Madras High Court
Sowrashtra Vipra Sabha vs Selvarani on 15 October, 2025
S.A.No.61 of 2014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
RESERVED ON : 08.09.2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 15.10.2025
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.D. MARIA CLETE
S.A. No. 61 of 2014
and
M.P. No. 1 of 2014
Sowrashtra Vipra Sabha,
Rep. by its President,
Door No. 11,
Thoopan Kumarasamy Street,
Pettai, Namakkal Town. ... Plaintiff/Respondent/Appellant
Versus
Selvarani,
D/o Kulandaivelu,
Door No. 187/94, Main Road,
Namakkal Town. ... Defendant/Appellant/Respondent
PRAYER in S.A.:
Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure
Code against the judgment and decree Learned Subordinate Judge,
Namakkal dated 20.08.2013 made in A.S.No.90/2012 reversing that of
the Learned Additional District Munsif, Namakkal dated 13.08.2012
made in O.S.No.529/2008.
PRAYER IN M.P.:
To grant an order of injunction restraining the respondent from in
any manner altering or adding to the existing construction in the property
1/14
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S.A.No.61 of 2014
subject matter of the suit in O.S.No.529/2008 on the file of the
Additional District Munsif, Namakkal pending disposal of the appeal and
pass such further or other orders as may be necessary in the
circumstances of the case and thus render justice.
APPEARANCE OF PARTIES:
For Appellant : Mr. R. Vivek, Advocate.
For Respondent : Mr. C. Jagadish, Advocate.
JUDGMENT
Heard.
2.This Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree
of the Subordinate Judge, Namakkal, in A.S. No. 90 of 2012, dated
20.08.2013, which reversed the decision of the Principal District Munsif,
Namakkal, in O.S. No. 529 of 2008 dated 13.08.2012.
3.In this appeal, the plaintiff before the Trial Court is the appellant,
and the defendant is the respondent. For the sake of convenience, the
parties will be referred to in the same rank as they stood in the Trial
Court.
4.The plaintiff association is the owner of the suit property situated
in Namakkal Town, which was leased to the defendant’s father, late
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Kulandaivel, for running a restaurant known as 'Amudha Hotel'. After his
death, the defendant continued in possession as tenant, paying monthly
rent of Rs. 5,100/-, which was paid up to May 2008 but has been in
arrears thereafter. In May 2008, the defendant, without consent, made
unauthorized alterations by damaging the cement floor, fixing tiles, and
altering the walls, thereby weakening the building despite objections by
the plaintiff. As the tenancy was one at will, the plaintiff issued a notice
dated 26.07.2008 terminating the tenancy and calling upon the defendant
to vacate by 01.09.2008. The defendant replied with false allegations,
claiming permission and a tenancy agreement, but produced no proof. A
rejoinder was issued on 06.09.2008, and since the defendant failed to
vacate or pay rent for June to August 2008, the plaintiff filed the present
suit seeking recovery of possession of the property and arrears of rent of
Rs. 15,300/-.
5.The defendant admits that the suit property was originally leased
to her late father, who ran a restaurant, and that she has continued as
tenant after his death by paying Rs. 2,000/- as name transfer fee and Rs.
1,00,000/- as advance. She states that rent was regularly paid up to April
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2008 at Rs. 4,250/-, later enhanced to Rs. 5,100/-, and though rent for
June, July and August 2008 was tendered by money orders, the plaintiff
wrongfully refused to accept it, compelling her to deposit rent in O.P.
No. 1/2008 before the District Munsif Court, Namakkal, without any
arrears up to May 2009. Allegations of unauthorized alterations are
denied; according to her, repairs such as fixing tiles, replacing broken
roof tiles and laying pipes were done with the plaintiff’s knowledge to
maintain hygiene and safety after adjoining structures collapsed, and she
even paid property tax and Rs. 15,000/- towards water and sewerage
charges. She denies having demolished walls or damaged the building,
asserting that only minor works were carried out to prevent risk to life
and property. The tenancy is based on a long-standing verbal agreement;
she has never violated its terms and continues to pay rent. Hence, the
plaintiff’s claim for arrears and eviction is false, malicious, and
unsustainable, and the suit must be dismissed with costs.
