[Cites 28, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Pradeep Chaturvedi vs State Bank Of India on 17 February, 2026
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1 WP. No. 1709 of 2012
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
WRIT PETITION No. 1709 of 2012
PRADEEP CHATURVEDI
Versus
STATE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Prashant Sharma- learned counsel for the petitioner.
Shri Mahesh Prasad Agarwal- learned counsel for respondent.
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Reserved on 12.2.2026
Delivered on 17.2.2026
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of Constitution of India, has been filed
seeking the following relief (s):
"The orders annexure P/1 and P/2 may kindly be quashed.
Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the facts and
circumstances of the case may also kindly be granted."
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner was posted as a
Cashier/ Clerk in the respondent Bank. An FIR at crime No.814/2009 was
registered against the petitioner for the offence under Sections 420, 406, 467, 468
of I.P.C. It is further submitted that the charges which have been levelled against
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the petitioner are with regard to account of Municipal Council, Dabra and
issuance of check of Rs. 5,95,400/- dated 10.4.2008 and transfer of that account.
In the earlier round of litigation, the inquiry was challenged by filing W.P. No.
3455/2010 before this Hon'ble Court. Vide order dated 19.07.2010, the
departmental proceedings pursuant to the charge-sheet dated 26.02.2010 were
stayed. Despite the stay order, the Inquiry Officer proceeded ex parte and
prepared the inquiry report on 22.11.2010. Although the stay was vacated on
11.10.2010, the record reveals that ex parte proceedings had been conducted
during the subsistence of the stay order, thereby vitiating the entire proceedings.
Even after vacation of the stay, no fresh notice was issued to the petitioner.
3. Learned counsel for petitioner further submits that no intimation was given
regarding the date on which the ex parte proceedings were concluded. The
receipt relied upon by the respondents (Annexure R-3) is alleged to be forged.
The inquiry was conducted at Dabra, whereas the letter was sent from Gohad,
District Bhind, which is about 80 km away. The signatures shown on the alleged
receipt dated 07.07.2010 are not those of the petitioner. The sequence of dates
itself creates serious doubt and indicates manipulation of record. Therefore, the
entire proceedings are vitiated on account of fraud and violation of principles of
natural justice. It is further submitted that the allegations are per se illegal and
unsustainable. With regard to the cheque of Rs. 5,95,400/-, the petitioner, being a
Single Window Operator, was neither the clearing nor the sanctioning authority.
As per the Voucher Verification Report (VVR), the cheque was authorized by the
Chief Manager, Shri Pradeep Verma. Hence, fastening liability upon the
petitioner is perverse and contrary to record.
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4. It is further submitted by learned counsel for petitioner that the said cheque
was presented on 10.04.2008, whereas the complaint was lodged after nearly two
years. The Municipal Council, whose accounts are subject to regular audits,
never raised any objection. The voucher and cheque were verified by the
competent authority and not by petitioner. It is further submitted that similarly,
the allegation regarding Cheque No. 958822 for Rs. 50,228/- is also
unsustainable. There is no material to show any wrongdoing on the part of the
petitioner. The long silence of the Municipal Council further weakens the
prosecution case. It is further contended that relevant documents demanded by
petitioner were not supplied. On 06.07.2010, 54 documents were allegedly
submitted on a date which had neither been fixed nor communicated. Such
proceedings during the period of stay demonstrate manipulation of record and
procedural illegality. It is also submitted that allegations relating to business
transactions of the petitioner's wife are wholly irrelevant and beyond the scope
of the charges. The appellate authority failed to apply its independent mind to the
grounds raised in the appeal. It is also submitted that no reasonable opportunity
of defence was provided to petitioner and material documents were not supplied.
The entire inquiry stands vitiated for violation of principles of natural justice and
therefore, the impugned order (Annexure P/1) deserves to be set aside.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary
objection regarding maintainability of the present writ petition. It is submitted
that petitioner has an efficacious, adequate alternative statutory remedy available
under the relevant provisions of law. To strengthen his plea, learned counsel for
respondents relied upon order dated 17.05.2017 passed in W.P. No. 3479/2005
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(Jitendra Kumar v. State of M.P. and Others). Thus, it is submitted that this
Court had directed petitioners to verify as to whether the present case is covered
by the order passed in Jitendra Kumar (supra) or not? However, without
exhausting such remedy, petitioner has directly approached this Court. Hence, it
is contended that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of
availability of alternative remedy alone.
