Madhya Pradesh High Court
Raj Kumari vs Sukh Sagar Shah on 13 October, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:51515
1 CR-1017-2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DEEPAK KHOT
ON THE 13th OF OCTOBER, 2025
CIVIL REVISION No. 1017 of 2025
RAJ KUMARI
Versus
SUKH SAGAR SHAH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Mahesh Prasad Shukla - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Dinesh Prasad Patel - Government Advocate for the
respondent/State.
ORDER
The present petition has been filed by the petitioner being aggrieved
by the order dated 29.07.2025 (Annexure A/2) passed by the VII District
Judge, Headquarter Waidhan, District Singrauli, whereby application
submitted by the respondent/appellant/defendant under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act has been allowed.
2. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that
the suit has been decreed vide judgment and decree dated 14.07.2021
(Annexure A/1). Thereafter, the respondent has filed first appeal on
08.03.2022 with a delay of more than seven months 23 days. The delay on
day-to-day basis has not been explained in the application submitted under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Learned court below has also not considered
the application as per the principles of condonation of delay, which require
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2 CR-1017-2025
that every person is required to explain the delay of every day. It is further
submitted that the documents annexed to the application also could not
disclose that the respondent was prevented for sufficient cause of suffering
from any ailment but, the learned court below without conducting an enquiry
has allowed the application maintaining the appeal and being aggrieved by
the said order, this petition has been filed for quashment of the order dated
29.07.2025 (Annexure A/2).
3 . Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record of
the file.
4. On a bare perusal of the the application submitted under Section 5
of the Limitation Act, it is seen that the respondent has tried to explain the
delay of every day, however, the delay, which has been occurred from the
passing of the decree till appellant gathered knowledge, is not mentioned,
however, that was not required because the respondent was not in knowledge
of the fact that such decree has been passed and thereafter, the delay of each
and every day has been explained. The learned court below pondering with
the submissions and the material available has considered the application
submitted alongwith an affidavit and allowed the same by relying on the
principle laid down by this in Second Appeal No. 1558/2008-Ramua (dead)
and others vs. Kolulal and others decided on 15.03.2022.
5 . The Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of judgments has held that the
court should adopt the liberal approach while dealing with an application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act unless the delay is shown to be based
on malafide or inordinate. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition,
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3 CR-1017-2025
Anantnag and another vs. Mst. Katiji and others, (1987) 2 SCC 107, the
Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:
"3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by
enacting Section 5 [ Any appeal or any application, other than an
application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed
period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he
had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the
application within such period.] of the Indian Limitation Act of
1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to
parties by disposing of matters on "merits". The expression
"sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic
to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner
which subserves the ends of justice -- that being the life-purpose
for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common
knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal
approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does
not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the
hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it
is realized that:
"1 . Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging
an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious
matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of
justice being defeated. As against this when delay is
condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would
be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that
a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's
delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in
a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are
pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves
to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested
right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate
delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on
account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by
resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on
account of its power to legalize injustice on technical
grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is
expected to do so."
Recently also in the case of Mool Chandra Vs. Union of India and
another, (2025) 1 SCC 625, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:
"20. Be that as it may. On account of liberty having been granted
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4 CR-1017-2025
to the appellant to pursue his remedy in accordance with law, yet
another OA No. 2066 of 2020 along with an application for
condonation of delay came to be filed. The delay was not
condoned by the Tribunal on the ground that it was filed more
than one year after the impugned order came to be passed. No
litigant stands to benefit in approaching the courts belatedly. It is
not the length of delay that would be required to be considered
while examining the plea for condonation of delay, it is the cause
for delay which has been propounded will have to be examined. If
the cause for delay would fall within the four corners of "sufficient
cause", irrespective of the length of delay same deserves to be
condoned. However, if the cause shown is insufficient, irrespective
of the period of delay, same would not be condoned."
6. In the present case, the delay is neither inordinate nor in the opinion
of this court is based on any malafide. The reasons assigned by the
respondent in the application are justified and not seems to be unnatural. It is
observed by the court that the appellant was prevented from sufficient cause
to approach the court in time. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this
Court, the learned court below has not committed any irregularity, illegality
or jurisdictional error while deciding the application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act submitted by the respondent alongwith the appeal. Thus, the
revision sans merit and is hereby dismissed accordingly.
(DEEPAK KHOT)
JUDGE
RAGHVENDRA
