Madhya Pradesh High Court
Laurels Scholl International ... vs Union Of India Department Of ... on 9 May, 2023
Author: Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
1
W.A No. 1619 of 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT I N D O R E
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND
DHARMADHIKARI
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PRAKASH CHANDRA GUPTA
ON THE 09th May, 2023
WRIT APPEAL No. 1619 of 2022
BETWEEN:-
LAURELS SCHOLL INTERNATIONAL THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED
REPRESENTATIVES MR. HUKUMCHAND PANCHAL S/O SHRI
RAMESHWAR PANCHAL LAURELS SCHOOL INTERNATIONAL
TALAVALI CHANDA, A.B. ROAD. MANGLIYA, DISTRICT INDORE
(MADHYA PRADESH)
.....APPELLANT
(SHRI GAURAV CHHABRA, LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT)
AND
UNION OF INDIA DEPARTMENT OF SCHOOL EDUCATION AND
1. LITERACY MINISTRY OF EDUCATION THROUGH SECRETARY 124-C
SHASTRI BHAWAN, NEW DELHI (DELHI)
VINEETA NAIR W/O PRADEEP NAIR, AGED 46 YEARS, 605 SIMRAN
2. RESIDENCY, KANADIA ROAD, BENGALI SQUARE, INDORE (MADHYA
PRADESH)
RENU SINGH W/O M.K. SINGH, AGED 54 YEARS, A-1-503 KAROL
3.
BAGH, BHAWRASLA, INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
MONICA KHANDELWAL W/O PRAKASH KHANDELWAL, AGED 50
4. YEARS, 153 ALOK NAGAR, KANADIA ROAD, INDORE (MADHYA
PRADESH)
NEELU ANAND W/O ABHIJEET SINGH ANAND, AGED 52 YEARS, B-189,
5.
MIG DUPLEX, BEHIND CHL HOSPITAL, INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
RINITA JAIN W/O TAPAN JAIN, AGED 48 YEARS, EH-58, SCHEME NO.
6.
54, VIJAY NAGAR, INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
VRUSHALI NIMGAOKAR W/O RISHIKESH NIMGAOKAR, AGED 45
7. YEARS, 203 ELITE TOWER, PARK ROAD INDORE (MADHYA
PRADESH)
2
W.A No. 1619 of 2022
SUDHA JHA W/O RAJESH JHA, AGED 52 YEARS, RH-4, CLASSIC
8. PURNIMA ESTATE, KHAJRANA RING ROAD, INDORE (MADHYA
PRADESH)
JAISON JOYS S/O JOYS JOHN, AGED 31 YEARS, 202, NAVYA AVENUE
9.
APT., 13 PARICHARIKA NAGAR, INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
ASHIMA SHASTRI MODI W/O GOURAV MODI, AGED 34 YEARS, 188/C,
10.
KALANIBAGH, DEWAS (MADHYA PRADESH)
NAVIN LODWAL S/O ARJUN LODWAL, AGED 40 YEARS, 19-B, DR.
11.
AMBEDKAR NAGAR, INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
SONALI PANDIT W/O LATE SHRI ATUL PANDIT, AGED 50 YEARS, 251,
12.
MR-4, MAHALAXMI NAGAR, INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
SASHI DADHICH W/O BIJENDRA DADHICH, AGED 50 YEARS, 67,
13.
VYENKATESH NAGAR, INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
NISHA SHARMA W/O LATE SHRI SANJAY SHARMA, AGED 53 YEARS,
14.
H-9, MIG COLONY, INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
ARCHANA MUNDRA D/O SHRI RAMPRASADJI JOTLA, AGED 52
15. YEARS, 29/1, RACE COURSE ROAD, DR. R.S. BHANDARI MARG,
INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
ROHIT BIWAL S/O SHRI RAMESH BIWAL, AGED 35 YEARS, 35-A/4,
16.
MAYUR NAGAR, INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
RAJVEER SINGH RATHORE S/O SHRI MADAN SINGH RATHORE,
17. AGED28 YEARS, 110-A, SWASTHYA NAGAR, INDORE (MADHYA
PRADESH)
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY SCHOOL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
18.
VALLABH BHAWAN BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)
COLLECTOR/ DISTRICT MAGISTRATE INDORE (MADHYA
19.
