Madras High Court
The Coimbatore District vs The Presiding Officer on 7 September, 2021
W.P.No.33342 of 2013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 07.09.2021
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE Mr.JUSTICE M.S.RAMESH
W.P.No.33342 of 2013
and
M.P.No.1 of 2013
The Coimbatore District
Central Cooperative Bank Ltd.,
State Bank Road,
Coimbatore - 641018,
Rep. By its General Manager. ...Petitioner
Vs
1.The Presiding Officer,
Labour Court,
Coimbatore.
2.V.Ponnusamy
3.Kalaiselvi
4.Nandakumar,
Represented by his Power agent
Tr.V.Ponnusamy
5. Kalpana ...Respondents
Prayer: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
praying to issue a Writ of Certiorari, to call for the records of the first
respondent in CP No.225 of 2008 and quash its order dated 25.04.2013.
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W.P.No.33342 of 2013
For Petitioner : M/S.T.S.Gopalan & Co.
For Respondents : Mr.C.Murugesan
for R2 to R5
ORDER
In this writ petition, the Co-operative Bank has challenged the order
passed by the Labour Court, Coimbatore in Computation Petition No.225 of
2008.
2. It is brought to the notice of this Court that when identically placed
workmen of the petitioner-Co-operative Bank had earlier filed Computation
Petitions under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in
C.P..Nos.1109 of 2002 etc., the issue came to be dealt with by a Hon'ble
Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.1727 of 2011, in the case of The
Management of Coimbatore District, Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., Rep.
by its Special Officer, Coimbatore Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour
Court, Coimbatore and 17 others and in the order dated 24.06.2021, the
Hon'ble Division Bench had found that the settlement arrived between the
Management and the workmen of the petitioner-Bank would be binding and
therefore, the workmen would be consequently entitled for the monetary
benefits mentioned therein. It was further held that the respondents therein/
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W.P.No.33342 of 2013
employees of the petitioner-Bank are deemed to be workmen under Section
2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore, the settlement arrived
between them is binding. The relevant portion of the order reads as follows:-
"6.We find merits on the submission made by
the learned counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 12
and 14 to 18. When there is a memorandum of
settlement reached between the appellant and
respondents 2 to 18 granting unearned leave to
employees and the same has been approved in the
G.O. No.488 Finance (Pension) Department dated
12.08.1996 stating at the time of retirement, 50% of
the leave of private affairs standing to the credit of
the employees upto maximum of 90 days, be entitled to
full leave salary, it is not open to the appellant to
canvass either before the Labour Court or before us
that there was no pre-existing right available to
respondents 2 to 18 to lay their claim under Section
33(c)(2) of the Act. To throw more light on the
appellant, it is relevant to refer to Section 33-C(2) as
under:
'(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive
from the employer any money or any benefit
which is capable of being computed in terms of
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W.P.No.33342 of 2013
money and if any question arises as to the
amount of money due or as to the amount at
which such benefit should be computed, then
the question may, subject to any rules that may
be made under this Act, be decided by such
Labour Court as may be specified in this
behalf by the appropriate Government ][within
a period not exceeding three months:]'
7.A mere perusal of the above provision shows
that any workman is entitled to receive from the
employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money and if any
question arises as to the amount of money due or as to
the amount at which such benefit should be computed,
then the question may, subject to any rules that may
be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour
Court.
8.In the case on hand, when the settlement has
been reached on 30.03.1979 and the State
Government has issued the said G.O.No.488 Finance
(Pension) Department dated 12.08.1996, granting
50% of the leave of private affairs standing to the
credit of the employees upto maximum of 90 days, at
the time of retirement, we are able to see that there is
a pre-exisiting right available to respondents 2 to 18.
Therefore, they are entitled to approach the Labour
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W.P.No.33342 of 2013
Court under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act.
9.Since the terms and conditions mentioned in
the Memorandum of Settlement reached under Section
12(3) of the Act on 30.03.1979 makes the legal
position clear granting un-earned leave to employees
and the rights conferred in clause 8(1)(c) of the
Special by-law making it clear that every employee of
the Bank shall be entitled to un-earned leave on
private affairs for six months on half pay and
allowances and the said G.O. providing 50% of leave
on private affairs standing to the credit upto the
maximum of 90 days at the time of retirement, it is not
known as to how the appellant can raise an issue that
Computation Petitions filed by the contesting
respondents, based on the Settlement dated
30.03.1979 reached under Section 12(3) of the Act,
cannot be taken upon for consideration though the
amendment was made only on 02.08.2011 to remove
the said benefit.
