Manipur High Court
Telem Jayanta Singh vs The State Of Manipur Through The ... on 17 May, 2022
LHAINEI Digitally
by
signed IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
CHONG LHAINEICHONG
HAOKIP
HAOKIP Date: 2022.05.17
16:10:34 +05'30'
AT IMPHAL
W.P. (C) No. 74 of 2021
Telem Jayanta Singh, aged about 48 yrs. S/o Late T. Chandra
Singh, resident of Matai Mayai Leikai, P.O. - Mantripukhri, P.S. -
Heingang, Imphal East District, Manipur, PIN - 795002.
... PETITIONER
-Versus -
1. The State of Manipur through the Commissioner/Secretary
(Revenue), Government of Manipur, New Secretariat Building
(North Block), P.O. & P.S. Imphal, Imphal West District,
Manipur, PIN - 795001 and
2. The Deputy Commissioner, Imphal East, P.O. & P.S. -
Porompat, Impahl East District, Manipur, PIN - 795008.
3. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Porompat, Impha East, P.O. & P.S.
- Porompat, Imphal East District, Manipur, PIN - 795008.
........RESPONDENT/S
With
W.P. (C) No. 76 of 2021
Shri Meitankeishangbam Raghumani Singh, aged about 83 years,
S/o Late M. Nongyai Singh, resident of Achangbigei Mayai Leikai,
P.O.- Mantripukhri, P.S. - Heingang, Imphal East District, Manipur,
PIN- 795002.
... PETITIONER
-Versus -
1. The State of Manipur through the Commissioner/Secretary
(Revenue), Government of Manipur, New Secretariat Building
(North Block), P.O. & P.S. Imphal, Imphal West District,
Manipur, PIN - 795001 and
2. The Deputy Commissioner, Imphal East, P.O. & P.S. -
Porompat, Impahl East District, Manipur, PIN - 795008.
3. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Porompat, Impha East, P.O. & P.S.
- Porompat, Imphal East District, Manipur, PIN - 795008.
........RESPONDENT/S
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 1
B E F O R E
HON'BLEMR. JUSTICE AHANTHEMBIMOL SINGH
For the Petitioners : Mr. P. Tomcha, Adv.
For the respondents : Mr. Lenin Hijam, AG.
Date of Hearing : 27.04.2022.
Date of Judgment &Order : 17.05.2022.
Judgment & Order
[1] Heard Mr. P. Tomcha, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners and Mr. Lenin Hijam, learned Advocate General, Manipur
appearing for the respondents.
The present two writ petitions have been filed with a
prayer for quashing the order dated 15.01.2021 passed by the Deputy
Commissioner, Imphal East, in Eviction Case No. 1 of 2021. Since the
facts and law involved in the two writ petitions are the same, the
present two writ petitions are heard jointly and the same are being
disposed of by this common judgment and order.
[2] The brief facts of the present case is that the petitioner in
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 and the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 76 of 2021
claimed that they are the owners and recorded Pattadars of the
homestead land under Old Patta No. 238 (Part), 1251/1268 (New)
covered by C.S. Dag No. 853/1498 measuring an area of 0.0425 acres
of Village No. 5-Khabam and the homestead land under Old Patta No.
238 (Part), 1251/1268 (New) covered by C.S. Dag No. 853/1498
measuring an area of 0.0425 acres of Village No. 5-Khabam
respectively.
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 2
[3] It is the case of the petitioners that they are in physical
possession of the said land by constructing wooden structures and
carrying on their business. According to the petitioners, the Sub-Deputy
Collector (S.D.C.), Heingang, without giving any notice to the petitioners
and behind their back, carried out an enquiry and submitted a report
dated 30.04.2020 to the Sub-Divisional Officer (S.D.O.), Porompat,
Imphal East, stating, inter-alia, that the homestead land of the
petitioners are Government Khas land. On the basis of the aforesaid
enquiry report submitted by the Sub-Deputy Collector, Heingang, the
Sub-Divisional Officer, Porompat registered Rev. Misc. Case No.
8/SDO/P/IE of 2020 and Rev. Misc. Case No. 5/SDO/P/IE of 2020
against the petitioners respectively for cancellation of the Jamabandi of
the petitioners.
[4] The petitioners contested the aforesaid revision cases by filing
their written statements and after hearing the parties, the Sub-Divisional
Officer, Porompat disposed of the said cases by an order dated
12.10.2020, passed in the aforesaid revision cases by holding that he
had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute in view of the provisions of
section 11 (3) of the MLR & LR Act, 1960.
