Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sunil Kumar Dubey vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 1 August, 2025
Author: Dinesh Kumar Paliwal
Bench: Dinesh Kumar Paliwal
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DINESH KUMAR PALIWAL
ON THE 1 st OF AUGUST, 2025
CRIMINAL REVISION No. 2207 of 2025
SUNIL KUMAR DUBEY
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Appearance:
Shri Rajendra K. Gupta - Advocate for the applicant.
Smt. Geeta Yadav - Govt. Advocate for respondent.
ORDER
This criminal revision under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been filed by the applicant assailing
the appeal judgment dated 25.01.2021 delivered by 2nd Additional Session
Judge, District Singrauli (MP) in Criminal Appeal No.100294/2015 (Sunil
Kumar Dubey Vs. State of M.P.) by which learned Appellate Court has
only modified the sentence part of 03 years under Section 420 of IPC to 01
year R.I. preferred against the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 30.9.2015 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Singrauli(MP)
in Criminal Case No.1232/2007 (State of M.P. Vs. Sunil Kumar Dubey )
whereby the applicant-accused has been convicted for commission of
offence under Section 420 of IPC and has been sentenced to undergo RI for
03 years and fine of Rs.3000/- with default stipulations. Hence, this criminal
revision.
2. Heard on I.A. No.11554 of 2025 - an application under Section 5 of the
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Limitation Act for condonation of delay in presentation of present criminal
revision.
3. The revision is drastically barred by 1074 days i.e. almost a period of two
years and nine months.
4. I have gone through the application for condonation of delay.
5. Learned counsel for applicant has submitted that the impugned appeal
judgment was passed on 25/1/2021 and the revision was required to be filed
within 90 days from the date of appeal judgment; but same could not be filed
in due time as applicant was not present at the time of appeal judgment
and had no knowledge about delivery of the appeal judgment. It is submitted
that counsel engaged by the applicant before the Trial Court could not
informed him about passing of the appeal judgment well in time because
applicant went out of Singrauli due to employment, therefore, he could not
appear. Thus, there is a delay of 1074 days i.e. almost a period of two years
and nine months in presentation of the present revision petition. It is further
submitted that the delay caused in filing the revision petition is bonafide and
unintentional as circumstances were beyond the control of the applicant as
he had no knowledge about delivery of appeal judgment, therefore, revision
petition was filed on 09.5.2025. On the aforesaid pretext, it is prayed that the
delay caused in presentation the revision petition may be condoned.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the applicant at length.
7. On perusal of the impugned appeal judgment and material available on
record, it is revealed that impugned appeal judgment was passed on
25.01.2021 in the presence of counsel for the applicant and same was passed
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after hearing counsel for the applicant/accused as well as counsel for the
respondent and the revision has been filed before this Court on 09.5.2025 i.e.
after a delay of 1074 days i.e. almost a period of two years and nine months.
8 . Law with regard to scope and jurisdiction of the Court in the matter of
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is well settled by
Hon'ble the Apex Court and the various High Courts.
9. In the case of Ramlal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.; AIR 1962 SC 361 ,
Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under:-
"7. In construing Section 5 (of the Limitation Act), it is
relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The
first consideration is that expiration of the period of limitation
prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour
of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between
the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation
prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a
benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as
decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly
disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is
that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion
is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal.
This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court
in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf
should be exercised to advance substantial justice."
10. As regards meaning, scope and rationale of the law of limitation,
Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (Dead) by LRs.
Vs. Executive Enginner, Jalgaon Medium Project and another; (2008) 17
SCC 448 has held as under:-
"26. Basically, the laws of limitation are founded on public
policy. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, p.
266, Para 605, the policy of the Limitation Acts is laid down
as follows:
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"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts
have expressed at least three differing reasons
supporting the existence of statutes of limitation,
namely, (i) that long dormant claims have more of
cruelty than justice in them, (ii) that a defendant might
have lost the evidence to disprove the stale claim, and
(iii) that persons with good causes of actions should
pursue them with reasonable diligence."
27. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as "statutes
of peace". An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation
creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is
essential for public order. This Court in Rajender Singh v.
Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705] has observed: (SCC p. 712,
para 18)
"18. The object of law of limitation is to prevent
disturbance or deprivation of what may have been
acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what
may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence
or laches."
