Madhya Pradesh High Court
Shanti Bai Jarwal vs Smt. Manju Kunare on 17 October, 2025
Author: Vivek Rusia
Bench: Vivek Rusia
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1
W.P. No.12 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT I N D O R E
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK RUSIA
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE BINOD KUMAR DWIVEDI
ON THE 8th OF OCTOBER, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 12 of 2025
SHANTI BAI JARWAL
Versus
SMT. MANJU KUNARE AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Abhinav Dhanodkar along with Ms. Prerna Dubey, learned counsel for the
petitioner.
Shri Vivek Sharan, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Nitendra Vajpayee
& Ms. Rajni Vajpayee, learned counsel for respondent No.1.
Shri Anand Soni, learned Additional Advocate General along with Shri Anirudh
Malpani, learned Government Advocate for respondents No.2 & 4 / State.
Shri Romesh Dave, learned Deputy Solicitor General.
Reserved on : 08st October, 2025
Delivered on : 17th October, 2025
ORDER
Per : Justice Vivek Rusia
The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India by the petitioner, a senior citizen aged about
89 years, widow of Late SuvalalJarwal, residing at House No. 304,
Ward No. 24, Sheelnath Camp, Kulkarni ka Bhatta, Indore.
FACTS OF THE CASE ARE AS FOLLOWS:-
F-2. The petitioner, who is a senior citizen as well as a parent, is
assailing the legality, propriety and jurisdictional competence of the
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order dated 13.12.2024 passed by the Additional Collector, Indore /
respondent No. 3, whereby the said order, the appellate authority has
allowed an appeal filed by Smt. Manju Kunare / respondent No. 1
( daughter) under Section 16 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents
and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the Senior
Citizens Act,2007) and thereby set aside the order dated 23.09.2024
passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Malharganj / respondent No.4
under Rule 19 of the Madhya Pradesh Maintenance and Welfare of
Parents and Senior Citizen Rules, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as the
M.P. Senior Citizen Rules, 2009).
F-3. This writ petition came before the Division Bench by way of
reference to answer the following question of law:-
''Whether an appeal under Section 16 of the Maintenance and
Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 is
maintainable only at the instance of any senior citizen or a
parent, or it is maintainable at the instance of any aggrieved
person?''
F-4. The petitioner asserts that she is the lawful owner and possessor
of the aforesaid house property, having valid title documents in her
name. She has been residing in the said house continuously for the past
forty-nine years along with her family members. It is the specific case of
the petitioner that on 12.11.2022, one PremchandKunare and his wife,
Smt. Manju Kunare /respondent no. 1 visited the subject property and
threatened the petitioner and her family members to vacate the premises
within three days, failing which they would be forcibly removed. The
petitioner approached the Police Station, Pardesipura, Indore, for
lodging a complaint, but the police authorities declined to register the
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same.
F-5. Again, on the night of 14.11.2022 at about 10:12 p.m., the
respondent no. 1 and her husband entered the premises, abused the
petitioner in public, physically assaulted her and her family members
and thereafter forcibly ousted the petitioner from the house. They also
allegedly threatened the petitioner not to approach any authority. Being
thus dispossessed, the petitioner was compelled to reside elsewhere
despite having no alternative accommodation. The petitioner then
submitted a detailed representation dated 05.04.2023 before the
Collector, Indore/respondent no. 2 in Jan Sunvai instead of invoking
provision of Rule 19 of the M.P. Senior Citizen Rules, 2009 under which
it is a duty of Sub Divisional Officer to ensure that the life and property
of senior citizens within the district are protected and that they can live
with security and dignity. No action was, however, taken on her
representation.
F-6. Aggrieved by such inaction, the petitioner approached this Court
by filing Writ Petition No. 10793 of 2023, which was disposed of on 07
July 2023 with a direction to the Collector to decide the representation
of the petitioner within one month after granting due opportunity of
hearing to all concerned parties. Pursuant to the said direction, the
matter was taken up by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Malharganj,
Indore /respondent No. 4, who afforded an opportunity of hearing to
both sides and considered what came on the material on record. The
respondent No. 4 by a detailed order dated 23.09. 2024 allowed the
application of the petitioner under Rule 19 of the M.P. Senior Citizen
Rules, 2009 and directed respondent No. 1 to vacate the subject property
and hand over peaceful possession to the petitioner within thirty days.
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F-7. Aggrieved by the said order dated 23.09.2024, respondent No. 1
preferred an appeal under Section 16 of the Senior Citizens Act,2007,
before the Additional Collector, Indore/respondent No. 3, which was
registered as Case No. 0020/Appeal/2024-25. On receipt of notice, the
petitioner appeared and raised a preliminary objection to the
maintainability of the appeal, contending that under Section 16 of the
Senior Citizens Act,2007, the right of appeal is conferred exclusively
upon "any senior citizen or a parent" aggrieved by an order of the
Tribunal and not upon any other person. The petitioner relied upon the
decision of this Court in Anil Choupda& Others v/s Subhadra
Choupda& Others in W.P. No. 18083 of 2022, decided on 18.04.2023,
and the Division Bench judgment in W.A. No. 655 of 2023, decided on
10.01.2024, wherein it was held that neither the children nor the
relatives have any locus to file an appeal under the said provision.
F-8. Despite such objection, the respondent no. 3, without deciding
the preliminary issue of jurisdiction and without granting adequate
opportunity to the petitioner to address her remaining objections,
proceeded to entertain the appeal and subsequently allowed the same
vide order dated 13.12.2024 and set aside the well-reasoned order of the
SDO dated 23.09.2024.
F-9. Hence, the petitioner has approached this court again by way of
the writ petition mainly onthe legal ground that the appellate authority
has acted wholly without jurisdiction, contrary to the plain language of
Section 16 and in disregard of binding precedent. Aggrieved by this
appellate order, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. The
petitioner alleged that she is suffering from multiple old-age ailments
and contended that at her advanced age, she has been compelled to
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approach this Court for the second time to secure possession of her sole
residence. Petitioner emphasises that the impugned action of the
appellate authority/Respondent No.3 not only defeats the object and
purpose of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, but also infringes her
fundamental right to life and dignity guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.
F-10. During the pendency of the proceedings, respondent No. 1 has
also instituted a civil suit bearing No. RCSA/1452/2024 before the
Court of the learned First Civil Judge, Indore, seeking specific
performance and permanent injunction in respect of the same property.
According to the petitioner, this civil action was initiated with mala fide
intent to create a parallel dispute over title and to frustrate the remedy
available to the petitioner under the special legislation for senior
citizens.
F-11. The writ petition came up before the writ court on 30.01.2025;
the core grievance argued by the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner centred on the jurisdictional competence of the respondent no.
3 to entertain an appeal under Section 16(1) of the Senior Citizens Act,
2007, at the instance of respondent no. 1, who was neither a senior
citizen nor a parent. Learned counsel for the petitioner before the writ
court further submitted that the appellate provision under the Act is
unambiguously worded to limit the right of appeal only to "any senior
citizen or a parent" and not to "any aggrieved person" in general,
especially children. In support of this proposition, reliance was placed
on the decisions of this court in Anil Choupda& Others v/s Subhadra
Choupda& Others in W.P. No. 18083 of 2022, decided on 18.04.2023,
wherein it was held that appeals under Section 16 of the Senior Citizens
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Act, 2007, are not maintainable at the instance of children or relatives.
F-12. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondent no.
1 before the writ court placed reliance on decision of co-ordinate bench
of this Court which have taken a contrary view in Nitin Jat & Another
v/s State of Madhya Pradesh & Others in W.P. No. 9078 of 2022
decided on 14 July 2023 wherein it was held that an appeal under
Section 16 can also be preferred by parties other than the senior citizen
or parent. Reference was also made to other decisions of various High
Courts, such as the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Smt.
Roopam @ Jyoti Sharma v/s District Magistrate, Lucknow in Writ-C
No. 21188 of 2021 decided on 18 May 2022), to the decision of the
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Jagdish Pitamber Pawar
v/s Pitamber Pundalik Pawar in W.P. No. 36 of 2023 and to the Punjab
& Haryana High Court decision in Paramjeet Kumar Saroya v/s Union
of India reported in AIR 2014 P&H 121 all of which favour an
expansive interpretation of the appellate provision. Reference was also
made to the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens
(Amendment) Bill, 2019, which proposes a legislative amendment to
Section 16(1) by inserting the words "or any of the children or
relatives".
