Madras High Court
J.Balu Sekar vs The State Of Tamil Nadu on 4 January, 2021
1
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
DATED: 04.01.2021
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.DHANDAPANI
W.P(MD)No.10568 of 2010
and
M.P.(MD)Nos. 1 and 2 of 2010
J.Balu Sekar ... Petitioner
Vs.
1.The State of Tamil Nadu,
represented by the Secretary to Government,
Co-operation, Food and Consumer Protection
Department,
St.George Fort, Chennai-600 009.
2.The Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies,
Tirunelveli Region,
Tirunelveli.
3.The Administrator,
Vallioor Co-op. Agricultural and Rural
Development Bank Ltd., D.R.L.(E)11,
Panagudi-627 109,
Tirunelveli District. ... Respondents
Prayer: Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to issue
a writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records in pursuant to the
Termination order passed by the third respondent in proceeding, dated
06.06.2005 and the consequential revision order passed by the second
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2
respondent in Na.Ka.11192/07, Sa.Pa. Dated 30.06.2008 and the appellate
order, passed by the first respondent in G.O.(2D) No.110 Co-operation,
Food and Consumer Protection Department, dated 26.10.2009 and in G.O.
(2D)No.21, Co-operation, Food and Consumer Protection Department,
dated 05.03.2010 and quash the same and consequently to direct the
respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service with backwages and all
attendant and consequential service benefits.
For Petitioner ... Mr.M.Saravana Kumar
for Mr.M.Karl Marx
For Respondents ... Mr.D.Muruganantham
Additional Government Pleader
for R.2
Mr.K.Bala Subramanian
for R.3
*****
ORDER
This writ petition has been filed seeking a writ of Certiorarified
Mandamus to call for the records in pursuant to the Termination order
passed by the third respondent in proceeding, dated 06.06.2005 and the
consequential revision order passed by the second respondent in Na.Ka.
11192/07, Sa.Pa. Dated 30.06.2008 and the appellate order, passed by the
first respondent in G.O.(2D) No.110 Co-operation, Food and Consumer
Protection Department, dated 26.10.2009 and in G.O.(2D)No.21, Co-
operation, Food and Consumer Protection Department, dated 05.03.2010
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and quash the same and consequently to direct the respondents to reinstate
the petitioner in service with back wages and all attendant and
consequential service benefits.
2. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner was initially
appointed as Office Assistant in the third respondent Bank, on 01.11.1975
and subsequently, he was promoted as Supervisor on 01.04.1980. While so,
a charge memo, dated 01.04.1980, was issued by the third respondent and
the same was served on him on 01.04.1980 by stating that the petitioner
temporarily misappropriated the collection amount to the tune of Rs.6,000/-
and Rs.3,393/-, which amounted to dereliction of duty.
3. The petitioner collected the amount from the members of the
Vallioor Primary Agricultural and Rural Development Bank and issued a
temporary receipt and thereafter, the said amount was not remitted to the
Bank account. After one year, that amount was remitted to the Bank, for
which, the petitioner was issued with a show cause notice and an enquiry
was conducted. After conduct of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted
a report holding the petitioner guilty of the charges framed against him.
Based on the said report, the disciplinary authority terminated the petitioner
from service on 06.06.2005. The said order of termination was challenged
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by the petitioner by filing a writ petition in W.P.No.1623 of 2006 and the
same was disposed of on 13.07.2007, with a direction to the petitioner to
file revision petition before the competent authority. As per the directions
of this Court, the petitioner filed a revision before the second respondent
and the same was rejected on 30.06.2008, against which, the petitioner filed
an appeal before the first respondent and the same was also rejected on
30.06.2008. Against the same, the petitioner filed a review application and
the same was also rejected on 05.03.2010. Challenging the same, the
present Writ Petition is filed by the petitioner seeking the above stated
relief.
4. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that while
the petitioner was working as a Supervisor, he had collected the loan
amount from the members of the third respondent Bank and the same was
entered in the passbook of the concerned persons and immediately after
collection of the said amounts, they were handed over to the Secretary of the
Bank for crediting the said amount in the books of the third respondent
Bank. However, the Secretary did not remit the amounts with the third
respondent Bank, for which, the petitioner was issued with a charge memo.
It is the further submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that
without considering the detailed explanation offered by the petitioner and
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without examining any witnesses, the enquiry officer has held the petitioner
guilty, which order is wholly unsustainable.
