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Shri Yamuna Publicity Joint Venture ... vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh
2026 Latest Caselaw 1648 MP

Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 1648 MP
Judgement Date : 17 February, 2026

[Cites 18, Cited by 0]

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Shri Yamuna Publicity Joint Venture ... vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 17 February, 2026

Author: Pranay Verma
Bench: Pranay Verma
          NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:5788




                                                               1                               WP-3472-2026
                             IN      THE      HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                                     AT INDORE
                                                         BEFORE
                                           HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PRANAY VERMA
                                                 ON THE 17th OF FEBRUARY, 2026
                                                 WRIT PETITION No. 3472 of 2026
                           SHRI YAMUNA PUBLICITY JOINT VENTURE ADOCEAN GLOBAL
                            PRIVATE LIMITED THROUGH ITS MEMBER 2/DIRECTOR MR.
                                                   Versus
                                 THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
                          Appearance:
                                   Shri Rajat Raghuwanshi - Advocate for the petitioner.
                                   Shri Rahul Sethi, Shri Shashank Shrivastav and Shri Ashutosh Gondli
                          - Advocate for respondent No.3.

                                                                ORDER

With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is finally heard.

02. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred by the petitioner being aggrieved by the Letter of Acceptance (LOA) dated 12.01.2026 (Annexure P/1) issued by respondent No.3 in

favour of respondent No.4 for allotment of advertisement rights on the unipoles located at AB Road, Indore.

03. On 05.11.2025 respondent No.3, Atal Indore City Transport Services Limited (AICTSL) issued a notice inviting E-Tenders for allotment of advertisement rights on 42 unipoles located at AB Road, Indore for a period of three years. It was specified that the license fee quoted must be above Rs.100/- per square feet per month. The petitioner also submitted his

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:5788

2 WP-3472-2026

tender form along with the requisite documents. On 29.12.2025 respondent No.3 conducted technical evaluation of bids and uploaded the evaluation report. A total of 18 bidders participated in the tender process out of which 15 including the petitioner and respondent No.4 were declared technically qualified. The financial bids were then opened in which respondent No.4 was declared as H-1 bidder and the petitioner was declared as H-2 bidder.

04. As per the petitioner, the figure quoted by respondent No.4 was Rs.4.56 Lakh Crores which was an impossible figure. The petitioner then submitted his objection before respondent No.3 but no response was received. On 30.12.2025 respondent No.4 addressed a letter to respondent No.3 stating that the amount quoted by it is erroneous and sought

cancellation of the entire tender process. However, on 12.01.2026 respondent No.3 issued Letter of Acceptance (LOA) in favour of respondent No.4 accepting its commercially absurd bid. By communication dated 24.01.2026, respondent No.4 itself admitted that the amount quoted by it is mistaken and sought correction of the financial bid which is legally impermissible. The petitioner has every apprehension that respondent No.3 may arbitrarily cancel the entire tender process to benefit respondent No.4.

05. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Letter of Acceptance (LOA) issued in favour of respondent No.4 is illegal and contrary to law. As per Clause 5.4 of the Request For Proposal (RFP) guidelines, if successful bidder fails to acknowledge the Letter of Acceptance (LOA) or the conditions mentioned therein, the next bidder is mandatorily required to be considered. Since respondent No.4 itself expressed its