F-13. The learned Single Judge, after examining the statutory
framework and precedents cited on both sides, noted that divergent
views had emerged from benches of this court. While in Anil Choupda
(supra) and Smt. Anuradha Pathak v/s Smt. Anshumali Pathak &
Others in W.P. No. 7917 of 2020 decided on 23.01.2025, the scope of
Section 16 was confined strictly to appeals by senior citizens or parents.
The judgment in Nitin Jat (supra) took a diametrically opposite view by
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holding that such an appeal may also be preferred by other affected
parties. The learned Single Judge further took note of similar divergence
in decisions rendered by other High Courts. Observing that such
divergence of opinion had created uncertainty in the application of the
law, the learned Single Judge concluded that an authoritative
pronouncement was warranted to settle the question. Accordingly, by
order dated 30.01.2025, the learned Single Judge directed the Registry
to place the matter before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for the constitution
of a Larger Bench to answer the following question of law:
''Whether an appeal under Section 16 of the Maintenance and
Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 is
maintainable only at the instance of any senior citizen or a
parent, or it is maintainable at the instance of any aggrieved
person''
F-14. In furtherance of the said judicial reference, when the matter
was placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice on the administrative
side, directions were issued vide order dated 19.09.2025 to constitute an
appropriate Larger Bench, i.e., a Three Judges Bench. The Hon'ble
Chief Justice took note of the fact that the divergence in view had arisen
between judgments rendered by Single Benches and accordingly
deemed it appropriate to constitute a Division Bench rather than a Full
Bench comprising three Judges. Hence, this matter is before us.
SUBMISSIONS OF PETITIONER'S COUNSEL
P-1. Shri Dhanodkar learned counsel commenced his submissions by
stating that the present reference deals with the construction and scope
of Section 16 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, which represents a
milestone in Indian social-welfare legislation conceived in direct
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response to the constitutional call embodied in Articles 21, 41, 46 and
300-A of the Constitution of India which collectively guarantee the right
to life with dignity, public assistance in cases of old age and sickness,
protection of weaker sections and security of property save by authority
of law. According to the learned counsel, the Act does not create
reciprocal rights between two equal classes but rather institutes an
exclusive code of protection for a single vulnerable class - parents and
senior citizens by imposing a corresponding legal obligation upon
children and relatives to maintain them.
P-2. Learned counsel further submitted that the enactment must
therefore be viewed not as an ordinary civil litigation but as a beneficial
and exclusive social-welfare legislation, the object of which is to secure
the constitutional promise of a dignified existence to the aged. Learned
counsel drew attention to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of
Bill No. 40 of 2007, which recites that the Bill was introduced to
"provide for more effective provisions for the maintenance and welfare
of parents and senior citizens guaranteed and recognised under the
Constitution and for matters connected therewith and incidental
thereto." The learned counsel emphasised that this declaration, when
read with the Report of the Standing Committee on Social Justice
and Empowerment dated 27 April 2007, makes it abundantly clear
that Parliament consciously intended to create a self-contained
mechanism ensuring expeditious relief to aged parents suffering neglect
and dispossession and further to restrict appellate remedies only to that
class.
P-3. Learned counsel invited the attention of the court to the
constitutional foundations of the statute contending that the right of the
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aged citizens to live with dignity has been judicially read into Article 21
since Bandhua Mukti Morcha v/s Union of India reported in (1984) 3
SCC 161 wherein Hon'ble Apex Court held that the right to life includes
the right to live with human dignity and free from exploitation. This
position was reaffirmed in Vincent Panikurlangara v/s Union of India
reported in (1987) 2 SCC 165, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court
recognised that maintenance of health and strength of workers and the
aged flows directly from Articles 39 and 41. Learned counsel further
relied on D.S. Nakara v/s Union of India reported in (1983) 1 SCC 305
wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court treated pension as a measure of socio-
economic justice and also relied on Francis Coralie Mullin v/s
Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi reported in (1981) 1 SCC 608
wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court emphasized that life under Article 21
means life with human dignity. According to learned counsel, these
authorities confirm that the duty to protect the elderly is part of
constitutional morality and the 2007 Act gives it legislative expression.
P-4. Learned counsel traced the origin of the statute to the felt
necessity identified by the National Policy for Older Persons 1999 and
by successive Law Commission Reports recommending a
comprehensive framework to ensure maintenance of parents by their
children. Learned counsel submitted that the Act finds its source in the
Concurrent List -Entry 23, which deals with social security and social
insurance, employment and unemployment, enabling Parliament and the
State Legislatures to enact such measures. Learned counsel submitted
that the Act of 2007 lays down a uniform national policy while
permitting states to frame rules under Section 32 for its implementation.
Reliance is placed on State of Punjab v/s Mohinder Singh Chawla
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reported in (1997) 2 SCC 83 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that
the right to health is integral to Article 21 and imposes a correlative duty
on the State and also relied on Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity
v/s State of W.B. reported in (1996) 4 SCC 37 wherein the Hon'ble Apex
Court extended that principle to emergency medical care. Thus, the
protection of old age and health is a constitutional obligation rather than
legislative charity.
P-5. Learned counsel contended that the Act must be read not in
isolation but as part of the constitutional duties as given in Articles 41
and 47 of the Constitution, which direct the State to make effective
provision for securing public assistance in cases of old age and to
improve public health. The statute fulfils these mandates and further
refers to Article 14 and Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution to
demonstrate that restricting appellate rights under Section 16 to senior
citizens alone does not offend equality or freedom of occupation; rather,
it represents a reasonable classification founded upon an intelligible
differentia and a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved.
The limited right of appeal preserves the beneficent character of the
statute. Reliance is placed on State of W.B. V/s Anwar Ali Sarkar,
reported in AIR 1952 SC 75, and Budhan Choudhry v/s State of Bihar,
reported in AIR 1955 SC 191, to submit that classification based on a
legitimate object is constitutionally permissible. Learned counsel
submitted that if appellate rights were extended to the children/relatives,
the object of swift and inexpensive relief to the aged would be defeated,
and hence the restriction under Section 16 advances rather than violates
constitutional equality.
P-6. Learned counsel explained the scheme of the Act, which is
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divided into seven Chapters and 32 Sections, to demonstrate its
exclusivity. Chapter I defines key expressions under Section 2, which
provides definitions such as "parent", "relative", and "senior citizen",
each focused on the beneficiary. Sections 4 to 11 create the procedure
for claiming and enforcing maintenance. Section 16, forming part of
Chapter V, reads:
"Any senior citizen or a parent, as the case may be,
aggrieved by an order of a Tribunal may, within sixty days
from the date of the order, prefer an appeal to the Appellate
Tribunal."
P-7. Learned counsel emphasised that the statutory language is plain,
unambiguous and exhaustive. It identifies the class of persons entitled to
appeal, namely "any senior citizen or a parent." Nowhere does the Act
confer that right upon "any aggrieved person." Learned counsel
emphasised that the Legislature, though familiar with the phrase "any
person aggrieved", consciously restricted the appellate right to the
specified class. The M.P. Senior Citizen Rules, 2009, in prescribing
Form I for such appeals, reproduce precisely the same language
confirming the conscious design of the legislature to confer an appellate
privilege only upon those two categories.
P-8. Learned counsel further placed reliance on the statutory rules
framed by various States and Union Territories under the Maintenance
and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, to demonstrate
the legislative consistency across jurisdictions in implementing the
objectives of the parent statute. The learned counsel contended that this
pattern of rule-making across States further supports the view that
Section 16 is deliberately confined to senior citizens and parents alone,
as many State rules consistently retain the beneficiary-centric structure
without affording appeal rights to children or relatives, thereby rejecting
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any suggestion of legislative negligence or omission.
P-9. Learned counsel submitted that the right of appeal is not
inherent or natural but a statutory creation, and its existence, extent, and
conditions depend entirely on legislative conferment. Reliance is placed
on the decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court in Super Cassettes Industries
Ltd. v/s State of U.P. reported in (2009) 10 SCC 531and Raj Kumar
Shivhare v/s Directorate of Enforcement reported in (2010) 4 SCC 772
wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the use of the word "any" in
the context of appeals must be understood in light of the class to which
it refers. Thus, "any senior citizen or parent" cannot be read as "any
person aggrieved" to defeat its object. Learned counsel further referred
that even in ancient Roman jurisprudence, the concept of appellatio was
an exception to the principle of finality and could be exercised only
when specifically permitted. That philosophy has been consistently
adopted by Indian courts as an appeal is a matter of grace, not of right.