5. Further the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that all
the amounts, which were collected from the members of the Bank, were
handed over to the Secretary of the Bank and therefore, action ought to have
been initiated against against the Secretary of the Bank and not against the
petitioner. Further, a copy of the enquiry report was not furnished to the
petitioner, so as to enable the petitioner to give a detailed reply. Without
furnishing the enquiry report, the original authority imposed the order of
punishment, which is contrary to the well established procedures and the
same was confirmed by the revisional and appellate authorities, which
shows non-application of mind and, therefore, the said impugned orders
requires interference.
6. Learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the
second respondent submits that the third respondent, in his charge memo,
dated 29.11.2004, had framed eight charges against the petitioner and the
enquiry officer, after scrutinizing the documents filed by the third
respondent bank, has come to the conclusion that the charges were proved
against the petitioner. The petitioner, as supervisor, had collected the
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amount from the members of the Bank and entered the same in the passbook
of the loanee, which was marked as Exhibit No.M1, which clearly shows
that the petitioner had collected the loan amounts from the members of the
Bank. The said collection amounts were not remitted with the third
respondent Bank immediately, however, the same was remitted to the Bank
only on 02.09.2004 as per Exhibit No.M12. The petitioner has also failed to
hand over the receipt book to the third respondent Bank. Only after taking
sustained efforts and paper publication, the petitioner handed over the
receipt book on 02.09.2004 to the third respondent Bank. Based on the
enquiry, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 28.04.2005 by
registered post, which the petitioner failed to receive and, therefore, another
opportunity was given to the petitioner to receive the domestic enquiry
report along with the show cause notice on 25.05.2005 or 26.05.2005.
However, the petitioner has not availed that opportunity and failed to give
explanation to the show cause notice. Therefore, the disciplinary authority
had acted on the basis of the enquiry report and the other materials placed
before him and the same does not call for any interference. Further, the
revisional and appellate authorities have also applied their minds
independently and passed the rejection orders, which deserves to be
sustained.
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7. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the learned
Additional Government Pleader appearing for the second respondent and
the learned Counsel appearing for the third respondent and perused the
materials placed on record.
8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India,
(1995 (6) SCC 749), while dealing with issue relating to the power of the
Court relating to judicial review of the order passed in disciplinary
proceedings, held as under :
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a
review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of
judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives
fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the
authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court.
When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a
public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine
whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether
rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings
or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority
entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power
and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that
finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical
rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined
therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority
accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom,
the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent
officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of
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judicial review does not act as appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent
findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere
where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent
officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice
or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry
or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary
authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be
such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the
Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding,
and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of
each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where
appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive
power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment.
In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and
findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence
or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed
before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel
[(1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38] this
Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of
the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or
suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no
evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
9. The above view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Principal Secy. Govt. of A.P. v. M. Adinarayana, (2004 (12) SCC 579),
wherein, it has been held as under :-
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“23. We have read this charge in the light of allegations in
support thereof. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the
respondent has neither supplied any prior information on the
Government nor did he send any prior intimation to the
Government. By not doing this, he has contravened the
provisions of Rule 9. The Tribunal has also categorically held
that the respondent has not applied for prior information before
he purchased the items from the competent authority nor he
intimated to the competent authority forthwith soon after the
purchase of the several items. Therefore, in our view, the charged
officer has violated Rule 9 of the Conduct Rules and thus is guilty
of misconduct within Rule 2-H (sic) of the Andhra Pradesh
Disciplinary Amendment Act, 1993. In view of the abovesaid
finding we hold that respondent is guilty of both the charges
framed against him within Rule 2 (b) of the Conduct Rules of
1961 framed under the Amendment Act, 1993.
* * * * * *
26. In our opinion, judicial review cannot extend to the
examination of the correctness of the charges as it is not an
appeal but only a review of the manner in which the decision was
made. We have, therefore, no hesitation in setting aside the order
of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal and the judgment
of the Division Bench of the High Court for reasons stated
(supra). The order passed by the Government removing the
respondent from service is in order and, therefore, the appeal
filed by the appellant State stands allowed. Further, there will be
no order as to costs.”
