Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 83 Mani
Judgement Date : 25 March, 2021
Page |1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
Crl. Revision Petition No. 6 of 2020
1. The State of Manipur represented by the Chief
Secretary (Home), Government of Manipur,
Babupara Old Secretariat Building, Imphal West,
Manipur.
2. The Officer-in-Charge/Investigating Officer, Chandel
Police, Chandel Police Station, Chandel District,
Manipur.
-- -- -- Petitioners
- VERSUS -
1. LH Wolring, aged about 68 years, S/o L.H.
Khungvol, resident of Lambung Village, Chandel
District, Manipur.
2. Langhu Manahring Anal @ David, aged about 47
years, S/o (L) L. Ango of Charongching Village
Chakpikarong Sub-Division.
3. Kothingwar, aged about 27 years, S/o (L)
Rt.Dalhring, resident of Tamphi Village,
Chakpikarong.
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with
MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021
Page |2
4. SP Kolome Anal, aged about 50 years, S/o (L) SP
Labin of Khumbung Khullen Village,
Chakpikarong.
-- -- --
Respondents
With MC(Crl. Rev. P.) No. 1 of 2021 Ref:- Cril. Revision Petition No. 6 of 2020
1. The State of Manipur represented by the Chief Secretary (Home), Government of Manipur, Babupara Old Secretariat Building, Imphal West, Manipur.
2. The Officer-in-Charge/Investigating Officer, Chandel Police, Chandel Police Station, Chandel District, Manipur.
-- -- -- Petitioners
- VERSUS -
1. LH Wolring, aged about 68 years, S/o L.H.
Khungvol, resident of Lambung Village, Chandel District, Manipur.
2. Langhu Manahring Anal @ David, aged about 47 years, S/o (L) L. Ango of Charongching Village Chakpikarong Sub-Division.
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021 Page |3
3. Kothingwar, aged about 27 years, S/o (L) Rt.Dalhring, resident of Tamphi Village, Chakpikarong.
4. SP Kolome Anal, aged about 50 years, S/o (L) SP Labin of Khumbung Khullen Village, Chakpikarong.
-- -- -- Respondents
BEFORE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.V. MURALIDARAN
For the Petitioner :: Mr. Lenin Hijam, Addl. AG Ms. N. Tejpriya, Advocate.
For the Respondents :: Ms. H. Bisheshwari, Advocate.
Reserving Judgment
& Order :: 08.03.2021
Date of Judgment &Order :: 25.03.2021
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
(CAV)
1. The present Criminal Petition has been filed by the
State of Manipur represented by the Chief Secretary, in-charge of
Home challenging the order dated 17/12/2020 vide Ref. No. FIR No.
25(11)2020 CDL- P.S. U/S 153A/504/505/506/500/34 IPC & 4
Explosive Substance Act, thereby releasing the accused person on
bail without availing ample opportunity to the police to investigate
the terrorist activities of the accused persons against whom many
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021 Page |4
incriminating things including documents, Laptop, computer hard
drives involved in terrorist activities were recovered by the Police.
2. Brief facts of the Case:
a) The State of Manipur has been trying to its best to
develop each and every District of Manipur
particularly in the Hill Districts including the
Chandel District. The respondent/accused
persons are the resident of Chandel District who
are actively indulging in various terrorist activities
as indicated in the police investigation with
incriminating evidences and there are a serious
attempts and threats by the accused that will carry
out the violent terrorist activities by use illegal
weapons which are believed to be in their
possession.
b) The incriminating articles like laptops, computer
hard drives, pen drives, documents were seized
from the respondents/accused and they were
produced before the Ld. CJM, Chandel. The
respondent/accused namely LH Wolring, who
turned out to be one of the main accused was
apprehended only on 15/12/2020 with the various
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021 Page |5
incriminating articles like laptops, computer hard
drives, pen-drives, documents etc. And, he along
with the other accused SP Kolomi was remanded
in police custody. And, without affording ample
opportunity to the police to investigate serious
terrorist activities against the respondent/accused
the Ld. CJM, Chandel by the impugned order
released the accused on bail in the afternoon of
17/12/2020.
3. Challenging the impugned Order, this Revision is filed
by the State amongst the following other GROUNDS;
a. The Ld. CJM, Chandel ought to have considered
that accused namely LH Wolring, who turned out
to be one of the main accused was apprehended
only on 15/12/2020 with the various incriminating
articles like laptops, computer hard drives, pen-
drives, documents etc. And, he alongwith the
other accused SP Kolomi was remanded in police
custody by the CJM only in the evening of
15/12/2020 and therefore the Ld. CJM failed to
consider that the police had only 1 (one) effective
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working day i.e. only on 16/12/2020 for
investigation. And, without affording ample
opportunity to the police to investigate serious
terrorist activities against the accused the Ld.
