Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 3221 Ori
Judgement Date : 12 July, 2022
THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
JCRLA No.15 of 2017
From the Judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 16.09.2016
passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Nabarangpur in C.T. Case
No.130 of 2013(T).
-----------
Hadu @ Hada Gond ....... Appellant
-Versus-
State of Orissa ....... Respondent
___________________________________________________________
For Appellant : M/s. Subhalata Choudhury, Advocate &
Mr. Sarbeswar Behera, Advocate.
For Respondent : Mrs. Saswata Patnaik, Addl. Govt. Advocate
___________________________________________________________
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE S. TALAPATRA
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE B. P. ROUTRAY
JUDGMENT
12th July, 2022
S. Talapatra, J. This appeal, by the convict (from Jail), arises from the
Judgment and order dated 16.09.2016 delivered in C.T. No. 130 of
2013(T) by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Nabarangpur. By the said
Judgment, the convict (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) has been
convicted under Section 302 of the IPC for intentionally causing death
of Deusu Gond by inflicting injuries on his head by means of Cudgel.
Pursuant to the said Judgment of conviction, the appellant has been
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.10,000/-
(Rupees ten thousand) in default whereof, to undergo further R.I. for
one year for committing the offence punishable under Section 302 of
the IPC.
2. Briefly stated the prosecution case, as revealed, is that on
28.03.2013 at about 4.30 in the afternoon, when Deusu Gond (the
deceased) was proceeding through the village road, the appellant picked
up quarrel with him in front of the house of one Aditya Gond. There had
been heated exchange of words between the deceased and the appellant.
All of a sudden, the appellant, being enraged brought out a wooden stilt
from a nearby fence and started giving blows indiscriminately on the
person of the deceased. The deceased fell down on the ground with
bleeding injuries on his head and other parts of the body and became
unconscious. The people, who were present at the place of occurrence
during that time, shifted the injured deceased to the house of the
appellant and the appellant was asked to take the injured deceased for
medical treatment. During that time, the informant, namely Pradeep
Gond (P.W.5) appeared there and on hearing the incident, he shifted the
injured deceased to Jodanga Medical, where the injured deceased was
given preliminary treatment. The Medical Officer at Jodinga Medical
had referred the injured deceased to Umerkote Medical for better
treatment. But the deceased succumbed to his injuries before he could
be shifted to Umerkote Medical. On the following day at 10.30 A.M., an
FIR was lodged, which was registered as Raighar PS Case No.47/2020.
It has revealed from the records that the Investigating Officer visited the
spot, examined several witnesses, seized blood stained earth and sample
earth from the spot. The Investigating Officer had also seized the
weapon of offence i.e. the blood stained wooden stilt from the spot and
held inquest over the dead body of the deceased. The Investigating
Officer had arrested the accused, sent the dead body for post mortem
examination, seized the blood stained wearing pant of the appellant and
seized the apparels in the wearing of the deceased. That apart, the
Investigating Officer got the appellant medially examined and seized
biological samples, as collected by the Medical Officer. The
Investigating Officer received the Post Mortem report. The seized
weapon of offence was produced before the Medical Officer, who
conducted autopsy. On completion of the Post Mortem examination, the
materials as seized were sent to the Regional Forensic Science
Laboratory (RFSL), Berhampur for clinical examination and report.
After the investigation was complete, the investigating officer found a
strong prima facie case and filed the charge sheet (the report under
Section 173(2) of the Cr. P.C).
3. Having taken the cognizance, on 06.08.2013, the charge
was framed against the appellant for causing murder of Deusu Gond, the
deceased, under Section 302 of the IPC. The said charge was flatly
denied by the appellant.