6.The Trial Court framed issues on arrears, alterations, entitlement
to possession and reliefs, examined P.W.1 with Exs.A1–A3, D.Ws.1 and
2 with Exs.B1–B7, and considered the Commissioner’s report and plan
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(C1 and C2). It held that rent had been duly tendered by money orders
and later deposited in court, proving no arrears; that the alleged
alterations were in fact repairs carried out with consent after the southern
wall collapsed, and allegations of demolition of four walls were
unproved.
7.The Trial Court observed that Section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act provides that, in the absence of a contract, local law or
usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or
manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year,
terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee by six months’ notice,
while a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be
deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable on the part of
either lessor or lessee by fifteen days’ notice. The Trial Court found that
in the present case, the building in question was let out on a month-to-
month basis for the purpose of running a hotel business. Accordingly, the
tenancy could be terminated by issuing a 15-day notice under the said
provision. Here, the plaintiff issued notice dated 26.07.2008 terminating
the tenancy. Since the defendant, who was a tenant, admitted receipt of
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the termination notice and had replied on 19.08.2008 and the suit was
filed on 17.09.2008, i.e., more than one month after such notice, the Trial
Court held that the tenancy was validly terminated in accordance with
Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and the plaintiff is entitled
to the relief of possession. Accordingly, it partly decreed the suit,
granting the plaintiff recovery of possession but dismissing the arrears
claim of Rs. 15,300/-, with no costs awarded, and allowed the defendant
two months’ time to vacate and hand over possession.
8.On appeal, the first appellate court set aside the decree of the
trial court. It framed the issues as to whether the defendant had carried
out the works in the suit property with the permission of the plaintiff, and
whether the plaintiff was entitled to recovery of possession.
9.The appellate court noted that the trial court had given
contradictory findings: while holding in favour of the defendant on the
issue of arrears of rent, it had nevertheless found in favour of the plaintiff
on the issue of unauthorized alterations. According to the appellate court,
once the finding on arrears was in favour of the defendant, the finding on
alterations also ought to have been in her favour. The first appellate court
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stated that the appeal was therefore filed by the defendant to challenge
only the finding on alterations. The appellate court observed that the trial
court had applied Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and held
that in a month-to-month tenancy 15 days’ notice suffices for
termination, but in cross-examination P.W.1 admitted that the defendant
had been in possession and running a business in the suit property for
more than fifty years as a tenant. On this basis, the appellate court held
that the relationship between the parties did not amount to a “lease”
under the Transfer of Property Act but was merely that of landlord and
tenant outside the purview of the Act.
10.On the allegation of alterations, the appellate court found that
the evidence showed only that tiles had been fixed on the walls and floor
of the building, which was over 60 years old, and that these works were
minor repairs necessitated by the collapse of the southern wall when an
adjoining shop was demolished and by rainwater entering from the
neighbouring properties. It accepted the testimony of D.W.1 and D.W.2
that the repairs were done with the permission of the then President of
the plaintiff Sabha, who was not examined by the plaintiff to deny this.
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The court held that fixing tiles on the wall and floor did not amount to
structural alteration and that the plaintiff had failed to prove otherwise.
11.Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that the plaintiff
was not entitled to recovery of possession. Since the plaintiff had not
filed any cross-appeal, and the defendant had successfully challenged the
adverse finding on alterations, the appeal was allowed, the trial court’s
finding on Issue No. 3 was set aside, and the suit in O.S. No. 529 of 2008
was dismissed in entirety.
12.While admitting the Second Appeal on 01.04.2014, this Court
framed the following substantial questions of law for consideration,
which is reproduced verbatim below:
“1.Whether the lower appellate Court was right
in holding that the relationship of the landlord and
tenant as established will not come within the purview of
the term lease contemplated in the Transfer of Property
Act?
2.Whether the lower appellate Court was right in
holding that the landlord has to be proved the grounds
alleged for eviction in a suit filed for ejectment after
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issuing a notice of termination under Section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act?”
