Madras High Court

Bandiappa vs Bhagyalakshmi on 14 July, 2021

                                                                         S.A.No.512 of 2021



                                   IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

                                                Dated : 14.07.2021

                                                    CORAM:

                                     THE HONOURABLE Mr.JUSTICE M.SUNDAR

                                                S.A.No.512 of 2021
                                                       and
                                              C.M.P.No.10320 of 2021

                  1. Bandiappa
                     S/o.Late Krishnappa

                      Seenappa (Deceased)
                      S/o.Late Krishnappa

                  2. Sathish
                     S/o.Bandiappa

                  3. Ramamoorthy
                     S/o.Bandiappa

                  4. Rajesh
                     S/o.Seenappa

                  5. Muniraj
                     S/o.Seenappa                                       ... Appellants

                                                       Vs.

                  1. Bhagyalakshmi
                     W/o.Late Subbarayappa

                  2. B.S.Vekatesh
                     S/o.Late Subbarayappa

                 1/23
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                                                                                     S.A.No.512 of 2021




                  3. B.S.Ganga
                     D/o.Late Subbarayappa

                  4. B.S.Sathyanarayana
                     S/o.Late Subbarayappa

                  5. B.S.Sethuram
                     S/o.Late Subbarayappa

                  6. B.S.Veugopal
                     S/o.Late Subbarayappa                                   ... Respondents

                  Prayer:
                            Second Appeal has been filed under Section 100 of Code of Civil
                  Procedure, 1908, praying to set aside the Judgment and Decree in A.S.No.4
                  of 2019 dated 25.08.2020 passed by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge,
                  Hosur confirming the decree and judgment in O.S.No.44 of 2014 dated
                  05.12.2017 passed by the learned District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate
                  No.I, Hosur.
                                   For Appellants   :     Mr.C.Samivel
                                                         ***


                                               JUDGMENT

Seven years is the age of the lis which has lead to captioned second

appeal, as a plaint was presented by 'six plaintiffs' (five appellants before this

second appeal Court as 2nd plaintiff died pending proceedings and five

appellants shall hereinafter be collectively referred to as 'plaintiffs' for the

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sake of convenience and clarity) on 21.03.2014 and the same was taken on

file as O.S.No.44 of 2014 on the file of the 'Court of District Munsif-cum-

Judicial Magistrate No.1 at Hosur' [hereinafter 'trial Court' for the sake of

convenience and clarity]

2. '37 cents or in other words 0.15.0 hectares extent of land comprised

in Dinnapalli Soodapuram Village, situate within Hosur Sub-Registration

District, Krishnagiri Registration District' is the subject matter of suit and the

same shall hereinafter be referred to as 'suit property' for the sake of

convenience and clarity.

3. In the aforementioned suit in the trial Court, there were six

defendants. Prayer in the suit was inter-alia for declaration of title and

consequent permanent injunction against the defendants qua alienation qua

suit property. The usual costs limb and residuary limb also form part of the

prayer paragraph in the plaint which is paragraph No.XI.

4. In the trial Court all the six defendants remained ex-parte.

However, in tune with obtaining legal position, the trial Court embarked

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upon the exercise of examining if plaintiffs have proved their case by

appreciating oral and documentary evidence before it. Fourth plaintiff

(Ramamoorthy) examined himself as P.W.1 and five exhibits were marked

and they are Ex.A1 to Ex.A5 being patta in the name of Sampangi Ramayya,

a loan document dated 22.11.1984, an order made by jurisdictional District

Revenue Officer dated 19.05.2014, Legalheir certificate of Krishnappa and

Kandhaya receipts in the name of Krishnappa respectively. On appreciation

of oral and documentary evidence, trial Court came to the conclusion that the

plaintiffs have not discharged the burden of proof qua prayer for declaration

of title and consequential injunction regarding suit property. The trial Court

non-suited the plaintiffs i.e., dismissed the suit in and by judgment and

decree dated 05.12.2017. Plaintiffs carried the matter in appeal by way of a

regular first appeal under Section 96 of 'The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908'

[hereinafter 'CPC' for the sake of convenience and clarity] vide AS.No.4 of

2019 on the file of 'Principal Subordinate Judge's Court, Hosur' [hereinafter

'First Appellate Court' for the sake of convenience and clarity]. Unlike the

trial Court in the First Appellate Court, respondents 1 to 4 (defendants 1 to 4

in the trial Court) entered appearance through counsel and contested the suit.

