Madhya Pradesh High Court
The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Kusum Bai Jatav on 17 May, 2025
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
ON THE 17 th OF MAY, 2025
REVIEW PETITION No. 785 of 2025
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Versus
KUSUM BAI JATAV
Appearance:
Shri M S Jadon - G.A. for the State.
Shri Alok Katare - Advocate for the respondent [R-1].
ORDER
This Review Petition at the instance of State is directed for reviewing the
impugned order dated 21.12.2023 in Writ Petition No.13551/2022.
2. As per office report, Review Petition is barred by time as there is delay of
468 days.
3. Application under section 5 of the Limitation Act vide I.A.
No.3717/2025 has been filed seeking condonation of delay.
4. I.A. No.3717/2025 is taken up for consideration.
5. Counsel for the petitioner/State while explaining the delay caused in
filing the Review Petition has submitted that the order under review had been
passed on 21.12.2023 and after obtaining certified copy of the order under
review, certain inter-departmental correspondences took place in the matter and
sanction had been accorded on 21.04.2025, and consequently, the Review Petition
was filed on 02.05.2025. It is prayed that the delay may be condoned and the
Review Petition may be heard on merits.
6. The aforesaid submissions made in the application suggest that instant
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case is a classic case where the State in fact has woken up from a deep slumber of
a long period of 468 days. Learned counsel for the petitioner is unable to
demonstrate as to when certified copy of the order under review was obtained and
was sent for opinion. Explanation offered by way of the instant skeleton
application under section 5 of the Limitation Act can hardly be said to be one
showing sufficient cause preventing the petitioners/State to file Review Petition
within limitation. The petition is hopelessly time barred by 468 days. Moreover,
the averments contained in the application for delay are hypothetical and vague,
hence, sufficient cause has not been shown for delay in filing the petition.
7. Law as regards scope and jurisdiction of the Court in the matter of
condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act is well settled by the
Hon'ble Apex Court and the various High Courts.
8. In the case of Ramlal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. reported in AIR 1962 SC
361, the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 7 has held as under:-
"7. In construing Section 5 (of the Limitation Act) it is relevant to bear
in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the
expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal
gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as
binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of
limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a
benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond
challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder
by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other
consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for
excusing delay in shown discretion is given to the court to condone
delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately
conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that
behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice."
9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of P.K. RAmachandran Vs. State of
Kerala reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556 , has held in para 6 as under:-
"6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to
be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the
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courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds."
10. As regards meaning, scope and rationale of the law of limitation, the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pundlilk Jalam Patil (Dead) by Lrs., Vs.
Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another, (2008) 17 SCC 448 has
held as under:
"26. Basically the laws of Limitation are founded on public policy. In
Halsbury's Laws of England,4th Ed., Vol.28,p.266,para 605, the policy
of the Limitation Acts is laid down as follows:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.- The courts have expressed at least
three different reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitation,
namely,(i) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in
them, (ii) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to dispute the
stated claim, (iii) that persons with good causes of actions should
pursue them with reasonable diligence."
27. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as 'statutes of peace'.
An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and
uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. This
court in Rajender Singh and others vs. Santa Singh and others [(1973)
2 SCC 705] has observed : (SCC p.712, para 18) "18. The object of law
of Limitation is to prevent disturbance and deprivation of what may
have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what
may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches".
28. In Motichand vs. Munshi [AIR 1970 SC 898], this court observed
that this principle is based on the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit
finis litium, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be
end to litigation but at the same time law of Limitation are a means to
ensuring private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening
diligence and preventing oppression.
29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time
limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a life span for legal
remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that
the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies
promptly. Salmond in his jurisprudence states that the laws come to the
assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy."
11. While dealing with the scope of jurisdiction under section 5 of the
Limitation Act, as regards condonation of delay, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Lanka Venkateshwarlu (dead) by L.Rs., Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and
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others, (2011) 4 SCC 363 has observed as under:
"19. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel.
At the outset, it needs to be stated that generally speaking, the courts in
this country, including this Court, adopt a liberal approach in
considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of
sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This principle is
well settled and has been set out succinctly in the case of Collector,
Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Ors. Vs. Katiji & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC
23. The concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness in exercise of
the discretion by the Courts in condoning delay, have been again stated
by this Court in the case of Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8
SCC 685, as follows:-
"25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive
liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of
reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The
purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the
concept of "reasonableness" as (State of M.P. and others Vs. Chhavi
Ram) it is understood in its general connotation."
26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite
consequences on the right and obligation of party to arise. These
principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on
the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has
accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party
to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it
will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the
applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence,
default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties
equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has
been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it
will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that
has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly."
28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have
impelled (State of M.P. and others Vs. Chhavi Ram) the High Court to
condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The
concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach",
"substantial justice" can not be employed to jettison the substantial law
of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there
is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by
the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and
restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any
lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case,
not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High
Court resorted to blatant sarcasms.
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29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a
judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of
cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy
unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary
powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within
reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be
exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or
fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and should not form the
basis of exercising discretionary powers. "
12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in a decision rendered in Maniben Devraj
Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 has held
in para 24 as under:-
"24. What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the
factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature
of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence
on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not
lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand,
the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is
thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a
legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay."
13. In a very recent decision the Apex Court while hearing a Special Leave
Petition (civil) in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary
reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3612 had dismissed the SLP holding that the
law of limitation is also applicable to the State with full vigour and the delay if not
explained with a sufficient cause, would entrail dismissal of the case.
14. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements of law as regards
object, scope, extent, limitation and the discretionary power to be exercised
under section 5 of the Limitation Act laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, this
Court is of the view that the delay of about 468 days caused in filing the petition
by the petitioners/State is miserably barred by limitation as neither sufficient cause
is shown in the application seeking condonation of delay nor the same is found to
be to the satisfaction of this Court.
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15. Accordingly, I.A. No.3717/2025 seeking condonation of delay in filing
the review petition is dismissed. Consequently, Review Petition is also dismissed.
No order as to cost.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE)
JUDGE
ojha