4. In order to substantiate the charge, the prosecution adduced
as many as 22 witnesses in addition to the documentary evidence. The
appellant did not adduce any evidence in order to rebut or in his
defence. After recording of the prosecution's evidence, the appellant
was examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. The appellant during the
said examination denied the incriminating evidence as concocted or as
untrue. Having appreciated the evidence as led in the trial, the impugned
Judgment has been returned by convicting the appellant. It has been
observed by the trial Judge that on scrutiny of the prosecution evidence,
it is found that P.W.1, P.W.10 & P.W.21 are the seizure witnesses in
respect of seizure of the wearing apparels of the deceased vide the
seizure list marked Ext.1. P.Ws. 4 & 13 are the witnesses before whom
the biological samples of the appellant, such as, nail clippings, blood
were seized by the investigating officer, vide the seizure list marked as
Ext.3. P.W.21 and P.W.3 are the seizure witnesses of the wearing pant
of the appellant vide the seizure list marked as Ext.2. P.W.6 has testified
that during the investigation, the investigating officer (P.W.22) effected
the seizure of cudgel (wooden lathi) from the house of P.W. 5 vide the
seizure list marked Ext.6. P.W.7, P.W.15, P.W.16, P.W.17 and P.W.20
are the witnesses in whose presence P.W.22 held inquest over the dead
body of the deceased. P.W.18 is the scribe, who had written the FIR
(Ext.5). P.W.11 has simply stated that, he heard about the murder of the
deceased by the appellant and he had seen the dead body of the
deceased lying in front of his house. P.W.14 is the witness of seizure of
sample earth and blood stained earth from the place of occurrence by
P.W. 22. P.W. 12, the wife of the deceased, has testified that she was
absent in her village on the day of occurrence. Having heard about the
occurrence, she had returned to her village and saw the dead body of the
deceased. P.W.5 (the informant) had not witnessed the occurrence, but
having information, he had filed the FIR. P.W.5 went to the house of the
appellant on hearing about the occurrence and found his brother (the
deceased) lying there with injuries on the back side of head and chest.
He was told that the appellant had inflicted those injuries on the person
of the deceased. P.W.5, as stated earlier, shifted the injured deceased to
the Jodenga Medical. Even though the Medical Officer had referred the
injured deceased to Umerkote Hospital for better treatment, but before
he could be taken to Umerkote Hospital, he succumbed to his injuries.
Immediately after his death, an FIR (Ext.4) was lodged before the
Police. So far as the culpability of the appellant is concerned, the
evidence of P.W.8 and P.W.19, who had given the eye-witness account
of the occurrence, was relied heavily by the prosecution. P.W.8 is a co-
villager of the deceased, in front of whose house, the occurrence took
place and P.W.19 is another brother of the deceased. P.W.8 has
categorically testified that he had intervened the quarrel and tried to
pacify both the appellant and the deceased but the appellant came with a
cudgel (somewhere referred, as the wooden lathi, which was seized) and
dealt blows on the chest of the deceased. Having received such blows,
the deceased fell down on the ground and lost sense. Out of fear, P.W.8
fled away from the spot.
5. In the Judgment, it has been observed that, there was no
reason (at least there is nothing in the evidence) for P.W.8 to falsify in
order to implicate the appellant. Even P.W.19 has testified that he saw
the accused hitting hard on the person of the deceased with the cudgel.
The deceased received injuries on his chest and head. Some villagers
caught hold of the appellant. Subsequently, the injured deceased was
shifted to the Medical (one hospital) but the life of the deceased could
not be saved. The trial Judge found that the eye witnesses are credible
and held that the appellant dealt blows by means of cudgel on the head
of the deceased, which is a vital part and caused bleeding injuries. The
evidence of P.W.9 (the Medical Officer) has corroborated the evidence
of P.W.8 and P.W.19 as regards the injuries inflicted on the head of the
deceased. P.W.9 (the Medical Officer), who conducted the autopsy by
dis-section of the dead body, found the cause of death due to injury to
occipital region of the head and presence of intracranial haemorrhage
which was caused for damage of the vital part of the brain leading to
cardio-pulmonary failure. P.W.9 has categorically stated in the trail that
the internal injury to the brain (of the deceased) has been caused by
external injuries, inflicted on the head. Those external injuries are the
primary cause of the death. It has been observed by the trial Judge on
appreciation of evidence as follows-:
......."there is clear evidence on record that the accused after giving blows by cudgel on the person of the deceased went to his house and again returned to the spot and dealt cudgel blows on the chest. The above facts and the conduct of the accused clearly goes to show that the accused has had required intention to cause death of the deceased......"
It has been further observed that the transaction of crime would stand to
show the mens rea with sufficient intention to cause death of the
deceased. Based on such findings, the judgment of conviction as
challenged by this appeal has been passed. Counsel for the parties did
not challenge the finding so far it concerns with the death of the
deceased, but so far the knowledge and intention as concerned with
dealing with the blows have been seriously questioned.
6. Mr. Behera, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has
submitted that it is apparent from the evidence that the culpable
homicide in the case in hand cannot be termed murder, as the same has
been committed without any pre-meditation, in the heat of passion, upon
a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue
advantage or acted in a cruel and unusual manner. Thus, the indictment
or the charges framed under Section 302 of the IPC is bound to fall
through, in as much as the conduct of the appellant is squarely covered
by Exception 4 of Section 300 of the IPC. Mr. Behera, learned counsel,
has pointed out that the appellant is languishing in jail since 09.03.2013.