[5] After disposal of the aforesaid revision cases, the Deputy
Commissioner, Imphal East, registered a case being Rev. Misc. Case
No. 4 of 2020 in his own motion and issued a notice dated 21.11.2020
to the present petitioners stating, inter-alia, that the Patta/Jamabandi of
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 3
the petitioners were fraudulently prepared in their names without any
allotment order issued by the Government of Manipur and that the entry
of their names in the land records were made fraudulently and illegally
without following the procedure prescribed under the Allotment Act and
Rules and without any prior approval of the Government or the Deputy
Commissioner and summoning the petitioners to appear before him on
30.11.2000 either in-person or by a duly instructed person who will be
able to answer all the material questions relating to the case or
otherwise to submit written statement and to produce
witnesses/evidences and documents upon which they intend to rely in
support of their claim.
[6] The petitioners contested the case by filing their respective
written statements and by appearing before the Deputy Commissioner,
Imphal East, through their counsel. After hearing the counsel appearing
on behalf of the present petitioners, the Deputy Commissioner, Imphal
East, passed an order on 08.01.2021 in Rev. Misc. Case No. 4 of 2020
in exercise of the power under MLR & LR Act, 1960 with the following
observations and directions:-
" (a) The suit lands covered by C.S. Dag No. 309, 310, 311
& 313 claimed by the Opp. Parties as C.D. Dag Nos. i)
309, 310, 311/812 ii) 313/1130 iii) 313/853 iv)
853/1498 & v) 853/1499 are recorded as "State Land"
"Khas Land". And in absence of any allotment order for
the same, the respondent cannot be held to be
pattadar of the land.
(b) The Respondents/Objectors are unable to establish
how they acquire ownership without due process of
law, particularly in absence of allotment orders by the
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 4
State Government and also in absence of duly
registered allotment deeds.
(c) State Land, Khas Land etc., can be mutated in the
name of an individual only through land allotment
process and the respondents have not produced any
such document from which it can be deduced that
allotment process has been duly completed.
(d) The so called mutation Orders in respect of the
disputed Patta could not be produced as the said
Offices in which those records were kept had gutted
down to fire on 23/7/2004 and again on 4/3/2006 and it
has submitted an FIR No. 25(3)06 LLI-PS U/s
436/447/34 IPC & PDPPA dated, 4/3/2006. However,
in absence of any allotment orders being issued by the
State Govt. or in absence of duly registered allotment
deeds, the question of existence of mutation orders or
Patta or Jamabandi does not arise.
(e) The Jamabandi Patta being Nos. i) 438(New), ii)
115(Old), 439/910(New), iii) 438/1251(New), iv)
238(Old), 1251/1268(New) & v) 238(Old),
1251/1269(New) are all fake without there being any
allotment orders or execution of registered allotment
deed by the State Govt., and as such the subject Dag-
Chithas/ Jamabandis are all declared null and void.
Consequently, the respondent/objectors are illegal
encroachers of the said Government Land and liable to
be evicted forthwith.
(f) It is also important to note that an internal inquiry is
also under process as to how the said alleged fake
Mutation orders/Jamabandi/Pattas have been
prepared without any allotment process and as to how
state land has been transferred to individual without
due process of law. And, officials involved in such
illegal activities shall be proceeded in accordance with
law.
Before parting the relevant record, this Court
request the O.C. Heingang Police Station to cause and
investigate with respect to the Land under Patta No. i)
438(New), ii) 115(Old), 439/910(New), iii)
438/1251(New), iv) 238(Old), 1251/1268(New)& v)
238(old), 1251/1269(New) as to who manufactured the
fake and bogus Jamabandi/Patta etc., and to book the
culprits according to law."
The sum and substance of the order passed by the Deputy
Commissioner, Imphal East is that the Dag-Chithas/Jamabandis
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 5
recorded in the name of the petitioners were all declared null and void
and consequently, the petitioners were also declared as encroachers
on Government land and liable to be evicted forthwith.
[7] After passing the aforesaid order dated 08.01.2021 in Rev. Misc.