However, defendants 5 & 6 continued to remain ex-parte in the First

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Appellate Court also. First Appellate Court, after full contest and after

examining the grounds on which the trial Court judgement and decree were

assailed as well as appreciation of oral and documentary evidence which was

before the trial Court, dismissed the first appeal in and by judgment and

decree dated 25.08.2020.

5. Plaintiffs who were non-suited consecutively and concurrently by

two successive decrees in the two tiers of litigation are now before this

second appeal Court vide captioned second appeal in the seven years old lis

and captioned second appeal is obviously under Section 100 of CPC.

6. Notwithstanding very many averments and grounds in the

memorandum of grounds of appeal, Mr.C.Samivel, learned counsel for

plaintiffs who is before this Virtual Court, made submissions, a summation of

which is as follows:

(a) The trial Court and First Appellate Court have not

considered Ex.A1 and Ex.A5 and have non-suited plaintiffs

by not looking into Ex.A1 and Ex.A5. To be noted,

description of Ex.A1 and Ex.A5 has already been set out

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supra. However, for clarity, this Court deems it appropriate to

mention again that Ex.A1 is patta in the name of Sampangi

Ramayya and Ex.A5 is Kandhaya receipts in the name of

Krishnappa.

(b) The trial Court has disposed of the suit without

framing issues.

(c) The trial Court and First Appellate Court have

admitted the case of plaintiffs, but has non-suited the

plaintiffs on the basis of oral and documentary evidence

before it.

7. This Court now embarks upon the exercise of considering the

submissions made by learned counsel for plaintiffs who are protagonists of

captioned second appeal i.e., appellants before this second appeal Court.

8. The first contention that Ex.A1 and Ex.A5 have not been considered

falls flat on its face as a mere reading of judgments of trial Court and First

Appellate Court make it clear that both Courts/both tiers have considered

Ex.A1 and Ex.A5 appreciating the same and returning findings. In the trial

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Court, paragraph No.5 and portions of paragraph No.6 of the judgment of

trial Court are relevant and the same read as follows:

                                     '5/    thjpfs;       jug;gpy;          thjp         uhkK:h;jj
                                                                                                 ; p            th/rh/1

                             Mf      tprhhpf;fg;gl;L          rk;g';fpuhikah                  bgahpyhd               gl;lh

th/rh/M/1 vd;Wk;. 22/11/1984k; njjpapl;l Mjhu fld;

gj;jpuj;jpd; rhd;wpl;l efy; th/rh/M/2 vd;Wk;.

19/05/2014k; njjpapl;L khtl;l tUtha; mYtyh;

mth;fspd; cj;jut[ th/rh/M/3 vd;Wk;. fpUc&;zg;ghtpd;

                             thhpR         rhd;wpjH;        th/rh/M/4                vd;Wk;.            fpUc&;zg;gh

                             bgahpyhd          fe;jha             urPJfs;               th/rh/M/5                 vd;Wk;

                             fpUc&;zg;ghtpd;           ,wg;g[        rhd;wpjH;            th/rh/M/6               vd;Wk;

                             thjpfs; jug;gpy; jhf;fy; bra;ag;gl;Ls;sJ/

                                     6/     thjpfs;        jug;gpy;           jhthr;            brhj;J             jdJ

                             jhj;jhtpw;F            ghj;jpag;gl;lJ                     vd;w              tiff;fhd

th/rh/M/1 Mtzj;ijg; ghprPyid bra;ifapy; rh;nt

vz;/40-7 bgy;Ykd;dd; nghuz;fz;ld; bt';flfphp

bgahpy; ,Ue;J 30/01/1970k; njjpapl;l U/s.10(1)(1)

tpjp go bt';fnlra;ah kfd; rk;g';fpuhikah bgahpy;

khw;wk; bra;ag;gl;Ls;sjhf nkw;go Mtzj;jpd; K:yk;

mwpa KofpwJ/ ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

fpUc&;zg;gh ,we;j tiff;fhd thjpfs; thhpRfs;

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vd;W thhpR rhd;Wk; jhf;fy; bra;ag;gl;Ls;sJ/ 1964.