10.In this regard, it is relevant to extract the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Karnataka
State Road Transport Corporation vs. KSRTC Staff
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W.P.No.33342 of 2013
and Workers' Federation and another reported in
1999 (2) SCC 687 as under:
'19.But even on an assumption that the
aforesaid notification satisfied the
requirements of section 19 Section 19 sub-
section (2) for terminating the settlement dated
28-7-1988, even then till a new settlement
laying down fresh terms of settlement on the
question of the payroll check-off facility saw
the light of day, the binding effect of the 1988
settlement has to continue to bind the parties
by way of contractual obligations. This aspect
is well-settled by a three-judge Bench decision
of this court in LIC of India v. D.J.Bahadur
where Krishna Iyer,J., speaking for the
Supreme Court at SCR p.1114 of the Report,
has made the following pertinent
observations:(SCC pp.340-41, para 34)
''34. The core question that first falls for
consideration is as to whether the settlements
of 1974 are still in force. There are three
stages or phases with different legal effects in
the life of an award or settlement. There is
specific period contractually or statutorily
fixed as the period of operation. Thereafter,
the award or settlement does not become non
est but continues to be binding. This is the
second chapter of legal efficacy but
qualitatively different as we will presently
show. then comes the last phase. If notice of
intention to terminate is given under Section
19(2) of 19(6) then the third stage opens
where the award or the settlement does survive
and is in force between the parties as a
contract which has superseded the earlier
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W.P.No.33342 of 2013
contract and subsists until a new award or
negotiated settlement takes its place. Like
nature, law abhors a vacuum and even on the
notice of termination under Section 19(2) or
(6) the sequence and consequence cannot be
just void but a continuance of the earlier
terms, but with liberty to both sides to raise
disputes, negotiate settlements or seek a
reference and award. Until such a new
contract or award replaces the previous one,
the former settlement or award will regulate
the relations between the parties. Such is the
understanding of industrial law at least for 30
years as precedents of the High Courts and of
this Court bear testimony. To hold to the
contrary is to invite industrial chaos by an
interpretation of the ID Act whose primary
purpose is to obviate such a situation and to
provide for industrial peace. To distil from the
provisions of Section 19 a conclusion
diametrically opposite of the objective,
intendment and effect of the section is an
interpretative stultification of the statutory
ethos and purpose. Industrial law frowns upon
a lawless void and under general law the
contract of service created by an award or
settlement lives so long as a new lawful
contract is brought into being. To argue
otherwise is to frustrate the rule of law. If law
is a means to an end -- order in society -- can
it commit functional hara-kiri by leaving a
conflict situation to lawless void?''
In view of the aforesaid settled legal position,
therefore, if any unilateral notice to terminate
the binding settlement of 28-7-1988 was issued
by the Corporation which, on the facts of the
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W.P.No.33342 of 2013
present case, is found not to have been issued,
even then till any new settlement on the
question of grant of the payroll check-off
facility was substituted by the parties, the
legally binding effects of the earlier settlement
of 1988 would continue to operate and the
Corporation will then be contractually bound
to confer the payroll check-off facility on the
Union. Consequently, there was no occasion
for the Corporation to issue the impugned
notification dated 21-9-1993 even on this
ground as it was clearly violative of the
mandatory requirement of Section19 sub-
section(2) and was contrary to the settled legal
position as aforesaid. It was, therefore, a
stillborn notification and was rightly set aside
by the learned Single Judge on that ground
and also by the Division Bench of the High
Court.'
