Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 7182 Ori
Judgement Date : 8 December, 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
JCRLA No.02 of 2012
(From the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
24.09.2011/26.09.2011 passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Malkangiri in Criminal Trial No.18 of 2011)
Sukra Beti .... Appellant
-versus-
State of Orissa .... Respondent
Advocates appeared in the case:
For Appellant : Ms. Mandakini Panda, Adv.
-versus-
For Respondent : Mr. S.S. Kanungo, AGA
CORAM:
MR. JUSTICE D. DASH
DR. JUSTICE S.K. PANIGRAHI
DATE OF HEARING:-02.11.2022
DATE OF JUDGMENT:-08.12.2022
Dr. S.K. Panigrahi, J.
1. In this JCRLA, the convict/ Appellant (Sukra Beti) challenges
the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
24.09.2011/26.09.2011 passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Malkangiri in Criminal Trial No.18 of 2011,
whereby the Appellant was convicted for commission of
offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter referred to as "the I.P.C." for brevity) and
sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine
of Rs.5,000/- only in default to undergo R.I. for a further
period of one year.
I. CASE OF THE PROSECUTION:
2. The prosecution case, in brief is that on 24.07.2010 at 3.00 p.m.,
Kumuti Khilla (hereinafter "informant") of village Jaruguda,
presented a written report at Malkangiri P.S.to the effect that
on 23.07.2010 at about 6.00 pm, he along with his wife Bimala
Khilla were returning from their cultivated land after
seedling. Bimala Khilla (hereinafter "deceased") reached first
and he remained in his land to guard the seedlings from the
cattles. Thereafter, one Saiba Khilla of their village came to
him and told that the accused assaulted his wife by means of
a bamboo lathi and that he along with another person namely
Mugi Khilla took Bimala to her house and tried to provide
water to her, however, she died. On hearing this, the
informant rushed to his house and found his wife Bimala
lying dead on the verandah. Thereafter, the informant
disclosed the matter before the village gentry and on
24.07.2010 morning, a village meeting was held wherein the
accused made extra judicial confession to have killed Bimala
Khilla.
3. On receipt of the information from the informant, I.I.C.,
Malkangiri P.S. registered Malkangiri P.S. Case No.84 dated
24-7-2010 and directed S.I. S.K. Nayak to take up investigation
of the case. The said S.I. conducted inquest over the dead
body of Bimala Khilla and sent her dead body for post-
mortem examination. He also seized the bamboo lathi used in
commission of crime of committing murder to Bimala Khilla.
The Appellant was arrested and after completion of
investigation, he was charge sheeted u/s 302 of the Indian
Penal Code. After the charge was framed, the trial was
completed by the Learned District & Sessions Judge, Keonjhar
and the Appellant was convicted u/s 302 of IPC and sentenced
to undergo imprisonment for life. Hence, this appeal.
II. SUBMISSION OF THE APPELLANT:
4. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has completely denied the
allegations charged against the appellant. She submits that the
appellant has been falsely implicated in the present case. She
has strenuously argued that the villagers asked him to donate
the cultivable land belonging to him for the purpose of village
tank. On declining the proposition, he has been falsely
implicated in this case by the villagers to grab his land.
5. Learned Counsel further contended that if at all, the accused
should be charged under culpable homicide not amounting to
murder. He has submitted that P.Ws 2, 3 and 4 have not
clarified in their deposition regarding the motive of the
appellant for this attack on the deceased. Therefore, the attack
on the deceased by the accused was not premeditated, rather,
it was sudden and in the heat of the moment.
III. SUBMISSIONS OF THE STATE/ RESPONDENT
6. Learned Counsel for the State submitted that the prosecution
has examined as many as twelve witnesses including the
informant i.e. P.W.1. P.Ws 2,3 and 4 are the eye witnesses to
the occurrence. They were also present in the village meeting
when the accused made extra judicial confession that he killed
Bimala Khilla (deceased). P.W.5 was also present in the said
meeting when the accused made extra judicial confession as
well as a witness to the seizure of bamboo lathi; i.e. the
weapon of offence at the spot.
