Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rajya Parivahan Karamchari Mahasangh vs Shri Sanjay Kumar Jain on 1 October, 2024
CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-IND:28755 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT I N D O R E
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA
ON THE 1st OF OCTOBER, 2024
CONTEMPT PETITION CIVIL No. 1080 of 2024
RAJYA PARIVAHAN KARAMCHARI MAHASANGH
Versus
SHRI SANJAY KUMAR JAIN AND OTHERS
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Appearance:
Shri Jagdish Baheti and Ms. Shreya Jain, learned counsel for the
petitioner is present.
Shri Girish Patwardhan, learned senior counsel with Shri Shri
Mukul Bhutda, learned counsel for the respondents is present.
ORDER
The petitioner has filed this Contempt Petition under Section 12 of The
Contempt of Courts Act r/w Article 215 of the Constitution of India to punish
the respondents for non-compliance of the order of the Writ Court dated
26.04.2022 passed in W.P. No.23763/2021.
2. The petitioner filed the aforesaid writ petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India challenging the order dated 25.09.2021 passed by the
court below whereby the execution proceedings preferred at the instance of
the petitioner have been dismissed.
3. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the Hon'ble Writ Court
disposed of the writ petition with the following directions :-
"09. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The impugned
order passed by the Executing Court is set aside and it is
directed to proceed further with the execution proceedings in
light of the observations made herein above and in accordance
with law.
10. The entire exercise for calculation and payment of
amount to the petitioner completed within a period of four
months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order"
4. When the matter came up for hearing ordered notice to the respondents
and Ms. Keerti Patwardhan, Advocate appeared on behalf of the respondents
and filed reply in the matter. Para Nos.5 and 6 of the reply read as under:-
"(5) That, the Execution Proceeding (EP) is already pending
before the Executing Court and since no direction was provided
to the respondents by the Hon'ble Writ Court, these Contempt
Proceedings are not maintainable considering the limited scope
of Contempt Proceeding.
(6) That, this Contempt Petition was filed against order dated
26.04.2022, but the present Contempt Petition was registered on
18.03.2024 which is beyond the period prescribed under section
20 of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The present Contempt
Petition is barred by limitation and the Hon'ble Supreme Court
also in the case of S Tirupathi Rao Vs. M. Lingamaiah reported
in 2024 SCC Online SC 1764 considered that the Contempt
Petition should be filed when the first Cause of Action arises
and within the time limit as prescribed under Section 20 of The
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971."
5. When the matter came up for hearing, learned senior counsel for the
respondents argued that this contempt petition is not maintainable as the
execution proceedings are pending before the Executing Court. He further
argued that Contempt Petition was filed beyond the limitation of one year as
provided under Section 20 of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. He has
placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of S.
Tirupathi Rao Vs. M. Lingamaiah, 2024 SCC Online SC, 1764.
6. Writ Court directed the respondents "to pay the amount within a period
of four months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order".
Admittedly, execution proceedings are already pending before the Executing
Court and contempt petition filed to punish the respondents.
7. As per Section 20 of Contempt of Courts Act, contempt petition has to be
filed within a year from the date of the order. Section 20 of The Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 reads as under:-
"20. Limitation for actions for contempt.--No court
shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its
own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of
one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to
have been committed."
8. On perusal of the above Section and the Writ Court order dated
26.04.2022, the present contempt petition has filed on 18.03.2024. Even after
exclusion of 4 months period the time limit given by the Writ Court, he filed
the contempt petition after one and half year.
9. In view of the decision delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian and others, 2001 (7) SCC, 549, learned
counsel has drawn attention of this Court towards various pronouncement and
stated that as per Article 215 of Constitution of India, the provisions of
Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 prohibited any action being
taken for contempt if a period of one year had elapsed, as was contended in
the present case. The constitutional power contained under Article 215 could
not in any way be stultified or curtailed by any Act of Parliament including
Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
10. This Court has carefully gone through the aforesaid judgements. In the
case of B. Surendra Reddy Vs. K. Devarajan, The Director of School
Education, Chennai & others, 2022 (0) Supreme (Mad) 2279, in para 29,
High Court of Madras has held as under:-
"29. The High Court's cannot invoke the powers under Article 215
of the Constitution of India, in all the cases by entertaining the
contempt application beyond the period of one year, so as to dilute
or eradicate the law prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971. All contempt applications ought to be filed
within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The High Court on exceptional
circumstances, on arriving a conclusion that a gross injustice to the
society or the case is of public importance, then the inherent
powers provided under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, can
be exercised without reference to Section 20 of the Contempt of
Courts Act. A litigant may come out with an interpretation that an
injustice is caused to all the orders or judgements passed by the
High Courts. Such a general proposition, as advanced by the
learned counsel appearing for the petitioner deserves no merit
consideration. No doubt, the litigants approach the Court to get
justice, that does not mean that all the contempt applications have
to be entertained after a period of one year prescribed under
Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Generalisation in
this regard can never be encouraged. What exactly the
circumstances warranting interference under Article 215 of the
Constitution of India has to be decided judiciously and applying
the peculiar facts and circumstances prevailing in each and every
case. General application in this regard is certainly impermissible
and Courts have to interpret these provisions in a pragmatic way
than in a general manner. In other words, the principles of
constructive interpretation is to be adopted while interpreting the
period of limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts
Act as well as Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Thus, this
Court is not inclined to consider the arguments advanced by the
learned counsel appearing for the petitioner by citing the above
judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
In view of the facts and circumstances, this Contempt Petition
stands dismissed."