Case No. 4 of 2020, the Deputy Commissioner, Imphal East registered
an eviction case being Eviction Case No. 1 of 2021 against the
petitioners and passed an order on 15.01.2021 in the said eviction case
thereby directing the petitioners to remove the illegal structures
constructed upon the land in question and to deliver vacant possession
within 17.01.2021, failing which necessary eviction shall be carried out
without giving further notice. Having been aggrieved, the petitioners
approached this Court by filing the present writ petitions assailing the
aforesaid order dated 15.01.2021, passed by the Deputy
Commissioner, Imphal East, in Eviction Case No. 1 of 2021
respectively.
[8] Mr. P. Tomcha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners
submitted that the Deputy Commissioner erroneously issued the notice
dated 21.11.2020 in Rev. Misc. Case No. 4 of 2020 under section 14 of
the MLR & LR Act and Sub-Rule (vii) of Rule 15 of the MLR & LR
(Allotment of Land) Rules, 1962 and proceeded under the provisions of
the said Section and Rules and passed the impugned order dated
08.01.2021 in Rev. Misc. Case No. 4 of 2020. The learned counsel
further submitted that the provisions under Section 14 of the MLR & LR
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 6
Act, 1960 and Rule 15 (vii) of the MLR & LR (Allotment and Land),
Rules, 1962 are not at all applicable for deciding the issue raised in the
said Rev. Misc. Case No. 4 of 2020 and that the Deputy Commissioner
is not empowered under the aforesaid Section and Rules to decide the
issues raised in the Rev. Misc. Case No. 4 of 2020 and to pass the
impugned order dated 08.1.2021. The learned counsel also submitted
that the impugned order dated 08.01.2021 have been passed illegally
and without any power and jurisdiction and accordingly, the said order
is not sustainable in the eyes of law.
[9] The learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently submitted
that before passing the impugned eviction order dated 15.01.2021, the
Deputy Commissioner, Imphal East neither issued any notice to the
petitioners to show cause as to why they should not be evicted from the
land posses by them, nor did the Deputy Commissioner hold any
summary enquiry before issuing the impugned order and that the
impugned eviction order had been issued without giving any opportunity
of hearing to the petitioners in complete violation of the principles of
natural justice and the mandatory provisions of Rule 18 of the MLR &
LR Rules, 1962 and accordingly, the impugned eviction order dated
15.01.2021 is liable to be quashed andset aside.
[10] Mr. Lenin Hijam, learned Advocate General, Manipur, submitted
that after registering the Rev. Misc. Case No. 4 of 2020, the Deputy
Commissioner, Imphal East issued a notice dated 21.11.2020 to the
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 7
petitioners directing them to appear before him to establish their right
and title over the land. Pursuant to the said notice, the petitioners
appeared before the Deputy Commissioner, Imphal East through their
respective counsel on many occasions, however, the petitioners failed
to establish their ownership over the disputed land and accordingly, the
Deputy Commissioner passed the impugned order dated 08.01.2021 in
the said Rev. Misc. Case No. 4 of 2020 declaring, inter-alia, that all the
Jamabandis recorded in the name of the petitioners are all fake and null
and void and that the petitioners are illegal encroachers on Government
land and liable to be evicted forthwith. Thereafter, the Deputy
Commissioner passed the impugned order dated 15.01.2020 in Eviction
Case No. 1 of 2021 directing the petitioners to remove the illegal
structures constructed upon the disputed land and to deliver vacant
possession within 17.01.2021, failing which necessary eviction shall be
carried out without giving further notice.
The learned Advocate General, Manipur further submitted
that the Deputy Commissioner is empowered under Section 11 (3) and
Section 15 of the MLR & LR Act to issue the impugned orders and that
the Deputy Commissioner had issued the impugned orders after giving
notice to the petitioners and after complying fully with the principle of
natural justice.
