Madhya Pradesh High Court
The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Sanjeev Singh @ Dadu on 14 October, 2024
Author: Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
Bench: Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, Anuradha Shukla
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-JBP:51250
1 MCRC-19112-2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE ANURADHA SHUKLA
ON THE 14th OF OCTOBER, 2024
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 19112 of 2022
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Versus
SANJEEV SINGH @ DADU AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Ajay Tamrakar-Government Advocate for the applicant/State.
ORDER
Per: Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
This application for grant of leave to appeal has been preferred under
Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as
"the Code") being aggrieved with the judgment dated 25.11.2021 passed by
the III Additional Sessions Judge, Nagod District Satna (M.P.) in
S.C.No.53/2019, whereby respondent No.1 Sanjeev Singh and respondent
No.3 Jitendra Jaiswal have been acquitted of the offence punishable under
sections 452, 354A(1), 363, 366 and 376(2)(d) of the Indian Penal Code,
9(g)/10 and 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012
and respondent No.2 Satendra Kushwaha has been acquitted of the offence
punishable under Sections 452, 354A(1) and Section 9(g)/10 of the
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.
Prosecution case, in short is that, on 28.10.2014, the prosecutrix
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lodged a report that on 24.10.2014 at around 04:00 p.m. she was inside her
house while her mother and father were in the farm. At the relevant time,
respondents/accused Sanjeev Singh, and Satendra Kushwaha without any
call entered the house, in turn, she asked them why did they enter the house
instead they should have met her mother and father. Accused Sanjeev Singh
with the purpose of outraging the modesty caught hold of her hand while
accused Satendra tried to outrage her modesty, she started screaming. Her
mother and father after hearing the screams came to the house immediately.
Thereafter, both the accused fled away from the spot.
Learned Government Advocate, while making reference to the
evidence on record, submitted that the trial Court has erred in appreciating
the evidence and the judgment of acquittal deserves to be interfered with.
Having regard to the arguments advanced by the learned Government
Advocate, the impugned judgment is perused.
The trial Court, after appreciation of the evidence, came to the
conclusion that there is a huge delay of about 3 months and 5 days in lodging
the FIR. In the FIR as well as in the statement recorded under Section 161 of
Cr.P.C. there is no allegation of rape against any of the respondents. It is
only while recording the statement recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. the
prosecutrix had leveled allegations against the respondents which appears to
be an afterthought. Even the FSL report does not support the case of the
prosecution. So also the chronology of the incident as projected could not be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. In such circumstances, only the statement
of prosecutrix under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. cannot be taken to be a Gospel
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truth so as to convict the respondents. Accordingly, the trial Court found
that the evidence on record was not sufficient to establish the culpability of
the respondents.
We agree with the findings recorded by the trial Court that prosecution
has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed
unless the conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence brought on record are
found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably
unsustainable.
Taking into consideration the reasons assigned on the face of evidence
on record establishing the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the view taken
by the learned trial Court was apparently a possible view. As such, no
interference is called for with the order of acquittal in question. Therefore,
this application for grant of leave to appeal under Section 378(3) of the
Code, being devoid of merit and substance, stands dismissed.
(SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI) (ANURADHA SHUKLA)
JUDGE JUDGE
b
