Madhya Pradesh High Court
Insaf vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 29 April, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
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1 M.Cr.C. No. 12477 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 29th OF APRIL, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 12477 of 2025
INSAF
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Prashant Chauhan, Advocate for the applicant.
Shri Mohit Shivhare, Public Prosecutor for State.
ORDER
This application, under Section 528 of the BNSS, has been filed for
quashment of FIR in Crime No. 274 of 2024 registered at Police Station
Kotwali, Sheopur District Sheopur for offence under Sections 354, 354A, 506
of IPC as well as further proceedings in RCT No. 766 of 2024 pending before
the trial Court.
2. According to the prosecution case, respondent No.2 lodged an FIR
alleging that she got married to Mohd. Talib on 15/2/2024 in accordance with
Muslim rites and rituals. About one month after her marriage, one day at
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around 7-8 p.m., her husband was not in the house. She was all alone in a
room and was lying on the bed. At that time, applicant, who is the uncle-in-law
of respondent No. 2, came inside the room and, finding that she was all alone
in the house, assured her that he would get a job for her and with an evil
intention started touching her waist, breasts and body. Accordingly, she raised
an alarm and called her mother-in-law Amna. Then her uncle-in-law/applicant
ran outside the room. It is alleged that thereafter, whenever applicant used to
come to the house, he used to make attempts to tease her. He used to touch her
body with evil intention. Whenever she tried to move away, he used to touch
her cheek, waist and breast and used to say why she is afraid of him and that
she should come nearer to him. On 9/5/2024, he extended a threat that she
should develop an illicit relationship with him, otherwise he would spoil her
life. When she narrated this incident to her husband and mother-in-law, both of
them ousted her from her matrimonial house and since 10/5/2024, she is
residing in her parental home.
3. Challenging the FIR lodged by respondent No. 2, it is submitted by
counsel for applicant that respondent No. 2 and her relatives had the intention
to falsely implicate the in-laws of respondent No. 2, therefore applicant, in
anticipation of false implication, had made a complaint to Superintendent of
Police Shivpuri on 10/5/2024. Even after registration of FIR, a complaint was
made by applicant to Superintendent of Police on 8/7/2024 along with all
previous applications and requested for filing expunging report. In spite of
that, a false report has been lodged. It is submitted that respondent No. 2 has
also initiated proceedings under Section 144 of BNS/S.125 of the CrPC for
grant of maintenance amount and also under Section 12 of the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act and the applicant has been implicated as
respondent. One more FIR in Crime No. 26 of 2024 at Police Station Mahila
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Thana, Shivpuri District Sheopur for offences under Sections 85, 115(2). 3(5)
of BNS and Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act has also been registered
against other in-laws of respondent No. 2 as well as the applicant. However, in
that FIR, allegation of eve-teasing has not been made. Thus, it is submitted that
FIR has been lodged against applicant on false allegations. Counsel for
applicant has also relied upon judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case
of Naresh Aneja v. State of U.P. reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 3 and
submitted that in order to make out an offence of criminal intimidation or
outraging the modesty of a woman, there should be mens rea on the part of
accused and in absence of mens rea or evil intention, no case under Section
354 IPC would be made out.
4. Per contra, the application is vehemently opposed by counsel for the
State.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
6. Before considering the allegations made against the applicant, this
Court would like to consider the scope of interference at this stage.
7. The three Judges Bench of Supreme Court in the case of Neeharika
Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2021) 19 SCC
401 has held as under :
13. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the
decision of the Privy Council in Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, the following
principles of law emerge:
13.1. Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter
XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offences.
13.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable
offences.
13.3. However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of
any kind is disclosed in the first information report the Court will not
permit an investigation to go on.
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13.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with
circumspection, in the "rarest of rare cases". (The rarest of rare cases
standard in its application for quashing under Section 482 CrPC is
not to be confused with the norm which has been formulated in the
context of the death penalty, as explained previously by this Court.)
13.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is
sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability
or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the
FIR/complaint.
13.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial
stage.
