Madras High Court

Tamilselvi vs The Commissioner on 17 March, 2025

Author: M.Sundar

Bench: M.Sundar

W.P. No.8215 of 2025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED : 17.03.2025

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.SUNDAR
and
THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE K. GOVINDARAJAN THILAKAVADI

W.P.No.8215 of 2025 and W.M.P.No.9206 of 2025

Tamilselvi Petitioner
vs.
1. The Commissioner
Sholinghur Municipality
Ranipet District

2. The Tahsildar
Sholinghur
Ranipet District Respondents

Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

seeking a writ of certiorari calling for the records of the first

respondent leading to issuance of the order bearing

Na.Ka.No.2876/2024/F1 (Na.Ka.No.2876/2024/F1) dated 19.02.2025

and quash the same.

For petitioner Mr. B. Arvind Srevatsa
assisted by
Mr. A. Irfan Sherif

For respondents Mr. T.K. Saravanan
Additional Government Pleader
-----

Page Nos.1/26

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W.P. No.8215 of 2025

ORDER

[made by M. SUNDAR, J.]

When the captioned matter was listed in the Admission Board

(first listing) on 10.03.2025, this Court made the following

proceedings/order:

'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED : 10.03.2025

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.SUNDAR and THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE K. GOVINDARAJAN THILAKAVADI

W.P. No.8215 of 2025 and W.M.P.No.9206 of 2025

Tamilselvi Petitioner vs.

1. The Commissioner Sholinghur Municipality Ranipet District

2. The Tahsildar Sholinghur Ranipet District Respondents

For petitioner Mr. B. Arvind Srevatsa For respondents Mr. T.K. Saravanan Additional Government Pleader

ORDER [made by M. SUNDAR, J.]

Captioned main 'writ petition' (hereinafter 'WP' for the sake of brevity) pertains to Survey No.645/2A in Sholingur Village, Sholingar Taluk, Ranipet District.

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2. It is submitted by Mr. B. Arvind Srevatsa that title has been decided by R1 in and by order dated 19.02.2025 bearing reference Na.Ka.No.2876/2024/F1 (hereinafter 'impugned order' for the sake of convenience and clarity) in summary proceedings under proviso to Section 128(1)(b) of The Tamil Nadu Urban Local Bodies Act, 1998 (Act 9 of 1999).

3. Issue notice to respondents.

4. Mr. T.K.Saravanan, learned Additional Government Pleader, accepts notice for both the respondents and submits that the impugned order was assailed in another writ petition being W.P.No.7229 of 2025 and that writ petition came to be dismissed by this Court on 05.03.2025. Saying so, learned State counsel sought for a short accommodation to produce a copy of the aforesaid order.

5. Request acceded to.

6. List this matter one week hence.

7. In the interregnum, let status quo as of today shall be maintained.

8. List under the cause list caption 'NOTICE REGARDING ADMISSION' in the Admission Board i.e. Motion List, on 17.03.2025 (Monday).

(M.S., J.) (K.G.T., J.) 10.03.2025'

2. The aforementioned proceedings/order shall now be read

as integral part and parcel of instant order. This means that the short

forms, short references and abbreviations used in our earlier

proceedings/order dated 10.03.2025 shall continue to be used in the

instant order too.

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3. In the second listing (today), adverting to the

aforementioned proceedings/order dated 10.03.2025,

Mr.T.K.Saravanan, learned Additional Government Pleader, placed

before us, an order dated 05.03.2025 made by this Bench in

W.P.No.7229 of 2025 and the writ miscellaneous petition thereat in

N.Malliga's case (N.Malliga vs. Sholingur Municipality) and a

reproduction of this order is as follows:

'IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED : 05.03.2025

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.SUNDAR and THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE K.GOVINDARAJAN THILAKAVADI

& W.M.P.No.8049 of 2025 in W.P.No.7229 of 2025

N.Malliga W/o.V.P.Nagarajan ... Petitioner vs. Sholingur Municipality Rep. By its Commissioner Sholingur Vellore District ... Respondent

Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of The Constitution of India praying to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records of the respondent in their notice vide Na.Ka.No.2876/2024/F1 dated 19.02.2025 calling upon to remove the construction within 15 days from the date of receipt of notice pertaining to the petitioner's property to an extent of 3 cents comprised in Survey No.645/2A, situated at No.109, Anadana Chathiram Road, Sholingur, 631 102,

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Vellore District, quash the same and consequently forbear the respondent from in anyway interfering with the petitioner's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the above said property pending final determination of the petitioner's representation dated 21.02.2025.