6. It is submitted by counsel for petitioner that this petition is pending since
2012 and therefore, relegating the petitioner back to CGIT may not be conducive
and accordingly prayed that petition may not be dismissed on the ground of
alternative remedy. Learned counsel for petitioner relied on W.A. No.240/2018
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. And another vs. Kailash Chandra where
petition was not relegated back due to availability of alternative remedy but the
facts of W.A. 240/2018 is different as in that petition there was no disputed
question of facts involved.
7. Heard the learned counsel for parties and perused the record.
8. Now the only question for consideration is as to whether this Court can
dismiss the petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy or not?
9. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and another v.
Uttar Pradesh Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh Samiti and another,
reported in (2008) 12 SCC 675 has held as under:
"37. We have given most anxious and thoughtful consideration to the
rival contentions of the parties. So far as preliminary objection raised
by the Corporation before the High Court is concerned, in our
considered view, the same was well founded and ought to have been
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upheld. It was urged before the High Court on behalf of the
Corporation and the State Government that the writ petition was
premature inasmuch as no retrenchment had been affected. Several
disputed questions of fact were involved in the petition. If the
contention of the Samiti was that there was illegal closure of
undertaking or there was non-payment of wages by the employer,
appropriate proceedings could have been initiated under industrial law.
In fact, one of the Judges of the Division Bench upheld the contention
and observed that the employees could have claimed closure
compensation under Section 25- FFF of the Act or could have
approached prescribed authority under the Payment of Wages Act
relying upon Section 33-C(2) of the Act or Section 6-H(2) of the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Act. The other Single Judge of the Division Bench,
however, held that the writ petition had been entertained and interim
orders were also passed. Relying upon Suresh Chandra Tewari [AIR
1992 All 331], the learned Judge held that "the petition cannot be
dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy if the same has been
entertained and interim order has been passed".
(emphasis supplied)
38. With respect to the learned Judge, it is neither the legal position
nor such a proposition has been laid down in Suresh Chandra Tewari
[AIR 1992 All 331] that once a petition is admitted, it cannot be
dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. It is no doubt correct
that in the headnote of All India Reporter (p. 331), it is stated that
"petition cannot be rejected on the ground of availability of alternative
remedy of filing appeal". But it has not been so held in the actual
decision of the Court. The relevant para 2 of the decision reads thus:
(Suresh Chandra Tewari case [AIR 1992 All 331], AIR p. 331)
"2. At the time of hearing of this petition a threshold question,
as to its maintainability was raised on the ground that the
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impugned order was an appealable one and, therefore,
before approaching this Court the petitioner should have
approached the appellate authority. Though there is much
substance in the above contention, we do not feel inclined to
reject this petition on the ground of alternative remedy having
regard to the fact that the petition has been entertained and an
interim order passed."
(emphasis supplied)
Even otherwise, the learned Judge was not right in law. True it is that
issuance of rule nisi or passing of interim orders is a relevant
consideration for not dismissing a petition if it appears to the High
Court that the matter could be decided by a writ court. It has been so
held even by this Court in several cases that even if alternative
remedy is available, it cannot be held that a writ petition is not
maintainable. In our judgment, however, it cannot be laid down as
a proposition of law that once a petition is admitted, it could never
be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. If such bald
contention is upheld, even this Court cannot order dismissal of a writ
petition which ought not to have been entertained by the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution in view of availability of
alternative and equally efficacious remedy to the aggrieved party,
once the High Court has entertained a writ petition albeit wrongly and
granted the relief to the petitioner."
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Genpact India Private Limited v.
Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and another, reported in 2019 SCC
Online SC 1500 decided on 22.11.2019 in Civil Appeal No.8945/2019 has held
as under:
"23. We now turn to the question whether the High Court was justified
in refusing to entertain the writ petition because of availability of
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adequate appellate remedy. The law on the point is very clear and was
summarised in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass
Agarwal AIR (2014) 1 SCC 603] as under:--
"11. Before discussing the fact proposition, we would
notice the principle of law as laid down by this Court. It
is settled law that non-entertainment of petitions under
writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficacious
alternative remedy is available is a rule of self-imposed
limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience
and discretion rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it
is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief
under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative
remedy. However, the High Court must not interfere
if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy
available to the petitioner and he has approached the
High Court without availing the same unless he has
made out an exceptional case warranting such
interference or there exist sufficient grounds to
invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article
226. (See State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh [AIR 1958 SC
86], Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa
[(1983) 2 SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131], Harbanslal
Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [(1983) 2 SCC 433 :
1983 SCC (Tax) 131] and State of H.P. v. Gujarat
Ambuja Cement Ltd. [(2005) 6 SCC 499])
12. The Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S.
Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation
Commission [AIR 1954 SC 207], Sangram Singh v.
