Madhya Pradesh High Court
Wd. Ritu Agrawal vs Subhash Chandra Kuderha on 16 May, 2024
1
In The High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
At Jabalpur
Before
Hon'ble Shri Justice Duppala Venkata Ramana
On The 16th Of May, 2024
Misc. Appeal No. 1980 Of 2024
Between:-
1. Wd. Ritu Agrawal W/o Late Nitin Agrawal,
Aged About 28 Years, Occupation:
Housewife Ward No. 8 Mohandra Police
Chouki Mohandra Tahsil Pawai District
Panna (Madhya Pradesh)
2. Abhinav Agrawal S/o Late Nitin Agrawal,
Aged About 6 Years, Occupation: Student
R/o Ward No 8 Mohandra Police Chouki
Mohandra Tehsil Pawai District Panna
(Madhya Pradesh)
3. Arti Agrawal D/o Late Nitin Agrawal, Aged
About 4 Years, R/o Ward No 8 Mohandra
Police Chouki Mohandra Tehsil Pawai
District (Madhya Pradesh)
4. Ramkrapal Agrawal S/o Late Ramgopal
Agrawal, Aged About 60 Years, R/o Ward No
8 Mohandra Police Chouki Mohandra Tehsil
Pawai District Panna (Madhya Pradesh)
5. Smt Usha Devi Agrawal W/o Shri Ramkrapal
Agrawal, Aged About 56 Years, R/o Ward No
8 Mohandra Police Chouki Mohandra Tehsil
Pawai District Panna (Madhya Pradesh)
.....Appellants
(By Shri A.S.Parihar - Advocate)
2
and
1. Subhash Chandra Kuderha S/o Shri
Shankerlal Kuderha, Aged About 50 Years,
Occupation: Vehicle Owner And Driver At
Present Tilakward Mudwara Katni District
Katni (Madhya Pradesh)
2. Manager,, Iffko Tokio General Insurance
Company Limited Not Mention` (Madhya
Pradesh)
.....RESPONDENTS
(NONE APPEARED)
This appeal coming on for admission this day, the court passed the
following:
ORDER
This application has been filed seeking condonation of delay of 300
days in filing the appeal in question. The present appeal has been filed
challenging the award dated 13.02.2023 passed by learned Additional
Member Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Pawai District - Panna. It is
contended that the matter got delayed and could not be filed within the period
of limitation as the appellants are the poor and rustic villagers and on
account of ignorance of law and facing financial hardship. However, the
delay in filing the appeal is not intentional and rather bona fide one.
(2) The brief facts of this case are that the present appeal filed by the
appellants against the award passed by the Member Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, Panna dated 13.02.2023 for enhancement of compensation, with
delay of 300 days filed I.A. No.6156/2024 for condoning the delay.
(3) Counsel for the appellants has stated that the claimants/appellants filed
claim petition before the learned Tribunal claiming compensation and the
learned Tribunal awarded Rs.18,91,400/-. Against the award passed by the
learned Tribunal, the appellants filed the appeal for enhance of Rs.5,00,000/-
then the awarded amounted of Rs.18,91,400/- with delay of 300 days. It is
further stated that he could not file the appeal in time as the appellants are the
poor and rustic villagers and on account of ignorance of law and facing
financial hardship, therefore, he prayed to condone the delay of 300 days
and admit the appeal.
(4) This Court has considered the submissions made. Normally a very
lenient view is being taken in the matters of this nature, particularly, where
the appeals filed by the appellants against the order passed by the learned
Tribunal but the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that sufficient cause
should be shown and a lenient view may be taken so as to advance the
substantial justice.
(5) In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, why the delay
has to be condoned mechanically merely because the appellants are poor and
rustic villagers and on account of ignorance of law and facing financial
hardships, he could not file the appeal within time, is not at all proper
explanation.
(6) The law is well settled that longer the delay, the heavier is the burden
on the party to prove that he was prevented by sufficient cause from
approaching the Court earlier. Though, ordinarily, the Courts have to take a
liberal view while considering the applications for condonation of delay, the
party, who fails to give plausible or convincing explanation for condonation
of delay, does not deserve any indulgence by this Court.
(7) A decision reported in Allala Bhagavanth Rao vs Garvandula
Vijayalaxmi and others1, wherein e the Court at paras-12 to 15 of the order
held as follows:.