CJM, Chandel by the impugned order released
the accused on bail in the afternoon of
17/12/2020. Therefore, the impugned order
dated 17/12/2020 is liable to be quashed and set-
aside.
b. The Ld. Trial Court failed to consider the gravity
of the case, wherein various incriminating articles
used for terrorist activities were seized by police.
Therefore, the Ld. CJM, Chandel ought not to
have released the accused on bail even before
the police could investigate the terrorist activities.
c. The Ld. Trail Court failed to consider that the
accused have spreaded hatred amongst the
various communities living in Chandel District
and they have loudly propagated that
government officials and also different
communities living in the District will bombed and
there are a serious attempts and threats by the
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021 Page |7
accused that will carry out the violent terrorist
activities by use illegal weapons which are
believed to be in their possession. Therefore, the
respondents/accused are required to be
investigated for the sake of national/State
security as the offence relates to the terrorist
activities in the District bordering Myanmar, which
is a terrorist hot-bed in the region.
d. The Ld. Trial Court has not given enough time to
properly investigate the case involving section 4
of Expl. Sub. Act.
4. Therefore, this revision petition is filed to set aside
impugned order dated 17/12/2020 of the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Chandel passed in Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandel in F.I.R. No
25(11) 2020 CDL-P.S. U/S 153A/504/505 /506/ 500/34 IPC & 4
Expl. Sub. Act and to re-arrest and detain the respondents/accused
in the judicial custody till the investigation of the case.
5. The fulcrum of this petition is the FIR registered
against the respondents/accused which is now at the stage of
investigation and the grant of bail by the learned CJM therefore,
with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, these petitions
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021 Page |8
have been heard together and are being disposed of by this
common judgment.
6. It is necessary to look in to the impugned order passed
by the CJM. The operative portion of the impugned order is as
follows;
"Sifting through the materials placed before me, it is
discernible that the pamphlets which allegedly
contain incriminatory and inflammatory messages
were seized from accused, viz., Kothingwar and
L.Monahring. From their instance and disclosure, two
other accused viz., L.H Wolring and SP Kolome Anal
were arrested. These arrests were not random, but
each arrest is connected to the inflammatory
pamphlets. The contents of the pamphlets are likely
to incite a class or community to commit any offence
against another class or community. The pamphlets
also contain threat of dire consequences. Therefore,
Sections 153A, 505 and 506 are prima facie
attracted. Similarly, the said pamphlet names certain
individuals and speak of them in an unsavory manner
and thus appears to be scandalous and defamatory.
Sections 500 and 504 are thus also made out. The
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Pamphlets speak of a threat of bomb blast. It never
was die case of the prosecution that the accused
conspired to cause explosion which would
endangered lives. Section 4 of Expl.Sub.Act, 1908 is
therefore not made out.
It is not the case of the prosecution that the custody
of the accused is necessary for discovery. It is also
not the case of the prosecution that custodial
interrogation or confrontation of the accused persons
is necessary. Merely because the other associates
needs to be identified and arrested is not a viable
ground to curtail the personal liberty of the accused,
particularly when adequate time has been granted
qua the offences. Any electronic evidences, that the
prosecution says are required, can be secured
without the accused being in custody. The Cr.P.C
gives the outer limit of 15(fifteen) days for P.C, but
extension of remand after initial remand period
should be granted only on justifiable grounds. The
prosecution has failed to show such ground(s). Bald
statement that the accused are not cooperating does
not suffice.
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To recapitulate, prima facie case against die accused
persons, other titan Section 4 of Expl.Sub.Act, exist.
Be that as it may, given the nature of offences alleged
and the punishment that could entail, it is the
considered view of this Court that further
incarceration of the accused is not necessary. Taken
into account in deciding the applications is also the
fact that there are no reasons to believe that the
accused are flight risk, or will hamper investigation or
that they would influence witnesses. Under the
aforesaid facts and circumstances, the principle of
bail not jail must take priority. All things considered,
the prayer of the IO is rejected. Corollary, the bail
applications stands allowed."
7. It should be noted that before the learned CJM who
decided the Bail Application at the initial stage, all the papers
pertaining to investigation were produced but the relevant papers
were not considered by the CJM while allowing the application. To
this Court also some papers were shown and this Court considered
the same. In spite of this, without considering the stage of
investigation or serious of circumstances pointed against the
respondents/accused, it seems the learned Judge has entertained
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021 P a g e | 11
the applications and released the accused who are involved in a
serious offence on bail. This can hardly be said to be new ground
for revising the order passed by the Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction
or to ignore the order passed by this Court.
8. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the
respondents/accused in the aforesaid revision applications
submitted that even though the offence is serious, yet this Court
should not interfere at this stage because the accused are already
released on bail and bail should not be cancelled unless there is
evidence on record that the accused are likely to tamper with the
evidence or are likely to abscond.
9. In all, the learned Advocates who are appearing on
behalf of the respondents/accused vehemently relied upon the
decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Shanu v. State of
kerala, and submitted that unless the Court arrives at the conclusion
that the accused would not be readily available for their trial and
they were likely to abuse the discretion in their favour by tampering
with the evidence, the Court should not cancel their bail which is
granted by the CJM by exercising its discretion. They further
submitted that the approach of the Court in the matter of bail is to
see that the accused should not be detained by way of punishment
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021 P a g e | 12
and if the presence of the accused could be readily secured at the
time of trial, then the order of bail should not be cancelled.
10. It is necessary to quote the judgment of the Kerala
High Court under below;
Though the offences punishable under the provisions
of the S.C. & S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act are
made triable by the Special Court presided over by a
Sessions Judge, considering the peculiar nature and
circumstances under which those cases are registered
and tried with regard to atrocities perpetrated against
the downtrodden and weaker sections of the society,
the offences punishable under the 15 subsections
under sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the Act are punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
six months but which may extend to five years and with
fine. The offences punishable under sub-s. (2) of S. 3
of the Act relate to graver offences. In this case as
already noted the offence alleged against the
petitioners is only punishable under S. 3(1)(x) of the
S.C. & S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, for which the
maximum sentence prescribed is imprisonment for
five years and with fine.
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6. In the decision in Satyan v. State of Kerala (1981
K.L.T. 606) this Court considered the question
whether the refusal to grant bail by the J.F.C.M. in an
offence punishable under S. 326 of I.P.C., on the
ground that the offence is punishable with
imprisonment for life, is justified or not and held that so
long as the offence punishable under S. 326 is triable
by a Magistrate of the First Class, there is no reason
why it should be viewed differently in the matter of
granting bail from an offence punishable under S. 420
of I.P.C. for which the punishment extends to
imprisonment for 7 years or any other non-bailable
offence for which the punishment is a term of
imprisonment.
7. In a subsequent decision reported in Chellappan v.
State of Kerala (1987 (1) K.L.T. 435) this Court relying
upon the above decision reportedin 1981 K.L.T. 606
held that the Magistrate has jurisdiction to grant bail if
the offence is not punishable with death or
imprisonment for life in the alternative under S. 437(1)
of the Cr. P.C.
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021 P a g e | 14
8. In that case the question that arose for
consideration was whether the Second Class
Magistrate had jurisdiction to grant bail to the accused
in Crime No. 16/87 registered by the Aranrnula
Policealieging offerices punishable under Ss. 143,
147, 148, 332, 225, 307 and 427 r/w 149 I.P.C. and S.
3(2)(c) of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property
Act with certain conditions. The State filed Crl. M.P.
32/87 before the Sessions Court seeking to cancel the
bail granted by the learned Magistrate and the
Sessions Court allowed the application and cancelled
the bail granted to the accused. That order was
challenged by the accused before this Court in that Crl.
M.C. In para 3 of the order a single Judge of this Court
has observed as follows:
"In passing the order the learned Sessions Judge held
that the Magistrate has overstepped his jurisdiction
and has violated the mandatory provisions contained
in S. 437(1) of the Cr. P.C. The view taken by the
learned Sessions Judge is wrong in the light of the
decision of this Court in Satyan v. State of Kerala
(1981 KLT 606) and also an unreported decision in Crl.
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021 P a g e | 15
M.C. No. 442 of 1984. In both these decisions, it was
held that the Magistrate has jurisdiction to grant bail if
the offence is not punishable with death or
imprisonment for life in the alternative. In Crl. M.C. No.
442 of 1984 the offence against the accused was one
under S. 436 I.P.C., which was exclusively triable by
the Court of Sessions. Therefore the view taken by the
learned Magistrate that he has powers to grant bail in
the instant case is correct."
9. In the above decision this Court has held that even
though offence punishable under S. 307 of I.P.C.,
exclusively triable by the Sessions Court was also
alleged, the Magistrate's Court has got jurisdiction to
grant bail under S. 437(1) of the Cr. P.C. since the
offence is not punishable with death or imprisonment
for life in the alternative.