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:5788

3 WP-3472-2026 unwillingness to deposit the tender amount quoted by it, the petitioner is entitled to be considered for the bid. As per Clause 5.5 of the Request For Proposal (RFP), if the unsuccessful bidder is unable to execute the agreement within the stipulated time period, respondent No.3 is under an obligation to immediately withdraw the offer and replace it with appropriate subsequent bidder. Provision in this regard is also contained in Clause 5.6 of the Request For Proposal (RFP). The action of respondent No.3 in intending to scrap the entire tender process is illegal and prejudices the legal rights of the petitioner. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner upon the decision of the Apex Court in Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India 1994 SCC (6) 651, The Silppi Constructions Contractors Vs. Union of India 2020 (16) SCC 489, W.P. No.11842/2025 (Pragmatic Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Through Director Pranvir Singh Kushwaha Vs. M.P. Housing and Infrastructure Development Board and Others) decided on 16.10.2025, W.P. No.18584/2017 (Shri Mahadev Shahra Sukrat Trust Vs. Ministry of Urban Development and Environment and Others) decided on 22.03.2024, Chairman Cum Managing Director Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. Sunita Kumari 2014 (16) SCC 790, W.P. No.1294/2022 (Amit Sharma Vs. M.P. Housing and Infrastructure Development Board and Others) decided on 18.10.2022 and Golden Food Products India Vs. State of U.P. and Others 2026 SCC Online SC 24.

06. Reply has been filed by respondent No.3 and learned counsel for respondent No.3 has submitted that no judicial review is expected in

commercial matters unless a case of arbitrariness, malafide, bias or

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:5788

4 WP-3472-2026 irrationality is made out which contingencies are not existent in the present case. There is no patent illegality or perversity. As per office memorandum dated 21.04.2022 of the Government of India, if the bidder who has been found to be the lowest withdraws or fails to sign the contract, the procuring entity is required to retender the case hence respondent No.3 is bound to scrap the present tender process. As per manual for procurement of non- consultancy services 2025, vide Clause 7.4.11, the same procedure is required to be followed. The bid submitted by respondent No.4 was an impossible bid hence respondent No.3 has been constrained to scrap the entire tender process. The petitioner does not have any right to demand the allotment to be considered in its favour as per the terms of Request For Proposal (RFP). It is hence submitted that the petition deserves to be dismissed. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for respondent No.3 upon the decision of this Court in Rajbahdur Yadav Vs. State of M.P. and Others W.P. No.22902/2025 decided on 08.08.2025, Raju Bokade Vs. M.P. Housing and Infrastructure Board W.P. No.21856/2023 decided on 31.08.2023, Siemens Aktiengeselischaft and Siemens Limited Vs. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. and Others 2014 (11) SCC 288, Maa Binda Express Carrier and Another Vs. North-East Frontier Railway and Others 2014 (3) SCC 760 and State of Jharkhand and Others Vs. CWE - SOMA Consortium 2016 (14) SCC 172.

07. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record.

08. The different aspects of scope of judicial review in contract/tender

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5 WP-3472-2026 matter has been subject matter of consideration before the Apex Court as well as this Court on a number of occasions. Not only the scope of judicial review, but the question of arbitrariness, bias and other related aspects have been discussed in detail. The same have been lucidly summarised by the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Pragmatic Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (Supra) in which it has been held as under:-

"36. In the case of Tata Cellular (supra) , the exhaustive judgment on different aspects of scope of judicial review in contract/tender has been discussed. Not only scope of judicial review but the question of arbitrariness, bias and other related aspects have been discussed in detail. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference and for bringing clarity in the issue :-

68. Having regard to the above arguments we propose to deal with the matter from the following five aspects :-

1. The scope of judicial review in matters of this kind.

2. Whether the selection is vitiated by arbitrariness ? -

(a) regarding financial projection and

(b) regarding rental.

3. Bias of Mr. Nair - Whether affected the selection ?

4. Whether the Apex Committee has been bypassed ?

5. Evolving of hidden criteria - whether valid ?

1. Scope of Judicial Review

69. A tender is an offer. It is something which invites and is communicated to notify acceptance. Broadly stated, the following are the requisites of a valid tender :

1. It must be unconditional.

2. Must be made at the proper place.

3. Must conform to the terms of obligation.

4. Must be made at the proper time.

5. Must be made in the proper form.

6. The person by whom the tender is made must be able and willing to perform his obligations.

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:5788

6 WP-3472-2026

7. There must be reasonable opportunity for inspection.

8. Tender must be made to the proper person.

9. It must be of full amount.

70. It cannot be denied that the principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise of contractual powers by Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. However it must be clearly stated that there are inherent limitations in exercise of that power of judicial review. Government is the guardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. The right to refuse the lowest or any other tender is always available to the Government. But the principles laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in view, while accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no question of infringement of Article 14 if the Government tries to get the best person or the best quotation. The right to choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary power. Of course, if the said power is exercised for any collateral purpose the exercise of that power will be struck down.