Reliance is placed on CCI v/s Steel Authority of India reported in
(2010) 10 SCC 744.
P-10. Learned counsel emphasised that the Act does not define the
phrase "aggrieved person", but judicial interpretation must adhere to the
legislative objective and relied on K. Raju v/s Union of India reported
in 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 746, where the Division Bench of the
Madras High Court held that the right of appeal under Section 16 is
exclusively reserved for senior citizens or parents. The said position was
reaffirmed in Arockia Mary v/s District Collector in W.P. (MD) No.
2512 of 2025, wherein the Madurai Bench held that the appeal filed by
the children was misconceived. To further reinforce the narrowness of
the provision learned counsel relied upon the decision in S. Vanitha v/s
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Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District reported in (2021)
15 SCC 730 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that where a
definition employs the phrase "means and includes" must be construed
as exhaustive and thus learned counsel submitted that the plain words of
Section 16 being unambiguous require no further interpretation.
P-11. Learned counsel referred to Doctrine of beneficial and
exclusive legislation and submitted that the Act of 2007 is a classic
example of a beneficial and exclusive legislation one that is intended to
confer a statutory right upon a specific class of beneficiaries namely
parents and senior citizens and relied upon Vijaya Manohar Arbat v/s
Kashirao Rajaram Sawai reported in (1987) 2 SCC 278 and Shivram
A. Shiroor v/s Radhabai Kowshik reported in (1984) 1 SCC 588.
P-12. Learned counsel on the Doctrine of Casus Omissus submitted
that its lineage can be traced back to English jurisprudence under Lord
Denning and Lord Simonds, which was later adopted by the Indian
courts. The literal meaning of the Latin phrase casus omissus -"an
omitted case" which denotes a situation not provided for in a legal text
and therefore incapable of being judicially supplied. The learned counsel
relied on Bangalore Water Supply v/s A. Rajappa reported in AIR 1978
SC 548, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court, approving Lord Denning's
interpretive caution, explained that even when statutory language
appears defective, courts must not "repair" it except through legitimate
interpretive principles. Reliance was also placed on the early
constitutional decisions in Fenton v/s Hampton (1858) XI Moore P.C.
347, later cited in Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham v/s State of Gujarat,
reported in AIR 2004 SC 3946, and Sangeeta Singh v/s Union of
India, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 484.
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P-13. Shri Dhandodkar learned counsel further referred to the Law
Lexicon and Black's Law Dictionary definitions of Casus Omissus as
"a situation not provided for by statute or contract and therefore
governed by common law." He emphasised that every modern statute is
the result of deliberate legislative choice, and where Parliament has
omitted a category, the omission must be treated as intentional.
P-14. Learned counsel referred to the interpretive decisions of Hon'ble
Apex Court on Doctrine of casus omissus beginning with Padma
Sundara Rao v/s State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2002) 3 SCC 533
wherein it was held that courts cannot read words into a statute or
supply omissions and M/s Grasim Industries Ltd. V/s Collector of
Customs, Bombay reported in (2002) 4 SCC 297 wherein the Hon'ble
Apex Court reaffirmed that a construction rendering any portion
redundant must be eschewed. The same line of reasoning was latter
reiterated in Shiv Shakti Co-operative Housing Society v/s Swaraj
Developers reported in (2003) 6 SCC 659 holding that no ground exists
for adding to or altering plain statutory words; M/s Castrol India Ltd.
v/s R.S. Joshi reported in (2003) 8 SCC 289and Balbir Singh v/s Union
of India reported in (2004) 5 SCC 427 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court
reiterated that casus omissus must not be readily inferred.
P-15. Learned counsel also referred to Babita Lila v/s Union of India,
reported in (2016) 9 SCC 647, and Petroleum & Natural Gas
Regulatory Board v/s Indraprastha Gas Ltd., reported in (2015) 9 SCC
209. Taking support from the above decisions, learned counsel
submitted that Section 16 of the 2007 Act, by expressly limiting the
appellate right to "any senior citizen or a parent", displays a deliberate
legislative omission of children or relatives, and to insert them judicially
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would amount to creating a casus omissus where none exists. In
beneficial statutes, too, courts must remain within the bounds of textual
intent, and therefore, the appellate right cannot be extended by analogy
or equitable sympathy and stands circumscribed only by the express
legislative words.
P-16. Learned counsel then proceeded to place before this court a
detailed comparative analysis of judicial pronouncements from various
High Courts, highlighting the divergent interpretative approaches taken
with respect to the scope and extent of the appellate remedy under
Section 16 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior
Citizens Act, 2007. It was his submission that the said provision has
been construed differently across jurisdictions giving rise to two distinct
lines of authority - first, a restrictive interpretation that confines the
appellate right exclusively to the senior citizen or parent and second, a
broader reading which extends the right of appeal to any person
aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, including children, relatives or
third parties.
P-17. In support of the restrictive view, learned counsel referred first
to the Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court in K. Raju v/s
Union of India reported in 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 746, wherein the
Madras High Court interpreted Section 16 as conferring the right of
appeal solely upon a senior citizen or a parent. The Bench observed that
the plain language employed by the Legislature is both specific and
exhaustive and does not admit of any expanded construction. The Bench
held that had Parliament intended to provide an appellate right to "any
aggrieved person", it would have expressly done so. Notably, the Court
emphasised that the proviso to Section 16, which deals with the
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suspension of maintenance during appeal, applies only when the appeal
is instituted by a senior citizen or parent, thereby confirming the
legislative intent to exclude all other classes from the appellate fold.
P-18. This position was reiterated by a Division Bench of the
Karnataka High Court in Sri K. Lokesh v/s Bangalore District
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Appellate
Tribunal in WA No. 254 of 2024, wherein the Karnataka High Court
reaffirmed the principle that statutory interpretation must adhere to the
express language of the enactment. Karnataka High Court cautioned
against judicial overreach by supplying words not found in the text and
declared that the absence of a negative prohibition does not give rise to a
positive entitlement. The Bench expressly declined to follow the
contrary view adopted by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in
Paramjeet Kumar Saroya (supra) and concluded that "Section 16 of the
Act can be invoked only by a senior citizen or a parent, the right of
appeal under Section 16 is not available to any other party."
P-19. The same line of reasoning found affirmation in the Division
Bench decisions of this court in Smt. Shilpi v/s Shakuntala reported in
2022 SCC OnLine MP 3312, wherein the Court dealt with a case
involving eviction sought by a ninety-year-old woman against her
relatives. The Tribunal had passed an order in her favour, which was
challenged in an appeal by the aggrieved relatives. The Division Bench
held that the right of exclusive residence and possession under the Act is
granted to senior citizens to ensure their dignity and welfare, and that
this legislative objective cannot be diluted by permitting collateral
challenges from children or third parties. The court held that the
Tribunal's jurisdiction is not intended to reopen broader civil disputes
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and that appeals under Section 16 are confined to senior citizens or
parents for whose benefit the law was enacted.
P-20. A similar conclusion was reached by this court in Dilip Marmat
v/s Collector reported in 2025 SCC OnLine MP 786, where the
Division Bench upheld the exclusive nature of the appellate remedy
under Section 16. The Court placed reliance on the decisions of the
Supreme Court in Sudesh Chhikara v/s Ramti Devi reported in 2022
SCC OnLine SC 1684 and Urmila Dixit v/s Sunil Sharan Dixit
reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2, wherein it was affirmed that the
2007 Act is intended to provide a speedy, simple and efficacious remedy
to senior citizens. The Court held that expanding the right of appeal to
persons other than those expressly mentioned in the provision would
frustrate the underlying purpose of the statute and give rise to avoidable
procedural delays.
P-21. In contrast, learned counsel acknowledged that a broader
interpretation has been adopted in certain jurisdictions, such as in
Paramjeet Kumar Saroya v/s Union of India reported in AIR 2014
P&H 121, wherein the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that in the
absence of an express prohibition, the right of appeal could be extended
to any aggrieved person. Similarly, the Bombay High Court in Riddhi
v/s Pratibha reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 1690 and in Jagdish
Pitambar Pawar v/s Pitambar Pundalik Pawar in W.P. No. 36 of 2023
adopted a liberal interpretation in favour of granting appellate access to
all parties affected by orders of the Tribunal. These decisions relied on
equitable reasoning that justice and fairness require the availability of an
appellate remedy to all persons whose rights may be impacted.