11. In the case of S. Tirupathi Rao Vs. M. Lingamaiah, 2024 SCC
Online SC, 1764, Hon'ble Apex Court in para 41, 42 and 53 has held as
under:-
"41. In Pallav Sheth (supra), a three-Judge Bench of this Court had
the occasion to consider whether the view taken by a two-Judge
Bench in Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal34 was correct. In Om
Prakash Jaiswal (supra), the Bench had taken the view that filing of
an application or petition for initiating proceedings for contempt does
not amount to initiation of proceedings by the court and initiation
under section 20 of the Act can only be said to have occurred when
the court forms the prima facie opinion that contempt has been
committed and issues notice to the contemner to show cause why he
should not be punished. Such view did not find favour with the Bench
in Pallav Sheth (supra). It was observed that a provision like section
20 has to be interpreted having regard to the realities of the situation,
and that, too narrow a view of section 20 had been taken in Om
Prakash Jaiswal (supra) which did not seem to be warranted; the view
taken would not only cause hardship but would perpetrate injustice.
Relevant passages from the decision in Pallav Sheth (supra) read thus:
"39. ... When the judicial procedure requires an application
being filed either before the court or consent being sought by
a person from the Advocate-General or a Law Officer, it
must logically follow that proceedings for contempt are
initiated when the applications are made.
40. In other words, the beginning of the action prescribed
for taking cognizance of criminal contempt under Section 15
would be initiating the proceedings for contempt and the
subsequent action taken thereon of refusal or issuance of a
notice or punishment thereafter are only steps following or
succeeding such initiation. Similarly, in the case of a civil
contempt, filing of an application drawing the attention of
the court is necessary for further steps to be taken under
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
41. One of the principles underlying the law of limitation
is that a litigant must act diligently and not sleep over its
rights. In this background such an interpretation should be
placed on Section 20 of the Act which does not lead to an
anomalous result causing hardship to the party who may
have acted with utmost diligence and because of the inaction
on the part of the court, a contemner cannot be made to
suffer. Interpreting the section in the manner canvassed by
Mr. Venugopal would mean that the court would be rendered
powerless to punish even though it may be fully convinced
of the blatant nature of the contempt having been committed
and the same having been brought to the notice of the court
soon after the committal of the contempt and within the
period of one year of the same. Section 20, therefore, has to
be construed in a manner which would avoid such an
anomaly and hardship both as regards the litigants as also by
placing a pointless fetter on the part of the court to punish for
its contempt. An interpretation of Section 20, like the one
canvassed by the appellant, which would render the
constitutional power of the courts nugatory in taking action
for contempt even in cases of gross contempt, successfully
hidden for a period of one year by practising fraud by the
contemner would render Section 20 as liable to be regarded
as being in conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215. Such
a rigid interpretation must therefore be avoided.
42. ... if the filing of an application before the
subordinate court or the High Court, making of a reference
by a subordinate court on its own motion or the filing of an
application before an Advocate-General for permission to
initiate contempt proceedings is regarded as initiation by the
court for the purposes of Section 20, then such an
interpretation would not impinge on or stultify the power of
the High Court to punish for contempt which power, dehors
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is enshrined in
Article 215 of the Constitution. Such an interpretation of
Section 20 would harmonise that section with the powers of
the courts to punish for contempt which is recognised by the
Constitution.
43. ***
44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories,
namely, that initiated suo motu by the court and that
instituted otherwise than on the court's own motion. The
mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be
different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the
court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice, in the
other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an
application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper
construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action
must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the
court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year
from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been
committed."
42. Interpretation of section 20 of the Act, which formed the crux of
the discussion in Pallav Sheth (supra), has the marginal note
'limitation for actions for contempt'. Section 20 ordains that:
"20. No court shall initiate any proceedings of
contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after
the expiry of a period of one year from the date on
which the contempt is alleged to have been committed."
53. Reverting to the point of limitation, even in case of a petition
disclosing facts constituting contempt, which is civil in nature, the
petitioner cannot choose a time convenient to him to approach the
Court. The statute refers to a specific time limit of one year from the
date of alleged contempt for proceedings to be initiated; meaning
thereby, as laid down in Pallav Sheth (supra), that the action should be
brought within a year, and not beyond, irrespective of when the
proceedings to punish for contempt are actually initiated by the high
court."
12. In view of the aforesaid decisions and also keeping in view the fact that
the present contempt petition has been filed beyond one year and the same is
not maintainable and likely to be dismissed. Accordingly, the present contempt
petition is dismissed. However, the petitioner shall be at liberty to raise the
objection for non-compliance of the order of the Writ Court before the
Executing Court and take appropriate steps in accordance with law which is
pending before Executing Court.
(DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA)
JUDGE
N.R.