Mr. Behera has strenuously contended that the conviction is liable to be
converted under Section 304, Part-II of the IPC against the appellant for
committing culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
7. Mrs. Saswata Patnaik, learned Addl. Government Advocate
appearing for the State has seriously refuted the said submission
advanced for the appellant. She has stated that there are clear two parts
in the transaction of crime. The first part constitutes sudden quarrel and
heated exchanged of words and assault by the appellant on the deceased
and the second part is the appellant's going to his home, bringing a
cudgel (wooden lathi) and assaulting the deceased severely on the vital
parts of the body. If it were that the appellant has only committed the
first part of the assault, such conduct would have come under Exception
4 of Section 300 of the IPC. But the second part of the transaction
clearly demonstrates that the assault was done with intention of causing
of bodily injuries and the bodily injuries were intended to be inflicted.
The said fact having been established by evidence is adequate to hold
that such assault in the ordinary course of nature is likely to cause death.
Illustration thirdly under Section 300 of the IPC being conformed to, the
said culpable homicide is murder. Hence, no interference of this Court
is called for in the impugned Judgment of conviction.
8. Mr. Behera, learned counsel has placed reliance on a few
decisions to buttress his contentions. In Santosh v. State of Madhya
Pradesh reported in AIR 1975 SC 654, the Apex Court has observed
that the Sessions Judge appears to have overlooked the various clauses
of Section 300 of the IPC. An intention to kill is not required in every
case. A knowledge that the natural and the probable consequences of the
act would be death will suffice for a conviction under Section 302 of the
IPC. Mr. Behera, learned counsel has submitted that there had been no
knowledge of probable consequences, as from the records it appears that
both the appellant and the deceased were inebriated. As such, as
emphasized, the element of knowledge cannot be inferred.
9. In order to nourish the submission on interpretation, it has
been contended by Mr. Behera, learned counsel that, there is no
evidence of any previous ill-feeling or enmity between the appellant and
the deceased. The appellant did not intend to cause of death or bodily
injuries which are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature, to cause
death. But as he dealt the blows on the vital part of the body, he has
been presumed to have that knowledge that, by that act, he was likely to
cause death. If a person is said to have given a blow on a vital part of
the deceased, it has been held in several cases that no one can impute
knowledge that such an injury was likely to cause death. The offence, in
the circumstances, would fall under Section 304, Part II, of the IPC.
In Lachhman Dhublia v. the State of Odisha, reported in
1984 CRI. L.J. 1116, as referred by Mr. Behera, learned counsel for the
appellant, several decisions of the Apex Court have been relied by this
Court:
"9. In Charmru Budhwa v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 652: 1954 Cri LJ 1676 the accused was found to have given one blow with a lathi on the head of the deceased and their Lordships held that when the fatal injury was inflicted by the accused on the head of the deceased by only one blow it could as well be that the act by which death was caused was not done with the intention of causing death or causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death.
In Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 116: 1956 Cri LJ 291, the accused gave a single blow with a hockey stick on the head of the deceased and he was held guilty for the offence under Section 304, Part II, I.P.C.
In Laxman Kalu Nikaje v. State of Maharashtra; AIR 1968 SC 1390 : 1968 Cri L J 1647, the accused dealt a single blow with a weapon on the chest of the deceased. The
injury was found to be situated 2" below the outer 1/3" of right clavicle on the right side of the chest and penetrated to the depth of 2" into the chest cavity. Death was caused mainly because it cut the auxillary artery and veins and caused shock and haemorrhage leading to the death. In these circumstances, their Lordships held that the offence came within the third part of Sec. 299, I.P.C. Accordingly, the conviction under Section 302, I.P.C. was altered to one under Section 304 I.P.C.
In Mirza Hidayatullah Baig v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 1525 : 1979 Cri LJ NOC 168, the accused dealt a single blow on the head of the deceased with a walking stick. It was held that the appellant did not have the intention to cause the particular injury which resulted from the blow given to the deceased. But as he aimed the blow at the head of the deceased which is a vital part of the body he must be presumed to have the knowledge that death was the likely result of that act. Accordingly, the conviction under Section 302, I.P.C. was altered to one under Section 304, Part II, I.P.C.