P-22. However, disagreeing with this line of authority, learned counsel
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submitted that the restricted view as enunciated in the decisions of the
Madras, Karnataka and this Court is doctrinally sound and legally
sustainable. Learned counsel urged that the wider interpretation rests on
impermissible assumptions of legislative omission and is contrary to the
established rule against judicial legislation. Learned counsel contended
that the omission to include "any aggrieved person" in Section 16 is
deliberate and must be respected as a conscious legislative choice. To
hold otherwise would violate the doctrine of casus omissus and
transgress the outer bounds of interpretive legitimacy.
P-23. Learned counsel further submitted that the decisions in Smt.
Shilpi (supra) and Dilip Marmat (supra), both rendered by Division
Benches of this Court, are in faithful alignment with the text, context
and constitutional objectives of the 2007 Act. Learned counsel
submitted that these decisions have preserved the protective structure of
the Act without enabling reciprocal or adversarial rights to those very
persons against whom relief is statutorily contemplated. Learned
counsel thus prayed that this court hold that only a senior citizen or a
parent may maintain an appeal under Section 16 of the Act.
SUBMISSION BY SHRI ROMESH, DEPUTY SOLICITOR
GENERAL
P-24. Shri Romesh Dave learned counsel submitted that the right to
file an appeal under this section is not open to everyone. It is a special
and limited right given only to a "senior citizen or a parent" and not to
any other person, such as a child, relative, or third party. Learned
counsel began by pointing to the clear wording of Section 16(1) of the
Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to submit that these words are simple, direct,
and restrictive and Parliament had used precise language to limit who
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may appeal i.e.....only senior citizens and parents which shows that the
Legislature meant to give the right of appeal only to those two groups
and not to anyone else.
P-25. Learned counsel further submitted that when the law is clear, the
Court must read it as it is. The first rule of interpretation is to follow the
plain meaning of the words. If the Legislature had intended to include
others, it would have said so. Expanding the provision by adding words
that Parliament did not use would amount to judicial legislation, which
would change a simple, protective law into a complex and technical
process. Learned counsel submitted that the purpose of the Senior
Citizens Act, 2007, is to help old and helpless people quickly and
simply, without long legal fights, but if the courts allow others, like
children or relatives, to appeal, it will turn a quick and protective system
into a slow and complex one.
P-26. Learned counsel submitted that the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, is
a social welfare law created to protect and support elderly parents and
senior citizens who cannot maintain themselves. Learned counsel
submitted that every feature of the Act, such as summary inquiries,
conciliation by the Tribunal, limited legal representation and shorter
time limits, was incorporated in the Act by the Parliament to ensure a
speedy and simple process. Learned counsel further submitted that the
appellate stage was meant only to allow elderly claimants to get quick
correction of errors and not to give opportunity for the children or
relatives to delay justice. If every respondent could appeal, it would
create delay, increase extra cost and unnecessary complications,
defeating the very object of the law.
P-27. Learned counsel submitted that the Parliamentary record clearly
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shows that lawmakers never intended to allow anyone other than senior
citizens or parents to appeal. During the parliamentary debates, there
were discussions about how the Tribunal should work and how quickly
relief should be given, but there was no suggestion to allow appeals by
respondents or third parties. Learned counsel submitted that this silence
is not accidental but is a deliberate choice by Parliamentary lawmakers
who wanted the law to stay simple and elderly-focused and not become
another technical and time-consuming legal process. Hence, Section 16
must be read as a conscious restriction meant to prevent long litigation
and to protect the rights of the elderly.
P-28. Learned counsel submitted that, from a practical point of view,
allowing all "aggrieved" persons to appeal would undermine the purpose
of the act. For instance, usually the people directed to pay maintenance
are children or relatives, and if they are allowed to go into an appeal in
every case, the elderly would be forced into long and tiring court battles,
which is not the intention of the statute. Learned counsel also submitted
that the proviso to Section 16, requiring that payment must continue
during the appeal, was never meant to expand the right of appeal but
only to ensure that the elderly person continues to receive maintenance
while the appeal filed by the senior citizen is pending, and it cannot be
used as a reason to give everyone a right of appeal.
P-29. Learned counsel discussed the contrary judgment of the Punjab
& Haryana High Court in Paramjit Kumar Saroya (supra), wherein the
court had allowed even children and relatives to appeal. Learned counsel
submitted that this decision is not correct because it relied on two
principles, purposive interpretation and casus omissus, to create a right
that the Legislature never intended.
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P-30. Learned counsel humbly submitted that the High Court had
reasoned that to avoid hardship, both these principles must be used;
however, this is incorrect because Parliament did not forget to include
other appellants, but it chose not to include them. The omission was
intentional and not accidental, and the omission was done as Parliament
wanted finality, not multiple appeals and hence Paramjit Kumar Saroya
(supra) should not be treated as a persuasive authority.
P-31. Learned counsel concluded that the words, structure, and
purpose of Section 16 all point to one conclusion that the right of appeal
belongs only to a senior citizen or a parent. This limited construction
best serves the purpose of the Act, which is to give elderly people a
quick and affordable remedy. Allowing others to appeal would frustrate
that purpose and reopen the door to lengthy litigation. Hence, learned
counsel urged that this court hold that an appeal under Section 16 of the
Senior Citizens Act, 2007, is maintainable only at the instance of a
senior citizen or a parent and that the view of the Punjab & Haryana
High Court in Paramjit Kumar Saroya should not be followed as it goes
beyond what Parliament intended.
SUBMISSIONS BY ADDITIONAL ADVOCATE GENERAL
S-1. Shri Anand Soni, Learned Additional Advocate General
appearing for the state, submitted that the question referred to the larger
bench must be resolved through an interpretation that furthers the
remedial object of the Act, harmonises its structure and accords to all
constitutional guarantees of equality and fairness. Learned A.A.G.
submitted that the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, is a piece of beneficial
social legislation intended to provide summary and effective protection
to parents and senior citizens. Sections 7 and 16 of the Senior Citizens
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Act, 2007, when read together, form an integrated procedural code
wherein Section 7 creates a Maintenance Tribunal while Section 16
establishes limited appellate supervision, and thus read as a whole, the
design of the statute is to secure substantive justice through speed, not to
restrict procedural fairness.
S-2. Referring to the statutory language, Learned A.A.G. submitted
that Section 16(1) which, on a literal reading appears to confer a right of
appeal upon "any senior citizen or parent" however emphasized that the
first proviso of Section 16 which requires that "on appeal, the children
or relative who is required to pay any amount shall continue to pay to
such parent the amount so ordered" plainly contemplates that the
appellant could also be a child or relative meaning thereby if this
interpretation is not adopted, the proviso would otherwise become
nugatory which violates the established rule that no word or clause of a
statute should be rendered superfluous and relied on RBI v/s Peerless
General Finance reported in (1987) 1 SCC 424).
S-3. Learned A.A.G. submitted that the omission is not deliberate but
accidental and is a casus omissus which the Courts are empowered to
reconcile through purposive construction. Reliance was placed on
Board of Muslim Wakfs (Rajasthan) v/s Radha Kishan reported in
(1979) 2 SCC 468 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that a
construction defeating a remedial purpose must be eschewed and further
also relied on Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v/s Essar Power Ltd.
reported in (2008) 4 SCC 755 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court
recognized the permissibility of "exceptional construction" to prevent
absurd or unjust results.
S-4. Learned A.A.G. also relied on the Maintenance and Welfare of
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Parents and Senior Citizens (Amendment) Bill, 2019, which proposes
to substitute the words "senior citizen or parent" with "senior citizen,
parent, child or relative." Although the Bill is pending, Learned A.A.G.
urged that it furnishes persuasive evidence of legislative intent and
reveals that Parliament itself considered the omission inadvertent.
Learned A.A.G. submitted that under the mischief rule of Heydon's
Case, courts may adopt an interpretation that suppresses the mischief
and advances the remedy, and the 2019 Bill demonstrates that the
mischief lay in one-sided appellate access. Thus, even without the
amendment, Section 16 must be construed in a manner that causes the
legislative correction.