                             1969.     1970k;    Mz;oy;       fpUc&;zg;gh      bgaUf;F       gl;lh

                             vz;/28f;F        urPJ     brYj;jpa       tiff;fhd          urPJfSk;

                             jhf;fy; bra;ag;gl;Ls;sJ/             2008k; Mz;ow;F gpd;dpl;L

                             ghh;tjk;kh      bgaUf;F       urPJ    brYj;jg;gl;l        tiff;fhd

                             urPJfs;      jhf;fy;     bra;ag;gl;Ls;sJ/         gl;lh    vz;/28w;F

                             fe;jhak;       brYj;jpa[s;sjhf         Mtz';fnsJk;           jhf;fy;

                             bra;ag;gltpy;iy/'

                                                             (Underlining made by this Court to

supply emphasis, highlight and for ease of reference)

9. First Appellate Court also has considered and appreciated Ex.A1

and Ex.A5. This is articulated in paragraph No.12 of judgment of First

Appellate Court and the relevant portions of paragraph No.12 of the

judgment of First Appellate Court read as follows:

'12. A careful perusal of the records it would reveal that the plaintiffs had produced Ex.A1 SLR copy and Ex.A2 mortgage deed dated 22.11.1984 and the order passed by the District Revenue Officer on 19.02.2014 to establish their title over the suit property.

As discussed above the Ex.A1 SLR was changed in the name of the predecessor of the defendants namely Sampangi Ramayya in the year 1970 and the appeal prepared by the 4th plaintiff with regard to the Ex.A1 was rejected by the District Revenue Officer, Krishnagiri on

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19.02.2014 by his order Ex.A3. ............................................. Moreover, the Ex.A2 mortgage deed would not sufficient to prove that the suit property belongs to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have produced Ex.A5 kist receipts from the year 1964, 1969, 1970 in the name of Krishnappanal and also produced kist receipts in the year 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2013 in the name of Paravathammal. The plaintiffs have produced kist receipts relates to the suit property. But, it would not confer any title. In the judgments reported in 2013 (2) CTC 347 State of Andhra Pradesh and others Vs. Star Bone Mill and Fertilizer Co., and 2014 (4) CTC (SC) 471, Union of India Vs. Vasavi Co.op Housing Society Ltd., 2005 (2) L.W. 196, M.E.A.Mohammed ali Vs. The District Revenue Officer, Ramnad, it is observed that entries in revenue records do not create or extinguish title nor do they have any presumptive value such entries are only for the purpose of payment of land revenue, therefore the arguments set forth by the plaintiffs in this aspect cannot be countenanced.' (Underlining made by this Court to supply emphasis, highlight and for ease of reference)

10. Though the first submission is flattened in the light of the

aforementioned extracts, this Court also looked at the aforementioned

extracts and the two judgments as a whole to see if there is anything perverse

and so perverse qua appreciation of these exhibits that absent perversity it

would have lead to a bipolar opposite conclusion by the Courts below. This

Court is unable to find any such perversity and suffice to say that there is no

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demonstrable perversity that has been placed before me.

11. This takes us to the second submission. This submission, in the

considered view of this Court is no argument as, all the defendants remained

ex-parte in the trial Court as already mentioned supra. The question of

narrowing down the pleadings and framing issues will arise only when there

are rival pleadings. In this case, when the defendants have remained ex-parte

without even entering appearance. To be noted this is not a case of

defendants being set ex-parte/remaining ex-parte after filing of written

statement. This means that there is no pleadings i.e., no written statement on

the side of defendants and the question of framing issues does not arise.

Therefore, the second submission that the trial Court has dismissed the suit

without framing issues is no argument and does not hold water in the case on

hand.

12. The third submission, is to the effect that the Courts below have

admitted the case of plaintiffs, but have non-suited the plaintiffs. Admission

if any can only be by the defendants i.e., adversaries. The question of Courts

admitting the case is not a tenable argument. However, this Court is of the

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view that the procedure and approach of the Courts below in scrutinising the

oral and documentary evidence even though there is no contest in the trial

Court is unexceptionable as the law is well settled that it is imperative for the

trial Court to make sure that the plaintiffs prove their case before making a

decree even if it is an ex-parte decree. A careful perusal of the judgment of

the trial Court makes it clear that the plaintiffs have not proved their case as

they have not filed documents that would establish their case. For an

illustration, the trial Court, referring to loan document has held that though

the pleadings is land comprised in Survey Nos.40/7 and 40/8 has been

mortgaged, no details such as basis of mortgage and whether mortgage was

discharged have been produced before the trial Court and there is no oral or

documentary evidence in this regard, with regard to patta, the trial Court has

come to the conclusion that though Kandhaya receipts have been filed for the

years 1964, 1969 and 1970, post 1970 there are no receipts qua this patta.

