 The petitioner brought the aforesaid
recommendation dated 21.05.2021 to the notice of this
Court by filing an Interlocutory Application. This Court,
vide order dated 07.07.2022, disposed of the said I.A.
with a direction to the competent authority/ // 11 //
Government to take an appropriate decision on the
recommendation made by the Commissioner of Excise,
Odisha. The said order was communicated to the
Government and in compliance thereof, the Government
passed the order dated 01.10.2022 under Annexure-1
rejecting the claim of the petitioner for reopening of his
"ON" shop. Hence, this writ petition.
3. Mr. P.K. Rath, learned Senior Counsel along
with Mr. A. Behera, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner vehemently contended that the rejection of
the claim of the petitioner for renewal of his "ON" shop
without giving any opportunity of hearing cannot be
sustained in the eye of law. It is further contended that
if the shop is permitted to be opened, it is in compliance
of the order passed by the apex Court. While rejecting
the claim of the petitioner, vide order dated 01.10.2022
under Annexure-1, the authority has not applied its
mind in proper perspective. Therefore, the said order
cannot be sustained in the eye of law. It is further
contended that on careful reading of the direction of the
apex Court, it appears that the local self government // 12 //
body areas are divided into two parts, i.e, (i) the
proximity of an area covered by self-same governing
body to municipal agglomeration and (ii) area covered
by the local self governing body is sufficiently developed
as to application of the same principle. It is further
contended that the Government in its wisdom has
issued a set of executive instructions dated 27.06.2018
on the question of area covered under local self
governing body which are in proximity with the
municipal corporation and distance factor is provided to
be 3 KMs. From the outer limit of the municipal
corporation/municipality, provided the area is
sufficiently developed as urban area. Therefore, the
rejection of the claim of the petitioner has been done in
contravention of the directions issued by the apex Court
and clarified from time to time. Thereby, the orders so
passed by the Government in Annexures-1, 2 & 3 and
the Collector, Angul in Annexure-4 cannot be sustained
in the eye of law and the same are liable to be quashed.
4. Mr. P.P. Mohanty, learned Addl. Government
Advocate appearing for the State-opposite parties // 13 //
vehemently contended that the State Government,
pursuant to the order dated 23.02.2018 passed by the
apex Court in Civil Appeal Nos.12164-12166/2016,
which relates to distance factor for operation of existing
liquor shops along the highways, issued the orders
dated 27.06.2018 and 01.01.2019 clarifying the criteria
to be followed for the purpose. It is further contended
that in compliance of the orders of the apex Court, the
State Government took a consensus decision to allow
the retail liquor outlets to operate along the highways
within 3 KMs from the outer limit of the municipal
corporation/municipalities provided the area is
sufficiently developed as urban areas. Therefore, the
State Government directed the Collectors to constitute
one inspection committee for field verification and
basing on the recommendation of the said committee,
the Collectors of the districts shall dispose of the
representations filed by the licensees following the
parameters as enumerated in Excise Department order
dated 27.06.2018. Thereby, it is contended that no
illegality or irregularity has been committed by the State
Government in rejecting the claim of the petitioner.
// 14 //
Therefore, the writ petition at the instance of the
petitioner should be quashed.
5. This Court heard Mr. P.K. Rath, learned
Senior Counsel along with Mr. A. Behera, learned
counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. P.P.
Mohanty, learned Addl. Government Advocate
appearing for the State-opposite parties in hybrid
mode. Pleadings have been exchanged between the
parties and with the consent of learned counsel for the
parties, the writ petition is being disposed of finally at
the stage of admission.
6. On the basis of the pleadings available on
record as well as the arguments advanced by learned
counsel for the parties, there is no dispute that the
petitioner was granted license to open IMFL "ON" shop
adjacent to the National Highway, but because of the
judgment of the apex Court, as mentioned above, the
"ON" shop of the petitioner was closed on 01.04.2017.
