Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sunil Kumar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 22 April, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:8952
1 W.P.No. 9032/2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 22nd OF APRIL, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 9032 of 2021
SUNIL KUMAR
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Prashant Singh Kaurav - Advocate for petitioner.
Shri S.S. Kushwaha- Government Advocate for respondent/State.
Shri Sankalp Sharma- Advocate for respondent No.2.
ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been
filed seeking the following relief(s):
"The order impugned Annexure P/1 may kindly be quashed;
i. The Respondent be directed to Reinstate Petitioner along with
backwages.
iii. The Respondent be directed to pay salary since December,
2019 alongwith interest.
Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the facts
and circumstances of the case may also kindly be granted."
2. It is the case of petitioner that he was working as a Pharmacist in Primary
Health Centre, Patai, District Gwalior, as a contractual employee. By order
dated 03.04.2021, services of petitioner were terminated on the ground of
registration of FIR as well as that petitioner had remained in jail from
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12.04.2017 to 04.05.2017. It is submitted that FIR No.37/15 was registered
against petitioner for offences under Sections 395, 397, 353, 332, and 186 of
IPC and Sections 11 and 13 of the M.P.D.V.P.K. Act on the allegations that
petitioner was involved in booth capturing and accordingly he was sent to jail
on 12.04.2017 and was released on bail on 04.05.2017.
3. It is submitted by counsel for petitioner that mother of petitioner was
contesting the election and the allegation of booth capturing is false. Later on,
by order dated 18.01.2018, petitioner was allowed to join the services.
However, the department was not making payment of salary to petitioner,
therefore, numerous letters were issued to the department for payment of salary.
However, by order dated 03.04.2021, services of petitioner were terminated
with a direction to decide the pending question of honorarium separately.
4. It is submitted by counsel for petitioner that later on petitioner was
acquitted. (He further admitted that although witnesses had claimed that the
incident of booth capturing had taken place but they turned hostile on the
question of identity of petitioner). As petitioner has been acquitted by judgment
dated 26.07.2022, therefore, the very basis for termination of services of
petitioner by order dated 03.04.2021 no more exists and thus the order dated
03.04.2021 be quashed. It is further submitted that in fact, on 22.2.2015,
petitioner was not present on the spot and he was falsely implicated alleging
booth capturing by him.
5. Per contra, petition is vehemently opposed by counsel for the
respondents.
6. The questions for consideration are:
1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner was a clean and honorable
acquittal or it was on the basis of benefit of doubt?
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2. Whether the authorities have a jurisdiction to consider the fact
of registration of a criminal case to discontinue his contractual
services or not?
3. Whether petitioner was not present on the spot at the time
when the booths were captured?
First question : Whether the acquittal of petitioner was a clean and
honorable acquittal or it was on the basis of benefit of doubt?
7. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan and Others Vs.
Love Kush Meena reported in (2021) 8 SCC 774, wherein it has been held as
under:-
"24. Examining the controversy in the present case in
the conspectus of the aforesaid legal position, what is
important to note is the fact that the view of this Court
has depended on the nature of offence charged and the
result of the same. The mere fact of an acquittal would
not suffice but rather it would depend on whether it is a
clean acquittal based on total absence of evidence or in
the criminal jurisprudence requiring the case to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, that parameter having
not been met, benefit of doubt has been granted to the
accused. No doubt, in that facts of the present case, the
person who ran the tractor over the deceased lady was
one of the other co-accused but the role assigned to the
others including the respondent herein was not of a mere
bystander or being present at site. The attack with knives
was alleged against all the other co-accused including
the respondent.
25. We may also notice this is a clear case where the
endeavour was to settle the dispute, albeit not with the
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job in mind. This is obvious from the recital in the
judgment of the trial court that the compoundable
offences were first compounded during trial but since
the offence under Sections 302/34 IPC could not be
compounded, the trial court continued and qua those
offences the witnesses turned hostile. We are of the view
that this can hardly fall under the category of a clean
acquittal and the Judge was thus right in using the
terminology of benefit of doubt in respect of such
acquittal.
26. The judgment in Avtar Singh case [Avtar
Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471 : (2016) 2
SCC (L&S) 425] on the relevant parameter extracted
aforesaid clearly stipulates that where in respect of a
heinous or serious nature of crime the acquittal is based
on a benefit of reasonable doubt, that cannot make the
candidate eligible."
