Madhya Pradesh High Court
Bharat Bhushan Singhal vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 24 January, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:1720
1 M.Cr.C. No. 24551 of 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 24th OF JANUARY, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 24551 of 2023
BHARAT BHUSHAN SINGHAL AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri R.K. Sharma - Senior Advocate with Shri Vijay Kumar Agrawal- Advocate
for applicants.
Shri Naval Kishor Gupta - Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1/State.
Shri Rahul Bansal- Advocate for respondent No.2.
ORDER
This application, under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has been filed seeking
following relief (s):
"Petitioners, therefore, beg to pray that this petition may kindly be
allowed and the charge sheet (Annexure P/1) and the proceedings of
Criminal Case No.278/2023 pending in the court of Shrimati Aarti
Rotania, Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Kolaras, District Shivpuri (M.P.)
be also kindly ordered to be quashed/set aside."
2. It is the case of prosecution that marriage of respondent No.2 was
performed with Kapil Singhal on 18.04.2014 in accordance with Hindu rites and
rituals. Applicant No.1 is the father-in-law and applicant No.2 is the mother-in-
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law whereas applicant No.3 was younger brother-in-law (Devar) of respondent
No.2, however, as he has expired during pendency of this application, therefore,
his name has already been deleted. According to the prosecution case, respondent
No.2 lodged an FIR on 08.05.2023 alleging that she got married to Kapil Singhal
in the year 2014 and after her marriage, applicants as well as her husband used to
beat her by locking her inside the room. It was further alleged that three years
back applicant No.3 and Kapil Singhal left her at Badarwas bypass and were
saying that she is mad and they will not keep her with them. Thereafter,
complainant came to her parental home by walking. It was further alleged that
applicants have illegally kept her minor daughter. Thereafter, about two months
back her husband Kapil Singhal and applicant No.1 came to her parental home.
When she insisted to take her back to her matrimonial home, she was abused
filthily and her husband Kapil Singhal caught hold of her hair and slapped her.
Incident was intervened by her father, brother and others. Applicant No.1 and her
husband were tried to be convinced and persuaded but they did not listen to them
and accordingly, FIR was lodged.
3. Challenging the FIR, it is submitted by counsel for applicants that there is
nothing in the FIR that respondent No.2 was being harassed for demand of dowry.
Furthermore, the FIR has been lodged belatedly after three years of the incident.
Husband of respondent No.2 had filed an application under Section 9 of Hindu
Marriage Act sometime in the year 2018 and thereafter the matter was
compromised and respondent No.2 came back to her matrimonial home.
Similarly, an application for custody of child was also filed by husband of
respondent No.2 under the Guardians and Wards Act and in view of the fact that
respondent No.2 had started residing with her husband, therefore, that application
was also withdrawn. Thus, it is submitted that the FIR has been lodged by way of
counter-blast to the aforementioned proceedings.
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4. Per contra, application is vehemently opposed by counsel for the State as
well as counsel for respondent No.2.
5. It is submitted by Shri Rahul Bansal, learned counsel for respondent No.2,
that proceedings for reconciliation were undertaken and as per the report of the
Mediator it is clear that it is the husband of respondent No.2 who refused to
reconcile the dispute and accordingly Shri Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, Mediator,
after observing that Shri Kapil and Shri Chetan on asking for convenient date for
mediation to be fixed expressed that they are not interested in any further
mediation closed the proceedings. Thus, it is submitted that it is applicants who
are guilty of treating respondent No.2 with cruelty.
6 Heard learned counsel for parties.
7. Before considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court
would like to consider the law governing the field to exercise power under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
In the light of judgments passed by Supreme Court in the cases of XYZ v.
State of Gujarat reported in (2019) 10 SCC 337, State of Tamil Nadu Vs. S.
Martin & Ors. reported in (2018) 5 SCC 718, Ajay Kumar Das v. State of
Jharkhand, reported in (2011) 12 SCC 319, Mohd. Akram Siddiqui v. State of
Bihar reported in (2019) 13 SCC 350, State of A.P. v. Gourishetty Mahesh
reported in (2010) 11 SCC 226, M. Srikanth v. State of Telangana, reported in
(2019) 10 SCC 373, CBI v. Arvind Khanna reported in (2019) 10 SCC 686,
State of MP Vs. Kunwar Singh by order dated 30.06.2021 passed in Cr.A.