13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a
rarity than an ordinary rule.
13.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction
of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific
spheres of activities. The inherent power of the court is, however,
recognised to secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of the
process by Section 482 CrPC.
13.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are
complementary, not overlapping.
13.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result
in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should
not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences.
13.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer
an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or
caprice.
13.12. The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which
must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported.
Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the
court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR.
Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be
premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the
complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts
to abuse of process of law. During or after investigation, if the
investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application
made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an
appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which
may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the
known procedure.
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13.13. The power under Section 482 CrPC is very wide, but
conferment of wide power requires the Court to be cautious. It casts
an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court.
13.14. However, at the same time, the Court, if it thinks fit, regard
being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint
imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this
Court in R.P. Kapur and BhajanLal, has the jurisdiction to quash the
FIR/complaint.
13.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged
accused, the Court when it exercises the power under Section 482
CrPC, only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the FIR
disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required
to consider on merits whether the allegations make out a cognizable
offence or not and the court has to permit the investigating
agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.
8. Even otherwise in the light of judgments passed by the Supreme Court
in the cases of XYZ v. State of Gujarat reported in (2019) 10 SCC 337, State
of Tamil Nadu Vs. S. Martin & Ors. reported in (2018) 5 SCC 718, Ajay
Kumar Das v. State of Jharkhand, reported in (2011) 12 SCC 319, Mohd.
Akram Siddiqui v. State of Bihar reported in (2019) 13 SCC 350, State of
A.P. v. Gourishetty Mahesh reported in (2010) 11 SCC 226, M. Srikanth v.
State of Telangana, reported in (2019) 10 SCC 373, CBI v. Arvind Khanna
reported in (2019) 10 SCC 686, State of MP Vs. Kunwar Singh by order
dated 30.06.2021 passed in Cr.A. No.709/2021, Munshiram v. State of
Rajasthan, reported in (2018) 5 SCC 678, Teeja Devi v. State of Rajasthan
reported in (2014) 15 SCC 221, State of Orissa v. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan,
reported in (2012) 4 SCC 547, S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal reported in
(2010) 5 SCC 600, Sangeeta Agrawal v. State of U.P., reported in (2019) 2
SCC 336, Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460,
Padal Venkata Rama Reddy Vs. Kovuri Satyanarayana Reddy reported in
(2012) 12 SCC 437 and M.N. Ojha v. Alok Kumar Srivastav reported in
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(2009) 9 SCC 682, this Court can quash the proceedings only if the
uncontroverted allegations do not make out an offence.
9. It is the stand of applicant that FIR in question has been lodged out of
malafides because in other litigations, there is no allegation of eve-teasing
against the applicant.
10. So far as malafides are concerned, Supreme Court in the case of Renu
Kumari Vs. Sanjay Kumar and others reported in (2008) 12 SCC 346
has held that where the allegations make out a cognizable offence, then
malafides of complainant become secondary. The Supreme Court in the case
of Renu Kumari (Supra) has held as under:-
9. "8. Exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC in a
case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The
section does not confer any new powers on the High
Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court
possessed before the enactment of CrPC. It envisages
three circumstances under which the inherent
jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect
to an order under CrPC, (ii) to prevent abuse of the
process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends
of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay
down any inflexible rule which would govern the
exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative
enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all
cases that may possibly arise. The courts, therefore,
have inherent powers apart from express provisions of
law which are necessary for proper discharge of
functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is
the doctrine which finds expression in the section which
merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the
High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal
possess, in the absence of any express provision, as
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inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are
necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the
course of administration of justice on the principle
of quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur
et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law
gives a person anything, it gives him that without which
it cannot exist). While exercising the powers under the
section, the court does not function as a court of appeal
or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section,
though wide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully
and with caution and only when such exercise is
justified by the tests specifically laid down in the
section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to
do real and substantial justice for the administration of
which alone the courts exist. Authority of the court
exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is
made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice,
the court has the power to prevent abuse. It would be an
abuse of process of the court to allow any action which
would result in injustice and prevent promotion of
justice. In exercise of the powers the court would be
justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the
process of court or quashing of these proceedings would
otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is
disclosed by the report, the court may examine the
question of fact. When a report is sought to be quashed,
it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what
the report has alleged and whether any offence is made
out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
9. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC
866 : (1960) 3 SCR 388] this Court summarised some
categories of cases where inherent power can and
should be exercised to quash the proceedings:
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(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance e.g. want of
sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report
or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but
there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
(AIR p. 869)
10. In dealing with the last category, it is
important to bear in mind the distinction between a case
where there is no legal evidence or where there is
evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the
accusations made, and a case where there is legal
evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not
support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction
under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court would not
ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the
evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a
reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be
sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge.