S-5. Turning to precedents, learned A.A.G. traced two divergent
interpretive lines. The literal line as reflected in the decision of Madras
High Court in K. Raju v/s Union of India reported in W.P. No. 29988 of
2019, the decision of the Karnataka High Court in K. Lokesh (supra),
the decisions of this court in Anil Choupda (supra) and Smt. Anuradha
Pathak (supra), wherein the courts have confined the right of appeal to
senior citizens and parents on the principle that a right of appeal is
purely statutory. In contrast, the purposive line commencing with the
decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Paramjeet Kumar
Saroya (supra), the decisions of Bombay High Court in Jagdish
Pitambar Pawar (supra) and Riddhi Dawle (supra), the decision of
Delhi High Court in Rakhi Sharma v/s State in W.P. No. 2895 of 2021,
the decision of Allahabad High Court in Smt. Roopam (supra) and the
decision of this Court in Nitin Jat (supra), wherein the courts have read
Section 16 as permitting an appeal by any affected party. Learned
A.A.G. submitted that these latter judgements give life to the first
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proviso, avoid procedural anomaly and conform to the remedial nature
of the enactment.
S-6. Learned A.A.G., then relying on the Doctrine of Purposive
Construction, Doctrine of Harmonious ConstructionandDoctrine of
Casus Omissus, submitted that courts cannot ordinarily supply
omissions; however, where an omission is clearly unintended and
ignoring it would defeat the object of the statute, the judicial
supplementation is permissible. Learned A.A.G. also relied on the
Doctrine of Equality of Arms and Natural Justice to submit that
procedural fairness demands parity of appellate opportunity. Learned
A.A.G. placed reliance on State of West Bengal v/s Anwar Ali Sarkar
reported in (1952) 1 SCC 1 to submit that a classification conferring
appeal rights only upon one side, though both are parties to the same
quasi-judicial proceeding, violates Article 14. Learned A.A.G. submitted
that the present classification in the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, lacks
rational nexus to the object of the statute since the welfare of elders can
be protected even while granting limited appellate access to the opposite
side under protective conditions.
S-7. Learned A.A.G. to reinforce that extending appellate access
would not undermine but rather strengthen the protective scheme, drew
parallels with other beneficial enactments such as under Section 29 of
the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, where
appeals lie "by the aggrieved person or the respondent" yet interim
protection orders under Section 23 continue pending appeal. Under the
Consumer Protection Act, 2019, in Sections 41, 51, and 67 and the
Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, in Sections
43(5) and 58, appeals are open to "any person aggrieved", but protective
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asymmetries such as pre-deposit obligations on the opposite party are
safeguarded for the beneficiary class. Similarly, Section 173 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Section 30 of the Employees'
Compensation Act, 1923, provide reciprocal rights of appeal subject to
deposit or substantial-question-of-law requirements. These acts
demonstrate a legislative pattern of appellate powers given to both sides
combined with protective measures, whereas Section 16, by contrast, is
a one-sided provision that the 2019 Bill explicitly seeks to correct.
S-8. Further invoking comparative and constitutional analogy,
Learned A.A.G. referred to the evolution of appellate rights under
criminal procedure. Historically, only the State could appeal an acquittal
under Section 378 CrPC, but the 2009 amendment inserted a proviso to
Section 372, granting victims a right to appeal and placed reliance on
Mallikarjun Kodagali v/s State of Karnataka reported in (2019) 2 SCC
752. Learned A.A.G. submitted that this development illustrates how
procedural parity enhances legitimacy without undermining protection
of the beneficiary class, and this same rationale applies to children or
relatives under the Senior Citizen Act, 2007, whose property and
livelihood rights are protected under Articles 21 and 300-A and may be
directly affected by Tribunal orders. Thus, the Doctrine of Fair
Procedure demands an appellate forum for both sides.
S-9. Learned A.A.G. submitted that recognising appeals by "any
aggrieved person" does not dilute the welfare orientation of the Act
because the continuation of payment proviso already secures the
maintenance /subsistence allowance of the senior citizen pending
appeal, and Rule 19 of the M.P. Senior Citizen Rules, 2009 ensures
expedited disposal. Rather, an appeal by both parties enhances the
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finality and accuracy of decisions, which ultimately reinforces elder
protection. Thus, Learned A.A.G. prayed that this court adopt a
purposive-harmonious interpretation, declaring that appeals by children
or relatives are maintainable.
SUBMISSION BY SHRI VIVEK SHARAN, SENIOR ADVOCATE
FOR RESPONDENT NO.1
R-1. Shri Vivek Sharan, learned senior counsel, submitted that the
central question referred by the learned Single Bench - "whether an
appeal under Section 16(1) is available only to a senior citizen or a
parent or to any aggrieved person" must be answered in favour of a
liberal construction extending the appellate remedy to all persons
directly affected by the order. Restricting the right of appeal solely to
parents or senior citizens would create a situation where children,
relatives or transferees against whom an erroneous order is passed under
Section 23 are all left without an efficacious remedy, which cannot be
the legislative intent of a welfare enactment.
R-2. Learned senior counsel submitted that the judgments referred to
in the order of reference itself reveal a clear divergence among High
Courts, but the dominant view favours the inclusive interpretation.
Learned senior counsel referred decisions of this court and various other
high courts, such as Anil Choupda (supra), Smt. Roopam (supra), Nitin
Jat (supra), Smt. Anuradha Pathak (supra), Jagdish Pitamber Pawar
(supra)and Riddhi v/s Pratibha reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Bom
1690, wherein all these decisions, the courts have recognised that the
right of appeal should be available to any aggrieved person. Learned
senior counsel further relied particularly on Paramjeet Kumar Saroya
(supra), wherein the Punjab and Haryana High Court treated the
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omission of the words "children or relatives" in Section 16 as a casus
omissus and read them into the provision to prevent injustice. Learned
senior counsel submitted that the only contrary view is that of the
Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Sri K. Lokesh (supra),
which learned senior counsel humbly submitted that proceeds on a
hyper-literal construction and should not be followed.
R-3. Learned Senior Counsel pointed out that Section 16(1) of the
Senior Citizens Act, 2007, suffers from textual ambiguity. The phrase
"any senior citizen or a parent" appears restrictive, yet when read with
Sections 23 and 27, it becomes clear that the Act contemplates orders
directly affecting third parties - children or transferees excluding them
from the appellate remedy would render the statute unbalanced and
arbitrary, contrary to the principles of fairness under Articles 14 and
300-A of the Constitution. Hence, the provision must be construed to
confer a remedy on any aggrieved person.
R-4. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the parliamentary
debates on the amendment bill expressly acknowledged the need to
extend the right of appeal to children and relatives and proposed
insertion of those words in Section 16(1) of the Senior Citizens Act,
2007, demonstrating that the legislative intention was always to make
the remedy available to all aggrieved parties. This amendment is
clarificatory and hence must be applied retrospectively.
R-5. Learned Senior Counsel then elaborated on the doctrine of
casus omissus, contending that where an omission is clearly inadvertent
and supplying it is essential to give effect to the legislative purpose, the
court is competent to read the statute accordingly. Learned senior
counsel relied upon the following judgements of Hon'ble Apex Court:
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Child in Conflict with Law v/s State of Karnataka reported in (2024) 8
SCC 473), Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd. v/s Vemuganti Ramakrishnan
Rao reported in (2013) 8 SCC 789, Union of India v/s Rajiv Kumar
reported in (2003) SCC OnLine 710), Sangeeta Singh v/s Union of
India reported in (2005) 7 SCC 484), Union of India v/s
Shardindureported in (2007) 6 SCC 276) and Prakash Gupta v/s SEBI
reported in (2021) 17 SCC 451). Relying on the above judgments,
learned senior counsel submitted that the courts must justly supply an
omission, where the legislative purpose would otherwise be defeated,
especially in beneficial statutes like the present one.
R-6. Learned Senior Counsel also cited Grid Corporation of Orissa
Ltd. v/s Eastern Metals and Ferro Alloys reported in (2011) 11 SCC
334 and Shailesh Dhairyawan v/s Mohan Balkrishna Lulla reported in
(2016) 3 SCC 619 to reiterate that a purposive construction should be
preferred to a literal one where the latter defeats the object of the statute
and also cited S. Vanitha (supra) wherein it was held that courts must
read social-welfare legislation liberally to effectuate its purpose. In
conclusion, learned senior counsel submitted that Section 16 must be
interpreted in a manner that advances the object of the Act and ensures
fairness to all affected parties and that the omission of the words
"children or relatives" is a curable casus omissus.