[11] So far as the contention of the petitioners about non issuance of
any notice prior to issuing the impugned eviction order as contemplated
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 8
under Rule 18 of the MLR & LR Rules is concerned, it has been
submitted by the learned Advocate General that as the Deputy
Commissioner, Imphal East had already given ample opportunity to the
petitioners to establish their claim of ownership over the land and as the
Deputy Commissioner had already issued an order declaring the
petitioners as illegal encroachers after holding an elaborate enquiry just
prior to issuance of the eviction order, issuing any further notice will not
serve any useful purpose and it will be just a mere useless formality
and that such an exercise will be totally futile and that non issuance of
such notice does not prejudice the petitioners in any manner. In support
of his contentions, the learned Advocate General relied on the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of "Dharampal
Satyapal Ltd. Vs. Deputy Commissioner and Central Excise, Gauhati"
reported in (2015) 8 SCC 519 wherein, it has been held as under:-
"38. But that is not the end of the matter. While the law on the
principle of audi alteram partem has progressed in the manner
mentioned above, at the same time, the courts have also repeatedly
remarked that the principles of natural justice are very flexible
principles. They cannot be applied in any straitjacket formula. It all
depends upon the kind of functions performed and to the extent to
which a person is likely to be affected. For this reason, certain
exceptions to the aforesaid principles have been invoked under
certain circumstances. For example, the courts have held that it would
be sufficient to allow a person to make a representation and oral
hearing may not be necessary in all cases, though in some matters,
depending upon the nature of the case, not only full-fledged oral
hearing but even cross-examination of witnesses is treated as a
necessary concomitant of the principles of natural justice. Likewise, in
service matters relating to major punishment by way of disciplinary
action, the requirement is very very strict and full-fledged opportunity
is envisaged under the statutory rules as well. On the other hand, in
those cases where there is an admission of charge, even when no
such formal inquiry is held, the punishment based on such admission
is upheld. It is for this reason, in certain circumstances, even post-
decisional hearing is held to be permissible. Further, the courts have
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 9
held that under certain circumstances principles of natural justice may
even be excluded by reason of diverse factors like time, place, the
apprehended danger and so on.
"39. We are not concerned with these aspects in the
present case as the issue relates to giving of notice before taking
action. While emphasising that the principles of natural justice cannot
be applied in straitjacket formula, the aforesaid instances are given.
We have highlighted the jurisprudential basis of adhering to the
principles of natural justice which are grounded on the doctrine of
procedural fairness, accuracy of outcome leading to general social
goals, etc. Nevertheless, there may be situations wherein for some
reason-perhaps because the evidence against the individual is
thought to be utterly compelling-it is felt that a fair hearing "would
make no difference"-meaning that a hearing would not change the
ultimate conclusion reached by the decision-maker-then no legal duty
to supply a hearing arises. Such an approach was endorsed by Lord
Wilberforce in Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn., who said that: (WLR p.
1595 : All ER p. 1294)
"... A breach of procedure ... cannot give [rise to] a remedy
in the courts, unless behind it there is something of substance
which has been lost by the failure. The court does not act in vain."
Relying on these comments, Brandon L.J. opined in Cinnamond
v. British Airports Authority that: (WLR p. 593 : All ER p. 377)
"... no one can complain of not being given an opportunity
to make representations if such an opportunity would have availed
him nothing."
In such situations, fair procedures appear to serve no purpose
since the "rights" result can be secured without according such
treatment to the individual.
"45. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles in mind, even
when we find that there is an infraction of principles of natural justice,
we have to address a further question as to whether any purpose
would be served in remitting the case to the authority to make fresh
demand of amount recoverable, only after issuing notice to show
cause to the appellant. In the facts of the present case, we find that
such an exercise would be totally futile having regard to the law laid
down by this Court in R.C. Tobacco.
"47. In Escorts Farms Ltd. v. Commr., this Court, while
reiterating the position that rules of natural justice are to be followed
for doing substantial justice, held that, at the same time, it would be of
no use if it amounts to completing a mere ritual of hearing without
possibility of any change in the decision of the case on merits. It was
so explained in the following terms: (SCC pp. 309-10, para 64)
"64. Right of hearing to a necessary party is a valuable
right. Denial of such right is serious breach of statutory procedure
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 10
prescribed and violation of rules of natural justice. In these
appeals preferred by the holder of lands and some other
transferees, we have found that the terms of government grant did
not permit transfer of land without permission of the State as
grantor. Remand of cases of a group of transferees who were not
heard, would, therefore, be of no legal consequence, more so,
when on this legal question all affected parties have got full
opportunity of hearing before the High Court and in this appeal
before this Court. Rules of natural justice are to be followed for
doing substantial justice and not for completing a mere ritual of
hearing without possibility of any change in the decision of the
case on merits. In view of the legal position explained by us
above, we, therefore, refrain from remanding these cases in
exercise of our discretionary powers under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India."
"48. Therefore, on the facts of this case, we are of the
opinion that non-issuance of notice before sending communication
dated 23-6-2003 has not resulted in any prejudice to the appellant
and it may not be feasible to direct the respondents to take fresh
action after issuing notice as that would be a mere formality."
