Madhya Pradesh High Court
Raja Pandey @ Ramraj Pandey vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 20 May, 2024
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
1
MCRC No.44847/2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
A T JA B A L P U R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE GURPAL SINGH AHLUWALIA
ON THE 20th OF MAY, 2024
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 44847 of 2020
BETWEEN:-
1. RAJA PANDEY @ RAMRAJ PANDEY S/O SHRI
NEELAMBER PRASAD PANDEY, AGED ABOUT 37
YEARS, OCCUPATION: BUSINESS R/O VILLAGE
BAMHANI, POLICE STATION CHURHAT,
DISTRICT SIDHI (MADHYA PRADESH)
2. CHHOTE PANDEY @ SHIVPOOJAN PANDEY S/O
SHRI NEELAMBER PRASAD PANDEY, AGED
ABOUT 40 YEARS, OCCUPATION: CULTIVATION
R/O VILLAGE BAMHANI, POLICE STATION
CHURHAT, DISTRICT SIDHI (MADHYA PRADESH)
3. SHIVA PANDEY @ SHIVAMANI PANDEY S/O SHRI
NEELAMBER PRASAD PANDEY, AGED ABOUT 48
YEARS, OCCUPATION: ADVOCATE R/O VILLAGE
BAMHANI, POLICE STATION CHURHAT,
DISTRICT SIDHI (MADHYA PRADESH)
4. BRIJENDRA VISHWAKARMA S/O SHRI
SHIVSHANKAR VISHWAKARMA, AGED ABOUT 40
YEARS, OCCUPATION: CULTIVATION, R/O
VILLAGE BAMHANI, POLICE STATION
CHURHAT, DISTRICT SIDHI (MADHYA PRADESH)
5. PREMLAL VISHWAKARMA S/O SHRI RAMRATAN
VISHWAKARMA, AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: CULTIVATION, R/O VILLAGE
BAMHANI, POLICE STATION CHURHAT,
DISTRICT SIDHI (MADHYA PRADESH)
6. RAJEEV VISHWAKARMA S/O SHRI
SHIVSHANKAR VISHWAKARMA, AGED ABOUT 35
YEARS, OCCUPATION: CULTIVATION, R/O
VILLAGE BAMHANI, POLICE STATION
CHURHAT, DISTRICT SIDHI (MADHYA PRADESH)
7. RAHUL VISHWAKARMA S/O SHRI PREMLAL
VISHWAKARMA, AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: CULTIVATION, R/O VILLAGE
BAMHANI, POLICE STATION CHURHAT,
DISTRICT SIDHI (MADHYA PRADESH)
2
MCRC No.44847/2020
8. DHEERAJ RAWAT S/O SHRI BABULAL RAWAT,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, OCCUPATION: LABOUR,
R/O VILLAGE BAMHANI, POLICE STATION
CHURHAT, DISTRICT SIDHI (MADHYA PRADESH)
9. DHANANTAR RAWAT S/O SHRI RUPAL RAWAT,
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS, OCCUPATION: LABOUR,
R/O VILLAGE BAMHANI, POLICE STATION
CHURHAT, DISTRICT SIDHI (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....APPLICANTS
(BY SHRI RAKESH DWIVEDI - ADVOCATE)
AND
1. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH
STATION HOUSE OFFICER, POLICE STATION
CHURHAT, DISTRICT SIDHI (MADHYA PRADESH)
2. BALMIK VISHWAKARMA S/O RAMRATAN
VISHWAKARMA, R/O WARD NO.1, BAMHANI,
P.S.CHURHAT, DISTRICT SIDHI (MADHYA
PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(SHRI ROHIT JAIN - GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT
NO.1/STATE, SHRI RAMAYAN PRASAD PATEL - ADVOCATE FOR
RESPONDENT NO.2)
This application coming on for admission this day, the court passed
the following:
ORDER
This application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has been filed
seeking the following relief:
"It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court may
be pleased to quash/set-aside FIR dated 12.09.2020
registered vide Crime No.621/2020 with P.S.