                                                   For Petitioner              :        Mr.D.S.Rajasekaran

                                                   For Respondent              :        Mr.T.K.Saravanan
                                                                                        Addl. Govt. Pleader
                                                                    ORDER

[Order of the Court was made by K.GOVINDARAJAN THILAKAVADI, J.,]

Captioned writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner assailing a notice dated 19.02.2025 in Na.Ka.No.2876/2024/F1 seeking a direction to forbear the respondent from taking any action against the writ petitioner pursuant to the above notice.

2. The contention of the writ petitioner is that she had purchased a portion of land in S.No.645/2A by virtue of a sale deed dated 08.06.2005 from one M.J.Sundararaj and she is in possession and enjoyment of the said land till date.

While so, on 19.02.2025, the respondent issued a notice under Section 128(1)(b) of 'The Tamil Nadu Urban Local Bodies Act, 1998 (Act 9 of 1999)' (hereinafter 'TNULB Act' for the sake of convenience and clarity) to one Mr.Nagaraj, neighbour of the writ petitioner alleging encroachment in the said land. Further contention of the writ petitioner is that the petitioner is having a legal right over the said property and therefore, the said notice issued by the respondent is liable to be set aside.

3. Issue notice to the respondent.

4. Mr.T.K.Saravanan, learned Additional Government Pleader accepts notice for the respondent.

5. The impugned notice was not issued to the writ petitioner and the same was issued only to one Mr.Nagaraj. On this short and solitary ground itself, we are not inclined to entertain this writ petition.

Resultantly, this writ petition fails and accordingly dismissed as devoid of merits. Consequently, the connected writ miscellaneous petition is closed. There shall be no order as to costs.

                                                                                       (M.S.,J.)       (K.G.T.,J.)
                                                                                             05.03.2025'







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4. A careful perusal of the aforementioned order dated

05.03.2025 in N. Malliga's case brings to light that the writ petition

was dismissed on the short and solitary point that the writ petitioner

was not noticee qua impugned notice. This has been set out very

clearly in paragraph no.5 of N.Malliga's case.

5. In this view of the matter, Mr. B. Arvind Srevatsa, learned

counsel for writ petitioner and learned State counsel, submitted that

N.Malliga's case really does not have any impact qua captioned WP.

We, therefore, revert to the case on hand.

6. Notwithstanding very many averments, contentions and

grounds in writ affidavit, learned counsel for writ petitioner predicated

his campaign against the impugned order on the sole contention that

R1 has usurped Civil Court jurisdiction and decided title in summary

proceedings which is impermissible.

7. Learned State counsel submitted to the contrary by

pitching his argument on the point that the revenue record

classification of the land that is subject matter of impugned order i.e.,

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land comprised in S.No.645/2A in 35, Sholinghur Village, Sholinghur

Taluk, Ranipet District (hereinafter 'said land' for the sake of

convenience and clarity) is 'road'. A scanned reproduction of copy of

the relevant portion of 'A' register and Adangal account, as placed

before us, by learned State counsel is as follows:

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8. In support of his contention that deciding title in summary

proceedings is impermissible, learned counsel for writ petitioner

pressed into service Thummala Krishna Rao case law [Government

of Andhra Pradesh vs. Thummala Krishna Rao and another

reported in (1982) 2 SCC 134 decided on 16.03.1982], Padmavati

Devi case law [State of Rajasthan vs. Padmavati Devi and others

reported in 1995 Supp (2) SCC 290 decided on 06.04.1995] and

Kavasji case law [Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji vs. Union of

India and another reported in (2019) 20 SCC 705 decided on

15.03.2019].