In Shankar v. State of Madhya Pradesh : AIR 1979 SC 1532 : 1979 Cri LJ 1135, the accused caused an injury on the neck of the deceased with a dagger. Their Lordships found that there was no premeditation for the murder and that the accused had no intention of causing the particular injury that he caused to the deceased. But he must be deemed to have the knowledge that death may be caused by
his act. Accordingly, the conviction under Section 302, I.P.C. was altered to one under Section 304, Part II, I.P.C.
In Hari Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 185 :
1983 Cri LJ 346, the accused in the heat of an altercation seized a jelli and thrust it into the chest of the deceased. On the evidence, their Lordships held that the accused had no intention to kill and accordingly he was convicted under Section 304, Part II, I.P.C.
In Jawahar Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 284 : 1983 Cri LJ 429, the accused had given a solitary blow of knife to the deceased which fell on his chest. The accused had no malice against the deceased. He had no quarrel with the deceased and the accused did not make any attempt at giving a second blow. Their Lordships held that the accused could not be said to have intention to cause that particular injury and that even if the injury proved to be fatal, the case would not be covered by Section 300, Para 3, but the accused could be attributed to the knowledge that he was likely to cause death. Accordingly the conviction under Sec. 302, I.P.C. was altered to one under S. 304, Part II, I.P.C."
10. Mr. Behera, learned counsel has contended that the
appellant cannot be attributed to have intention to cause that particular
injury and that, even if the injury is proved to be fatal, the case would
not be covered by thirdly under Section 300, As the appellant cannot be
attributed to have the knowledge that his act was likely to cause an
injury which may cause death and hence, the conviction is liable to be
altered to Section 304, Part-II of the IPC.
11. For appreciation of the submission of learned counsel for
the parties, it would be appropriate to evaluate the evidence, as recorded
in the trial, in a meaningful manner. There is no dispute that PWs.8 and
19 are the eye witnesses of the transaction of crime. The evidence of
P.W.9 came to corroborate the ocular evidence of P.Ws.8 and 19. As
already noted, the remaining witnesses including P.W.22, i.e., the
investigating officer are of formal nature and their evidence had little
ramification on the finding of the conviction. As such, this Court would
read a little extensively the evidence of P.W.8 and P.W.19. Sudu Rout,
P.W.8 has testified, after identifying the appellant as the perpetrator,
that in the previous year meaning 2013, at about 04:00 P.M., the
appellant assaulted Deusu Gond with lathi. He intervened and tried to
pacify them. The appellant left the spot thereafter, went to his house and
returned with lathi and again assaulted Deusu on his chest. Deusu fell
down and became unconscious. Out of fear, he left the spot. His
statements could not be dented in the cross-examination.
12. P.W.19 namely Bhika Gond testified in the trial and stated
that the deceased is his brother. About 3 years back (from the date of
recording of the statement of P.W.19) at about 04:00P.M., the appellant
had picked up quarrel with his brother (the deceased) near the house of
Ghasi and assaulted him by means of a piece of wood. As a result, his
brother sustained injuries on his chest and head. The villagers arrived
there and caught hold of the appellant. His brother (the deceased) was
taken to the hospital where he died. In the cross-examination, P.W.19
has admitted that, he does not know the date of occurrence. His house is
100 meters away from the spot. He has made a very significant
statement that Sudu (P.W.8) and Udit, not examined in the trial, and
himself were present in the scene of occurrence. His statement in the
cross examination requires to be reproduced and is reproduced
hereunder:
"At the time of my arrival, accused was assaulted the deceased and the deceased was lying on the ground. I cannot say if my brother (deceased) and the accused were addicted with liquor.P.W.19 has stated the diameter of the Lathi used by the appellant was about 4 inches."
He has denied the fact that the appellant neither quarreled with the
deceased nor assaulted the deceased. The evidence of P.W.9, Dr. Ashis
Ranjan Prusty is vital for the case in hand in as much as he had carried
out the post-mortem examination over the dead body of Deusu Gond
(the deceased).
According to the post mortem examination report (Ext.6) the following
external injuries were found on the dead body of the deceased.
i) Lacerated wound of size 2 c.m. * 2 c.m. * 2 c.m. on left parietal region,
ii) Lacerated wound of size 2 * 2 * 1 c.m. on occipital region,
iii) Abrasion with swelling on both scapular region.
P.W. 9 has observed in the report as under:
"Wall, ribes and cartilages were intact and congested, pleura was intact and congested. Larnyx and trachea were intact and congested and contained frothy exudate. Right lung intact, congested and filled with blood. Left lung intact, congested and filled with blood."