APPRECIATION & CONCLUSION
A-1 The question which we are required to answer is "whether an
appeal under Section 16 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and
Senior Citizens Act, 2007 is maintainable only at the instance of any
senior citizen or a parent, or it is maintainable at the instance of any
aggrieved person ?"
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A-2. The Senior Citizen Act, 2007, is an act to provide more effective
provisions for the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior
citizens, which is granted and recognised under the Constitution. The
Definition 2(d) defines the word "parent" means a father or mother,
whether biological, adoptive or stepfather or stepmother, irrespective of
whether they are a senior citizen or not, because it is separately defined
in Definition 2 (h), according to which a citizen of India who has
attained the age of 60 years or above. Therefore, as per these two
definitions, there are only two categories of persons, i.e. parent and
senior citizen, for whose benefits this Act has been promulgated.
A-3. Definition 2(a) defines the "children" which includes son,
daughter, grandson and grand-daughter, and all should be major. Apart
from children, the ''relative'' under Definition 2(g) means any legal heir
of the childless senior citizen who is not a minor and is in possession of
or would inherit his property after his death.
A-4. Definition 2(j) defines the ''Tribunal'' which is constituted under
Section 7, and it is called the Maintenance Tribunal. Since this act deals
with the welfare of parents and senior citizens, the welfare is also
defined in Definition 2(k), which is provision for food, health care,
recreation centres and other amenities necessary for the senior citizens.
A-5. By virtue of Section 3, this Act has been given overriding effect
over all enactments, keeping in mind the welfare intention behind its
enactment.
A-6. Chapter II deals with the ''Maintenance of Parents and Senior
Citizens. Section 4 deals with the maintenance of a parent and a senior
citizen who is unable to maintain himself from his own earnings or
property owned by him. They can make an application under Section 5
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against one or more of their children and against such relatives referred
to in Clause (g) of Section 2 if they have no children. Section 4(3) & (4)
casts an obligation upon children and relatives, as the case may be, to
maintain parents or senior citizens, as the case may be, having sufficient
means. Therefore, the children have not been given any option to deny,
but are under an obligation to maintain their parents and the senior
citizens, as the case may be.
A-7. Under Section 5, the cognizance by the Tribunal can be taken
suo motu or on an application preferred by senior citizens or parents, as
the case may be. Sections 5 & 6 further provide the procedure and
jurisdiction of a Maintenance Tribunal. In this procedure, the children or
the relatives get a complete opportunity to defend themselves against
their parents or senior citizens.
A-8. Section 7 provides for the establishment of the Maintenance
Tribunal, under which the State Government notify in the official
gazette about the constitution of each Sub-division one or more
Tribunals, and such Tribunal shall be presided over by an officer not
below the rank of Sub-Divisional Officer of a State. The procedure to be
adopted for conducting an inquiry under Section 5 shall be a summary
procedure with all powers of the Civil Court for the purpose of taking
evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of
compelling the discovery and production of documents, etc. After
completing the procedure, the order of maintenance is liable to be
passed under Section 9. Section 9(2) provides for minimum
maintenance, which shall not exceed ten thousand rupees per month.
Section 11 gives power to enforce the order of maintenance.
A-9. There is a provision of the constitution of the Appellate Tribunal
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under Section 15, under which the State Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one Appellate Tribunal for
each district to hear the appeal against the order of the Tribunal, which
shall be presided over by an officer not below the rank of District
Magistrate. Section 15 is reproduced below:-
''15. Constitution of Appellate Tribunal
1. The State Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, constitute one Appellate Tribunal
for each district to hear the appeal against the order of the
Tribunal.
2. The Appellate Tribunal shall be presided over by an
officer not below the rank of District Magistrate.''
A-10. As per Section 15, the constitution of the Appellate Tribunal
is only to hear the appeal against the order of the Tribunal. Section
16, which requires consideration/ interpretation in this case, as to
who can file an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. For ready
reference, Section 16 is reproduced below:-
''16. Appeals
1. Any senior citizen or a parent, as the case may be,
aggrieved by an order of a Any senior citizen or a parent, as
the case may be, aggrieved by an order of a Tribunal may,
within sixty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal
to the Appellate Tribunal:
Provided that on appeal, the children or relative who is
required to pay any amount in terms of such maintenance
order shall continue to pay to such parent the amount so
ordered, in the murmcr directed by the Appellate Tribunal:
Provided further that the Appellate Tribunal may,
entertain the appeal alter the expiry of the said period of sixty
days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by
sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.
2. On receipt of an appeal, the Appellate Tribunal shall,
cause a notice to be served upon the respondent.
3. The Appellate Tribunal may call for the record of
proceedings from the Tribunal against whose order the appeal
is preferred.
4. The Appellate Tribunal may, after examining the appeal
and the records called for either allow or reject the appeal.
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5. The Appellate Tribunal shall, adjudicate and decide upon
the appeal Hied against the order of the Tribunal and the order
of the Appellate Tribunal shall be final:
Provided that no appeal shall be rejected unless an
opportunity has been given to both the panics of being heard
in person or through a duly authorised representative.
1. The Appellate Tribunal shall make an endeavour to
pronounce its order in writing within one month of the receipt
of an appeal.
2. A copy of every order made under sub-section (3) shall
be sent to both the panics free of cost.''
A-11. As per plain and simple language of Section 16(1), the right
to file an appeal is given only to a senior citizen or a parent, as the
case may be, aggrieved by an order of a Tribunal, within sixty days
from the date of the order. As per the proviso, the Appellate Tribunal
has the power to entertain the appeal beyond the period of sixty days
if the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause. On receipt of the
appeal, the Appellate Tribunal shall cause a notice to be served upon
the respondent. In the appeal. The Appellate Tribunal has the power
to call the record of a Maintenance Tribunal.
A-12. Sub-section (4) of section 14 gives a power to the Appellate
Tribunal to either allow or reject the appeal. It is important to note here
that the Appellate Tribunal has not given power to set aside or quash the
order of the Tribunal because the same is in favour of the parents or a
senior citizen. By reading Section 16(1) & (4) conjointly, it gives
impression that in the appeal filed by senior citizens or parents the order
of Tribunal by which their case has either been dismissed or less amount
of maintenance has been fixed, the Appellate Tribunal after examining
the appeal and the record, may either allow the appeal by granting
maintenance or enhanced it or maintained the order of Tribunal as the
case may be.
A-13. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
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proviso to section 16(1) of the Act gives the impression that the children
or relatives can also prefer an appeal because during the pendency of the
appeal, they are continued to pay such maintenance amount so ordered.
We are of the opinion that this proviso has been inserted to deal with the
situation that, in case of enhancement claimed by the parent in the
appeal, the children will continue to pay the maintenance, and, as part of
that, the Appellate Tribunal has not been given any power to stay the
order of the Tribunal. Even if the senior citizens or parents file an
appeal, that will not operate to stay on the order of the Tribunal, and
children and relatives are liable to pay the maintenance during the
pendency of the appeal. Therefore, Section 16(1) confines the right of
appeal only to senior citizens or parents, not to children or relatives. The
Appellate Tribunal, in an appeal, either allow the appeal or rejects the
appeal, maintaining the order of the Tribunal.
A-14. Again, emphasis has been laid on sub-section (5) of Section 16,
which gives authority to the Appellate Tribunal to adjudicate or decide
the appeal against the order of the Tribunal unless the opportunity has
been given to both parties. Even if it is provided in the Act, it goes
without saying. If the appellate authority is constituted and power has
been given to entertain the appeal, then naturally the Appellate Authority
/ Tribunal is liable to adjudicate and decide the appeal by giving an
opportunity to both parties. There is any intention of Parliament that the
right to file an appeal has been given to children or relatives. Since this
Act has been enacted for the welfare of the parents and senior citizens,
therefore, the Appellate Authority is required to pass the order within
one month from the date of receipt of the appeal, and there is a finality
of the order.
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A-15. It has been brought on record that now a bill has been prepared
to be presented before the Parliament for amendment in Section 16(1)
for the purpose of giving right of appeal to the children and relatives,
meaning thereby, the Government is conscious that at present such a
right is not available in Section 16(1), therefore, such an amendment is
required. Hence, unless the bill is passed and the right to file an appeal
is given to the children and relatives, no appeal would be maintainable
at the instance of aggrieved persons.