9. Learned counsel submitted that Thummala Krishna Rao

principle has been adverted to and applied in Padmavati Devi case

and Padmavati Devi principle, has, in turn, been applied and

adverted to in Kavasji case.

10. This Court carefully considered the rival submissions and

this Court comes to the conclusion that the captioned WP deserves to

be dismissed. The discussion and dispositive reasoning is as follows:

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(i). Before we embark upon the legal drill of

considering the case laws pressed into service by learned

counsel for writ petitioner, we deem it appropriate to write

that as regards how case laws have to be relied on and

how a citation should be adverted to, we respectfully follow

the declaration of law made by a Hon'ble Constitution

Bench in Padma Sundara Rao case [Padma Sundara

Rao vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2002) 3 SCC

533:2002 SCC OnLine SC 334], wherein, the factual

matrix is, a notification issued under Section 6 of the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894, was assailed in Madras High Court

and the Madras High Court, relying on N.Narasimhaiah

case reported in (1996) 3 SCC 88, held that the same

was validly issued. The matter was carried to Hon'ble

Supreme Court on the question of law as to whether, after

quashing of a notification under Section 6, a fresh period of

one year is available to the State Government to issue

another notification under Section 6. It is, in this context,

i.e., while deciding this legal question, the Constitution

Bench declared the law with terse eloquence as regards

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how Courts should place reliance on case laws /

precedents. The most relevant paragraph is paragraph 9

and the same reads as follows:

''9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case, said Lord Morris in Herrington v. British Railways Board [(1972) 2 WLR 537 : 1972 AC 877 (HL) [Sub nom British Railways Board v. Herrington, (1972) 1 All ER 749 (HL)]] . Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases.'

(underlining made by us for ease of reference)

(ii). As regards Thummala Krishna Rao case,

learned counsel drew our attention to paragraph 9 and

submitted that facts which raise a bona fide dispute of title

between Government and the occupant must be

adjudicated by a Civil Court.

We carefully and respectfully perused the factual

matrix in Thummala Krishna Rao case. In Thummala

Krishna Rao case, three parcels of lands situate in

Habsiguda, Hyderabad East Taluk, Andhra Pradesh,

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constituted the subject matter and all these three parcels

of lands originally belonged to one Nawab Zainuddin. After

his demise, they devolved on Nawab Habibuddin.

Thereafter, in 1932 and 1937, all these three parcels of

land were acquired by the Government of Nizam of

Hyderabad under the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act (Act

akin to Land Acquisition Act, 1894) for the benefit of

Osmania University which was then administered by a

Department of the Government of Hyderabad. Thereafter,

on 13.02.1956, Osmania University filed a civil suit in

O.S.No.1 of 1956 against Nawab Habibuddin in the City

Civil Court, Hyderabad, claiming that the three parcels of

lands were acquired by the Government for the benefit of

University and praying for eviction from those lands. This

suit was dismissed by the Trial Court in 1959 inter alia on

the ground that one of the parcels was not acquired by the

Government and the two other parcels were, no doubt,

acquired but University failed to prove its possession

thereof within twelve years before the filing of the suit.

The Trial Court also returned a finding that with regard to

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other two parcels, Nawab Habibuddin had encroached upon

the same in 1942 which in any event was more than twelve

years before the filing of the suit. Osmania University

carried the matter to High Court on appeal, High Court

confirmed the findings of the Trial Court and to be noted,

State Government was not impleaded as a party to these

proceedings. When things stood thus, Osmania University

wrote a letter (on 08.05.1964) to the Government of

Andhra Pradesh requesting it to take steps for summary

eviction of persons who were allegedly in unauthorised

occupation of all three parcels of land and the jurisdictional

Tahsildar, acting under Section 7 of Land Encroachment

Act, 1905, called upon Nawab Habibuddin to vacate the

lands followed by an order of eviction. Nawab Habibuddin

carried it on appeal to the Collector (unsuccessfully) and a

further appeal against decision of the Collector was also

unsuccessful (appeal dismissed by Revenue Board in 1968)