71. Judicial quest in administrative matters has been to find the right balance between the administrative discretion to decide matters whether contractual or political in nature or issues of social policy; thus they are not essentially justiciable and the need to remedy any unfairness. Such an unfairness is set right by judicial review.

75. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans (1982) 3 All ER 141, 154 Lord Brightman said :

"Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision was made.

xx xx xx Ju the decision-madicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision-making process. Unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will in my view, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power."

In the same case Lord Hailsham commented on the purpose of the remedy by way of judicial review under RSC, Ord. 53 in the following terms :

"This remedy, vastly increased in extent, and rendered, over a long period in recent years, of infinitely more convenient access than that provided by the old prerogative writs and actions for a declaration, is intended to protect the individual against the abuse of power by a wide range of authorities, judicial, quasijudicial and, as would originally have been thought when I first practiced at the Bar, administrative. It is not intended to take away from those authorities the powers and discretion properly vested in them by law and to substitute the courts as the bodies making the decisions. It is intended to see that the relevant authorities use their powers in a proper manner."

In R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p. Datafin plc, (1987) 1

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:5788

7 WP-3472-2026 All ER 564, Sir John Donaldson, M.R. Commented :

"An application for judicial review is not an appeal."

In Lonrho plc v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, (1989)2 All ER 609, Lord Keith said :

"Judicial review is a protection and not a weapon."

It is thus different from an appeal. When hearing an appeal the Court is concerned with the merits of the decision under appeal. In Amin, Re (Amin v. Entry Clearance Officer, (1983) 2 All ER 864, Lord Fraser observed that :

"Judicial review is concerned not with the merits of a decision but with the manner in which the decision was made ..... Judicial review is entirely different from an ordinary appeal. It is made effective by the court quashing the administrative decision without substituting its own decision, and is to be contrasted with an appeal where the appellate tribunal substitutes its own decision on the merits for that of the administrative officer."

77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be :

1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers?

2. Committed an error of law,

3. Committed a breach of the rules of natural justice,

4. Reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or,

5. Abused its powers.

Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under:

(i) Illegality : This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it.

(ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness.

(iii) Procedural impropriety.

The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. As a matter of fact, in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex Brind 1991 (1) AC 696), Lord Diplock refers specifically to one development, namely, the possible recognition of the principle of proportionality. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that the court should, "consider whether something has

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:5788

8 WP-3472-2026 gone wrong of a nature and degree which requires its intervention".

78. What is this charming principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness ? Is it a magical formula ? In R. v. Askew (1768) 4 Burr 2186 : 98 ER 139, Lord Mansfield considered the question whether mandamus should be granted against the College of Physicians. He expressed the relevant principles in two eloquent sentences. They gained great value two centuries later :

"It is true, that the judgment and discretion of determining upon this skill, ability, learning and sufficiency to exercise and practise this profession is trusted to the College of Physicians and this Court will not take it from them, nor interrupt them in the due and proper exercise of it. But their conduct in the exercise of this trust thus committed to them ought to be fair, candid and unprejudiced; not arbitrary, capricious, or biased; much less, warped by resentment, or personal dislike."

81. Two other facets of irrationality may be mentioned. (1) It is open to the court to review the decision-maker's evaluation of the facts. The court will intervene where the facts taken as a whole could not logically warrant the conclusion of the decision-maker. If the weight of facts pointing to one course of action is overwhelming, then a decision the other way, cannot be upheld. Thus, in Emma Hotels Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Environment (1980 41 P & CR 255), the Secretary of State referred to a number of factors which led him to the conclusion that a non-residents bar in a hotel was operated in such a way that the bar was not an incident of the hotel use for planning purposes, but constituted a separate use. The Divisional Court analysed the factors which led the Secretary of State to that conclusion and, having done so, set it aside. Donaldson, L.J. said that he could not see on what basis the Secretary of State had reached his conclusion.