Churhat, District Sidhi, M.P., in the interest of
justice."
2. It is submitted by counsel for applicants that on 12.09.2020 at
about 16:25, complainant Balmik Vishwakarma lodged a report that on
26.06.2020 at about 12 in the noon, he was having a bath in his house.
At that time, applicants came to his house and after disconnecting the
electricity connection started abusing him and also insisted that he
should immediately vacate the house. When it was objected by
complainant, then all applicants started demolishing his house by using
lathi and danda and demolished the entire roof and also damaged the
articles kept in the house, as a result, he has sustained damages in lakhs.
After committing the offence they also extended a threat that he should
immediately vacate the premises otherwise he would be killed.
3. By referring to sale deed dated 24.05.1999, it is submitted by
counsel for applicants that house in question was constructed over
khasra No.334 and in the sale deed it was also mentioned that one
kachcha house is also situated on the land which was sold to applicants.
It is further submitted that complainant alongwith others had filed a
Civil Suit No.96A/2011 for declaration of title, permanent injunction as
well as for declaration of sale deed dated 24.05.1999 as null and void.
By judgment and decree dated 18.11.2011 passed by Fourth Civil Judge
Class-2, Sidhi in Civil Suit No.96A/2011, Trial Court dismissed the suit.
4. Being aggrieved by said judgment and decree, complainant and
other plaintiffs filed a civil appeal which was registered as Regular Civil
Appeal No.103-A/2014 and that was partially allowed and it was
declared that the sale deed dated 24.05.1999 is binding on the
complainant. It is submitted that once civil rights have already been
adjudicated by Civil Court then converting the civil dispute into a
criminal case is unwarranted and accordingly, relied upon a judgment
passed by Supreme Court in the case of Ahmad Ali Quraishi and
another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, reported in (2020) 13
SCC 435. It is further submitted that FIR has been lodged with ulterior
motive and by relying upon the judgment passed by Supreme Court in
the case of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others,
reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, it is submitted that FIR is liable to
be quashed.
5. Per contra, the application is vehemently opposed by counsels for
respondents.
6. Heard learned counsel for parties.
Whether FIR is bad on the ground that civil litigation has been
given the colour of criminal litigation or not?
7. It is true that complainant had filed a civil suit alongwith other
plaintiffs which was dismissed but against the judgment and decree
passed by Trial Court on 18.11.2011 in Civil Suit No.96A/2011
complainant as well as other plaintiffs had filed Regular Civil Appeal
No.103A/2014. The said appeal was partially allowed by Court of
Second Additional District Judge, Sidhi by passing a judgment and
decree dated 23.08.2016. The operative part of decree reads as under:
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8. From plain reading of decree passed by Appellate Court, it is clear
that Appellate Court had held that sale deed dated 24.05.1999 is binding
on the parties so far as it relates to undivided share of 1.95 acres. It has
also been mentioned that purchaser can obtain the possession only after
getting the land partitioned. Thus, it is clear that sale deed dated
24.05.1999 was declared to be valid only to the extent of 1.95 acres of
land and purchasers were entitled to take possession only after getting
the aforesaid land partitioned.
9. It is not the case of applicants that any proceedings for partition
were initiated after the judgment and decree was passed by Appellate
Court.
10. It is well established principle of law that co-sharer can alienate
his undivided share but he cannot alienate a specific piece of land. After
purchasing the undivided share, the purchaser would step into the shoes
of the seller and can take possession only after the land is partitioned.
Since no partition had taken place, therefore, the purchaser had no right
to take possession of any specific piece of land.
11. Under these circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion
that since applicants had demolished the house of complainant without
any order of partition, therefore, it cannot be said that civil litigation has
been given the colour of criminal litigation. Thus, the aforesaid
contention is hereby rejected.
Whether proceedings have been initiated out of ulterior motive or
not?