and the litigants in Thummala Krishna Rao case

(respondents before the Supreme Court) purchased the

parcels of land from Nawab Habibuddin for valuable

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consideration and on his demise, they were impleaded in

the proceedings before the Revenue Board. Thereafter,

decision of Revenue Board also was confirmed by the

Government against which writ petitions and intra-court

appeals were preferred. It is, in this context, that High

Court of Andhra Pradesh held that summary remedy cannot

be resorted to as regards complicated questions of title and

Hon'ble Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the High

Court of Andhra Pradesh by saying that title dispute

between Government and occupant must be adjudicated

upon by ordinary Courts of law.

In Thummala Krishna Rao case, it is nobody's case

that the lands that were subject matter i.e., three parcels

of lands were classified as public land i.e., road, as in the

case on hand. There was a tussle for title and a Civil Court

decision was confirmed by the High Court and it is in this

context, that Thummala Krishna Rao case was rendered.

Therefore, applying Padma Sundara Rao principle

(declaration of law as it is a Constitution Bench judgment),

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we respectfully write that Thummala Krishna Rao case

does not come to the aid of the writ petitioner in the case

on hand.

(iii). In Padmavati Devi case, facts make it clear

that there were houses and shops in the land in question

and persons in occupation were paying rent to State,

jurisdictional Tahsildar called upon such persons to deposit

rent and also called upon the noticees to explain how they

have been letting their premises and selling pieces of land.

Noticees responded to this notice stating that the land is

not a 'Sawai Chak' (Government land); they have been in

possession of the same for long and proceedings under

Section 91 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956

(hereinafter 'Rajasthan Act' for the sake of brevity) cannot

be initiated. Tahsildar rejected the objections making it

clear that if the noticee has got a right of any kind, she has

to get her right settled in a Court of law. Appeal against

this order of Tahsildar was dismissed by the Collector.

Further appeal to the Revenue Appellate Authority resulted

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in setting aside of the orders of the Tahsildar and Collector,

Revenue Appellate Authority order was set aside by Board

of Revenue and it was directed that noticee should be

evicted from the land forthwith under Section 91 of

Rajasthan Act and it also directed that construction made

thereon be suitably dealt with. This order of the Board of

Revenue was assailed in the Rajasthan High Court by way

of a writ petition, the same was allowed and the matter

was carried to Hon'ble Supreme Court and Hon'ble

Supreme Court, applying Thummala Krishna Rao

principle, held that summary remedy under the Rajasthan

Act was not the kind of legal process which is suited for an

adjudication of complicated questions of title. This makes it

clear that the factual matrix in Padmavati Devi case is

completely different from the facts obtaining in the case on

hand as this is not a case of lease by State or alienation by

lessee. In Padmavati Devi case, the Tahsildar himself

had called upon the noticee to approach Civil Court.

Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in respectfully

applying Padma Sundara Rao case declaration of law and

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as a sequitur, coming to the respectful conclusion that

Padmavati Devi principle also does not come to the aid of

the writ petitioner.

(iv). The factual matrix in the case on hand is that,

the subject matter is the land comprised in Survey

No.645/2A, which, according to the revenue records,

admeasures 0.95.5 hectares equivalent to 2 acres and 35

cents classified as 'road'. One Chakravarthy Iyengar, in

and by a sale deed dated 07.10.1970, registered as

document no.4027 of 1970 on the file of the jurisdictional

Sub Registrar, sold 84 cents with a recital regarding

possession. This sale was in favour of one Janakirama

Naidu and after his demise, his son M.J. Sundar Raj

executed an unregistered possession deed (RthjPd

Mtzk;) dated 10.06.2004 in favour of one Ashokan

(husband of writ petitioner) and the local body passed a

resolution on 15.11.2002 accepting donation of a well for

larger public use and resolved that it is open to M.J. Sundar

Raj to obtain patta for the remaining 35 cents of land.