10. In a recent decision in Director General of Police, RPF & Ors. -
Vs – Rajendra Kumar Dubey (C.A. No.3820/2020 dated 25.11.20), the
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Hon'ble Supreme Court, adverting to the various decisions of the Apex
Court relating to the interference by the High Court in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction with respect to disciplinary proceedings, including the decision
in Chaturvedi's case (supra), held as under :-
“12.1 ...... It is well settled that the High Court must not act as
an appellate authority, and re-appreciate the evidence led before
the enquiry officer.
We will advert to some of the decisions of this Court with
respect to interference by the High Courts with findings in a
departmental enquiry against a public servant.
In State of Andhra Pradesh v S.Sree Rama Rao, a three judge
bench of this Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution is not a court of appeal over the decision of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant. It is not the function of the High Court under its writ
jurisdiction to review the evidence, and arrive at an independent
finding on the evidence. The High Court may, however interfere
where the departmental authority which has held the proceedings
against the delinquent officer are inconsistent with the principles
of natural justice, where the findings are based on no evidence,
which may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent
officer is guilty of the charge, or in violation of the statutory
rules prescribing the mode of enquiry, or the authorities were
actuated by some extraneous considerations and failed to reach a
fair decision, or allowed themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant considerations, or where the conclusion on the very
face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no
reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. If
however the enquiry is properly held, the departmental authority
is the sole judge of facts, and if there is some legal evidence on
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which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of
that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be
canvassed before the High Court in a writ petition.
These principles were further reiterated in the State of Andhra
Pradesh v Chitra Venkata Rao. The jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The
court exercises the power not as an appellate court. The findings
of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal on the
appreciation of evidence, are not re-opened or questioned in writ
proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the
record can be corrected by a writ court, but not an error of fact,
however grave it may be. A writ can be issued if it is shown that
in recording the finding of fact, the tribunal has erroneously
refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had
erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence. A finding of fact
recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that
the material evidence adduced before the tribunal is insufficient
or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency
of evidence led on a point, and the inference of fact to be drawn
from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
tribunal.
In subsequent decisions of this Court, including Union of
India v. G. Ganayutham, Director General RPF v. Ch. Sai
Babu, Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage
Board v T.T. Murali, Union of India v. Manab Kumar Guha,
these principles have been consistently followed.
In a recent judgment delivered by this Court in the State of
Rajasthan & Ors. v. Heem Singh this Court has summed up the
law in following words :
“33. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters,
there are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of
restraint. The second defines when interference is permissible.
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The rule of restraint constricts the ambit of judicial review. This
is for a valid reason. The determination of whether a misconduct
has been committed lies primarily within the domain of the
disciplinary authority. The judge does not assume the mantle of
the disciplinary authority. Nor does the judge wear the hat of an
employer. Deference to a finding of fact by the disciplinary
authority is a recognition of the idea that it is the employer who
is responsible for the efficient conduct of their service.
Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural
justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence
which apply to judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is
hence not the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of
proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard governed by
a preponderance of probabilities. Within the rule of
preponderance, there are varying approaches based on context
and subject. The first end of the spectrum is founded on
deference and autonomy – deference to the position of the
disciplinary authority as a fact finding authority and autonomy
of the employer in maintaining discipline and efficiency of the
service. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the
court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the
enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer from
perversity. A failure to consider vital evidence is an incident of
what the law regards as a perverse determination of fact.
Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our jurisprudence.
Service jurisprudence has recognized it for long years in
allowing for the authority of the court to interfere when the
finding or the penalty are disproportionate to the weight of the
evidence or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a
steady sail between the banks of these two shores which have
been termed as the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest
with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when they
exercise judicial review. To determine whether the finding in a
disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an initial or
threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is to satisfy the
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conscience of the court that there is some evidence to support
the charge of misconduct and to guard against perversity. But
this does not allow the court to re-appreciate evidentiary
findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which
appears to the judge to be more appropriate. To do so would
offend the first principle which has been outlined above. The
ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common sense without
which the judges’ craft is in vain.”
In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, this Court held that the
High Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution of India shall not venture into re-appreciation of
the evidence. The High Court would determine whether : (a) the
enquiry is held by the competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held
according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is
violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the
proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations which are
extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the
authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on
the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no
reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the
admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority
had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which
influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no
evidence.