Election Tribunal [AIR 1955 SC 425], Union of India v.
T.R. Varma [AIR 1957 SC 882], State of U.P. v. Mohd.
Nooh [AIR 1958 SC 86] and K.S. Venkataraman and Co.
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(P) Ltd. v. State of Madras [AIR 1966 SC 1089] have
held that though Article 226 confers very wide powers in
the matter of issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy
of writ is absolutely discretionary in character. If the
High Court is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have
an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere, it can refuse to
exercise its jurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinary
circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the
conclusion that there has been a breach of the principles
of natural justice or the procedure required for decision
has not been adopted. [See N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G.
Raja Nainar [AIR 1959 SC 422], Municipal Council,
Khurai v. Kamal Kumar [AIR 1965 SC 1321 : (1965) 2
SCR 653], Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das
[(1984) 2 SCC 436 : 1984 SCC (Tax) 133], S.T.
Muthusami v. K. Natarajan [(1988) 1 SCC 572],
Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant [(1995) 5 SCC 75 :
1995 SCC (L&S) 1207 : (1955) 31 ATC 110], Kerala
SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil [(2000) 6 SCC 293], A.
Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan [(2000) 7 SCC
695], L.L. Sudhakar Reddy v. State of A.P. [(2001) 6
SCC 634], Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri
Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha v. State of
Maharashtra [(2001) 8 SCC 509], Pratap Singh v. State
of Haryana [(2002) 7 SCC 484 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 1207 :
(1995) 31 ATC 110] and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd.
v. ITO21 [(2003) 1 SCC 72]] ...
15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has
recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative
remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in
accordance with the provisions of the enactment in
question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of
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judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the
provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been
passed in total violation of the principles of natural
justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal
case [AIR 1964 SC 1419], Titaghur Paper Mills case
[(1983) 2 SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131] and other
similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an
effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved
person or the statute under which the action complained
of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for
redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore,
when a statutory forum is created by law for
redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be
entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation."
24. Recently, in Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore v.
Mathew K.C. [(2018) 3 SCC 85], the principles laid down in Chhabil
Dass Agarwal [(2014) 1 SCC 603] were reiterated as under:
"The discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is not
absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in the given
facts of a case and in accordance with law. The normal
rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution ought not to be entertained if alternate
statutory remedies are available, except in cases falling
within the well-defined exceptions as observed in CIT v.
Chhabil Dass Agarwal [(2014) 1 SCC 603]..."
25. We do not, therefore, find any infirmity in the approach adopted
by the High Court in refusing to entertain the Writ Petition. The
submission that once the threshold was crossed despite the
preliminary objection being raised, the High Court ought not to have
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considered the issue regarding alternate remedy, may not be correct.
The first order dated 25.01.2017 passed by the High Court did record
the preliminary objection but was prima facie of the view that the
transactions defined in Section 115QA were initially confined only to
those covered by Section 77A of the Companies Act. Therefore,
without rejecting the preliminary objection, notice was issued in the
matter. The subsequent order undoubtedly made the earlier interim
order absolute. However, the preliminary objection having not been
dealt with and disposed of, the matter was still at large.
26. In State of U.P. v. U.P. Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh
Samiti [(2008) 12 SCC 675] this Court dealt with an issue whether
after admission, the Writ Petition could not be dismissed on the
ground of alternate remedy. The submission was considered by this
Court as under:
"38. With respect to the learned Judge, it is neither the
legal position nor such a proposition has been laid down
in Suresh Chandra Tewari [AIR 1992 All 331] that once
a petition is admitted, it cannot be dismissed on the
ground of alternative remedy. It is no doubt correct that
in the headnote of All India Reporter (p. 331), it is stated
that "petition cannot be rejected on the ground of
availability of alternative remedy of filing appeal". But it
has not been so held in the actual decision of the Court.
The relevant para 2 of the decision reads thus: (Suresh
Chandra Tewari case, AIR p. 331)
"2. At the time of hearing of this petition a
threshold question, as to its maintainability was
raised on the ground that the impugned order was
an appealable one and, therefore, before
approaching this Court the petitioner should have
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approached the appellate authority. Though there
is much substance in the above contention, we do
not feel inclined to reject this petition on the
ground of alternative remedy having regard to the
fact that the petition has been entertained and an
interim order passed."