(2) A decision would be regarded as unreasonable if it is impartial and unequal in its operation as between different classes. On this basis in R. v. Barnet London Borough Council, ex p. Johnson (1989 88 LGR 73) the condition imposed by a local authority prohibiting participation by those affiliated with political parties at events to be held in the authoritys parks was struck down.

94. The principles deducible from the above are :

(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made.

(3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible.

(4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract.

Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts.

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:5788

9 WP-3472-2026 (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides.

(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. Based on these principles we will examine the facts of this case since they commend to us as the correct principles.

37. In the case of Tata Selular (supra), Apex Court interfered in two cases (out of many cases filed at the instance of service providers) on the ground of arbitrariness and violation of principle justice. Relevant paragraph No.151 in this regard is reproduced as under :-

151. In the above two cases, we are obliged to interfere on the ground of arbitrariness and violation of the principle of natural justice confining ourselves to the doctrine of judicial restraint, however, by the application of permissible parameters to set right the decision-making process.

38. In the case of Jagdish Mandal (supra), while relying upon the judgment delivered in Tata Cellular (supra) as well as Sterling Computers Limited (supra), Apex Court has given the guidance in the following manner :-

22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and malafides.

Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made "lawfully" and not to check whether choice or decision is "sound". When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions :

(i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:5788

10 WP-3472-2026 is mala fide or intended to favour someone;

OR Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say : "the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached";

(ii) Whether public interest is affected.

If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. Cases involving black-listing or imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor or distribution of state largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action.

39. Similarly, in the case of Reliance Energy (supra), Apex Court held that "legal certainty' is an important aspect of the rule of law in the matters of tender because in absence of clarity or objectivity it may result unequivocal and discriminatory treatment. Apex Court also stressed over doctrine of 'level playing field'. Relevant discussion is as under :-

37. In Union of India v. International Trading Co., (2003)5 SCC 437, the Division Bench of this Court speaking through Pasayat, J. had held :

"14. It is trite law that Article 14 of the Constitution applies also to matters of governmental policy and if the policy or any action of the Government, even in contractual matters, fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional.

15.While the discretion to change the policy in exercise of the executive power, when not trammelled by any statute or rule is wide enough, what is imperative and implicit in terms of Article 14 is that a change in policy must be made fairly and should not give impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior criteria. The wide sweep of Article 14 and the requirement of every State action qualifying for its validity on this touchstone irrespective of the field of activity of the State is an accepted tenet. The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the state, and nonarbitrariness in essence and substance is the heart beat of fair play. Actions are amenable, in the panorama of judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for a discernible reasons, not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. The meaning and true import and concept of arbitrariness is more easily visualised than precisely defined. A question whether the impugned action is arbitrary or not is to be ultimately answered on the facts and circumstances of a given case. A basic and obvious test to apply in such cases is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned action and if so, does it really satisfy the test of reasonableness."

38. When tenders are invited, the terms and conditions must indicate with legal certainty, norms and benchmarks. This "legal certainty" is an important aspect of the rule of law. If there is

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:5788

11 WP-3472-2026 vagueness or subjectivity in the said norms it may result in unequal and discriminatory treatment. It may violate doctrine of "level playing field".