A-16. Recently, the Apex Court in the case of Urmila Dixit (supra) has
discussed the intention of the Central Government behind bringing this
Act as beneficial legislation. Paragraphs 8 to 18 are reproduced below:-
''8. To answer the issue at hand, it is imperative for this Court
to discuss the rules of interpretation to be applied when
interpreting a beneficial legislation akin to the Act at hand.
While dealing with certain provisions of the Motor Vehicles
Act, this Court, in Brahmpal v. National Insurance
Company, observed that a beneficial legislation must receive
a liberal construction in consonance with the objectives that
the concerned Act seeks to serve.
9. This Court in K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob reiterated
the above expositions and stated that:
"11. Provisions of a beneficial legislation have to be
construed with a purpose-oriented approach. [Kerala
Fishermen's Welfare Fund Board v. Fancy Food, (1995)
4 SCC 341] The Act should receive a liberal construction
to promote its objects. [Bombay Anand Bhavan
Restaurant v. ESI Corpn., (2009) 9 SCC 61 : (2009) 2
SCC (L&S) 573 and Union of India v. Prabhakaran
Vijaya Kumar, (2008) 9 SCC 527 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri)
813] Also, literal construction of the provisions of a
beneficial legislation has to be avoided. It is the Court's
duty to discern the intention of the legislature in making
the law. Once such an intention is ascertained, the statute
should receive a purposeful or functional interpretation
[Bharat Singh v. New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, (1986)
2 SCC 614 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 335]
...
13. While interpreting a statute, the problem or
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mischief that the statute was designed to remedy should
first be identified, and then a construction that
suppresses the problem and advances the remedy should
be adopted. [Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v.
Sanjay Dalia, (2015) 10 SCC 161 : (2016) 1 SCC (Civ)
55] It is settled law that exemption clauses in beneficial
or social welfare legislations should be given strict
construction [Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram
Kowshik, (1984) 1 SCC 588] . It was observed in
Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram Kowshik
[Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram Kowshik,
(1984) 1 SCC 588] that the exclusionary provisions in a
beneficial legislation should be construed strictly so as to
give a wide amplitude to the principal object of the
legislation and to prevent its evasion on deceptive
grounds. Similarly, in Minister Administering the Crown
Lands Act v. NSW Aboriginal Land Council [Minister
Administering the Crown Lands Act v. NSW Aboriginal
Land Council, 2008 HCA 48: (2008) 237 CLR 285],
Kirby, J. held that the principle of providing purposive
construction to beneficial legislations mandates that
exceptions in such legislations should be construed
narrowly."
(emphasis supplied)
10. More recently, in Kozyflex Mattresses (P) Ltd. v. SBI
General Insurance Co. Ltd., this Court held the definition of
a consumer under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 to
include a company or corporate person in view of the
beneficial purpose of the Act.
11. While considering the provisions of the Medical
Termination of Pregnancy Act, this Court in X2 v. State (NCT
of Delhi), reiterated that interpretation of the provisions of a
beneficial legislation must be in line with a purposive
construction, keeping in mind the legislative purpose.
Furthermore, it was stated that beneficial legislation must be
interpreted in favour of the beneficiaries when it is possible to
take two views.
12. It is in the above background that we must proceed to
examine the Act. The statement of object and reasons of the
Act indicates the purpose behind the enactment, as relied
upon by this Court in S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner,
Bengaluru Urban District and Ors., is:
"Traditional norms and values of the Indian society laid
stress on providing care for the elderly. However, due to
withering of the joint family system, a large number of
elderly are not being looked after by their family.
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Consequently, many older persons, particularly widowed
women are now forced to spend their twilight years all
alone and are exposed to emotional neglect and to lack
of physical and financial support. This clearly reveals
that ageing has become a major social challenge and
there is a need to give more attention to the care and
protection for the older persons. Though the parents can
claim maintenance under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, the procedure is both time-consuming
as well as expensive. Hence, there is a need to have
simple, inexpensive and speedy provisions to claim
maintenance for parents."
13. The preamble of the Act states that it is intended towards
more effective provisions for maintenance and welfare of
parents and senior citizens, guaranteed and recognised under
the Constitution.
14. Therefore, it is apparent, that the Act is a beneficial piece
of legislation, aimed at securing the rights of senior citizens,
in view of the challenges faced by them. It is in this backdrop
that the Act must be interpreted and a construction that
advances the remedies of the Act must be adopted.
15. Before adverting to the provisions of the Act, we must be
cognizant of the larger issue that this case presents, i.e., the
care of senior citizens in our society. This Court in Vijaya
Manohar Arbat Dr v. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai and Anr.
highlighted that it is a social obligation for both sons and
daughters to maintain their parents when they are unable to do
so.
16. In Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse and Anr., this
Court observed that when a case pertaining to maintenance of
parents or wife is being considered, the Court is bound to
advance the cause of social justice of such marginalised
groups, in furtherance of the constitutional vision enshrined in
the preamble. Recently, this exposition came to be reiterated
in Rajnesh v. Neha and Another.
17. While issuing a slew of directions for the protection of
senior citizens in Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India, this
Court had highlighted:
"3. The rights of elderly persons is one such
emerging situation that was perhaps not fully foreseen
by our Constitution-framers. Therefore, while there is a
reference to the health and strength of workers, men and
women, and the tender age of children in Article 39 of
the Constitution and to public assistance in cases of
unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement and in
other cases of undeserved want in Article 41 of the
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Constitution, there is no specific reference to the health
of the elderly or to their shelter in times of want and
indeed to their dignity and sustenance due to their age.
4. Eventually, age catches up with everybody and
on occasion, it renders some people completely helpless
and dependent on others, either physically or mentally or
both. Fortunately, our Constitution is organic and this
Court is forward looking. This combination has resulted
in path-breaking developments in law, particularly in the
sphere of social justice, which has been given
tremendous importance and significance in a variety of
decisions rendered by this Court over the years. The
present petition is one such opportunity presented before
this Court to recognise and enforce the rights of elderly
persons--rights that are recognised by Article 21 of the
Constitution as understood and interpreted by this Court
in a series of decisions over a period of several decades,
and rights that have gained recognition over the years
due to emerging situations."
(emphasis supplied)
18. Keeping in mind the beneficial intention of the statute
and the above expositions, we now proceed to consider the
issue at hand.''
A-17. In the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court has finally
concluded that the Senior Citizen Act is a beneficial piece of
legislation aimed at securing the rights of senior citizens, and in this
backdrop, it must be interpreted, and a construction that advances the
remedies of the act must be adopted. At this stage it is necessary
to look into the verdict of the the Supreme Court of India given in the
case of Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v/s B. Vijaya Sai reported
in (2022) 5 SCC 1 as under:-
''67. Another principle that the High Court has failed to notice
is that a part of a section cannot be read in isolation. This
Court, speaking through A.P. Sen, J., in BalasinorNagrik
Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya
[BalasinorNagrik Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal
Pandya, (1987) 1 SCC 606] , observed thus : (SCC p. 608,
para 4)
"4. ... It is an elementary rule that construction of a
section is to be made of all parts together. It is not
permissible to omit any part of it. For, the principle that
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the statute must be read as a whole is equally applicable
to different parts of the same section."
This principle was reiterated by this Court in
Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai [Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai,
(1991) 3 SCC 410] : (SCC p. 418, para 6)
"6. ... It is well settled that a section has to be read in its
entirety as one composite unit without bifurcating it or
ignoring any part of it."
66. It is thus trite law that while interpreting the provisions of
a statute, it is necessary that the textual interpretation should
be matched with the contextual one. The Act must be looked
at as a whole and it must be discovered what each section,
each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and
designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No
part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in
isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has
a place and everything is in its place. As already discussed
hereinabove, the said Act has been enacted by the legislature
taking into consideration the increased globalisation of trade
and industry, the need to encourage investment flows and
transfer of technology, and the need for simplification and
harmonisation of trade mark management systems. One of the
purposes for which the said Act has been enacted is
prohibiting the use of someone else's trade mark as a part of
the corporate name or the name of business concern. If the
entire scheme of the Act is construed as a whole, it provides
for the rights conferred by registration and the right to sue for
infringement of the registered trade mark by its proprietor.