Subsequently, the apex Court clarified the said
judgment, vide order dated 11.07.2017, and thereafter,
on 23.02.2018, granted relaxation for opening of the // 15 //
"ON" shop. In response to the same, the petitioner
requested the Government to grant permission to open
his shop taking into consideration the relaxation
granted by the apex Court. But, without considering the
same in proper perspective, it was contended that to
implement the spirit and objectives of dictum of the
apex Court, the Government fixed the restrictive
parameters to 3 KMs from the outer limit of
municipality/municipal corporation, vide its letter
dated 27.06.2018, as a policy decision for the State of
Odisha. Even if relaxation was granted, on the basis of
the order of the Collector dated 25.01.2019, the
proposal of the Commissioner of Excise, Odisha cannot
be sustained in the eye of law, as the same is not in
accordance with the Government order issued in this
regard. Needless to say, the direction given by the apex
Court was that the local self governing body areas are
divided into two parts, i.e, (i) the proximity of an area
covered by self-same governing body to municipal
agglomeration and (ii) area covered by the local self
governing body is sufficiently developed as to
application of the same principle. Thereby, taking // 16 //
advantage of such division of areas even if the petitioner
applies for license that cannot be given as it is a policy
decision of the Government and the same is in
adherence to the orders passed by the apex Court.
7. Government has to run the Government and
for that purpose it has to take policy decisions. The
policy decisions are entirely within the domain of the
Government. Necessarily the Government shall exercise
its own discretion in this regard. But, it is a
fundamental rule for the exercise of the discretionary
power that discretion must brought to bear on every
case-each one must be considered on its own merits
and decided as the public interest requires at the time.
In enforcing this rule the courts are underlining the
difference between judicial and administrative
processes. The legal rights of litigants are decided
according to legal rules and precedents so that like
cases are treated alike.
8. In State of Gujarat v. Arvind Kumar
Tewari, (2012) 9 SCC 545, the apex Court held that // 17 //
policy decision cannot ordinarily be subject-matter of
judicial review.
9. In Chief Constable of the North Wales
Police v. Evans, (1982) 2 All E.R. 141 (H.L), it is held
that judicial review is concerned, not with the decision,
but with the decision-making process. Unless that
restriction on the power of the court is observed, the
court will under the guise of preventing the abuse of
power, be itself guilty of usurping power.
10. In Union of India v. J.D. Suryavanshi,
(2011) 13 SCC 167, the apex Court held that courts
should not interfere in matters of policy or in the day-
to-day functioning of any departments of Government
or statutory bodies. Even within the executive, the need
for separation of roles has been voiced.
11. In Raj Shikshan Prasarak Mandal v. State
of Maharashtra, (2001) 10 SCC 75, the apex Court
held that so long as the Government decision is not
actuated with any malice or is not the outcome of an
arbitrary or whimsical act, the same should not be
interfered with by a court of law under Article 226.
// 18 //
12. In Netai Bag v. State of West Bengal,
(2000) 8 SCC 262, the apex Court held that the
Government is entitled to make pragmatic adjustments
and policy decision which may become necessary or
called for under the prevalent peculiar circumstances.
The court cannot strike down a policy decision merely
because it feels that another decision would have been
fairer or wiser or more scientific or logical.
13 In Directorate of Film Festivals v. Gaurav
Ashwin Jain, (2007) 4 SCC 737, the apex Court held
as follows:
"The scope of judicial review of governmental policy is now well defined. Courts do not and cannot act as appellate authorities examining the correctness, suitability and appropriateness of a policy, nor are courts advisors to the executive on matters of policy which the executive is entitled to formulate. The scope of judicial review when examining a policy of the Government is to check whether it violates the fundamental rights of the citizens or is opposed to the provisions of the Constitution, or opposed to any statutory provision or manifestly arbitrary. Courts cannot interfere with policy either on the ground that it is erroneous or on the ground that a better, fairer or wiser alternative is available. Legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the policy, is the subject of judicial review."