This is articulated in paragraph No.7 of the judgment of the trial Court and

the relevant portions read as follows:

'7/ /////////////////////// rh;nt vz;/40-7, 40-8y; cs;s

brhj;jpid mlkhdk; bra;jpUg;gjhf thjpfs; jug;gpy;

bjhptpf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ/ vjd; mog;gilapy; mlkhdk;

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itf;fg;gl;lJ/ mlkhdj;ij kPl;L bfhz;lhh;fsh

vd;gJ Fwpj;Jk; thjpfs; jug;gpy; Mtz';fnsh.

                             rhl;rpa';fnsh      Kd;dpiyg;gLj;jg;gltpy;iy/                   gl;lh

                             vz;/28w;F    fe;jhak;      brYj;jpajhf        1964.   1969.     1970

                             Mfpa       tUl';fSf;fhd           fe;jha      urPJfs;        jhf;fy;

                             bra;ag;gl;Ls;sJ/           1970w;F   gpd;dpl;L      nkw;go     gl;lh

                             vz;zpw;F      urPJfs;      brYj;jpajhf        thjpfs;        jug;gpy;

                             Mtz';fnsJk;            jhf;fy;    bra;ag;gltpy;iy/            nkYk;.

                             jhthr;         brhj;J            thjpfspd;          mDgtj;jpYk;

                             RthjPdj;jpYk;      ,Ue;J         tUfpwJ      vd;gij      thjpfs;

                             jFe;j       rhl;rpa';fs;     K:yKk;.       Mtz';fs;          K:yKk;

                             epU:gzk;      bra;aj;jtwpa[ss
                                                         ; hh;fs;         vd;W     jPh;khdpj;J

thjpfspd; tHf;fpid bryt[j; bjhifapd;wp js;Sgo

bra;J jPh;g;gspf;fg;gLfpwJ/'

13. Suffice to say that the First Appellate Court is also a Court of fact

albeit last Court of fact, it has proceeded in this basis, it has noticed the

contest by the respondents 1 to 4 and has dismissed the appeal confirming

the non-suiting of plaintiffs by the trial Court. Therefore, this approach of

the First Appellate Court also is unexceptionable as there is nothing

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demonstrable qua perversity. As already alluded to supra, captioned Second

Appeal is under Section 100 CPC and therefore, it has to turn on substantial

question of law.

14. Before proceeding further, this Court reminds itself of Kanailal

principle being law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kanailal and

others Vs. Ram Chandra Singh and others reported in (2018) 13 SCC 715

wherein the principles of Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC have been telescoped

into a legal drill under Section 100 CPC. In this view of the matter, this

Court deems it appropriate to set out and say that the lone point for

determination in the captioned second appeal is whether there is any

perversity in appreciation of documents by the Courts below and as to

whether any substantial question of law arises in the case on hand owing to

such perversity (if any) or owing to any other reason.

15. The first limb of aforementioned point for determination i.e.,

perversity point has already been answered in dispositive reasoning given

above. The argument that Ex.A1 and Ex.A5 have not been considered by the

Courts below has been flattened and in any event, there is nothing

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demonstrable to show that the appreciation is perverse and therefore, answer

to this first limb is not in the affirmative and with regard to second limb of

point for determination, this Court reminds itself that the expression

'substantial question of law' occurring in Section 100 of CPC has been

elucidatively explained in a long line of case laws i.e., catena of case laws

starting from the celebrated Sir Chunilal Mehta's case [Sir Chunilal

V.Mehta and Sons Ltd., Vs. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co.