13. P.W.9 has clearly stated that the cause of death is due to
injury in the occipital region and presence of intracranial haemorrhage,
which caused damage to the vital centre of brain and that led to cardio-
pulmonary failure. According to him, the nature of death is homicidal.
There was no meaningful cross-examination. Apart that, P.W.9 has
categorically opined that, the injuries found on the body of the deceased
can be caused by the recovered weapon of offence (Ext.7). The seizure
of the cudgel has not been contested by the counsel for the appellant.
What appears from the reading of the evidence is that according to
P.W.9, there was no external injury over the chest nor were there any
internal injuries under the ribs. Even there was no lacerated injury or
swellings on the chest of the deceased. The post mortem examination
was commenced within 24 hours of death. Even then, there is no sign of
any injury or sign of assault on the chest of the deceased. Hence, the
part of the evidence of P.W.8 that the appellant went to his house and
returned with a lathi and thereafter assaulted Deusu on his chest cannot
be believed by this Court. P.W.19 did not tell the narrative of assault
after return of the appellant from his house, as indicated by Mrs. S.
Patnaik, learned counsel appearing for the State. However, P.W.8 had
introduced that story. There is no reason to disbelieve him as a whole.
But his testimony to the extent of assaulting on the chest has become
clouded by the post mortem report. It has not been contested that Deusu
was seriously injured and later on, he succumbed to those injuries.
Therefore, what transpires is that, there was heated exchange of words
and out of rage, the appellant struck blow by a lathi (the wooden stilt)
on the left parietal region and on occipital region. The assault on the
other parts of the head cannot be ruled out, as P.W.9 has categorically
observed that abrasions and the swelling on both scapular region were
found. In Santosh (supra), the injuries were not on the vital parts of the
body and it has been observed that, injuries on the vital parts of the
body was deliberately avoided and hence, no inference on intention to
murder could be drawn. Knowledge of probable consequences of an act
would suffice for conviction under Section 302 IPC. In this regard, Mr.
Behera, learned counsel has tried to impress upon this Court that both
the deceased and the appellant was inebriated at the time of occurrence.
Hence, knowledge of the consequence cannot be inferred. We are
constrained to observe that, there is no evidence that the appellant or the
deceased were in inebriated condition. The suggestion that was
projected from the defence was squarely denied by the witness. Hence,
the said contention is bound to fall through.
14. We are to weigh now the impact of the evidence that the
appellant dealt two vital blows on the left parietal region and on the
occipital region. We cannot be oblivious that the injury that was
inflicted to occipital region of the head has caused the damage to the
brain center, which was instrumental to cardio-pulmonary failure. The
cardio-pulmonary failure has been inferred as the cause of death by
P.W.9 and such observation has not been challenged by the appellant.
As we have already observed that there were more than two assaults, as
both sides of scapular regions had abrasion with swelling. Those stand
to show cruel and unusual manner of assault. What has been observed
by this Court in Lachhman Dhublia (supra) having referred to several
decisions of the Apex Court is that, if there was a single blow, in the
case that the accused did not make any attempt to give the second blow,
it may be held that the accused did not have intention to cause that
injury and that even if the injury is proved to be fatal, the case would
not be covered by Section 300 thirdly. But in that case, the accused
would be attributed to the knowledge that he was likely to cause an
injury which might cause death. Accordingly, the conviction under
Section 302 of the IPC was altered to one under Section 304, Part-II of
the IPC. The present case is not a case of single blow. The transaction of
crime is in two parts. There were several blows according to the post
mortem report on the scapular region and out of those injuries, the
injury that was inflicted by the appellant on occipital region was fatal.
Hence, it cannot be inferred that the appellant did not have any intention
to cause the particular injury. On the contrary, we are satisfied that the
evidence, as adduced by the prosecution, is sufficient to show that the
said assault was done with intention of causing bodily injury and such
injury as intended to be inflicted is adequate in ordinary course of nature
to cause death.
15. Hence, the prosecution has been successful in proving the
charge of murder. In view of the above observations, no interference in
the Judgment of conviction or in the order of sentence is called for.
16. In the result, the appeal stands dismissed.
17. Send down L.C.Rs. forthwith.
(S. Talapatra) Judge
(B.P. Routray) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack.
The 12th July, 2022/Subhasis Mohanty, P.A./ R.R. Nayak, Jr. Steno.
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!