In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Court held that :
“13.Under Articles 226 / 227 of the Constitution of India, the
High Court shall not :
(i) re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in the case
the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
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(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based;
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to
be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it
shocks its conscience.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
11. From the ratio laid down above, it is implicitly clear that the
Courts, in exercise of its power of judicial review, cannot extend the
examination to the correctness of the act of the disciplinary authority, but
only limit itself to the manner in which the decision has been arrived at by
the authorities and whether the same is in accordance with law. This Court
is to test only the correctness of the decision arrived at by the authorities on
the basis of the evidence before it and not proceed with the case as if it is an
appeal against the impugned order.
12. A perusal of the records reveal that documentary evidence has
been placed by the Management to sustain its case that the petitioner had
collected the amounts and had not deposited the same immediately, though
the said amounts have been entered in the pass books of the loanee and the
same were deposited to the credit of the third respondent bank only much
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later in point of time. The petitioner, in his affidavit, has clearly admitted
collection of the amounts from the members of the bank and, in that
scenario, there is no need for the bank to let in oral evidence. Only when
receipt of amount is disputed, it becomes necessary for the bank to let in
oral evidence. When the petitioner, on his own volition, had accepted
receipt of the amount and entering the receipt in the pass books of the
concerned individuals, non-examination of witnesses would in no way
jeopardize the case of the bank. Though it is the case of the petitioner that
he had handed over the money collected to the Secretary, however, no
evidence in support of the same has been placed by the petitioner before the
enquiry officer to substantiate his case. Therefore, considering the materials
placed before him, the enquiry officer has held that the documentary
evidence are very much against the petitioner and, therefore, the charges
framed against the petitioner stood proved. This Court, is in complete
agreement with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer.
13. Insofar as the contention of the petitioner relating to non-
providing of the enquiry report and calling for further explanation by
issuing show cause notice is concerned, it is the stand of the Bank that the
enquiry report along with the show cause notice was sent to the petitioner
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twice, however, the petitioner did not receive the same. In such a backdrop,
the disciplinary authority had proceeded to act on the enquiry report.
14. It is evident from paragraph No.13 of the affidavit filed in support
of this writ petition, the petitioner has mentioned that the second respondent
issued a paper publication on 29.05.2005 stating that the petitioner should
submit his explanation on the enquiry report within seven days from the
date of publication. Thereafter, the petitioner approached the Bank on
04.06.2005 on which date, he found the gate of the bank locked and,
therefore, he could not approach the bank. Though such a contention is
raised by the petitioner, it is to be pointed out that when the petitioner is
aware of the proceedings that is being taken up against him, in due
diligence, the petitioner should have kept in touch with the bank to know
about the status of the proceeding. However, for reasons best known, the
petitioner had not participated in the enquiry proceedings, which left the
enquiry officer to conclude the proceedings.
15. It is to be pointed out that it is borne out by the record that the
stand of the Bank stands vindicated by the documentary evidence placed
before the enquiry officer. The bank had sent the show cause notice along
with the enquiry report twice to the petitioner through registered post,
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however, the petitioner had not received the same and had returned it.
Further, paper publication in this regard was also issued by the bank, which
has been admitted by the petitioner in his affidavit. That being the factual
position, the stand of the petitioner that he was not provided with the copy
of the enquiry report and no show cause notice was issued calling for further
explanation from him does not merit acceptance.
16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Rajendra Kumar Dubey's case
(supra), following the ratio laid down in Gunasekaran's case has held that
the High Court, sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution, while
determining its scope of interference in a departmental proceedings is only
bound to determine whether (a) the enquiry is held by the competent
authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in
that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in
conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves
from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations which are
extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have
allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous
considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived
at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to
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admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority
had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the
finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
17. In the case on hand, as could be seen from the materials, though
violations of principles of natural justice is claimed by the petitioner stating
that he has not been provided with the enquiry report and show cause notice
was not issued calling for further explanation on the basis of the enquiry
report, as already held by this Court above, the said contentions does not
merit acceptance. Once a finding is rendered by the enquiry officer, which
has been accepted by the disciplinary and appellate authorities, as stated
above, this Court, sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot
reappreciate the evidence in toto, as if it is sitting in appeal. Once this
Court finds that the procedure has been followed in the conduct of the
disciplinary proceedings, unless it is shown that a fair conclusion is not
reached or that the evidence has not been admitted or inadmissible evidence
has been admitted which prevailed upon the disciplinary authority to come
to the erroneous conclusion, this Court would not be justified in interfering
with the decision arrived at by the disciplinary authority. Further, the
petitioner having not participated in the enquiry proceeding, inspite of
opportunities given to him, it is not open for the petitioner to contend that
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either the enquiry has not been conducted in a proper manner or that the
enquiry officer has not appreciated the materials in proper perspective while
rendering his finding. Further, it is also evident that no extraneous
considerations have influenced either the enquiry officer or the disciplinary
authority. Such being the case, there being no lacunae or discrepancy, as
pointed out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the conduct of the
departmental proceedings, this Court, in exercise of its powers under Article
226 is not inclined to reappreciate the evidence as if sitting in appeal over
the appellate decision.
