Madhya Pradesh High Court
Buddhulal vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 9 October, 2025
Author: Vishal Mishra
Bench: Vishal Mishra
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA
ON THE 9 th OF OCTOBER, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 37554 of 2025
BUDDHULAL
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Durgesh Kumar Singrore - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Sumit Raghuvanshi - Government Advocate for respondents/State.
ORDER
This petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been filed
seeking following reliefs:-
"(i) This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ in the
nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 05.12.2005,
31.08.2007 and 22.01.2015 (Annexures P-1, P-2 and P-4
respectively).
(ii) This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to remand the matter
to the Tehsildar for deciding the matter afresh after affording
opportunity of hearing to the parties.
(iii) Any other relief to which the petitioner is entitled to, be also
granted.
(iv) Cost of the petition granted."
2. It is the case of the petitioner that one Jagat son of Bhavroo resident of
Gram Bargaon filed an application before the Tehsildar Dindori under Section 89
of Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 for correction of error in the Map.
Notice of the application was issued to the petitioner, he appeared and filed reply
to the same. On 05.12.2005, the Tehsildar Dindori passed order ordering for
correction in the Map. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred an
appeal before the Sub Divisional Officer Dindori and the Sub Divisional Officer
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vide order dated 31.08.2007 dismissed the appeal on the ground of barred by
limitation. Thereafter the petitioner filed an application under Section 107 of the
Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code before the Additional Collector Dindori and
the same application stood dismissed vide order dated 09.07.2024 being not
maintainable. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated 31.08.2007
preferred an appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Jabalpur Division,
Jabalpur along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
however, the Additional Commissioner vide order dated 22.01.2015 dismissed the
application as well as appeal preferred by the petitioner. Hence, the present
petition.
3. It is contended that the Tehsildar has committed an error in ordering
correction in the existing map. The appellate authorities have also committed an
error in dismissing the appeals on technical grounds. It is contended that wife of
the petitioner had died on 30.11.2014 and petitioner's land was recently
demarcated. However, there is no explanation for approaching this Court with a
delay of almost 10 years challenging the order passed in the year 2015.
4. The law with respect to sleeping litigant has been considered by the
Court in catena of cases. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Esha
Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and
Ors. reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 , has held as under :-
"21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles
that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic,
justice-oriented, nonpedantic approach while
dealing with an application for condonation of
delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise
injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and
purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms
are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper
perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
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21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and
pivotal the technical considerations should not be
given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to
deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence
on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken
note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bonafides imputable to a party
seeking condonation of delay is a significant and
relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to
strict proof should not affect public justice and
cause public mischief because the courts are
required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate
eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it
cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate
delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for
to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted
whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That
apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas
the second calls for a liberal delineation.21.9. (ix)
The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant
factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the
fundamental principle is that the courts are required
to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of
both parties and the said principle cannot be given a
total go-by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or
the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the
courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side
unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets
away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation
by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of
limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be
carefully scrutinised and the approach should be
based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which
is founded on objective reasoning and not on
individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given
some acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some
more guidelines taking note of the present day
scenario. They are:-
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay
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should be drafted with careful concern and not in a
haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the
courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock
of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is
seminal to justice dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay
should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the
base of individual philosophy which is basically
subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid
down regard being had to the concept of judicial
discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving
consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory
system should be made as that is the ultimate
institutional motto.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay
as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical
propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner
requires to be curbed, of course, within legal
parameters."
5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa & Anr. vs.
Mamata Mohanty, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436 has opined as under:-
"54. This Court has consistently rejected the contention
that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay
and laches in case the petitioner approaches the Court
after coming to know of the relief granted by the Court
in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper
explanation for delay and laches. A litigant cannot
wake up from deep slumber and claim impetus from
the judgment in cases where some diligent person had
approached the Court within a reasonable time."
6 . A Division Bench of this Court in Focus Energy Ltd. (M/s) vs
Government of India, (DB) reported in I.L.R. (2011) M.P. 53 relying upon
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :
"10. Thus, facts stated supra leads to irresistible
conclusion that appellant is guilty of delay and
laches. Its conduct disentitles it to any relief. In New
Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and Others,
AIR 2007 SC 1365 the Supreme Court has held that
delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of
equitable jurisdiction. In Municipal Council,
Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48
the Supreme Court has observed that discretionary
relief can be provided to one who has not by his act
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or conduct given a go-bye to his rights. Equity
favours a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant. In
the State of Haryana v. Aravali Khanij Udyog,
(2008) 1 SCC 663 it has been held that where third
party rights are created, the High Court should not
interfere. Similarly, in Shiba Shankar Mohapatra
(supra) it has been held that the Court exercising
public law jurisdiction does not encourage agitation
of stale claims where the right of third parties
crystallizes in the interregnum."
7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpn.
Ltd. vs K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as follows:
"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to
be borne in mind by the High Court when they
exercise their discretionary powers under Article
226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the
High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary
powers if there is such negligence or omission on
the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time and other
circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite
party. Even where fundamental right is involved the
matter is still within the discretion of the Court as
pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of
Imports and Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970
SC 769] . Of course, the discretion has to be
exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes
Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper
Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492]
(PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon
Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and
Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor
Service [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] .
Sir Barnes had stated:
"Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is
not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it
would be practically unjust to give a remedy either
because the party has, by his conduct done that
which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he
has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put
the other party in a situation in which it would not
be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases,
lapse of time and delay are most material. But in
every case, if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere
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delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by
any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Two circumstances always important in such cases
are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts
done during the interval which might affect either
party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in
taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates
to the remedy."
8. It is further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok
Kumar vs District Magistrate, Basti reported in (2012) 3 SCC 311 that :
"10. ... It is time and again, stated that a party who has
slept over his right since is not entitled to the
discretionary relief of the High Court."
9. If the aforesaid judgments with respect to delay and laches are applied
to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the petitioner has slept over his right
for a considerable period. Therefore, no relief can be extended to him.
10. Accordingly, the petition sans merit and is hereby dismissed. No
order as to costs.
(VISHAL MISHRA)
JUDGE
sj