8. The Supreme Court in the case of Avtar Singh (supra) has held as
under:-
"38.1 Information given to the employer by a
candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or
pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after
entering into service must be true and there should be no
suppression or false mention of required information.
38.2. While passing order of termination of
services or cancellation of candidature for giving false
information, the employer may take notice of special
circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such
information.
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38.3. The employer shall take into consideration
the Government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to
the employee, at the time of taking the decision.
38.4. In case there is suppression or false
information of involvement in a criminal case where
conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before
filling of the application/ verification form and such fact
later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the
following recourse appropriate to the case may be
adopted:
38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which
conviction had been recorded, such as shouting slogans
at young age or for a petty offence which if disclosed
would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post in
question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore
such suppression of fact or false information by
condoning the lapse.
38.4.2 Where conviction has been recorded in
case which is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel
candidature or terminate services of the employee.
38.4.3 If acquittal had already been recorded in a
case involving moral turpitude or offence of
heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not
a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt
has been given, the employer may consider all relevant
facts available as to antecedents, and may take
appropriate decision as to the continuance of the
employee.
38.5. In a case where the employee has made
declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the
employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and
cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.
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38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully
declared in character verification form regarding
pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer,
in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion
may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such
case.
38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact
with respect to multiple pending cases such false
information by itself will assume significance and an
employer may pass appropriate order cancelling
candidature or terminating services as appointment of a
person against whom multiple criminal cases were
pending may not be proper.
38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known
to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it
may have adverse impact and the appointing authority
would take decision after considering the seriousness of
the crime.
38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service,
holding Departmental enquiry would be necessary
before passing order of termination/removal or dismissal
on the ground of suppression or submitting false
information in verification form.
38.10. For determining suppression or false
information attestation/verification form has to be
specific, not vague. Only such information which was
required to be specifically mentioned has to be
disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant
comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be
considered in an objective manner while addressing the
question of fitness. However, in such cases action cannot
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be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false
information as to a fact which was not even asked for.
38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio
veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be
attributable to him."
9. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and
Others vs. Abhijit Singh Pawar, passed in Civil Appeal No. 11356 of 2018
(Arising out of SLP (c) No.17404 of 2016) by judgment dated 26th November,
2018 has observed as under:-
''14. In Avtar Singh (supra), though this Court was
principally concerned with the question as to non-
disclosure or wrong disclosure of information, it was
observed in paragraph 38.5 that even in cases where a
truthful disclosure about a concluded case was made, the
employer would still have a right to consider antecedents
of the candidate and could not be compelled to appoint
such candidate.
15. In the present case, as on the date when the
respondent had applied, a criminal case was pending
against him. Compromise was entered into only after an
affidavit disclosing such pendency was filed. On the
issue of compounding of offences and the effect of
acquittal under Section 320(8) of Cr.P.C., the law
declared by this Court in Mehar Singh (supra), specially
in paragraphs 34 and 35 completely concludes the issue.
Even after the disclosure is made by a candidate, the
employer would be well within his rights to consider the
antecedents and the suitability of the candidate. While so
considering, the employer can certainly take into
account the job profile for which the selection is
undertaken, the severity of the charges levelled against
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the candidate and whether the acquittal in question was
an honourable acquittal or was merely on the ground of
benefit of doubt or as a result of composition.
16. The reliance placed by Mr. Dave, learned Amicus
Curiae on the decision of this Court in Mohammed
Imran (supra) is not quite correct and said decision
cannot be of any assistance to the respondent. In para 5
of said decision, this Court had found that the only
allegation against the appellant therein was that he was
travelling in an auto-rickshaw which was following the
auto-rickshaw in which the prime accused, who was
charged under Section 376 IPC, was travelling with the
prosecutrix in question and that all the accused were
acquitted as the prosecutrix did not support the
allegation. The decision in Mohammed Imran (supra)
thus turned on individual facts and cannot in any way be
said to have departed from the line of decisions rendered
by this Court in Mehar Singh (supra), Parvez Khan
(supra) and Pradeep Kumar (supra).