39. In the case of Reliance Airport Developers (P) Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, (2006)10 SCC 1, the Division Bench of this Court has held that in matters of judicial review the basic test is to see whether there is any infirmity in the decisionmaking process and not in the decision itself. This means that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision- making power and he must give effect to it otherwise it may result in illegality. The principle of "judicialreview" cannot be denied even in contractual matters or matters in which the Government exercises its contractual powers, but judicial review is intended to prevent arbitrariness and it must be exercised in larger public interest. Expression of different views and opinions in exercise of contractual powers may be there, however, such difference of opinion must be based on specified norms. Those norms may be legal norms or accounting norms. As long as the norms are clear and properly understood by the decision-maker and the bidders and other stakeholders, uncertainty and thereby breach of rule of law will not arise. The grounds upon which administrative action is subjected to control by judicial review are classifiable broadly under three heads, namely, illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. In the said judgment it has been held that all errors of law are jurisdictional errors. One of the important principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment is that whenever a norm/benchmark is prescribed in the tender process in order to provide certainty that norm/standard should be clear. As stated above "certainty" is an important aspect of rule of law. In the case of Reliance Airport Developers (supra), the scoring system formed part of the evaluation process. The object of that system was to provide identification of factors, allocation of marks of each of the said factors and giving of marks had different stages. Objectivity was thus provided.

40. These judgments are still followed up to Subodh Kumar Singh (supra).

41. Illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety are the broad rounds as discussed by the Apex Court in the matter of Tata Cellular (supra) but at the same time, it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. While discussing the facet of irrationality, it has been mentioned that it is open to the court to review the decision-maker's evaluation of the facts. The Court will intervene where the facts taken as a whole could not logically warrant the conclusion of the decision-maker. Another facet of irrationality is that a decision would be regarded as unreasonable if it is impartial and unequal in its operation as between different classes. Therefore, from the present case, it is to be deciphered where the case suffers from illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety."

09. The contention of the petitioner is that as per Clauses 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 of the Request For Proposal (RFP), upon failure of respondent No.4 to execute the agreement and in view of the requests having been made by it for

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:5788

12 WP-3472-2026 cancellation of the tender process, the petitioner is entitled to be considered for allotment being the next highest bidder. For ready reference, the said clauses are reproduced hereunder:-

"5.4 Award of Contract AICTSL shall issue a letter of acceptance ("LOA") to the Successful Bidder. The Successful Bidder would be required to sign and return the copy of the LoA as acknowledgement within 15 days of the receipt of the LoA by the Successful Bidder. In the event the duly signed copy of the LoA by the Successful Bidder is not received within the stipulated 15 days, AICTSL shall have the option to either extend such time limit for the receipt or deduct from the Bid Security of such Successful Bidder an amount which at the sole discretion of AICTSL is believed to be the loss and/ or damages suffered by AICTSL as a result of the delay in providing the acknowledgement. In the event the Successful Bidder fails to acknowledge the LoA, and the next eligible bidder may be considered by AICTSL.

5.5 Signing of Contract Agreement ;

The signing of the Advertisement Agreement shall be completed not later than 1 (one) month of the issuance of the LoA to the Successful Bidder or within such extended time frame as extended by AICTSL in its sole discretion. In the event the Successful Bidder is unable to execute the Advertisement Agreement within the time period, AICTSL will have the right to withdraw the offer immediately from the Successful Bidder and replace it with an appropriate subsequent bidder. Thereafter, the previously appointed Successful Bidder will have no rights, and its Bid Security will be forfeited.

5.6 Annulment of Award Failure of the Successful Bidder to comply with the requirements set for thin this RFP and/ or the provisions of the Advertisement Agreement shall constitute sufficient grounds for the annulment of the award of the bid and forfeiture of the Bid Security. In such case, AICTSL will have the right to replace the Successful Bidder with the next highest bidder. Thereafter, the previously appointed Successful Bidder will have no rights."

10. From a perusal of the aforesaid clauses, it is seen that the condition

of considering the next eligible bidder in the event of the successful bidder failing to acknowledge the Letter of Acceptance (LOA) is discretionary and not mandatory. The word used is "may" and not "shall". It states that the next eligible bidder may be considered by respondent No.3. It does not state that next eligible bidder has to be considered by respondent No.3. The offer can be withdrawn from the successful bidder and replaced with an appropriate

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13 WP-3472-2026 subsequent bidder. That is a choice of respondent No.3 and not a duty or an obligation cast upon it and it cannot be said that after withdrawal of the offer from the successful bidder, the next highest bidder is bound to be considered no matter what. Replacement of the next highest bidder is at the discretion of respondent No.3 which can be exercised either way by it in the available facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, the contention that in view of respondent No.4 not executing the agreement and withdrawing from the tender process, the petitioner is bound to be considered cannot be accepted.