The legislative scheme as enacted under the said statute
elaborately provides for the eventualities in which a
proprietor of the registered trade mark can bring an action for
infringement of the trade mark and the limits on effect of the
registered trade mark. By picking up a part of the provisions
in sub-section (4) of Section 29 of the said Act and a part of
the provision in sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the said Act
and giving it a textual meaning without considering the
context in which the said provisions have to be construed, in
our view, would not be permissible. We are at pains to say
that the High Court fell in error in doing so.
65. We find that the High Court has failed to take into
consideration two important principles of interpretation. The
first one being of textual and contextual interpretation. It will
be apposite to refer to the guiding principles, succinctly
summed up by Chinnappa Reddy, J., in the judgment of this
Court in RBI v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co.
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Ltd. [RBI v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd.,
(1987) 1 SCC 424] : (SCC pp. 450-51, para 33)
"33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the
context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may
well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives
the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important.
That interpretation is best which makes the textual
interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best
interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this
knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and
then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by
phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the
context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-
maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the
sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and
appear different than when the statute is looked at
without the glasses provided by the context. With these
glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover
what each section, each clause, each phrase and each
word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the
scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no
word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes
have to be construed so that every word has a place and
everything is in its place. It is by looking at the
definition as a whole in the setting of the entire Act and
by reference to what preceded the enactment and the
reasons for it that the court construed the expression
"Prize Chit" in Srinivasa [Srinivasa Enterprises v. Union
of India, (1980) 4 SCC 507] and we find no reason to
depart from the court's construction."
A-18. In the case of Suresh Chikara (supra), the Apex Court has held
that the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, has been enacted for the purpose of
making effective provisions, maintenance and welfare of parents and
senior citizens guaranteed and recognised under the Constitution. The
maintenance Tribunal has been established under Section 7 to exercise
various powers under the Act.
A-19. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner
submitted that the State Government has framed the rules in which
Chapter III deals with the procedure prescribed for the Appellate
Tribunal. As per Rule 15 M.P. Senior Citizen Rules, an appeal aggrieved
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by an order of the Tribunal shall be filed before the Appellate Tribunal
in Form 1. Therefore, in this rule, the word 'aggrieved' is used; thus,
whosoever is aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, may be children or
a relative, may prefer an appeal. In the rule the word aggrieved is used
because the same word is used in Section 16(1) of the Senior Citizen
Act, 2007 which says that "any senior citizen or parent, as the case may
be, aggrieved by an order", therefore, the word 'aggrieved' in Rule 15 is
there only for an appeal to be filed by senior citizen or parent not by any
person.
A-20. It is a settled law that the rules made under the act cannot give a
new right or an expansion of right more than given in the parent act. The
rule has to be read within the scope of the act. Section 32 of Senior
Citizens Act, 2007 give a power to the State to make rules and as per
sub-section (2), without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing
power, the State Government may provide rule for holding an enquiry
under Section 5 and sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act and the
maximum maintenance allowance which may be ordered by the
Tribunal under Section 9(2), therefore, no such power has been given to
frame a rule for giving right of appeal by the State Government which
has not been given by the Parliament under the Act. Thus, the contention
of Shri Sharan, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.1, is not
acceptable.
A-21. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent has laid
down much emphasis on a judgment passed by Punjab and Haryana
High Court in the case of Paramjeet Kaur (supra), in which the Division
Bench had held that Section 16(1) of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 must
read to provide for a right of appeal to any of affected person as there is
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no negative provision in the act denying the right of appeal other than
parents and senior citizen. The Writ Court of this High Court in the case
of Nitin Jaat (supra) placed reliance on this judgment and remanded the
matter back to the Appellate Tribunal to entertain the appeal filed by the
children. Because of this order, the learned Writ Court in this matter has
requested the Chief Justice to refer this issue to a Larger Bench. As
discussed above, the language of Section 16(1) of the Senior Citizens
Act, 2007, has to be read as it is without any addition or subtraction.
Had there been any intention of the lawmakers to give a right of appeal
to children or relatives, simply aggrieved person would have been used
in Section 16. The entire act has been brought into force only for the
welfare of senior citizens therein; therefore, the right to approach the
Tribunal as well as the Appellate Tribunal has been given to them only.
A-22. The Division Bench of High Court of Bangalore in the case of
Sri K. Lokesh (supra) has distinguished the Division Bench of the
judgment passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of
Paramjeet Kaur (supra), by observing that it is held by the Supreme
Court that when right to appeal is not created, such right cannot be
assumed by logical analysis or in a situation where there is no provision
restricting such right to appeal. It is also observed that when the right to
appeal is created/provided to a class, it is only to be understood that the
other class is excluded or not provided by such an act. Para 44 & 45 are
reproduced below:-
''44. Further, the principle that appeal being a statutory right
and no party have a right to file appeal except in accordance
with the prescribed procedure is well-settled. The right of
appeal may be lost to a party in face of relevant provisions of
law in appropriate cases. Thus, the right to appeal is not a
right which can be assumed by logical analysis much less by
exercise of inherent jurisdiction. It should essentially be
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provided by the law in force. In absence of any specific
provision creating a right in a party to file an appeal, such
right can neither be assumed nor inferred in favour of the
party.
45. The reasoning of the Punjab and Harayana High Court
that there is no negative provision in the Act denying the right
of appeal to other party cannot be countenanced. As observed
herein-above, it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that
when right to appeal is not created, such right cannot be
assumed by logical analysis or in a situation where there is no
provision restricting such right to appeal. When right to
appeal is created/provided to class, it is only to be understood
that other class is excluded or not provided with such right.
The provision need not in specific debar other class from right
of appeal.''
A-23. The last contention of the learned senior counsel for the
petitioner is that if right of appeal is not given under Section 16 of the
Senior Citizens Act, 2007, then they are remediless and they cannot
approach even civil Court as the jurisdiction of civil Court is barred
under Section 27, especially in respect of any matter to which any
provision of this act applies. It is further submitted that even the civil
Court cannot grant an injunction in respect of anything which is done
or intended to be done by or under this Act. Shri Sharan, learned
Senior Counsel for the respondent No.1 elaborated above submission
that in a given facts and circumstances that where the learned
Tribunal passes an order without authority or beyond the territorial
jurisdiction or with a malafide intention without considering the other
legal issue, in such situation, there would be no remedy of appeal for
the children and they will have to comply the order of the tribunal.
A-24. Needless to advise them that the remedy of writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India is always available to any citizen
of this country to challenge the order of a statutory authority, quasi-
judicial authority, tribunal, even a civil court, etc. All the matters which
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travel up to the Supreme Court at the instance of the children or a
relative, the writ petitions were filed in the High Court directly
challenging the order of maintenance and all the writ petitions were
maintained. Therefore, it cannot be said that if the right of appeal is not
given to children or relatives, under Section 16 of the Senior Citizens
Act, 2007, they are remediless. As discussed above, the purpose of the
act is to provide more speedy and effective provisions for the
maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens as guaranteed
and recognised under the Constitution of India. Thus, two-tier remedies
are provided under this act, the first is by way of a filing application
before the Maintenance Tribunal, and the second is by way of an appeal
before the Appellate Tribunal. If the Tribunal passes a favourable order
or rejects the claim, then further remedy has been provided to the senior
citizens or parents to go into the appeal either to seek modification,
enhancement of the order passed by the Tribunal, or to get an order or
maintenance against the rejection of the claim. Under Section 16(4), the
Appellate Tribunal may either allow or reject the appeal, but the order of
the Tribunal is not liable to be set aside or quashed if there is an order of
maintenance. Under any circumstances, the children are duty-bound to
maintain their parents.
C-1. In view of the above discussion, we respectfully disagree with
the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of
Paramjeet Kaur (supra), therefore, we are of the opinion that the view
taken by the Single Bench of this Court in the case of Nitin Jaat (supra)
is not a correct view hence, the same is hereby overruled.
C-2. We hereby answer the sole question of law that an appeal
under Section 16 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and
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Senior Citizens Act, 2007, is maintainable only at the instance of any
senior citizen or a parent, and it is not maintainable at the instance of
any aggrieved person.
Let the writ petition be listed before a Single Bench.
(VIVEK RUSIA) (BINOD KUMAR DWIVEDI)
JUDGE JUDGE
Ravi