10. As already noted, the 15 offences enumerated
under sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the S.C. and S.T.
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act are punishable with
maximum imprisonment of five years and with fine,
though the offences are triable by the Special Court,
which is the Sessions Court. Therefore, applying the
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021 P a g e | 16
principles enunciated in the decisions of this Court
referred to above, it is clear that the J.F.C.M.'s Court
has got jurisdiction to grant bail to the persons
accused of the offence punishable under any of the
sub-cls. (i) to (xv) of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the Act. In this
case, the offence alleged against the petitioners is
punishable under S. 324 of I.P.C. and S. 3(1)(x) of the
S.C. and S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. Therefore,
it follows that the J.F.C.M.'s Court has got jurisdiction
to grant bail to the accused under S. 437(1) of the Cr.
P.C. irrespective of the fact that the case is triable by
the Special Court, which is the Court of Session.
Hence the learned Magistrate is directed to enlarge
the petitioners on bail on appropriate conditions he
deems necessary, in case the petitioners surrendered
or arrested and produced before the court and moved
for bail.
The Crl. M.C. is allowed as above.
11. It is true that normally this Court would be slow in
interfering with the discretionary order granting bail to the accused.
It is equally true that one of the paramount considerations for the
Court at the time of cancelling bail in this revision would be whether
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021 P a g e | 17
the accused would be readily available for their trial and whether
they are likely to abuse the discretion granted in their favour by
tampering with the evidence. But at the same time the Court has
also to consider the other relevant aspects in the matter before
granting bail. The Court is required to exercise the discretion of
granting bail judicially after following the well laid down principles. If
the CJM has ignored the said criteria of deciding bail application
either intentionally or arbitrarily, then this Court has jurisdiction to
set aside the said order. It is not the law that once the accused is
released on bail on erroneous ground, till he tampers with the
evidence or till he absconds, the High Court has no authority to
interfere with the said order. In each case the Court is required to
consider the reasonable apprehension of the prosecuting agency
depending upon the facts of each case. The CJM is subordinate to
the High Court and it is always open to the State Government to
point out to the High Court that the order passed by the CJM is
arbitrary or illegal one or it suffers from any serious infirmity and the
High Court would have jurisdiction to set aside the said order.
12. The criteria for deciding bail application and the
jurisdiction of the High Court would be clear from the catena of
Hon'ble Supreme Court decisions and of this Court which are
referred to hereinafter.
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021 P a g e | 18
13. In the case of T.H. Hussain v. M.P. Mondkar, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court has inherent
power to cancel the bail granted to a person accused of a bailable
offence and in a proper case such power can be exercised in the
interest of justice. The Court has further observed that if a fair trial
is the main objective of the Criminal Procedure, any threat to the
continuance of a fair trial must be immediately arrested and the
smooth progress of a fair trial must be ensured and this can be
done, if necessary, by the exercise of inherent power. The Court
has further held that if the accused person, by his conduct, puts the
fair trial into jeopardy, it would be the primary and paramount duty
of the Criminal Courts to ensure that the risk to the fair trial is
removed and Criminal Courts are allowed to proceed with the trial
smoothly and without any interruption or obstruction; and this would
be equally true in cases of both bailable as well as non-bailable
offences. The Court has further held that by exercising inherent
power the Court can cancel the bail.
14. In the case of State v. Captain Jagjit Singh, the Court
has laid down certain guidelines while considering the bail
application and set aside the bail granted by the High Court by
holding that the High Court has not taken into consideration the
relevant factors and the fact that the matter was relating to non-
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021 P a g e | 19
bailable offence under Section 3 of the Indian Official Secrets Act,
1923. The Court has observed that when prima facie case has been
found against the accused that he is involved in a non-bailable
offence, while granting bail the Court should take into consideration
(i) the nature of the offence, (ii) if the offence is of a kind in which
bail should not be granted considering its seriousness, the Court
should refuse bail even though it has very wide power under Section
498 of the Criminal Procedure Code (at-present Section 439 of the
new Criminal Procedure Code).
15. The Court has further observed that while granting bail
the Court should take into account the various considerations such
as (i) the nature and seriousness of the offence, (ii) the character of
the evidence, (iii) circumstances which are peculiar to the accused,
(iv) a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not
being secured at the trial, (v) reasonable apprehension about the
witnesses being tampered with, (vi) the larger interests of the public
or the State and (vii) similar other consideration which arise when a
Court is asked for bail in a non-bailable offence. The aforesaid
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is all throughout followed
until now and, therefore, while granting bail the Court should take
into consideration all the aforesaid criteria laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. The trial Court or this Court cannot ignore the
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021 P a g e | 20
criteria laid down by the Supreme Court while granting bail and all
these factors should jointly be taken into consideration while
deciding the bail application. Therefore, merely because the
presence of the accused can be secured at the trial, that is not the
only factor which is required to be considered while granting bail.