7. P.Ws 2, 3 and 4 are the co-villagers of the informant as well as
the accused. They have clearly and categorically stated in
their evidence that the occurrence took place about eleven
months back on a day at about 6.00 p.m. Additionally, their
statements with respect to having seen the accused hit the
deceased on her waist with a bamboo lathi has also been
corroborated. Moreover, there is no reason to dis-believe the
corroborated statements of the eye-witnesses.
IV. COURT'S REASONING AND ANALYSIS:
8. Heard both the parties and went through the judgement of the
Trial Court. After extensively perusing the documents
adduced by the prosecution and the depositions of the
witnesses, this Court is of the view that there are two points of
determination in the present case:
i. Whether the prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the act of the appellant led to
the death of the deceased?
ii. Whether the act of the appellant was premeditated
and with an intention to cause the death of the
deceased?
9. In order to substantiate the case against the accused, the
prosecution has examined altogether twelve witnesses
including the informant as P.W.1. P.Ws 2,3 and 4 are the eye
witnesses to the occurrence. They were also present in the
village meeting when the accused made extra judicial
confession that he killed the deceased. P.W.5 is the witness
who was also present in the said meeting when the accused
made extra judicial confession as well as a witness to the
seizure of bamboo lathi; i.e. the weapon of offence at the spot.
P.W.6 is a witness to the seizure of the wearing apparels of the
deceased after post-mortem examinations.
10.The case of the prosecution mainly rests upon the testimony of
eyewitnesses i.e., P.W.2, 3 & 4 coupled with the post-mortem
report of P.W.12. P.W.2 is an eye witness to the occurrence and
he informed about the assault on the deceased by the accused
to P.W.1. P.W.2 deposed in his evidence that on the day of
occurrence at about 6.00 p.m. i.e. about eleven months back, he
was sitting in his house and at that time, the accused assaulted
Bimala by means of a bamboo lathi on her waist. His
deposition further reveals that due to assault, when Bimala fell
on the ground, he along with P.W.3 took Bimala from the spot
of incident to her house. He has further stated that on the
following morning, a village Panchayat was held wherein the
accused confessed his guilt that he committed the murder.
P.W.3 and 4 have fully corroborated the evidence of P.W.2 in
all material particulars including the date and time of
occurrence, use of weapon and the accused. The three eye-
witnesses were cross-examined at length by the learned State
Defence Counsel, however, nothing has been elicited from
their mouth to dis-credit their sworn testimony.
11.Owing to the number of eye-witnesses and their corroborative
value, the Trial Court has rightfully relied on them with
regards to the case of the prosecution. It has been well-
established by law that there can be a conviction on the basis
of the deposition of the sole eye witness, if the said witness is
found to be trustworthy and/or reliable. As observed
hereinabove, there is no reason to doubt the credibility and/or
reliability of P.W.2, 3 and 4. In the case of Shivaji Sahebrao
Bobade v. State of Maharashtra1, the Supreme Court held that
even where a case hangs on the evidence of a single eye
witness it may be enough to sustain the conviction given
sterling testimony of a competent, honest man although as a
rule of prudence courts call for corroboration.
12. The Trial Court has also taken into consideration the fact that
the accused made extra judicial confession in the village
meeting that he killed Bimala by assaulting her. Apart from
this, the evidence of P.Ws 1 to 4 finds ample corroboration
from the evidence of P.W.5, the Ex-Sarpanch of their area.
P.W.3 has stated in his evidence that P. Ws1, 2, 5 and other
villagers were present in the meeting including the accused.
P.W.5 has further stated that a village Panchayat was held the
following morning of the incident and he was present in the
said meeting. He has also clearly and categorically stated in
his evidence by supporting the evidence of P.Ws 1 to 4 that
the accused confessed in the meeting that he assaulted
Bimala, causing her death. He has also deposed regarding the
(1973) 2 SCC 793
seizure of the bamboo lathi at the spot vice Ext.1. Thus, P.W.5
has fully corroborated the evidence of P. Ws 1 to 4 that the
accused confessed in the village meeting that he assaulted
Bimala, causing her death.