No.709/2021, Munshiram v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2018) 5 SCC 678,
Teeja Devi v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2014) 15 SCC 221, State of
Orissa v. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 547, S. Khushboo
v. Kanniammal reported in (2010) 5 SCC 600, Sangeeta Agrawal v. State of
U.P., reported in (2019) 2 SCC 336, Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander reported
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in (2012) 9 SCC 460, Padal Venkata Rama Reddy Vs. Kovuri Satyanarayana
Reddy reported in (2012) 12 SCC 437 and M.N. Ojha v. Alok Kumar Srivastav
reported in (2009) 9 SCC 682, this Court can quash the proceedings only if the
uncontroverted allegations do not make out an offence. Even otherwise, this Court
in exercise of power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot conduct a roving
enquiry or a mini trial to find out the correctness of allegations.
8. The first ground for attacking the prosecution is that FIR was lodged by
way of counter-blast to proceedings initiated under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage
Act and 13 of Guardians and Wards Act. The said ground is misconceived and is
hereby rejected. Application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was filed
by husband of respondent No.2 on 25.09.2018. Thereafter, on 06.02.2019 a
submission was made that in the light of reconciliation proceedings which were
done on 31.11.2018, the parties have started residing together, therefore, the
proceedings under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act were dropped on the basis of
reunion. Similarly, in proceedings initiated under Section 13 of Guardians and
Wards Act, the proceedings were withdrawn by order dated 09.03.2019 from the
Lok Adalat. It has been alleged that respondent No.2 was ousted from her
matrimonial house in 2020. Therefore, whatever had happened prior to 2020 is
immaterial to adjudicate the correctness of allegations made in the FIR. Even
otherwise, in the light of judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of
Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi, reported in (2007) 12 SCC 369 it is clear that
lodging of FIR after institution of proceedings under Section 13 of Hindu
Marriage Act cannot be said to be by way of counter blast and cannot be
quashed on the said ground. Thus, the first contention of counsel for applicant
that the FIR in question has been lodged by way of counter-blast is hereby
rejected.
9. It is next contended by counsel for applicants that since there are no
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allegations of demand of dowry, therefore, no offence under Section 498A of
IPC is made out.
10. Considered the aforesaid submission made by learned counsel for
applicants.
11. Section 498A of IPC reads as under:
Section 498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty.--Whoever, being the husband or the
relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty
shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.-- For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means--
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive
the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to
life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to
coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of
failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.
Thus, cruelty on account of non-fulfillment of demand is one of the
ingredients but the demand of dowry is not a sine qua non for alleging cruelty.
Any cruel act on the part of accused which may put the life and limb of a woman
in danger or which may drive the woman to commit suicide will amount to
cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A of IPC. In the present case,
allegations are that applicants were calling respondent No.2 as a mad person and
on account of that they were doing cruelty with her. Furthermore, she was left at a
public place and even applicant No.1 and husband of respondent No.2 did not
care to leave her to her parental home, thereby compelling respondent No.2 to go
to her parental home by walking. Furthermore, not bringing her back to her
matrimonial house for last three years clearly indicates that each and every day is
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giving fresh cause of action in the light of judgment passed by the Supreme Court
in the case of Rupali Devi v. State of U.P., reported in (2019) 5 SCC 384
wherein it has been made clear that cruelty can be physical and mental. After
desertion of respondent No.2, it can be said that the physical cruelty might
have come to an end, but compelling a married woman to live in her parental
house without any reasonable reason would also amount to mental cruelty.
Therefore, it cannot be said that either the FIR is belated or the allegations do
not make out an offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC.
12. So far as contention of counsel for applicants that applicants had already
moved before the concerning Police Station seeking protection against possible
false implication by respondent No.2 is concerned, the same cannot be
accepted as a valid defence for the reason that accused has not right to dictate
the investigating agency to investigate the matter in a particular manner. Even
otherwise in the light of judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case
Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Principal Secretary and others reported in (2014)
2 SCC 5 this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of Constitution of
India cannot supervise the investigation because it lies within the exclusive
domain of prosecution.