16. Hence taking into consideration the aforesaid
observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions
mentioned above, it can be said that following factors are the
relevant factors which are required to be taken into consideration
for deciding bail application:
(1) The nature of the case is the vital factor and the nature
of the stage of investigation is also pertinent.
(2) The collection of incriminating materials to which the
accused is linked may be liable if convicted.
(3) While considering the question of granting bail under
Section 439(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the
Court should take into consideration the provisions of
Section 437(1) in spite of the fact that under Section
439(1) the High Court and Sessions Court have wide
jurisdiction to grant bail.
(4) The nature and gravity of the circumstances in which
the offence is committed-say terrorist offences, highway
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021 P a g e | 21
robbery or dacoity, gang rape, murder or murders
because of group rivalry, attack by one community on
other community or such other cases.
(5) The position and the status of the accused with
reference to the victim and the witnesses say in case of
burning of house-wife, witnesses may be neighbours,
their evidence might be tampered with by any means.
(6) The reasonable possibility of the presence of the
accused not being secured at the trial.
17. Apart from this, it is the main argument advanced by
the learned Addl.AG Mr. Lenin Hijam that though the petitioners
were arrested and remanded into judicial custody only on
15.12.2020 in the evening by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate
and without issuing any notice to the I.O. or the respondent police
seeking the objection has simply granted the bail to all the accused
on the very next day i.e. 17.12.2020 which is totally against the
natural justice.
[18] It is made clear that on fair reading of the order passed
by the learned Judge that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has
exceeded his limits without following the natural justice and without
giving fair opportunity to the Prosecution to put forth their objection,
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021 P a g e | 22
had simply granted the bail with explanation and dealing each
provision in his order. The learned CJM is bear in mind that he is
not passing the final order after conducting the trial for discussing
the maintenance of each offences registered by the State Police but
it is only for bail.
[19] The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate also without
giving proper opportunity to the petitioners/State has mentioned in
the order that the Prosecution has failed to show that the custodial
interrogation or confrontation of the accused person is necessary.
[20] The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate also mentioned
in the order that the pamphlet speaks of a threat of bomb blast and
further mentioned that it was never the case of the Prosecution that
the accused confined to cause explosion which would endanger
lives and hence, Section 4 of Explosive Substance Act, 1908 is
therefore, not made out. This statement of the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate is not proper and without getting any reply from the
Prosecution he cannot simply stated in the order by mentioning with
that the provisions under Section 500 and 504 IPC and under
Section 4 of the Explosive Substance Act, 1908 is not made out.
[21] Therefore, the very order of the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate dated 17.12.2020 granting bail to the accused that too
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021 P a g e | 23
within one day from the remand of their custody and without getting
the objection from the Prosecution that too also without filing any
proper bail application by the accused is totally wrong.
[22] In my view, the Special Acts and its provisions to be
followed in dealing with the arrest, remand, committal and trial of
the accused who were charged with the offences under the said
special act. Therefore, the judgment of the Kerala High Court is on
different perspective and facts of the case is quite different.
Moreover, only the concerned special court alone has the
jurisdiction in granting bail and the CJM exceeded its jurisdiction.
[23] In the result,
a) this Crl.Rev.P.No.6 of 2020 is allowed by
setting aside the order passed by the
Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandel in
FIR No.25(11) 2020 CDL-P.S. U/s.153-
A/504/505/506/500/34 of IPC and 4 Expl.
Sub.Act dated 17.12.2020.
b) the petitioner, the officer-in-
charge/Investigating Officer, Chandel Police
Station, Chandel District, Manipur is directed
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021 P a g e | 24
to re-arrest the Respondents/Accused and to
remand into Judicial Custody.
c) the petitioner in M.C.(Crl.Rev.P.) No.1 of
2021 is closed.
d) the petitioners/State are permitted to move
before the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Chandel for police custody and for further
proceedings.
[24] Registry is directed to issue copy of this order to both
the parties.
JUDGE
FR/NFR
Sushil
Yumkh Digitally signed by Yumkham
am Rother Date:
2021.03.26 Rother 16:25:45 +05'30'
Crl. Rev.P. No. 6 of 2020 with MC(Cril.Rev.P.) No. 1 of 2021
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