28. In Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC
110 : AIR 1970 SC 898 : (1969) 2 SCR 824] this Court
observed that this principle is based on the maxim "interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium", that is, the interest of the State
requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same
time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice
suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and
preventing oppression.
29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for
fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing
a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare.
They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory
tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his
Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of
the vigilant and not of the sleepy."
11. While dealing with the scope of jurisdiction under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, as regards condonation of delay, Hon'ble the Apex Court in
the case of Lanka Venkateshwarlu (Dead) by LRs. Vs. State of Andhra
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Pradesh and Others; (2011) 4 SCC 363 has observed as under:-
"19. We have considered the submissions made by the
learned counsel. At the outset, it needs to be stated that
generally speaking, the courts in this country, including this
Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the application
for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This principle is well
settled and has been set out succinctly in Collector (L.A.) v.
Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107] .
xxx ... xxx..
23. The concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness in
exercise of the discretion by the courts in condoning delay,
have been again stated by this Court in Balwant Singh
[(2010) 8 SCC 685 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 537] , as follows:
(SCC p. 696, paras 25-26)
"25. We may state that even if the term 'sufficient cause'
has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall
within the concept of reasonable time and proper
conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of
introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce
the concept of 'reasonableness' as it is understood in its
general connotation.
26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has
definite consequences on the right and obligation of a
party to arise (sic a lis). These principles should be
adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the
facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable
right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the
failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing
sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be
unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking
of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a
result of negligence, default or inaction of that party.
Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone
the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been
thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and
remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other
party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a
result of his acting vigilantly."
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xxx... xxx..
28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which
could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay
after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such
as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach",
"substantial justice" cannot be employed to jettison the
substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the
court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In
our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to
show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a
Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis
between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this
case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate
language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms.
29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant
language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by
this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering
applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and
unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers,
especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within
reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be
exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims
or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not
form the basis of exercising discretionary powers."
12. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Maniben Devraj Shah Vs.
Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai; (2012) 5 SCC 157 has held in
para 24 as under:-
"24. What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get
in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on
bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that
there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and
the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it
may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation
given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is
thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would
be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the
delay."
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13. Hon'ble the Apex Court in Chief Post Master General and Ors. Vs.
Living Media India Ltd. and Another; AIR 2012 SC 1506 has held that
unless reasonable and acceptable explanation of delay and sufficient cause is
shown, the application need not be accepted.
14. Hon'ble the Apex Court in University of Delhi Vs. Union of India and
Others; (2020) 13 SCC 745 has held that in the matter of condonation of
delay & laches, the well accepted position is also that the accrued right of the
opposite party cannot be dealt with lightly. The condonation of delay is an
exception and should be used where lapse of time is not attributable to any
laches or negligence of the appellant.
15. In the case of State of M.P. and Others Vs. M/S Perfect Sales, Vineet
Market, Jayendraganj, Lashker, Gwalior; AIR 2015 MP 161 , Bench at
Gwalior of this Court has held that the appellant slept over the matter for 296
days and did nothing to assail the judgment of the subordinate Court. It
shows careless attitude on the part of the appellant and there being no
sufficient cause shown, the delay cannot be condoned.
16. In the case in hand, the delay caused in presentation of the revision
petition is 1074 days i.e. almost a period of two years and nine months and
no reasonable explanation with sufficient cause has been given. The entire
explanation given by the applicant depicts a casual approach, unlawful mind
of law of limitation despite being aware of position of law. That apart, when
there is such a long delay and there is no proper explanation, laches would
also come into play while noticing as to the manner in which a party has
proceeded before filing a revision petition.
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17. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of law as regards
object, scope, extent, limitation and the discretionary power to be exercised
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act laid down by Hon'ble the Apex Court,
this Court of the view that the delay of 1074 days i.e. almost a period of two
years and nine months caused in presentation of the revision petition by the
applicant is hopelessly barred by limitation as neither sufficient cause is
shown in the application seeking condonation of delay nor the same is found
to be the satisfaction of this Court.
18. Accordingly, I.A. No.11554 of 2025 - application under Section 5 of
Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay is hereby dismissed.
Consequently, this Criminal Revision is also dismissed. No order as to costs.
19. Let copy of this order be sent down to the Courts concerned through
Session Judge, Singrauli (MP).
(DINESH KUMAR PALIWAL)
JUDGE
mrs. mishra
