Land Acquisition Officer Sardar ... vs Rupaji
2024 Latest Caselaw 15909 MP

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Land Acquisition Officer Sardar ... vs Rupaji on 29 May, 2024

Author: Anil Verma

Bench: Anil Verma

                                                                1
                                         IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                                       AT INDORE
                                                          FA No. 225 of 2021
                                             (SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT AND OTHERS Vs PURUSHOTTAM)

                                                       FA/00226/2021, FA/00227/2021
                           Dated : 29-05-2024
                                    Shri Vivek Patwa, learned counsel for the Petitioner .

                                    Shri Pratyush Mishra, learned counsel for the Respondents

1/ This order shall govern the disposal of IA nos. 1628/2021, 1632/2021 and 1634/2021, which are the applications filed under section 5 of the Limitation

Act, 1963 for condonation of delay as the issue involved in aforesaid First Appeals is identical, and therefore, they are heard and decided by this common order.

2/ Brief facts of case are that the appellants have acquired the land for construction of road, which affected and damaged the pipeline of the respondents, but the land of the respondents was not affected. On 29/04/2019, an award was passed under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to "the Act, 2013). Thereafter on 30/08/2019, the respondents have

preferred reference before the District Judge, Badwani, which has been decided vide impugned order dated 15/12/2019. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellants have preferred these First Appeals.

3/ Learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the appellants are the instrumentality of the State Government who are required to take necessary and mandatory permissions before filing the appeal. The impugned order was passed on 15/12/2019 and its certified copy was received on 21/09/2020, then the opinion of the Government Advocate was sought.

Thereafter, the matter was forwarded to the Law Department for seeking necessary permission, which was awaited, but meanwhile, the Collector, Barwani granted permission to file appeal. Officer in-charge was appointed, soon after the office of the appellant/s was closed on account of imposition of lockdown due to spread of CORONA virus. After the lockdown, officer in- charge contacted with his counsel and thereafter, filed these appeals, but due to the aforesaid reasons, which were beyond the control of the appellants, delay of 28 days has been caused, which is bonafide. Hence, he prays that the delay of 28 days be condoned.

4/ Per-contra, learned counsel for the respondents opposed the

applications and prays for its rejection by submitting in reply that vide order dated 15/11/2019. Reference Court enhanced the compensation, but the appellants applied for certified copy on 11/08/2020 i.e. almost nine months after the date of award. and the appellants collected copy on 10/09/2020s. As per the provision of section 74 of the Act, 2013, the limitation period is only 60 days,which cannot be exceeded further 60 days, but the appellants have filed the appeals after huge delay. There is no bonafide and sufficient reasons for the aforesaid delay. The Act, 2013 is a special Act and its provisions shall prevail upon the General Provisions of Law. Hence the applications for condonation of delay deserves to be dismissed and consequently, present First Appeals be also dismissed being time barred. To bolster his contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgment delivered in the case of State of Bihar through Collector and another Vs. Rakesh Kumar and others [2023 SCC Onlin Pat 602]5; State of Kerala represented by District Collector Kottayam and another Vs. Kool Goam Pvt Ltd represented by its Managing Director Alexander Sebastian and another [2024 SCC Online Ker 863]; State of Bihar

through the Collector and another Vs. Kaushalendra Kumar Singh and others [2023 SCC Online Pat 4592]. The Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bengaluru Vs. M/s S.V. Global Mill Limited, Chennai [ ILR 2020 KAR 1897] 5/ Heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the record. 6/ The question that arises for consideration in present appeals is whether the appellants herein has made out the case for condonation of delay of 28 days?

7/ For the sake of reference, Section 74 of the Act, 2013 is reproduced hereunder :

"74. Appeal to High Court.-(1) The Requiring Body or any person aggrieved by the Award passed by an Authority under section 69 may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of Award:

Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days.

(2) Every appeal referred to under sub-section (1) shall be heard as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to dispose of

such appeal within six months from the date on which the appeal is presented to the High Court."

8/ Undoubtedly, the Act, 2013 is a Special Act. Section 74 of the Act, 2013 is almost identical with section 34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to "the Act, 1996"), which reads as under :

"34. Application for setting aside arbitral awards.

(1) .........

(2) ........

(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:

Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter."