(emphasis supplied)
Even otherwise, the learned Judge was not right in law.
True it is that issuance of rule nisi or passing of interim
orders is a relevant consideration for not dismissing a
petition if it appears to the High Court that the matter
could be decided by a writ court. It has been so held even
by this Court in several cases that even if alternative
remedy is available, it cannot be held that a writ petition
is not maintainable. In our judgment, however, it
cannot be laid down as a proposition of law that once
a petition is admitted, it could never be dismissed on
the ground of alternative remedy. If such bald
contention is upheld, even this Court cannot order
dismissal of a writ petition which ought not to have been
entertained by the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution in view of availability of alternative and
equally efficacious remedy to the aggrieved party, once
the High Court has entertained a writ petition albeit
wrongly and granted the relief to the petitioner.
27. We do not, therefore, find any error in the approach of and
conclusion arrived at by the High Court. It is relevant to mention that
the concessions given on behalf of the Revenue as recorded in the
directions issued by the High Court also take care of matters of
prejudice, if any. Consequently, the appellant, as a matter of fact, will
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have a fuller, adequate and efficacious remedy by way of appeal
before the appellate authority.
28. Certain issues raised during the course of hearing touching upon
the aspects whether the appellant is liable under Section 115QA of the
Act or whether the transaction of buy back of shares in the present
matter would come within the statutory contours of said Section
115QA or not, are issues which will be gone into at the appropriate
stages by the concerned authorities; and as such we have refrained
from dealing with those issues."
11. By placing reliance on the order dated 17.05.2017 passed in W.P. No.
3479/2005 (Jitendra Kumar v. State of M.P. and Others), the respondents
raised the issue of availability of an alternative remedy. The Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in Jintendra Kumar Supra has held as under for ready
reference and convenience:
After arguing for some time, Shri M.P. Agarwal submits that in the
writ appeal No. 36/12 (State Bank of India and Ors Vs. Vikram
Sharma) vide judgment dated 19.07.2012 Division Bench of this High
Court has held that respondent employee working in a clerical cadre is
amenable to the jurisdiction of Industrial Dispute Act and he has
liberty to raise Industrial dispute in accordance with the Provisions of
Industrial Disputes Act,1947.
In view of this submission, Shri B.B. Shukla fairly submits that this
writ petition be disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to approach
machinery under the Industrial Dispute Act for adjudication of his
grievance and a direction be issued to the concerned labour Court to
adjudicate this dispute within a time bound manner.
Shri M.P. Agarwal has no objection to such prayer being granted.
Accordingly, this petition is disposed of with liberty in favour of
petitioner to raise the dispute of his termination and any other dispute
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associated with order of termination before CGIT within two months
from today under the Provision contained in the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 and CGIT shall make an endeavor to decide the dispute
within a further period of six months from the date of receiving the
dispute.
It is made clear that if parties so desire, they can use the pleadings
advanced before this Court, before the CGIT so to cutshort the time
for adjudication of the dispute inasmuch as petition, return and
additional return are on record.
It is also clarified that issue of limitation shall not come in the way of
the petitioner as this Court at the request of Bank has relegated him to
avail the remedy available under the Industrial Disputes Act.
12. Under these circumstances, it is clear that even if petition has been
admitted, still it can be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative
remedy.
13. Learned counsel for petitioner relied on W.A. No.240/2018 Hindustan
Petroleum Corporation Ltd. And another vs. Kailash Chandra where petition was
not relegated back due to availability of alternative remedy but the facts of W.A.
240/2018 is different as in that petition there was no disputed question of facts
involved. Learned counsel for petitioner has not denied that petitioner has an
alternative remedy of filing an appeal before the CGIT. Since multiple disputed
questions of facts are involved, therefore, this Court is not inclined to entertain
this writ petition specifically when petitioner has an efficacious remedy of
approaching CGIT.
14. In view of the foregoing discussion and the facts and circumstances of the
present case in their entirety, the present petition is disposed of with liberty to
petitioner to raise the dispute of his termination and any other dispute associated
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with order of termination before CGIT within period one month from today
under the Provision contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and CGIT
shall make an endeavor to decide the dispute within a further period of three
months from the date of receiving the dispute.
(Anand Singh Bahrawat)
Judge
Ahmad