[12] The learned Advocate General submitted that the Deputy
Commissioner, Imphal East passed the orders dated 08.01.2021 in
Rev. Misc. Case No. 4 of 2020 in exercise of the power conferred
under Section 11 (3) of the MLR & LR Act and the impugned order
dated 15.01.2021 in Eviction Case No. 1 of 2021 in exercise of the
power under Section 15 of the MLR & LR Act and that if the petitioners
are aggrieved by the said two orders, they can challenge the same by
filing appeals, revision, review or civil suit as provided under Section
93, 95, 96 and 11(4) of the MLR & LR Act. It has also been submitted
that as the petitioners have filed the present writ petitions challenging
the said impugned orders without exhausting the alternative and
effective statutory remedies available under the MLR & LR Act, the
present writ petitions are not maintainable and are liable to be
dismissed outright.
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 11
In support of his contentions, the learned Advocate
General relied on the following judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of:-
(1) "Rajasthan State Industrial Development and
Investment Corporation And Another Vs. Diamond & Gem
Development Corporation Limited And Another"reported in (2013)
5 SCC 470, wherein, it has been held that-
"39. The cancellation of allotment was made by
appellant RIICO in exercise of its power under Rule 24 of the
1979 Rules read with the terms of the lease agreement. Such
an order of cancellation could have been challenged by filing a
review application before the competent authority under Rule
24(aa) and, in the alternative, the respondent Company could
have preferred an appeal under Rule 24(bb)(ii) before the
Infrastructure Development Committee of the Board. The
respondent Company ought to have resorted to the arbitration
clause provided in the lease deed in the event of a dispute,
and the District Collector, Jaipur would have then decided the
case. However, the respondent Company did not resort to
either of the statutory remedy, rather preferred a writ petition
which could not have been entertained by the High Court. It is
a settled law that writ does not lie merely because it is lawful
to do so. A person may be asked to exhaust the
statutory/alternative remedy available to him in law."
(2) "Phoenix ARC Private Limited V. Vishwa Bharati
Vidya Mandir and Others" reported in AIR 2022 SC 1045, wherein, it
has been held that-
"7.3 In the case of Satyawati Tondon and Ors.
(supra), it was observed and held by this Court that the
remedies available to an aggrieved person against the action
taken under section 13(4) or Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act,
by way of appeal under Section 17, can be said to be both
expeditious and effective. On maintainability of or
entertainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, in a case where the effective remedy is
available to the aggrieved person, it is observed and held in
the said decision in paragraphs 43 to 46 as under:-
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 12
"43. Unfortunately, the High Court over-looked the
settled law that the High court will ordinarily not entertain a
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective
remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule
applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of
taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of
banks and other financial institution. In our view, while dealing
with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for
recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in
mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State
Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto
themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive
procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage
constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the
grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such
cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy
under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust
the remedies available under the relevant statute.
"44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are
conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court
under Articles 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or
authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government,
directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs
for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or
for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express
limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we
cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint
evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to
keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
"45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of
alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of
compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the
High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of
the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that
the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing
application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation
contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance."
[13] Before considering the rival submissions advanced by the
learned counsel appearing for the parties, it will be appropriate to
examine the provisions of the MLR & LR Act and Rules relevant for the
purpose of deciding the issues involved in the present writ petitions. The
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 13
relevant provisions of the Act and Rules are reproduced hereunder for
ready reference :-
"11. * * * * * * *
(3) Where any property or any right in or over any
property is claimed by or on behalf of the Government or by any
person as against the Government and the claim is disputed,
such dispute shall be decided by the deputy commissioner
whose order shall, subject to the provisions of the Act, be final.
(4) Any person aggrieved by an order made under sub-
section (3) or in appeal or revision therefrom may institute a civil
suit to contest the order within a period of six months from the
date of such order, and the decision of the civil court shall be
binding on the parties.
"15. Unauthorised occupation of land.-(1) Any person
who occupies or continues to occupy any land belonging to
Government without lawful authority shall be regarded as a
trespasser and may be summarily evicted therefrom by the
competent authority and any building or other construction
erected or anything deposited on such land, if not removed
within such reasonable time as such authority may from time to
time fix for the purpose, shall be liable to be forfeited to the
Government and to be disposed of in such manner as the
competent authority may direct :
"93. Appeals.-(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided,
an appeal shall lie from every original order passed under this
Act,-
(a) ............................