// 19 //
14. In M.P. Gangadharan & Anr. Vs. State of
Kerala & Ors., (2006) 6 SCC 162, the Supreme Court
considered a question as to whether a Family Court can
be shifted from one place to another within the area of
its jurisdiction. The Court while discussing the scope of
judicial review in such administrative functions,
observed that the constitutional requirement for judging
the question of reasonableness and fairness on the part
of the statutory authority must be considered having
regard to the factual matrix obtaining in each case. It
cannot be put in a straight-jacket formula. It must be
considered keeping in view, the doctrine of flexibility.
Before an action is struck down, the court must be
satisfied that a case has been made out for exercise of
power of judicial review. Referring to the recent
development of law, the Court further observed that 'We
are not unmindful of the development of the law that
from the doctrine of Wednesbury Unreasonableness, the
court is leaning towards the doctrine of proportionality.
But in a case of this nature, the doctrine of
proportionality must also be applied having regard to
the purport and object for which the Act was enacted'.
// 20 //
15. In Maharashtra Land Development
Corporation & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra &
Anr., (2011) 15 SCC 616, the Supreme Court observed
that the Wednesbury principle of reasonableness has
given way to the doctrine of proportionality. As per the
Wednesbury principles, administrative action can be
subject to judicial review on the grounds of illegality,
irrationality or procedural impropriety. The principle of
proportionality envisages that a public authority ought
to maintain a sense of proportion between particular
goals and the means employed to achieve those goals,
so that administrative action impinges on the individual
rights to the minimum extent to preserve public
interest. It was held by the Court that administrative
action ought to bear a reasonable relationship to the
general purpose for which the power has been
conferred. Any administrative authority while exercising
a discretionary power will have to necessarily establish
that its decision is balanced and in proportion to the
object of the power conferred. The test of proportionality
is concerned with the way in which the decision maker // 21 //
has ordered his priorities, i.e. the attribution of relative
importance to the factors in the case. It is not so much
the correctness of the decision that is called into
question, but the method to reach the same. If an
administrative action is contrary to law, improper,
irrational or otherwise unreasonable, a court competent
to do so can interfere with the same while exercising its
power of judicial review. It was further held that, the
principle of proportionality therefore implies that the
Court has to necessarily go into the advantages and
disadvantages of any administrative action called into
question. Unless the impugned administrative action is
advantageous and in public interest such an action
cannot be upheld. At the core of this principle is the
scrutiny of the administrative action to examine
whether the power conferred is exercised in proportion
to the purpose for which it has been conferred.
Similar view has also been taken by this
Court in Sona Spun Pipe Industries Ltd. V. State of
Odisha, MSME Department & Two Ors., 2020 (II) CLR // 22 //
902 : 2020 (III) ILR-CUT 364, where one of us (Dr. B.R.
Sarangi, J.) was a Member.
16. Taking into consideration the aforesaid facts
and circumstances of the case, if the Government, as a
matter of principle, has taken a decision by framing a
policy in conformity with the direction given by the apex
Court, which has been revised from time to time, the
claim made by the petitioner, that his shop has to be
opened at the place where it was granted, even though
it was closed on 01.04.2017, is not tenable. The policy
decision of the Government, which is in adherence to
the direction of the apex Court, is to allow the retail
liquor outlet to operate the highways within 3 KMs
outer limit of municipality/municipal corporation
provided the areas is sufficiently developed as urban
areas. Therefore, it was directed to consider the
representation of the petitioner within the parameters of
the policy decision as well as the direction of the apex
Court. Applying the same, if the representation filed by
the petitioner has been rejected, this Court is not
inclined to interfere with the same.
// 23 //
17. In the result, therefore, the writ petition
merits no consideration and the same is dismissed.
But, however, under the circumstances of the case,
there shall be no order as to costs.
(DR. B.R. SARANGI)
JUDGE
M.S. RAMAN, J. I agree.
(M.S. RAMAN)
JUDGE
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
The 14th August, 2023, Alok
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ALOK RANJAN SETHY
Designation: Secretary
Reason: Authentication
Location: Orissa High Court
Date: 14-Aug-2023 17:28:10
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