1 . 2016 4 ALT 43
12. The word 'sufficient cause' is not defined either in the
Limitation Act or in the C.P.C.; the reason appears to be
that there is no straightjacket formula to decide whether the
cause shown for condonation of delay is sufficient cause or
not. Depending on the facts and circumstances of each case,
the Court can exercise discretion and decide the sufficient
cause. Sufficient cause shall be construed liberally without
adopting any pedantic approach. It cannot be stretched to
frustrate the very intention of Legislature in specifying the
period for filing appeal or petition etc.
13. In Lanka Venkateswarlu (Died) by L.Rs.v.State of A.P.,
(2011) 1 UPLJ 242 (SC), the apex Court heavily laid on the
Courts when to allow the petitions, though no sufficient
cause is made out, and ruled as follows:
"We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale,
which could have impelled the High Court to condone the
delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The
concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented
approach", "substantial justice" cannot be employed to
jettison the substantial law of limitation, especially in cases
where the Court concludes that there is no justification for
the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High
Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and
restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst
adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather
pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with
the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court
resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong
intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has
been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of
cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of
delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do
not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All
discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be
exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The
discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner
informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or
predilections cannot and should not form the basis of
exercising discretionary powers."
14. In fact, the petitioner did not make out any sufficient
cause except making a bald unsubstantiated allegation in
the affidavit If such lame excuses for condoning the delay
are accepted as sufficient causes, virtually denuding or
jettisoning the substantive law of limitation.
15. In view of the law declared by the apex Court basing
on the concept of real justice, substantial justice the Courts
cannot allow petitions under Section 5 of Limitation Act,
when no sufficient cause is made out. Therefore, basing on
lame excuse or unsubstantiated cause, it is difficult to
condone the delay, liberally construing the word sufficient
cause.
(8) In the above decision, it is laid down that the expression "sufficient
cause" is elastic term and each day's delay need not be explained in strict
sense. Also, it has been clearly held that the approach to be applied for
condonation of delay would depend upon the cause shown and only when
sufficient cause is shown, the relief sought can be granted. But in the instant
case the appellant having the knowledge about the passing of award but the
present appeal is filed on 11.03.2024 with delay of 300 days prescribing the
outer limit in the form of limitation to approach the Court of law is to see that
the parties to the proceedings are not vexed with the litigation forever or for
an inordinate length of period. When successful party as per its whims and
fancies challenged the award at a later point of time. This is not the
legislative intent. No doubt, the expression "sufficient cause" must receive a
liberal constructions so as to advance substantial justice. The delay in
preferring the appeal would be condoned in the interest of justice. However,
such delay should only be condoned where the Court finds that there is
absence of negligence or inaction on the part of the parties seeking the Court
to condone the said delay.
(9) In the instant case having the knowledge about the award passed by
Claims Tribunal but the appellant has not taken any steps to file an appeal
forthwith and the negligent attitude or casual approach in approaching the
Court is not expected to be entertained. Public interest and confidence upon
the Courts is to be protected. Judicial verdict has to attain finality, therefore,
this Court does not find any such cause which amounts to sufficient cause for
condonation of delay.
(10). In such circumstances, obviously the discretion could not have been
exercised in favour of the appellants who have not approached this Court
with clean hand, therefore, the application filed by the appellants lacked
bonafide. The condonation of delay of days should only be condoned where
the Court finds that there is absence of negligence or inaction on the part of
the party seeking the Court to condone the said delay. But in the instant case,
the parties are approaching in the Court with a willful default, negligent
attitude and a casual approach in approaching the Court is not expected to be
entertained. The public interest and confidence upon the Courts is to
protected. Judicial verdict has to attain finality. The cause for delay pleaded
in the petition is not at all acceptable and the appellants fail to give any
plausible and convicting explanation for condonation of delay, does not
deserves any indulgence by this Court.
(11). By following the above judgments read together, sufficient cause has
to show for filing this appeal with delay of 300 days. This Court does not find
any sufficient cause pleaded by the appellants for condoning the delay. Apart
from this, there is a long delay of 300 days beyond 90 days period provided
for filing an appeal under the Statute, there is no explanation contained in the
condonation of delay application beyond the usual file-pushing is not
sufficient, therefore, the appellants have miserably failed to give any
acceptable and cogent reasons to condone the such huge delay.
(12) Having perusal of the above decisions cited (supra) this Court does not
find any sufficient cause pleaded by appellants for condoning the delay in
question, therefore, this Court is not inclined to condone the delay in filing
the appeal and dismissed I.A.No.6156/2024 accordingly.
(13). In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated above, I find
no merit in this appeal and same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to
costs.
(14). Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall also stand dismissed.
DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA,J
rk
Date: 2024.05.21 13:20:08 +05'30'