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Neither M.J. Sundar Raj nor Ashokan obtained patta. To be

noted, said land is qua S.No.645/2A. It is clear that there is

nothing regarding title of the said land. Said land always

stood classified as 'road'. Mere transfer of what is

described as 'possessory right' by a unregistered document

is the stated position of the writ petitioner. Furthermore, 'A'

only with regard to S.No.645/1 (Patta No.893) to an extent

of 12.61 ares.

(v). To be noted, Section 2 of 'the Tamil Nadu Land

Encroachment Act, 1905 (Tamil Nadu Act III of 1905)' (for

brevity 'said 1905 Act') captioned 'Right of property in

public roads, etc., waters and lands' makes it clear that

roads, streets, lanes, paths, etc. have been declared to be

a property of the Government and sub-section (2) of

Section 2 specifically declares that all public roads and

streets, vested in any local authority shall be deemed to be

the property of the Government. The entire Section 2 of

the said Act reads as follows:

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'2. Right of property in public roads, etc. waters and lands --

(1) All public roads, streets, lanes and paths, the bridges, ditches, dikes and fences, on or beside the same, the bed of the sea and of harbours and creeks below high water mark, and of rivers, streams, nalas, lakes and tanks, and all back waters, canals and water courses and all standing and flowing water, and all lands, wherever situated, save insofar as the same are the property --

(a) of any zamindar, poligar, mittadar, shrotriemdar or inamdar or any person claiming through or holding under any of them, or

(b) of any person paying shit, kattubadi, jodi, poruppu or quit rent to any of the aforesaid persons, or

(c) of any person holding under ryotwari tenure including that of a janmi in the Gudalur taluk of the Nilgiris District and in the transferred territory or in any way subject to the payment of land revenue direct to Government, or

(d) of any other registered holder of land in proprietary right or

(e) of any other person holding land under grant from the Government otherwise than by way of licence, and, as to lands, save also insofar as they are temple site or owned as house-site or back yard, are and are hereby declared to be the property of Government except as may be otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, subject always to all rights of way and other public rights and to the natural and easement rights of other land owners, and to all customary rights legally subsisting.

(2) All public roads and streets vested in any local authority shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the property of the Government.'

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It is is nobody's case, not even that of the writ petitioner,

that the said property falls under any of the exceptions

vide clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 2.

(vi). As regards Kavasji case, the property that was

subject matter of the case, comprised a main bungalow, a

cottage, outhouses, garages and an open plot of land

(garden) admeasuring around 1.52 acres or thereabouts.

This property was owned by two persons, viz., Burjorji

Goostadji and Cooverbai Homi Karani. Thereafter, this duo

sold the property to one Sorabji, who, in turn, leased out

the property to the Government for a period of five years.

Further lease was granted and in 1939, Sorabjee applied to

the Cantonment Board, Poona, seeking permission to

undertake certain building work in the suit property and

after exchange of some letters, permission was granted

and on Sorabjee's demise, his son Kavasji inherited the

property. At this juncture, the jurisdictional Collector, in

and by an order dated 08.06.1943, requisitioned the

property under the Defence of India Rules, 1939, and

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requisitioned handing over of the same to military

authorities. Thereafter, on 23.03.1946, there was a de-

requisition but on 05.08.1948, the Collector, once again,

requisitioned the suit property but in this order, it was

clearly mentioned that Kavasji is the owner of the suit

property. Kavasji filed a writ petition in Bombay High Court

seeking restoration and repossession of suit property.

Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and directed

restoration to Kavasji but the Government of India did not

vacate the suit property. Thereafter, there were further

proceedings holding that the suit property was held under

old grant which stood resumed. Kavasji assailed this, the

matter was carried to Hon'ble Supreme Court after orders

of Bombay High Court and in this context, Hon'ble

Supreme Court referred to Padmavati Devi principle

(paragraph 48 of Kavasji) and ultimately held that

whenever questions of ownership of rights of the parties

will have to be gone into by the Court concerned, it shall

be decided strictly on pleadings. Hon'ble Supreme Court

clearly held that the appellant (Kavasji) had raised a bona

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fide dispute of question of ownership of the suit property

and the respondent/State did not have jurisdiction to

invoke powers under the Public Premises Act by resorting

to summary procedure. The factual matrix in the case on

hand is completely different as would be evident from the

narrative of factual matrix in Kavasji case and therefore,

Kavasji case also does not come to the aid of the writ

petitioner.