(b) ............................
(c) if such an order is passed by the Deputy
Commissioner, to the tribunal.
"95. Revision.-The Tribunal or the Deputy
Commissioner may either on his own motion or on the
application of any party, call for the records of any proceedings
before any Revenue Officer subordinate to him for the purpose
of satisfying himself as to the legality or the propriety of any
order passed by such Revenue Officer, and may pass such
order in reference thereto as he thinks fit :
Provided that he shall not vary or reverse any order
affecting any right between private person without having
given to the parties interested notice to appear or be heard
:
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 14
Provided further that no revision shall lie after the expiry
of ninety days from the date of the order to be revised.
"96. Review of orders.-A Revenue Officer may,
either on his own motion or on the application of any party
interested, review any order passed by himself or by any of
his predecessors-in-office and pass such order in reference
thereto as he thinks fit :"
"Rule 18. (1) Before ordering eviction of a person
under sub-section (1) of section 15 the competent authority
shall issue a notice to him requiring him to show cause
within a period to be specified in the notice why he should
not be evicted from the land.
(2) If the person concerned files an
objection within the period specified in the notice or such
extended period as may be allowed by the competent
authority it shall hold a summary inquiry in the manner laid
down in Schedule III.
(3) If the person concerned files no
objection within the time so allowed or if after inquiry the
competent authority finds that the person is a trespasser it
shall order his eviction and shall also require him to remove
any building or other construction erected or any thing
deposited on the land within a time specified in the order."
[14] On careful examination of the above quoted Act and
Rules, this Court is of the considered view that the Deputy
Commissioner is the competent authority and empowered under
Section 11 (3) of the MLR & LR Act to decide the dispute regarding
any claim of ownership or any right in or over a property on behalf of
the Government or by any person against the Government and that
any person aggrieved by an order made under Sub-Section (3) of
Section 11 can institute a civil suit to contest the order passed by the
Deputy Commissioner.
[15] Section 15 (1) of the MLR & LR Act provides that any
person who occupies or continues to occupy any land belonging to the
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 15
Government without lawful authority shall be regarded as a trespasser
and may be summarily evicted there from by the competent authority
and any building or constructions erected, if not removed within such
reasonable time fixed by the authority for the purpose, shall be liable
to be forfeited or disposed of. However, under Rule 18 of the MLR &
LR Rules, it is provided that before ordering eviction of a person under
Section 15 (1) of the MLR & LR Act, the competent authority should
issue a notice to him requiring him to show cause as to why he should
not be evicted from the land and that if the person file an objection an
enquiry should be held before his eviction.
[16] Under Section 93, it is provided that an appeal shall lie
against an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner to the tribunal
and that under Section 95 and 96, there is provisions for filing revision
and review against the order passed by the Revenue Officers under
the MLR & LR Act.
[17] In the present cases, the Deputy Commissioner, Imphal
East issued a notice dated 21.11.2020 to the petitioners summoning
them to appear before him in-person or by a duly authorised
representative to establish their rights and title over the land in dispute
and after hearing the counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners,
the Deputy Commissioner passed the order dated 08.01.2021 in Rev.
Misc. Case No. 4 of 2020 declaring, inter-alia, that the DagChithas or
Jamabandis recorded in the name of the petitioners are null and void
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 16
and consequently, the petitioners were also declared as encroachers
on Government land and liable to be evicted forthwith. Subsequently,
the Deputy Commissioner, Imphal East, issued the impugned order
dated 15.01.2021 in the Eviction Case No. 1 of 2021 directing the
petitioners to remove the illegal structures constructed upon the said
land and to deliver vacant possession. In view of the undisputed facts,
this court is of the considered view that the Deputy Commissioner,
Imphal East, had acted in compliance with the provisions of Section 11
(3) and Section 15 of the MLR & LR Act and Rule 18 of the MLR & LR
Rules and that the Deputy Commissioner, Imphal East has the power
and authority to issue the impugned orders.