13. P.W.8 (son of the deceased) has fully corroborated the
deposition of P.Ws 2 to 4 in all material particulars that the
accused assaulted his mother by means of a bamboo lathi,
causing her death. The Trial Court has treated P.W.8 as an
interested witness while relying on the depositions of P.Ws
2,3 and 4. Even though P.W.8 is related to the deceased,
however his deposition can be admitted as evidence
considering that his deposition has been completely
corroborated by the P.Ws 2,3 and 4. It is well settled by the
Supreme Court that in cases where there is a relation between
the witness and the deceased, it is the duty of the court to
scrutinize the evidence with proper caution. In the case of
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jagdeo2, the court held that the
testimony of the witness cannot be discarded on the ground
that the witness is connected to the deceased if the evidence
given by him is consistent and supported with other
witnesses. Similarly in case of Bhagwan Singh and Others v.
State of Uttar Pradesh3, it was held by the Supreme Court
2003 AIR 660 SC
2003 AIR 660 SC
that the evidence of related witness cannot be discarded
solely on the ground of being related to the victim.
14. The accused has taken a stand while giving evidence as D.W.1
that the villagers had asked him to donate his cultivable land
for the purpose of village tank. Owing to the rejection of their
proposal, they have falsely implicated him in this case in
order to grab his land. Although, the accused has taken this
stand while deposing before the Trial Court as D.W.1,
however he had not taken this stand earlier, at the time of
cross-examination of PWs. Therefore, the Trial Court has
rightfully rejected the defence pleas taken by the accused.
15. P.W.12, the Medical Officer has stated in his evidence that on
post-mortem examination, the external injury such as bruise
over back side of the body, black in colour, 10 cm x 5 cm in
size, which extends from Thoratic Rib (1-10-level) obliquely
upwards to Thoracic region. He has further stated that on
dissection, he found one lacerated injury of size 5 x 3" x 1" d
on the right lobe of liver. He has further opined that the cause
of death was due to laceration injury on the right lobe of the
liver with massive internal hemorrhage leading to shock and
death. He has further opined that all the injuries were anti-
mortem in nature and in ordinary course of nature, the injury
was sufficient to cause death. He has also proved his report
vide Ext.9. Moreover, he has stated that the injury found on
the body of deceased is possible by means of M.O.IV (bamboo
lathi) and that it is possible to cause the death of a human
being by that lathi.
16. In this regard, the Trial Court concluded that the aforesaid
unassailed testimony of the doctor (P.W.12) corroborated
through the evidence of P.Ws.2, 3 and 4 coupled with the plea
of the defence i.e. no dispute to the homicidal nature of death
of the deceased points to the irresistible conclusion that, the
nature of death suffered by the deceased is neither accidental
nor suicidal, rather the same is purely homicidal one.
Therefore, this Court is of the view that the prosecution has
been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the act of the
appellant has led to the death of the deceased.
17. Culpable homicide becomes murder if the case comes under
any one of the clauses out of the four defined in Section 300 of
the I.P.C. and the same becomes punishable under Section 302
of the I.P.C. But the culpable homicide is not murder if the
case falls within any one of the exceptions out of five of the
said Section 300 of the I.P.C. and then the same becomes
culpable homicide not amounting to murder and punishable
under Section 304 of the I.P.C., but not under Section 302 of
the I.P.C.