18. On a holistic consideration of the materials available on
record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the findings recorded in
the enquiry are just and reasonable and this Court, under the guise of
judicial review, cannot conduct a roving expedition as if the matter is in
appeal before this Court. The petitioner having not produced any material
to substantiate his case and not participating in the enquiry and fully being
aware that enquiry proceedings against him are under way, the finding
recorded by the enquiry officer, as accepted by the authorities below to
fasten the guilt on the petitioner does not require any interference.
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19. Insofar as the punishment awarded to the petitioner is
concerned for the delinquency, it has been the consistent view of the Courts
that, it is always within the domain of the Appointing Authority to decide on
the punishment to be imposed on the delinquent, which should be
proportionate to the act of the delinquent. Only when the punishment is
disproportionate and shocking the conscience, the Courts interfere with the
same, in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
In Prem Nath Bali – Vs - High Court of Delhi reported in (2015 (16) SCC
415), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :
“20. It is a settled principle of law that once the
charges levelled against the delinquent employee are proved
then it is for the appointing authority to decide as to what
punishment should be imposed on the delinquent employee as
per the Rules. The appointing authority, keeping in view the
nature and gravity of the charges, findings of the inquiry
officer, entire service record of the delinquent employee and
all relevant factors relating to the delinquent, exercised its
discretion and then imposed the punishment as provided in
the Rules.
21. Once such discretion is exercised by the
appointing authority in inflicting the punishment (whether
minor or major) then the courts are slow to interfere in the
quantum of punishment and only in rare and appropriate case
substitutes the punishment. Such power is exercised when the
court finds that the delinquent employee is able to prove that
the punishment inflicted on him is wholly unreasonable,
arbitrary and disproportionate to the gravity of the proved
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charges thereby shocking the conscience of the court or when
it is found to be in contravention of the Rules. The Court may,
in such cases, remit the case to the appointing authority for
imposing any other punishment as against what was
originally awarded to the delinquent employee by the
appointing authority as per the Rules or may substitute the
punishment by itself instead of remitting to the appointing
authority.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
20. In the case on hand, a careful perusal of the entire records relating
to the enquiry as also the order passed by the disciplinary authority, as
confirmed by the other authorities, it clearly transpires that the disciplinary
authority has applied his mind to the enquiry report and all the other
materials while imposing the punishment of termination and on revision, the
revisional authority has appreciated the materials independently and
concurred with the view of the disciplinary authority. On an overall
consideration of the materials, this Court is in consensus with the order
passed by the disciplinary authority as confirmed by the appellate and
revisional authorities and the punishment imposed on the petitioner is just
and reasonable considering the nature of delinquency and no sympathy can
flow from this Court for such an act. Therefore, the punishment imposed on
the petitioner is in no way shocking the conscience of this Court or
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disproportionate to the delinquency and, therefore, this Court is not inclined
to interfere with the same.
21. For the reasons aforesaid, this Writ Petition sans merit and,
accordingly, the same is dismissed. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous
Petitions are also dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Index : Yes/No 04.01.2021
Internet : Yes/No
SSL
Note: In view of the present lock down owing to
COVID-19 pandemic, a web copy of the order may
be utilized for official purposes, but, ensuring that
the copy of the order that is presented is the correct
copy, shall be the responsibility of the
advocate/litigant concerned.
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To
1.The the Secretary to Government,
State of Tamil Nadu,
Co-operation, Food and Consumer Protection
Department,
St.George Fort, Chennai-600 009.
2.The Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies,
Tirunelveli Region,
Tirunelveli.
3.The Administrator,
Vallioor Co-op. Agricultural and Rural
Development Bank Ltd., D.R.L.(E)11,
Panagudi-627 109,
Tirunelveli District.
http://www.judis.nic.in
M.DHANDAPANI,J.
SSL
W.P(MD)No.10568 of 2010
04.01.2021
http://www.judis.nic.in