12. The Supreme Court in the case of Renu Kumari v. Sanjay
Kumar and others, reported in (2008) 12 SCC 346 has held as under:
"9. "8. Exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC in a case
of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section
does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only
saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before
the enactment of CrPC. It envisages three circumstances
under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised,
namely, (i) to give effect to an order under CrPC, (ii) to
prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise
secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable
to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the
exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment
dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may
possibly arise. The courts, therefore, have inherent powers
apart from express provisions of law which are necessary
for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon
them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in
the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent
powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or
criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as
inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are
necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course
of administration of justice on the principle of quando lex
aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res
ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person
anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist).
While exercising the powers under the section, the court
does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent
jurisdiction under the section, though wide, has to be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only
when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid
down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone the courts exist. Authority of
the court exists for advancement of justice and if any
attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce
injustice, the court has the power to prevent abuse. It would
be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action
which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of
justice. In exercise of the powers the court would be
justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process
of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise
serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by
the report, the court may examine the question of fact.
When a report is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to
look into the materials to assess what the report has alleged
and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations
are accepted in toto.
9. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866 :
(1960) 3 SCR 388] this Court summarised some categories
of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised
to quash the proceedings:
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance e.g. want of
sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there
is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced
clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. (AIR p.
869)
10. In dealing with the last category, it is important to
bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is
no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is
clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case
where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may
or may not support the accusations. When exercising
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court would
not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the
evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a
reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be
sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial
process should not be an instrument of oppression, or,
needless harassment. The court should be circumspect and
judicious in exercising discretion and should take all
relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before
issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands
of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any
person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an
instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a
prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of
exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC and the
categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its
power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent
abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court
in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] . A note of
caution was, however, added that the power should be
exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases.
The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as
follows : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)
'(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support
of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge.'
11. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High
Court under Section 482 CrPC are very wide and the very
plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise.
The court must be careful to see that its decision, in exercise
of this power, is based on sound principles. The inherent
power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate
prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a
State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie
decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and
hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and
produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether
factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in
their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course,
no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in
which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary
jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage.
[See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 :
1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892] and Raghubir
Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri
LJ 1] .] It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse
the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in
order to determine whether a conviction would be
sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that
the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to
assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint
cannot be proceeded with. When an information is lodged at
the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala
fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It
is the material collected during the investigation and
evidence led in the court which decides the fate of the
accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the
informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves
be the basis for quashing the proceedings.
[See Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar [1990 Supp SCC
686 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 142] , State of Bihar v. P.P.
Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192]
, Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6
SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059] , State of Kerala v. O.C.
Kuttan [(1999) 2 SCC 651 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 304] , State of
U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7 SCC 705 : 1996 SCC (Cri)
497] , Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada [(1997) 2
SCC 397 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 415] , Satvinder Kaur v. State
(Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [(1999) 8 SCC 728 : 1999 SCC
(Cri) 1503] and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999)
3 SCC 259 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 401] .]"
The above position was again reiterated in State of
Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [(2002) 3 SCC 89 : 2002
SCC (Cri) 539] , State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore
Gupta [(2004) 1 SCC 691 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 353] and State
of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo [(2005) 13 SCC 540 :
(2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 272] , SCC pp. 547-50, paras 8-11."
13. Thus, it is clear that once the complaint makes out a cognizable
offence then mala fides of complainant would become secondary in
nature.
14. Furthermore, this Court has already held that in the light of
judgment and decree passed by Second Additional District Judge, Sidhi
in RCSA No.103-A/2014 the applicants had no right to claim any
specific piece of land unless and until it was partitioned.
15. Since it is not the case of applicants that land in question fell to
their share in any partition proceedings, therefore, it cannot be said that
FIR lodged by complainant was a product of any mala fide or ulterior
motive. Accordingly, this contention is hereby rejected.
16. No other argument is advanced by counsel for applicants.
17. For the reasons mentioned above, this Court is of considered
opinion that no case is made out for quashment of FIR and
consequential proceedings.
18. Accordingly, the application fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G.S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
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VARSHA
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Date: 2024.05.21 14:30:59 +05'30'