Judicial process should not be an instrument of
oppression, or, needless harassment. The court should
be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion
and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into
consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an
instrument in the hands of a private complainant to
unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the
same time the section is not an instrument handed over
to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring
about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power
under Section 482 CrPC and the categories of cases
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where the High Court may exercise its power under it
relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State
of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 :
1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] . A note of
caution was, however, added that the power should be
exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare
cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court
are as follows : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)
'(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support
of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just
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conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge.'
11. As noted above, the powers possessed by the
High Court under Section 482 CrPC are very wide and
the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in
its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its
decision, in exercise of this power, is based on sound
principles. The inherent power should not be exercised
to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being
the highest court of a State should normally refrain from
giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire
facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the
evidence has not been collected and produced before the
Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal,
are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true
perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no
hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in
which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary
jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage.
[See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC
305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892]
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and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [AIR 1964
SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1].] It would not be proper for
the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in
the light of all probabilities in order to determine
whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such
premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are
to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the
material before it and conclude that the complaint
cannot be proceeded with. When an information is
lodged at the police station and an offence is registered,
then the mala fides of the informant would be of
secondary importance. It is the material collected during
the investigation and evidence led in the court which
decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations
of mala fides against the informant are of no
consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for
quashing the proceedings. [See Dhanalakshmi v. R.
Prasanna Kumar [1990 Supp SCC 686 : 1991 SCC
(Cri) 142] , State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp
(1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192] , Rupan Deol
Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 :
1995 SCC (Cri) 1059] , State of Kerala v. O.C.
Kuttan [(1999) 2 SCC 651 : 1999 SCC (Cri)
304] , State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7 SCC 705 :
1996 SCC (Cri) 497] , Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh
Kumar Bhada [(1997) 2 SCC 397 : 1997 SCC (Cri)
415], Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of
Delhi) [(1999) 8 SCC 728 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1503]
and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC
259 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 401] .]"
The above position was again reiterated in State of
Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [(2002) 3 SCC 89 : 2002
SCC (Cri) 539] , State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore
Gupta [(2004) 1 SCC 691 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 353]
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and State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo [(2005) 13
SCC 540 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 272] , SCC pp. 547-50,
paras 8-11."
11. Why respondent No. 2 did not make allegation of eve-teasing in
different proceedings can be explained by her during her cross-examination.
Furthermore, there is a distinction between cruelty as defined under Section
498A of IPC and outraging of modesty as defined under Section 354 of IPC.
From the FIR, it appears that for the first time modesty of respondent No. 2
was outraged by the applicant after one month of marriage, i.e. sometime in
March 2024 and threat to have illicit relationship was given on 9/5/2024 by the
applicant. The entire incident took place within three months. Until and unless
respondent No. 2 is cross-examined and is given an opportunity to explain as
to why allegation of outraging modesty in other proceedings was not made,
this Court is unable to draw any adverse inference against respondent No. 2.
This Court cannot conduct a mini trial to adjudicate the reliability and
credibility of a witness as well as correctness of allegations.
12. Under these circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion that in
view of limited scope of interference, no case is made out warranting
interference.
13. Application fails and is, hereby, dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
(and)