11.A perusal of the above judgment would show
that until a new settlement or contract replaces the
previous one, the former settlement will regulate the
relations between the parties and will bind both the
parties. Following the same, the Apex Court in yet
another judgment in the case of Gujarat Agricultural
University vs All Gujarat Kamdar Karmachari Union
reported in 2009 (15) SCC 335 has observed as
under:
'21. It is an admitted position that no new
settlement has been entered into between the
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W.P.No.33342 of 2013
employer and the workmen subsequently nor
has any award replaced the settlement dated
22- -1980. In this view of the matter, it has to
be held that the settlement dated 22-8-1980
continues to regulate the conditions of service
of the workmen covered thereby. The contract
of service or the conditions of service
provided in the settlement holds the field until
new lawful settlement is brought into being. As
a matter of fact, the employer was well aware
of this legal position and, therefore, the daily-
rated labourers governed by the settlement
were continued to be given only a day off in a
week until the change was effected vide
Circular dated 3-10-1991. Thus, the Industrial
Tribunal as well as the High Court cannot be
said to have erred in relying upon the
settlement dated 22-8-1980.'
12.A perusal of the same clearly shows that the
contract of service or the conditions of service
provided in the settlement holds the field until new
lawful settlement is being effected. Therefore, in the
present case, the Settlement dated 30.03.1979 reached
under Section 12(3) of the Act would definitely bind
the contesting respondents.
13.Yet another contention made by counsel for
the appellant that respondents 2 to 18 are not entitled
to maintain the Computation Petitions under Section
33(c)(2) of the Act as they are not workman is liable to
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W.P.No.33342 of 2013
go on the basis of the very admission made by the
Management witness before the Labour Court
admitting the controversy that the Settlement dated
30.03.1979 reached under Section 12(3) of the Act
between them would cover all 38 persons working in
the Bank including respondents 2 to 18 herein. In this
context, it is also pertinent to extract the admission
made by M.W.1 before the Labour Court:
'bjh/rh/M/1y; c&uj;J 38 t';fpapy;
cs;s midj;J Chpah;fSf;Fk;
bghUe;Jk;/ ,e;j kDjhuh;fSf;Fk;
bghUe;Jk;/ bjh/rh/M/1 xg;ge;jk;
bghJ nkyhsh; ,iz nkyhsh;
midtUf;Fk; bghUe;Jtjhfj;jhd;
cs;sJ/'
14.Besides, in the cross examination, M.W.1
had clearly admitted that respondents 2 to 18 do not
have the power of signing cheques; they do not have
power to take disciplinary action against the
subordinates; they are not entitled to enter into any
settlement on behalf of the Bank; and they cannot sue
on behalf of the Bank. It is also further admitted that
though they are entitled to grant ordinary leave viz.,
casual leave, with reference of other leave, they have
only power to make recommendation. They are
considered as Managers only for name sake, but in
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W.P.No.33342 of 2013
reality, they were doing the clerical work for the Bank.
These admissions of M.W.1 would not be impeached.
Therefore, the controversy raised by the appellant
that respondents 2 to 18 being the Managers and
Assistant managers, are not workmen and hence, they
are not entitled to approach the Labour Court, cannot
be accepted, since M.W.1/Subramanian in his
evidence clearly admits that Ex.W.1 Settlement is
applicable to the petitioners, namely, the contesting
respondents herein. Since the binding effect of the
settlement has to continue to bind the parties by way
of contractual obligations, the contention of the
appellant that the contesting respondents before us
are not coming within the purview of workman as
defined under Section 2(s) of the Act is not legally
sustainable.
15.In the light of the above judgments, we are of
the considered view that the Labour Court has rightly
passed the common order and the same has been
rightly confirmed by the learned Single Judge.
Therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed, hence,
the same is dismissed. Consequently, connected
C.M.P. is closed. No costs."
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W.P.No.33342 of 2013
3. Since the Hon'ble Division Bench has already dealt with the mater
and had upheld the rights of the workmen in the Computation Petition
Nos.1109 of 2002, batch etc., which case is similar to the order passed in the
present Computation Petition No.225 of 2008, which is the subject matter of
the present writ petition, this Court may not be in a position to deviate from
the findings of the Hon'ble Division Bench.
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W.P.No.33342 of 2013
M.S.RAMESH,J.
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4. In the light of the above observations, this Court does not find any
infirmity in the impugned order passed by the Labour Court. Accordingly,
this Writ Petition stands dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected
Miscellaneous Petition is closed.
07.09.2021
Index:Yes/No
Internet:Yes/No
Speaking order/Non-speaking order
hvk
To
The Presiding Officer,
Labour Court, Coimbatore.
W.P.No.33342 of 2013
and
M.P.No.1 of 2013
http://www.judis.nic.in