11. Respondent No.3 has relied upon the office memorandum dated 21.04.2022 of the Government of India wherein it has been specified that in case the lowest evaluated bidder withdraws or if his bid is not accepted, the procuring entity has to retender the case. Reliance has also been placed on the manual for procurement of non-consultancy services 2025 Clause 7.4.11 which is also to the same effect. These memorandum/manual have not been denied by the petitioner. Respondent No.3 is hence bound to comply with the aforesaid circulars of the Government of India and if, by relying upon the same, it has decided to retender the case, no illegality in the same can be found. For ready reference, the aforesaid provisions are reproduced below:-

"If the bidder, who bid has been found to be the lowest evaluated bid withdraws or whose bid has been accepted, fails to sign the procurement contract as may be required, or fails to provide the security as may be required for the performance of the contract or otherwise withdraws from the procurement process, the Procuring Entity shall re-tender the case."

"If the bidder, whose bid has been found to be the lowest evaluated bid (L1) or Highest scorer (H-1) withdraws or whose bid has been accepted, fails to sign the procurement contract as may be required, or fails to provide the security as may be required for the performance of the contract (Para 7.5.3) or otherwise withdraws from the procurement process (para 7.2.6), the Procuring Entity shall deal the case as per para 7.2.6-3)".

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14 WP-3472-2026

12. In Rajbahdur Yadav (Supra), the Division Bench of this Court by relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Haryana Urban Development Authority and Others versus Orchid Infrastructure Developers Private Ltd 2017 (4) SCC 243 has held that the bidders participating in the tender process have no other right except the right to equality and fair treatment in the matter of evaluation of competitive bids offered by interested persons in response to notice inviting tender in a transparent manner and free from hidden agenda. The authority has the right not to accept the highest bid and even to prefer a tenderer other than the highest bidder. Unless there is a concluded contract with the bidder, no right accrues.

13. In Raju Bokade (Supra) , the Division Bench of this Court has held that the question of granting a contract to the second or the third highest bidder is at the discretion of the respondents. Any eligible person is entitled to bid for the same but does not have a right to be considered for being awarded the tender only because he is a second highest bidder, third highest bidder or otherwise. The respondents have the right to cancel the bid and float a new tender in which the intending bidder can very well participate.

14. In Maa Binda Express Carrier and Another (Supra) , the Apex Court has held that submission of a bid/tender in response to a notice inviting tender is only an offer which the State or its agencies are under no obligation to accept. Bidders participating in the tender process cannot insist that their bids/tenders should be accepted simply because their bids are lowest or highest.

15. In CWE - SOMA Consortium (Supra) , it has been held by the

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15 WP-3472-2026 Apex Court that so long as the bid is not accepted highest bidder does not acquire any vested right to have the auction concluded in his favour.

16. In the present case, the bid submitted by respondent No.4 has not been honoured by it and on the contrary, request has been made by it for withdrawal of the same. Under the relevant clauses of the Request For Proposal (RFP), it is not mandatory for respondent No.3 to consider the next highest bidder for allotment. On the contrary, it has the right to cancel the entire tender process and to initiate a new tender process in which the petitioner can certainly participate. In the office memorandums relied upon by respondent No.3, it has been specified that in case of withdrawal or non- acceptance of bid by the highest bidder, re-tender process has to be resorted to. The bid of the petitioner has not even been considered and accepted by respondent No.3 hence at the present stage, no right has accrued in its favour. There is no concluded contract between the petitioner and respondent No.3. Thus, if at the present stage, respondent No.3 has decided to cancel the entire tender process and initiate a fresh process, no interference in the same can be made.

17. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any merit in this petition, which is consequently dismissed.

(PRANAY VERMA) JUDGE

Shilpa

 
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