(vii). Reverting to the impugned order, R1 has

adverted to the aforereferred 1970 sale deed as well as

resolution of the local body and has found that said land

having been classified as 'road', cannot be transferred by

private parties, it is of no avail and on that basis, 'final

orders' were passed within the meaning of proviso to

Section 128(1)(b) of 'the Tamil Nadu Urban Local Bodies

Act (Act 9 of 1999)' (hereinafter 'TNULB Act' for the sake

of convenience and clarity). Section 128 of the TNULB Act

reads as follows:

'128. Power to remove encroachment from public place. -

(1) The Commissioner may, -

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(a) remove without any notice any movable temporary structure, enclosure, stall, booth, any article whatsoever hawked, exposed or displayed for sale or any other thing whatsoever by way of encroaching street or public place or the [land belonging to or vested with the municipality] with the municipal limit;

(b) remove any immovable structure whether permanent or of temporary nature encroaching the street or public place or the [land belonging to municipality or vested with the municipality] within the municipal limit, after issuing a show cause notice for such removal, returnable within a period of seven days from the date of receipt thereof:

Provided that the Commissioner shall consider any representation received within the time limit, before passing final orders.

(2) Whoever makes any encroachment in any land or space (not being private property) in any public street or any [land belonging to or vested with the municipality] within the municipal limit, shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to three years and with fine which may extend to [fifty thousand rupees]:

Provided that the Court may, for any adequate or special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than one year.'

(viii). Therefore, this Court is of the considered view

that it cannot be gainsaid that R1 has decided title qua

said land. R1 has merely adverted to the revenue records

and come to the conclusion that said land was always

classified as 'road' and continues to remain as 'road'. It is,

in this context, that R1 has held that purported

conveyance or transfer of possessory right is of no avail.

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This, in the considered view of this Court, cannot be

construed as deciding title. In this regard, this Court

deems it appropriate to write that any private individual or

private entity can transfer any land in favour of another

private individual or private entity by executing a

document. That, by itself, will not confer any title, much

less, any right in favour of vendee. It is deemed

appropriate to reiterate that it is the stated position of the

writ petitioner that patta has not been obtained either by

writ petitioner, writ petitioner's spouse or M.J.Sundar Raj

and not even Chakravarthy Iyengar, for that matter. If an

order akin to the impugned order is interfered with in writ

jurisdiction on the ground that it is usurpation of rights of a

Civil Court regarding deciding title, it may lead to a

situation where no public land occupied by encroachers can

be dealt with under summary procedure under the said

1905 Act, the TNULB Act and/or any other similar Act

which provides for summary procedure. The principle that

parties should be relegated to Civil Court will apply only

when a bona fide disputation of title arises.

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11. Ergo, the sum sequitur is, captioned main WP is dismissed.

Consequently, captioned writ miscellaneous petition thereat also

perishes with the main WP, i.e., captioned writ miscellaneous petition

is also dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.




                                                                                            (M.S., J.) (K.G.T., J.)
                                                                                                    17.03.2025

                     cad
                     Index              :    Yes/No
                     NC                 :    Yes/No







https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis                   ( Uploaded on: 21/03/2025 04:04:34 pm )





                                                                                                    M.SUNDAR, J.

                                                                                                                 and

                                                                  K. GOVINDARAJAN THILAKAVADI, J.

                                                                                                                  cad


                     To:

                     1.           The Commissioner
                                  Sholinghur Municipality
                                  Ranipet District

                     2.           The Tahsildar
                                  Sholinghur
                                  Ranipet District








                                                                                                         17.03.2025







https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis                      ( Uploaded on: 21/03/2025 04:04:34 pm )