17. We must observe at this stage that there is nothing
on record to suggest that the decision taken by the
concerned authorities in rejecting the candidature of the
respondent was in any way actuated by mala fides or
suffered on any other count. The decision on the
question of suitability of the respondent, in our
considered view, was absolutely correct and did not call
for any interference. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set
aside the decisions rendered by the Single Judge as well
as by the Division Bench and dismiss Writ Petition
No.9412 of 2013 preferred by the respondent. No costs.''
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10. The Supreme Court in the case of Mohammed Imran Vs. State of
Maharashtra and others passed in C.A. No. 10571 of 2018, by order dated
12-10-2018 has held as under :-
''6. Employment opportunities is a scarce commodity in
our country. Every advertisement invites a large number
of aspirants for limited number of vacancies. But that
may not suffice to invoke sympathy for grant of relief
where the credentials of the candidate may raise serious
questions regarding suitability, irrespective of eligibility.
Undoubtedly, judicial service is very different from
other services and the yardstick of suitability that my
apply to other services, may not be the same for a
judicial service. But there cannot be any mechanical or
rhetorical incantation of moral turpitude, to deny
appointment in judicial service simplicitor. Much will
depend on the facts of a case. Every individual deserves
an opportunity to improve, learn from the past and move
ahead in life by self-improvement. To make past
conduct, irrespective of all considerations, albatross
around the neck of the candidate, may not always
constitute justice. Much will, however, depend on the
fact situation of a case."
11. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of Territory, Chandigarh
Administration and Ors. vs. Pradeep Kumar and Another, reported in
(2018) 1 SCC 797 has held as under:-
''11. Entering into the police service required a
candidate to be of good character, integrity and clean
antecedents. In Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and
Another v. Mehar Singh (2013) 7 SCC 685, the
respondent was acquitted based on the compromise. This
Court held that even though acquittal was based on
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compromise, it is still open to the Screening Committee
to examine the suitability of the candidate and take a
decision.......
12. While considering the question of suppression of
relevant information or false information in regard to
criminal prosecution, arrest or pendency of criminal
case(s) against the candidate, in Avtar Singh v. Union of
India and Others(2016) 8 SCC 471, three-Judges Bench
of this Court summarized the conclusion in para (38). As
per the said decision in para (38.5), (SCC p. 508)
''38.5. In a case where the employee has
made declaration truthfully of a concluded
criminal case, the employer still has the
right to consider antecedents, and cannot be
compelled to appoint the candidate."
13. It is thus well settled that acquittal in a criminal case
does not automatically entitle him for appointment to the
post. Still it is open to the employer to consider the
antecedents and examine whether he is suitable for
appointment to the post. From the observations of this
Court in Mehar Singh and Parvez Khan cases, it is clear
that a candidate to be recruited to the police service must
be of impeccable character and integrity. A person
having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category.
Even if he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be
presumed that he was honourably acquitted/completely
exonerated. The decision of the Screening Committee
must be taken as final unless it is shown to be mala fide.
The Screening Committee also must be alive to the
importance of the trust repose in it and must examine the
candidate with utmost character.
* * *
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17. In a catena of judgments, the importance of integrity
and high standard of conduct in police force has been
emphasized. As held in Mehar Singh case, the decision
of the Screening Committee must be taken as final
unless it is mala fide. In the case in hand, there is
nothing to suggest that the decision of the Screening
Committee is mala fide. The decision of the Screening
Committee that the respondents are not suitable for
being appointed to the post of Constable does not call
for interference. The Tribunal and the High Court, in our
view, erred in setting aside the decision of the Screening
Committee and the impugned judgment is liable to be set
aside.
12. The Supreme Court in the case of The State of M.P. and others Vs.
Bunty by order dated 14/3/2019 passed in Civil Appeal No.3046/2019 has
held as under:-
"13. The law laid down in the aforesaid decisions makes
it clear that in case of acquittal in a criminal case is
based on the benefit of the doubt or any other technical
reason. The employer can take into consideration all
relevant facts to take an appropriate decision as to the
fitness of an incumbent for appointment/continuance in
service. The decision taken by the Screening Committee
in the instant case could not have been faulted by the
Division Bench."
13. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ashutosh Pawar vs. State of
M.P. reported in 2018 (2) MPJR 178 has held as under:-
"Decision of Criminal Court on the basis of compromise
or an acquittal cannot be treated that the candidate
possesses good character, which may make him eligible,
as the criminal proceedings are with the view to find
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culpability of commission of offence whereas the
appointment to the civil post is in view of his suitability
to the post. The test for each of them is based upon
different parameters and therefore, acquittal in a
criminal case is not a certificate of good conduct to a
candidate. The competent Authority has to take a
decision in respect of the suitability of candidate to
discharge the functions of a civil post and that mere
acquittal in a criminal case would not be sufficient to
infer that the candidate possesses good character.
Division Bench judgment of this Court in
W.P.No.5887/2016 (Arvind Gurjar vs. State of M.P.) is
overruled. Another Division Bench judgment in W.A.
No.367/2015 (Sandeep Pandey vs. State of M.P. and
others) is also overruled. Jurisdiction of the High Court
in a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of
India is to examine the decision-making process than to
act as Court of appeal to substitute its own decision. In
appropriate case, if the Court finds decision-making
process is arbitrary or illegal, the Court will direct the
Authority for reconsideration rather than to substitute the
decision of the competent Authority with that of its own.
The expectations from a Judicial Officer are of
much higher standard. There cannot be any compromise
in respect of rectitude, honesty and integrity of a
candidate who seeks appointment as Civil Judge. The
personal conduct of a candidate to be appointed as
Judicial Officer has to be free from any taint. The
standard of conduct in the case of Judicial Officer is
higher than that expected of an ordinary citizen and also
higher than that expected of a professional in law as
well. The same must be in tune with the highest standard
of propriety and probity."
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14. This Court in the case of Anil Kumar Balmik vs. State of M.P. and
others by order dated 02.09.2020 passed in W.P.No.23104/2019(s) has held
has under:-
"Compounding of offence" is nothing but an
undertaking by the victim to give up the prosecution of
the offender.
15. This Court in the case of Bhagwat Singh Vs. State of M.P. and others
decided on 08/12/2021 in Writ Petition No.26996/2021 has held as under:-
"8. Although it is the case of the petitioner that he had
not suppressed the factum of registration of criminal
case and acquittal of the petitioner on the basis of
compromise, but it appears that the screening committee
after considering the case, found that the petitioner is not
fit for police service.
9. By the impugned order, the candidature of the
petitioner has been once again rejected on the ground
that since the petitioner has been acquitted on the basis
of compromise, therefore, it cannot be said to be an
honourable acquittal. As already held by the Full Bench
of this Court in the case of Ashutosh Pawar (supra), an
acquittal on the basis of compromise cannot be treated
that the candidate possesses good character, which may
make him eligible, as the criminal proceedings are with
a view to find culpability of commission of offence
whereas the appointment to the civil post is in view of
his suitability to the post. Further, the Supreme Court in
the case of Pradeep Kumar (supra) has held that
entering into the police service requires good character,
integrity and clean antecedents.
10. Undisputely, it is for the employer to consider the
suitability of a candidate. Eligibility and suitability are to
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different aspects and this Court cannot substitute its
finding by holding that the candidate should be held to
be suitable. This Court in the case of Anil Kumar
Balmik (supra) has held as under:
"Suitability" cannot be confused with
"Eligibility". A coordinate Bench of this Court in
the case of Madhur Vs. State of M.P. by order
dated 17-4-2018 passed in W.P. 21231 of 2017
has held as under :
The "suitability" cannot be confused with
eligibility". In the 'Major Law Laxicon'
by P. Ramanatha Iyer about the word
following view is expressed-"the word
'suitable' does not require a definition
because any man of experience would
know who is suitable. However, each
case has to be viewed in the context in
which the word "suitability" or "suitable"
is used, the object of the enactment and
the purpose sought to be achieved." A
constitution Bench of Supreme Court in
State of J & K vs. Trilokinath Khosa
(1974) 1 SCC 19 and another Bench in
State of Orissa vs. N.N. Swami (1977) 2
SCC 508 opined that eligibility must not
be confused with the suitability of the
candidate for appointment. These
judgments were considered 9 W.P.
No.21231/2017 by Calcutta High Court
in 2013 SCC Online 22909 (All b. Ed.
Degree Holders Welfare Association vs.