[18] On careful examination of the records of the present writ
petitionsmore particularly the notice dated 21.11.2020 and the order
dated 08.01.2021 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Imphal East in
Rev. Misc. Case No. 4 of 2020, this Court did not find any material
whatsoever to substantiate or to support the contentions of the writ
petitioners that the Deputy Commissioner, Imphal East, had
erroneously issued the said notice dated 21.11.2020 under the
provisions of Section 14 of the MLR & LR Act and Rule 15 of the MLR
& LR (Allotment of Land) Rules, 1962and that the Deputy
Commissioner had proceeded under the erroneous and inapplicable
provisions of the Act and Rules and passed the impugned orders
without any authority or jurisdiction. Mere mentioning of Section 14 of
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 17
the MLR & MR Act and Rule 15 of the MLR & LR (Allotment of Land)
Rules, that too, in the context as contained in the said notice dated
21.11.2020 cannot, by any stress of imagination, be construed that the
said notice has been issued under the said Section and Rule.
Moreover, since the source of power of the Deputy Commissioner,
Imphal East, in taking up the proceedings and issuing the impugned
orders are traceable under Section 11 (3) and Section 15 of the MLR
& LR Act, mere non mentioning or mentioning of wrong provisions of
the Act and Rules cannot vitiate the impugned orders. In this regard,
we can gainfully rely on the following judgments of the Hon'ble Apex
Court:-
(1) "N. Mani Vs. Sangeetha Theatre And Others"
reported in (2004) 12 SCC 278
"9. It is well settled that if an authority has a power
under the law merely because while exercising that power the
source of power is not specifically referred to or a reference is
made to a wrong provision of law, that by itself does not vitiate
the exercise of power so long as the power does exist and can
be traced to a source available in law."
(2) "PK. PalanisamyVs. N. Arumugham & Another"
reported in (2009) 9 SCC 173
"27. Section 148 of the Code is a general provision and
Section 149 thereof is special. The first application should have
been filed in terms of Section 149 of the Code. Once the court
granted time for payment of deficit court fee within the period
specified therefor, it would have been possible to extend the same
by the court in exercise of its power under Section 148 of the
Code. Only because a wrong provision was mentioned by the
appellant, the same, in our opinion, by itself would not be a
ground to hold that the application was not maintainable or that
the order passed thereon would be a nullity. It is a well-settled
principle of law that mentioning of a wrong provision or non-
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 18
mentioning of a provision does not invalidate an order if the court
and/or statutory authority had the requisite jurisdiction therefor.
"28. In Ram Sunder Ram V. Union of India it was held:
(SCC pp.260-61, para 19)
"19. .... It appears that the competent
authority has wrongly quoted Section 20 in the order of
discharge whereas, in fact, the order of discharge has to
be read having been passed under Section 22 of the
Army Act.
„9. It is well settled that if an authority
has a power under the law merely because while
exercising that power the source of power is not
specifically referred to or a reference is made to a
wrong provision of law, that by itself does not
vitiate the exercise of power so long as the power
does exist and can be traced to a source available
in law.‟ (See N. Mani V. Sangeetha Theatre, SCC
p. 280, para 9.)
Thus, quoting of wrong provision of Section 20 in the order
of discharge of the appellant by the competent authority
does not take away the jurisdiction of the authority under
Section 22 of the Army Act. Therefore, the order of
discharge of the appellant from the army service cannot
be vitiated on this sole ground as contended by the
learned counsel for the appellant."
"29. In N. Mani V. Sangeetha Theatre it is stated: (SCC
p. 280, para 9)
"9. It is well settled that if an authority has a
power under the law merely because while exercising that
power the source of power is not specifically referred to or
a reference is made to a wrong provision of law, that by
itself does not vitiate the exercise of power so long as the
power does exist and can be traced to a source available
in law."
[19] In the present cases, as the Deputy Commissioner, Imphal
East issued a notice dated 21.11.2020 summoning the petitioners to
appear before him to substantiate their claim of rights and title or
ownership over the disputed land and as the Deputy Commissioner
held an elaborate enquiry and heard the petitioners through their
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 19
counsel before issuing the impugned eviction order dated 15.01.2021,
this Court is of the considered view that the Deputy Commissioner,
Imphal East, had substantially complied with the provisions of Rule 18
of the MLR & LR Rules and had also complied with the principles of
natural justice. This Court is also of the considered view that the
petitioners could not make out any case of causing any prejudice to
them by non-issuance of a notice prior to issuance of the impugned
eviction order. In view of the above, this Court declines to interfere
with the impugned eviction order.
In the result, the writ petitions are hereby dismissed and
all the earlier interim orders stands vacated. Parties are to bear their
own costs.
JUDGE
FR/NFR
Lhaineichong
W.P.(C) No. 74 of 2021 &Anr. Page 20