13. Admittedly, the girl was born on 25.10.2016 and respondent No.2 was
ousted by applicants from her matrimonial house sometime in year 2020 by
retaining the custody of minor child. It is not the case of applicants that any
order of custody has been passed by the court of competent jurisdiction. Thus,
it is clear that they had forcibly separated the minor child from her mother who
is natural guardian. Furthermore, it is clear from the Mediation proceedings
that it is the husband of respondent No.2 who has refused to proceed further
with the reconciliation proceedings. Supreme Court in the case of Taramani
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Parakh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others reported in (2015) 11
SCC 260 has held as under:-
"12. In Kailash Chandra Agrawal v. State of U.P. (2014) 16 SCC
551, it was observed (SCC p. 553, paras 8-9):
"8. We have gone through the FIR and the criminal
complaint. In the FIR, the appellants have not been named and
in the criminal complaint they have been named without
attributing any specific role to them. The relationship of the
appellants with the husband of the complainant is distant. In
Kans Raj v. State of Punjab (2000) 5 SCC 207 : 2000 SCC (Cri)
935 : (2000) 3 SCR 662] it was observed (SCC p. 217, para 5):
"5. ... A tendency has, however, developed for roping in
all relations of the in-laws of the deceased wives in the
matters of dowry deaths which, if not discouraged, is
likely to affect the case of the prosecution even against
the real culprits. In their overenthusiasm and anxiety to
seek conviction for maximum people, the parents of the
deceased have been found to be making efforts for
involving other relations which ultimately weaken the
case of the prosecution even against the real accused as
appears to have happened in the instant case."
The Court has, thus, to be careful in summoning distant
relatives without there being specific material. Only the
husband, his parents or at best close family members may be
expected to demand dowry or to harass the wife but not distant
relations, unless there is tangible material to support allegations
made against such distant relations. Mere naming of distant
relations is not enough to summon them in the absence of any
specific role and material to support such role.
9. The parameters for quashing proceedings in a criminal
complaint are well known. If there are triable issues, the Court
is not expected to go into the veracity of the rival versions but
where on the face of it, the criminal proceedings are abuse of
Court's process, quashing jurisdiction can be exercised.
Reference may be made to K. Ramakrishna v. State of Bihar,
(2000) 8 SCC 547 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 27, Pepsi Foods
Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998 SCC (Cri)
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1400, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 :
1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604
and Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P., (2011) 11 SCC 259 : (2011)
3 SCC (Cri) 159."
13. In the present case, the complaint is as follows:
"Sir, it is submitted that I was married on 18-11-2009 with
Sidharath Parakh s/o Manak Chand Parakh r/o Sarafa Bazar in
front of Radha Krishna Market, Gwalior according to the Hindu
rites and customs. In the marriage my father had given gold and
silver ornaments, cash amount and household goods according
to his capacity. After the marriage when I went to my
matrimonial home, I was treated nicely by the members of the
family. When on the second occasion I went to my matrimonial
home, my husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law started
harassing me for not bringing the dowry and started saying that
I should bring from my father 25-30 tolas of gold and Rs
2,00,000 in cash and only then they would keep me in the house
otherwise not. On account of this my husband also used to beat
me and my father-in-law and my mother-in-law used to torture
me by giving the taunts. In this connection I used to tell my
father Kundanmal Oswal, my mother Smt Prem Lata Oswal,
uncle Ashok Rai Sharma and uncle Ved Prakash Mishra from
time to time. On 2-4-2010 the members of the family of my
matrimonial home forcibly sent me to the house of my parents
in Ganj Basoda along with my brother Deepak. They snatched
my clothes and ornaments and kept with them. Since then till
today my husband has been harassing me on the telephone and
has not come to take me back. Being compelled, I have been
moving this application before you. Sir, it is prayed that action
be taken against husband Sidharath Parakh, my father-in-law
Manak Chand Parakh and my mother-in-law Smt Indira Parakh
for torturing me on account of demanding dowry.
14. From a reading of the complaint, it cannot be held that even if
the allegations are taken as proved no case is made out. There are
allegations against Respondent 2 and his parents for harassing the
complainant which forced her to leave the matrimonial home. Even
now she continues to be separated from the matrimonial home as she
apprehends lack of security and safety and proper environment in the
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matrimonial home. The question whether the appellant has in fact been
harassed and treated with cruelty is a matter of trial but at this stage, it
cannot be said that no case is made out. Thus, quashing of proceedings
before the trial is not permissible."
Thus, it is clear that prima facie case is made out warranting prosecution
of applicants. However, it is made clear that observations made by this Court in
the present order are in the light of limited scope of interference under Section
482 of Cr.P.C. and the trial court shall decide the trial strictly in accordance
with law without getting influenced or prejudiced by this order.
14. With aforesaid observation, application is dismissed.
(G.S. Ahluwalia)
Judge
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