State of West Bengal ). In (2009) 8 SCC
273 (Mahesh Chandra Gupta vs. Union
of India) it was again held that suitability
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of a recommendee and the consultation
are not subject to judicial review but the
issue of lack of eligibility or an effective
consultation can be scrutinized.. The
Supreme Court in (2014) 11 SCC 547
(High Court of Madras vs. R. Gandhi)
while dealing with appointment on a
constitutional post opined that
'eligibility' is an objective factor. When
'eligibility' is put in question, it could
fall within the scope of judicial review.
The aspect of 'suitability' stands
excluded from the purview of judicial
review. At the cost of repetition, the
Apex Court opined that 'eligibility' is a
matter of fact whereas 'suitability' is a
matter of opinion. In this view of the
matter, when Competent Authority has
examined the suitability in the teeth of
relevant enabling provision i.e. Rule 6 (3)
of Rules of 1961, interference is totally
unwarranted.
While exercising the power under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India cannot act as an Appellate
Authority and cannot substitute its own findings.
The Supreme Court in the case of UPSC v. M.
Sathiya Priya, reported in (2018) 15 SCC 796 has held
as under :
18........It is the settled legal position that
the courts have to show deference and
consideration to the recommendations of
an Expert Committee consisting of
members with expertise in the field, if
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malice or arbitrariness in the
Committee's decision is not forthcoming.
The doctrine of fairness, evolved in
administrative law, was not supposed to
convert tribunals and courts into
appellate authorities over the decision of
experts. The constraints--selfimposed,
undoubtedly--of writ jurisdiction still
remain. Ignoring them would lead to
confusion and uncertainty. The
jurisdiction may become rudderless.""
16. Thus, it is clear that where the acquittal is not honorable and clean and
was recorded on account of the fact that witnesses had turned hostile, it cannot
be said that the respondents cannot consider the nature of allegations made
against petitioner.
17. Petitioner has also placed copies of deposition sheets of witnesses who
have clearly stated that there was an incident of booth capturing, but they
turned hostile with regard to the identity of the petitioner. Thus, the incident of
booth capturing had taken place. The mother of the petitioner was one of the
candidates. Since certain witnesses had turned hostile, therefore, the petitioner
was granted acquittal. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that it was a
clean and honorable acquittal, but, it was on the basis of benefit of doubt as the
witnesses had turned hostile.
Second question: Whether the authorities have a jurisdiction to consider
the fact of registration of a criminal case to discontinue his contractual
services or not?
18. The petitioner was given contractual appointment on the post of
Pharmacist by order dated 12.09.2013. Petitioner has filed a copy of the
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contract/Human Resource Manual. Clauses 2.9 and 11.2 of the same read as
under:-
2-9 izFke lafonk ij pfj= lR;kiu & lafonk in ij p;fur deZpkjh
dks fu;qfä ds le; bl vk'k; dk Loizek.ku nsuk gksxk fd mlds }kjk
çLrqr leLr nLrkost lR; ,oa oS/k gSa rFkk mlds fo#) fdlh vU; laLFkk
esa dksbZ f'kdk;r] vkijkf/kd çdj.k fopkjk/khu ugha gSA vko';drkuqlkj
lacaf/kr vkosnd@vkosnd }kjk çLrqr vfHkys[kksa dh iqfyl }kjk tkap
djokbZ tk ldsxhA pfj= ds lac/k esa fdlh çfrdwy fVIi.kh dh n'kk esa
fu;qfä çkf/kdkjh }kjk lafonk fu;qfä fcuk dksbZ dkj.k crk, rqjar jn~n
dj nh tk;sxhA ¼e/;çns'k jkti=&06 Qjojh 2003 dfMdk 10¼3½½
11-2 lafonk deZpkjh }kjk dnkpj.k djus] foÙkh; vfu;ferrk esa 'kkfey
gksus] fdlh Hkh vijkf/kd --R; esa fyIr gksus vFkok ,sls fdlh Hkh dk;Z esa
fyIr gksus ij] ftlls jk"Vªh; LokLF; fe'ku dh Nfo dks Bsl igq¡prh gks]
jk{ke çkf/kdkjh }kjk ekSf[kd vFkok fyf[kr lquokbZ dk volj fn;k
tk;sxkA fu/kkZfjr le;okf/k esa çR;qÙkj ugha fn;s tkus vFkok çR;qRrj
lek/kku dkjd u ik;s tkus ij fu;ksDrk vf/kdkjh }kjk vuqca/k rRdky
lekIr fd;k tk ldsxkA bl gsrq 01 ekg ds uksfVl@01 ekg dk ekuns;
nsus dh ck/;rk ugh gksxhA
19. The allegation against the petitioner is that he was involved in booth
capturing and had also remained in jail for a period of about one month. Booth
capturing is the biggest enemy of democracy. A voter has a right to elect the
candidate of his choice, and by capturing the booth, if somebody takes away
that valuable right from the voter and casts votes in favour of a particular
candidate or tries to destroy the votes already cast by the voters in favour of
another candidate, then it is clear that it is the biggest offence in the eyes of
democracy. Election of a candidate has to be on the basis of his or her good
image in society, and no one can be allowed to win an election by using muscle
power. Therefore, in the light of the judgments passed by the Supreme Court in
the cases of Love Kush (Supra) and Avtar Singh (Supra), it is clear that since
the acquittal was not honorable, respondents are well within their rights to
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consider the effect of registration of a criminal case for the purposes of
discontinuation of his contractual services.