18. However, if an injury is inflicted with the knowledge and
intention that it is likely to cause death, but with no intention
to cause death the offence would fall within the definition of
Section 304-I IPC and not under Section 302 IPC. In this
regard, the Supreme Court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab4
as also in Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v. State of
Maharashtra5, opined:
"Applying the principles of law, as noticed hereinafter, I am of the considered opinion, that the offence committed by the appellants does not fall within the definition of Section 300 of the IPC, nor does it fall within the definition of offence, punishable under Section 304II of the Indian Penal Code. In my considered opinion, the learned trial Court rightly held that the nature of the offence, falls within the definition of Section 304-I of the IPC Section 304 deals with situations, where culpable homicide does not amount to murder, i.e. does not fall within the definition of murder, as contained in Section 300 of the IPC. Section 304 is sub-divided into two parts. If an injury is inflicted with the knowledge and intention that it is likely to cause death, but with no intention to cause death the offence would fall within the definition of Section 304-I, however, if there is no intention to cause such an injury, but there is knowledge that such an injury can cause death, the offence would fall within the definition of Section 304-II. Thus, is intention. If intention to cause such an injury as is likely to cause death, is established, the offence would fall under Part-I but where no such intention is established and only knowledge that
AIR 1958 SC 465
(2005) (9) SCC 71
the injury is likely to cause death, it would fall under Part-II."
"However, the nature of the injury, the weapon of offence, the intention and knowledge of the assailants, in my considered opinion, clearly places the offence as one under Section 304-I of the IPC. Appellant No.1 inflicted the injury with knowledge and intention that the injury, if inflicted is likely to cause death, but with no intention to cause death. However, as from the facts and circumstances of the present case, and the fact that it was a sudden fight, a single blow inflicted with the reverse side of a Kassi, it cannot be stated that he had an intention to cause death, as required to make out an offence under Section 300 of the IPC."
19. Reliance has also been placed on the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Tejinder Singh & Anr.6
In this case, two persons inflicted Gandasa blows on the
deceased. The altercation had already taken place four days
prior to the incident over the boundary line of the plots of the
parties. The accused persons came heavily armed shouting
that the deceased should not be spared at a point of time
when his wife had brought breakfast for him and he had gone
to hand pump to bring water in a pitcher. It was even in the
aforementioned situation, this Court held:
"In view of our above findings we have now to ascertain whether for their such acts A-1 and A-2 are liable to be convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC. It appears from the evidence
AIR 1995 SC 2466
of PW-4 and PW-5 that the deceased was assaulted both with the sharp edge and blunt edge of the gandasas and the nature of injuries also so indicates. If really the appellants had intended to commit murder, they would not have certainly used the blunt edge when the task could have been expedited and assured with the sharp edge. Then again we find that except one injury on the head, all other injuries were on non-vital parts of the body. Post-mortem report further shows that even the injury on the head was only muscle deep. Taking these facts into consideration we are of the opinion that the offence committed by the appellant is one under Section 304 (Part I), IPC and not under Section 302, IPC."
20. In the present case, it has been established by the prosecution
that the accused inflicted a serious injury on the deceased.
This has been established owing to the deposition of three
eye-witnesses P.W.2, 3 and 4; due corroboration of the
deposition of P.W.8 (son of the deceased) and the medical
report (Ext.9) of P.W.12, the medical officer. The prosecution
has further established that the injury was inflicted upon the
deceased with the knowledge and intention that it is likely to
cause death. However, he has not been able to prove whether
the attack was premeditated and with an intention to cause
death. Therefore, even if the injury inflicted was a serious one,
that by itself may not be decisive but is one of the relevant
factors in regard to the application of fourthly of section 300.
Application of the said provisions must be made keeping in
mind the fact situation obtaining and the legal principles
noticed hereinbefore.
21. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the
Appellant is guilty of commission of the offence under Section
304, Part-I and not under Section 302 of the I.P.C. thereof.
22. Therefore, we allow the Appeal in part. The conviction for
commission of the offence under Section 302 of the I.P.C. and
sentence to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of
Rs.5,000/- only in default to undergo R.I. for a further period of
one year recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Malkangiri in Criminal Trial No.18 of 2011 as per the judgment
of conviction and order of sentence dated 24.09.2011/26.09.2011
are hereby set aside. Instead, the Appellant is convicted for the
offence under Section 304, Part-I of the I.P.C. and sentenced to
undergo R.I. for 10 years.
23. With such observations, the Appeal is disposed of.
( Dr. S.K. Panigrahi ) Judge
D. Dash, J. I agree.
( D. Dash ) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated the 8th Dec., 2022/ B. Jhankar
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!