Ltd., reported in AIR 1962 SC 1314] wherein a Constitution Bench of

Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the principles laid down by a Full Bench

of this Court (Madras High Court) in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao's case

[Rimmalapudi Subba Rao Vs. Noony Veeraju And Others reported in AIR

1959 Madras 969 (FB)]. The long line of case laws in this regard over half a

century and one decade inter-alia are Santosh Hazari case being Santosh

Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari reported in (2001) 3 SCC 179, Hero Vinoth

case being Hero Vinoth (minor) Vs. Seshammal (2006) 5 SCC 545 and

Malan Bi case being Syeda Rahimunnisa Vs. Malan Bi (dead) by legal

representatives and another reported in (2016) 10 SCC 315. This Court

deems it appropriate to not to burden this judgment with extracts from these

case laws as that may lead to making this judgment verbose. Suffice to say

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that these principles/determinants/concomitants qua the expression of

'substantial question of law' occurring in Section 100 CPC continues to hold

the field as Hon'ble Supreme Court as recently as on 27.08.2020 in Nazir

Mohamed case [Nazir Mohamed Vs. J.Kamala and others reported in 2020

SCC OnLine SC 676] has reiterated the aforementioned principles starting

from celebrated Sir Chunilal Mehta's case. Relevant paragraphs in Nazir

Mohamed case are paragraph Nos.29 to 37 and the same read as follows:

'29. The principles for deciding when a question of law becomes a substantial question of law, have been enunciated by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Sir Chunilal v. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd.1, where this Court held:—

“The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.”

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30. In Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal , this Court referred to and relied upon Chunilal v. Mehta and Sons (supra) and other judgments and summarised the tests to find out whether a given set of questions of law were mere questions of law or substantial questions of law.

31. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth (supra) are set out herein below:-

21. The phrase substantial question of law, as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying question of law, means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with- technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of substantial question of law by suffixing the words of general importance as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution.

The substantial question of law on which a second appeal 2(2006) 5 SCC 545 shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta [(1927-28) 5I5 IA 235 : AIR 1928 PC 172] the phrase substantial question of law as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was

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involved in the case. In Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 : AIR 1962 SC 1314] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju [AIR 1951 Mad 969 : (1951) 2 MLJ 222 (FB)] : (Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 : AIR 1962 SC 1314] , SCR p. 557) When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law.

32. To be substantial, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way.

33. To be a question of law involved in the case, there must be first, a foundation for it laid in the pleadings, and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact, arrived at by Courts of facts, and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case.

34. Where no such question of law, nor even a mixed question of law and fact was urged before the Trial Court or the

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First Appellate Court, as in this case, a second appeal cannot be entertained, as held by this Court in Panchagopal Barua v. Vinesh Chandra Goswami3.

35. Whether a question of law is a substantial one and whether such question is involved in the case or not, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The paramount overall consideration is the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and the impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. This proposition finds support from Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari .

36. In a Second Appeal, the jurisdiction of the High Court being confined to substantial question of law, a finding of fact is not open to challenge in second appeal, even if the appreciation of evidence is palpably erroneous and the finding of fact incorrect as held in Ramchandra v. Ramalingam . An entirely new point, raised for the first time, before the High Court, is not a question involved in the case, unless it goes to the root of the matter.

37. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus:

(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact, but the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law.Construction of a document, involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law.

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(ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue.

(iii) A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the Court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law.

(iv) The general rule is, that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the wellrecognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.'

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16. This Court, after setting out a survey of case laws qua the

expression 'substantial question of law' now turns to the four questions that

have been proposed as substantial questions of law by the protagonist of

captioned second appeal as culled out from the memorandum of grounds of

appeal which read as follows:

'1. Whether the Courts below is justified in dismissing the suit by entirely lobbing that the Ex.A1, A2 and A5 were not proved?

2. Whether the Courts below are right in deciding the suit only on the presumption and assumption?

3. Whether the Courts below are right in considering the Ex.A1, A2 and A5 and their possession for deciding the declaration suit?

4. Whether the Courts below are right in non application of the primary evidence putforth by the appellants?'

17. If the aforementioned principles/concomitants/determinants qua

expression the 'substantial question of law' occurring in Section 100 CPC are

applied, it follows as an inevitable sequitur that the aforementioned questions

do not qualify as substantial questions of law and in any event, they do not

arise in the case on hand as nothing debatable, nothing that is res integra or

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nothing demonstrable that settled principles of law have been disregarded is

there in the case on hand. It is also necessary to say that there is nothing

turning on misconstruction of a document or a wrong application of a

principle of law in construing a document. Therefore, there is no difficulty

in coming to the conclusion that no substantial question of law arises in the

captioned second appeal.