20. Furthermore, from order dated 03.04.2021, it is clear that services of the
petitioner must have been terminated after he remained in jail, but after 11
months, he was again taken back in service. Petitioner has filed a copy of order
dated 18.01.2018 in which it is mentioned that petitioner is permitted to appear
on duty, and in case the charges are proved, then the honorarium paid to him
shall be recovered, and action shall be taken in accordance with government
rules. For that purpose, the petitioner was required to give his consent on a
judicial stamp of Rs. 500. It was specifically mentioned that joining in
compliance with order dated 18.01.2018 shall be treated as new joining on
contractual basis, and previous services rendered by the petitioner shall not be
considered for any other purpose. It was also mentioned that no honorarium
shall be paid for the previous period. Thus, it is clear that petitioner must have
been discontinued sometime in the month of February 2017 (as it is mentioned
in the impugned order that he was taken back in service after 11 months of his
discontinuation). For reasons best known to the petitioner, he has not filed a
copy of the order of discontinuation of his contractual services, which must
have been passed in the year 2017. Furthermore, it is clear that the criminal
case was registered against the petitioner on 22.02.2015, and he was arrested
only on 12.04.2017 and remained in jail up to 04.05.2017. Thus, it is clear that
the petitioner must have been absconding from the date of registration of
offence i.e. 22.02.2015 till 12.04.2017 when he was arrested. Meanwhile, his
services must have been discontinued, but nothing has been placed on record.
Even in the writ petition, petitioner has not mentioned the date on which his
services were discontinued and has also not mentioned the reasons for
permitting him to rejoin by treating his rejoining as new appointment on
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contractual basis. If order dated 18.01.2018 is considered, then it is clear that
although criminal trial was pending against the petitioner, still he was obliged
and was taken back in service by treating it as a new contractual appointment.
How such an order could have been passed in favour of the petitioner has not
been explained.
21. Be that whatever it may be.
22. Once an offence of booth capturing was registered against the petitioner,
and petitioner was not honorably acquitted, then respondents are well within
their right to consider the effect of allegations made against the petitioner. As
already pointed out, booth capturing is a direct attack on democracy. Therefore,
it cannot be said to be an offence of trivial nature, specifically when the mother
of the petitioner herself was one of the candidates.
23. Thus, this Court is of considered opinion that the respondents did not
commit any mistake by discontinuing the contractual services of the petitioner
by impugned order dated 03.04.2021.
Question No. 3 : Whether petitioner was not present on the spot at the time
when the booths were captured?
24. Petitioner has tried to take the plea of alibi. Accordingly, counsel for the
petitioner was directed to point out from the judgment of acquittal as to whether
the trial Court had found that petitioner was not present on the spot at the time
when the offence was committed. It was fairly conceded by counsel for the
petitioner that there is no such finding by the trial Court, and the acquittal has
been recorded only on the ground that the witnesses had turned hostile.
25. Thus, whether the petitioner was present on the spot or not is beyond the
scope of jurisdiction of this Court in a petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:8952
26. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, this Court
is of the considered opinion that no case is made out warranting interference.
27. The petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
(and)