13.During hearing on 04.09.2025, the opening argument on the
side of the respondent was that the suit filed by the plaintiff itself is not
maintainable as the plaintiff is only a society and therefore has to
proceed only before the rent control authority, and as such, while the
plaintiff did not accept the rents paid by the defendant, the same was
deposited before the RCOP Court and the plaintiff had also withdrawn
Rs. 3 lakhs from the court, and that the RCOP suit is pending before the
rent court. It was submitted that the point raised was a mere question of
law and could be raised at any stage of the proceedings. In these
circumstances, the following additional substantial question of law was
framed:
“3.Whether the suit building is exempted from the
purview of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent
Control) Act, 1960, in view of G.O.Ms.No.2000 dated
16.08.1976?”
14.As regards the additional substantial question of law, the
maintainability of the suit was sought to be challenged on the ground of
jurisdiction. That said, the question of maintainability in the present case
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is not a pure question of law, as it depends on the legal status of the
plaintiff Sabha in question.
15.In that context, the appellant rightly placed reliance on the
decision of this very Court in CRP No. 3164 of 1998 dated 07.04.2004,
which had conclusively determined the status of the plaintiff Sabha in an
earlier dispute concerning the very same property and parties, albeit
involving the father of the present defendant. In that case, this Court had
examined the nature of the Sabha and the building in question and held
that the Sabha was a public trust engaged in charitable activities.
Consequently, it was found that G.O. Ms. No. 2000 dated 16.08.1976
applied to exempt the building from the operation of the Tamil Nadu
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. That decision, having
been rendered in relation to the same property and the same institution,
carries binding effect and is not open to re-litigation. The character of the
trust, though generally a matter of evidence, has already been adjudicated
with finality. This Court, therefore, cannot revisit or come to a finding
contrary to the one already reached in the earlier CRP proceedings.
16.Accordingly, the argument that the suit should have been filed
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before the Rent Controller cannot be sustained. The building, being
exempt from the Rent Control Act by virtue of the said G.O. and the
earlier ruling, falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the civil court, and
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is the applicable law. The plaintiff’s
suit was rightly instituted before the civil court.
17.On the first substantial question of law, the first appellate court
fell into error by confusing the evidentiary requirements of a Rent
Control petition with those of a civil suit governed by the Transfer of
Property Act and concluding that the parties' relationship was not a
“lessee” within the meaning of the Act. Once it is admitted that there is a
landlord and tenant relationship, evidenced by decades of rent payments
and possession, the arrangement is nothing but a lease under Section 105
of the Transfer of Property Act. The Act speaks the language of a lease
but rent control statutes use tenancy/tenant; the words “lessee” and
“tenant” are often used interchangeably; any distinction is subtle and
turns on the governing statutes. All the ingredients to constitute a lease
as defined under Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 are
satisfied in this case. Therefore, the appellate court was wrong in holding
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that the relationship was not a lease within the meaning of the Act.
18.On the second substantial question of law, the reasoning of the
trial court is sound. In paragraph 12 of its judgment, the trial court
correctly held that in a month-to-month oral tenancy, what matters is the
termination of tenancy by a valid notice under Section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act. Once such termination notice is served, the
landlord is entitled to possession. It is not necessary for the landlord to
also prove fault such as default in rent or damage to the building. Those
grounds are relevant under Rent Control statutes, if the eviction petition
is filed under Sections 10(2)(i) and 10(2)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, but not under the Transfer
of Property Act, 1882. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that a
notice of termination dated 26.07.2008 was duly served, and the suit was
instituted after the expiry of the statutory period. This is sufficient to
entitle the landlord to recover possession. The first appellate court’s
insistence that the plaintiff must also prove default or damage was
misplaced and contrary to law.
19.For the reasons stated above, all substantial questions of law are
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answered in favour of the appellant. The lower appellate court’s
judgment and decree are set aside, and the judgment and decree of the
trial court are restored. In consequence, this Second Appeal is allowed;
Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is ordered to be
closed. No order as to costs.
15.10.2025
ay
Index: Yes / No
Speaking Order / Non-speaking Order
Neutral Citation : Yes / No
To
1.The Subordinate Judge, Namakkal.
2.The Additional District Munsif, Namakkal.
3.The Section Officer, V.R.Section,
High Court of Madras, Chennai.
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DR. A.D. MARIA CLETE, J
ay
Pre-Delivery Judgment made in
and
15.10.2025
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