9/ Learned counsel for the appellants argued at length by submitting that time had spent in internal office correspondence and due to COVID pandemic, office of the appellant/s was closed for the period about one year. As per the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court regarding COVID relaxation,.vide order dated 23/03/2020, the period of delay of 344 days should be condoned.

10/ It is vehemently argued by learned counsel for the respondents that there was no legal requirement for the appellants to obtain prior sanction from the Higher Authority. In section 74 of the Act, 2013, it is provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days.

11/ Learned counsel for the appellants argued at length that the language employed in Section 34(3) is "prevent", which is stricter language than the language employed in Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963.

12/ Division Bench of this Court in the case of Madhya Pradesh

Road Development Corporation Ltd and another Vs. Vindhyachal Expressway Pvt Ltd and another, vide order dated 28/02/2024 passed in Arbitration Appeal no. 308/2023 has held as under :

35. The learned senior counsel for the respondent has argued that the factum of approval etc. is not a event which "prevented" the appellants from challenging the award. In the opinion of this Court the word "prevent" does not mean only obstruction by physical force.

"Prevent" may be something which may hinder or impede or stop happening of any event. As has already held 12 above, the time spent at arriving at consensus was something which was bona fide and thus it can be said to be a sufficient cause which prevented the appellants from making an application within the prescribed limitation of three months"

13/ It is argued by learned counsel for the respondent/s that no premium can be given to the instrumentality of the State for delay caused by red-tapism in legal matters. Learned counsel for the respondent has argued at length that Government Agencies and instrumentalities are not entitled for any special limitation and special treatment in the matter of limitation just to protect their red-tapism. To bolster his contention, he has placed reliance upon the The Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bengaluru (supra), in which it has been held as under :

" 87. Thus, what emerges from the aforesaid judicial precedent and discussion is that whenever there is a special enactment prescribing a limitation period different from the Limitation Act, it is necessary to consider as to whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded. Of course, in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the expression used is

"expressly excluded by special or local law". But, with the passage of time, the expression "expressly excluded" has also been interpreted to also mean exclusion by necessary implication having regard to the scope, object and scheme of the special law being a code by itself prescribing a limitation period different from the Limitation Act, which would exclude application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act."

14/ Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has also relied on judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheoraj Singh Vs. Union of India [(2023) 10 SCC 531], in which it has been held that an exercise of discretion by the High Court has to be tested on the anvil of liberal and justice oriental approach as propounded in various decisions referred in the said judgment. It has also been held that the law of limitation is founded on public policy and some lapse on the part of the litigant by itself would not be sufficient to deny the condonation of delay as the same could cause miscarriage of justice.

15/ The the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag and another Vs. Ms. Katiji and others (1987) 2 SCC 107, has held as under:-

"Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the "State" which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-

motherly treatment when the "State" is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file- pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time-barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides."

16/ It is noteworthy that the Act, 2013 and the provisions of the Act, 1996 are almost similar, therefore, the judgment delivered by Division Bench of this Court in the case of Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd and another (supra) is completely applicable in the instant case, in which it has also held as under :

"50. The commercial Court has held in the impugned order that

the explanation for the delay after 13.04.2023 is not properly explained, thus, it refused to condone the delay of 27 days caused after 13.04.2023. As discussed by us in detail above, the delay of 27 days caused has been properly explained by the appellants.

51. In view of the factual situation of this case and the law as applicable in the present factual situation of the case as discussed in detail above, we are of the opinion that the Commercial Court has erred in refusing to condone the delay of 27 days which was within the limit of condonable delay of 30 days"

17/ Therefore, in view of the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court and other High Courts,this Court is of the considered opinion that the reasons for obtaining certified copy of the order and relaxation for CORONA pandemic as assigned by the appellants appear to be bonafide. Adoption of strict standard of rule sometime fails to protect public interest, it would be result of public mischief by local management for delay in process of filing of appeal and the delay of only 28 days caused by the Government is due to its instrumentality and bonafide, therefore, it should be condoned.

18/ In view of the aforesaid, the applications for condonation of delay are allowed and delay of 28 days is hereby condoned.

19/ List the matter in due course.

20/ A copy of this order be placed in the record of connected FA no. 00226/2021 and FA no. /00227/2021

(ANIL VERMA) JUDGE

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