PRADESH)
COUNCIL FOR INDIAN SCHOOL CERTIFICATE EXAMINATIONS
20. THROUGH ITS SECRETARY PRAGATI HOUSE, 3RD FLOOR, 47-48
NEHRU PLACE, NEW DELHI (DELHI) - 110019
.....RESPONDENTS
(SHRI HIMANSHU JOSHI, LEARNED ASSTT. SOLICITOR GENERAL FOR
THE RESPONDENT NO.1/UNION OF INDIA)
(SHRI RISHI SHRIVASTAVA, LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS
NO. 2 TO 17))
(SHRI AAKASH SHARMA, LEARNED GOVT. ADVOCATE FOR THE
RESPONDENT NO. 18 & 19)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reserved on : 03.01.2023
Pronounced on : 09.05.2023
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3
W.A No. 1619 of 2022
This appeal having been heard and reserved for orders coming
on for pronouncement this day, Hon'ble Shri Justice S.A.
DHARMADHIKARI pronounced the following
ORDER
Heard finally with the consent of both the parties.
The present writ appeal under Section 2(1) of the Madhya
Pradesh Uccha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam,
2005 has been filed assailing the order dated 28.10.2022 passed by the
learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 11165/2021 whereby the learned
Single Judge has rejected the preliminary objection with regard to
maintainability of the writ petition against private unaided minority
educational institution and held that the writ petition is maintainable
against the private unaided institutions.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the
appellant/respondent(respondent in writ petition) is a private unaided
minority educational institution imparting education to students in
Indore and does not receive any grant either directly or indirectly, from
the Government. The appellant is affiliated to Council for the Indian
School Certificate Examinations(for short 'CISCE' hereinafter) Thus,
appellant is a private institution and is solely dependent on the fees
which is received from the parents for day to day functioning including
salary of its teaching and non-teaching staff.
3. The respondents herein had filed a writ petition bearing W.P. no.
11165/2021 challenging their termination. The respondents herein have
prayed for the following reliefs in the writ petition:
" Appropriate writ, Order or Direction may kindly
W.A No. 1619 of 2022
be issued that,
(1) Retrospective termination of the petitioners be held
as illegal and be set aside.
(2) Respondent No.5 be directed to make payment of
full salary to the petitioners till date, including the
payment of back wages alongwith interest of 12% p.a.
thereon.
(3) Respondent No.3 be directed to initiate inquiry
against respondent no. 5 for illegalities committed by
Respondent no. 5.
(4) Respondent No. 4 be directed to cancel the
affiliation of Respondent No.5.
Any other relief that this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in
the facts and circumstances of this case may kindly be
passed in the interest of justice."
4. During the pendency of petition, the present appellant (respondent
no.5) filed preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the
writ petition on the ground that it is a settled principle of law that the
relief as sought by the respondents in the writ petition under Article 226
of the Constitution of India cannot be granted by this Court, as the
appellant is a private unaided minority institution. The respondent no.2
to 17 were appointed as teachers by the appellant purely on contractual
basis governed by the service rules of the institution, therefore, the writ
of mandamus cannot be issued against a private body, such as the
appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that on the
aforesaid grounds, the writ petition ought to have been dismissed by the
W.A No. 1619 of 2022
learned Single Judge.
5. Learned counsel further submitted that from the appointment
order, it is clear that the respondent(s) no.2 to 17 were appointed purely
on contract basis and thus the issue of termination was covered under
the ambit of private law and as such no public element was involved. It
is settled principle of law that private unaided minority institution such
as appellant herein can be made amenable only when the action and
inaction of such institution relates to public function performed by such
institution whereas the issue under challenge in the said writ petition
was arising out of completely private contract.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the order passed in
the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. Vs. C.P. Sebastian reported in (2009)
14 SCC 360 wherein it has been held that " a contract of personal
service includes all matters relating to the service of employee -
confirmation, suspension, transfer,termination etc". Thus, by no stretch
of imagination, the learned Single Judge ought to have dismissed the
writ petition filed against the present appellant.
7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents opposed
the prayer and submitted that the application filed by the appellant was
misconceived as appellant is an unaided private school, but it is very
much imparting education which is the public function and the
respondents are teachers, therefore, learned Single Judge has rightly
come to the conclusion that they are amenable to the writ jurisdiction.
8. Heard, learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
9. The Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Ahluwalia Vs. State of
Punjab and Others reported in (2012) 12 SCC 331 in para 11 to 14 has
W.A No. 1619 of 2022
held as under.
"11. On the other hand, Mr. S.S. Ray, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of respondent Nos.2-4 submitted that no writ petition would be
maintainable against the respondent - institution. In support of his
submission, learned counsel has placed reliance in the case of Pradeep
Kumar Biswas Vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology & Ors., (2002) 5
SCC 111, particularly making reference to paragraph 40 of the aforesaid
judgment. Paragraph 40 of the aforesaid judgment is extracted
hereunder:
40. "The picture that ultimately emerges is that the tests
formulated in Ajay Hasia are not a rigid set of principles
so that if a body falls within any one of them it must, ex
hypothesi, be considered to be a State within the meaning
of Article 12. The question in each case would be whether
in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body
is financially, functionally and administratively dominated
by or under the control of the Government. Such control
must be particular to the body in question and must be
pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State
within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is
merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it
would not serve to make the body a State."
12. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for
the parties. In our opinion, in view of the judgment rendered by this
Court in the case of Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami
Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust (supra), there can be no doubt
that even a purely private body, where the State has no control over its
internal affairs, would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution, for issuance of a writ of
mandamus. Provided, of course, the private body is performing public
functions which are normally expected to be performed by the State
Authorities.
13. In the aforesaid case, this Court was also considering a situation
where the services of a Lecturer had been terminated who was working
in the college run by the Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas
Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust. In those circumstances,
this Court has clearly observed as under :
"20. The term "authority" used in Article 226, in the
context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term
in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of
enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article
226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for
enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-
W.A No. 1619 of 2022
fundamental rights. The words "any person or authority"
used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only
to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State.
They may cover any other person or body performing
public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very
much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty
imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light
of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to
the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is
imposed, if a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot
be denied.
22. Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be
denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not
imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of
this law, Professor de Smith states: "To be enforceable by
mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be
one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to
have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or
even contract." We share this view. The judicial control
over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights
of the people should not be put into watertight
compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the
requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a
very wide remedy which must be easily available "to reach
injustice wherever it is found". Technicalities should not
come in the way of granting that relief under Article
226. We, therefore, reject the contention urged for the
appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition." The
aforesaid observations have been repeated and reiterated
in numerous judgments of this Court including the
judgment in Unni Krishnan and Zee Telefilms Ltd.(supra),
brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the
Appellant Mr.Parikh.
14. In view of the law laid down in the aforementioned judgments of this
Court, the judgment of the learned Single Judge as also the Division
Bench of the High Court cannot be sustained on the proposition that the
writ petition would not be maintainable merely because the respondent -
institution is a purely unaided private educational institution. The
appellant had specifically taken the plea that the respondents perform
public functions, i.e. providing education to children in their institutions
throughout India."
10. A similar opinion was enunciated by Full Bench of the Hon'ble
Apex Court when it rendered its decision in the landmark case of
Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs. Union of India, reported in (1984) 3 SCC
W.A No. 1619 of 2022
161:
"15. We may point out that what we have said above in regard to the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court under Article 32 must apply
equally in relation to the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts
under Article 226, for the latter jurisdiction is also a new constitutional
jurisdiction and it is conferred in the same wide terms as the jurisdiction
under Article 32 and the same powers can and must therefore be
exercised by the High Courts while exercising jurisdiction under Article
226. In fact, the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 is much
wider, because the High Courts are required to exercise this jurisdiction
not only for enforcement of a fundamental right but also for enforcement
of any legal right and there are many rights conferred on the poor and
the disadvantaged which are the creation of statute and they need to be
enforced as urgently and vigorously as fundamental rights."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. A more recent view was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of K.K. Saksena Vs. International Commission on Irrigation
& Drainage reported in (2015) 4 SCC 670:
"33. In this context, when we scan through the provisions of Article 12 of
the Constitution, as per the definition contained therein, the State
includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government
and legislature of each State as well as all local or other authorities
within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of
India. It is in this context the question as to which body would qualify as
other authority has come up for consideration before this Court ever
since, and the test/principles which are to be applied for ascertaining as
to whether a particular body can be treated as other authority or not
have already been noted above. If such an authority violates the
fundamental right or other legal rights of any person or citizen (as the
case may be), a writ petition can be filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court
and seeking appropriate direction, order or writ. However, under Article
226 of the Constitution, the power of the High Court is not limited to the
Government or authority which qualifies to be State under Article 12.
Power is extended to issue directions, orders or writs to any person or
authority. Again, this power of issuing directions, orders or writs is not
limited to enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part III, but
also for any other purpose. Thus, power of the High Court takes within
its sweep more authorities than stipulated in Article 12 and the subject-
matter which can be dealt with under this article is also wider in scope."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. An important caveat was appended by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
W.A No. 1619 of 2022
in K.K. Saksena (supra) whereby the Court had ruled that even if an
authority was deemed to be a 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution,
the Constitutional Courts before issuing any writ, particularly that of
mandamus, must satisfy that such impugned action of the authority
concerned which is under challenge, forms a part of the public law as
opposed to private law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had held:
"43. What follows from a minute and careful reading of the aforesaid
judgments of this Court is that if a person or authority is 'State' within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, admittedly a writ petition under
Article 226 would lie against such a person or body. However, we may
add that even in such cases writ would not lie to enforce private law
rights. There are a catena of judgments on this aspect and it is not
necessary to refer to those judgments as that is the basic principle of
judicial review of an action under the administrative law. The reason is
obvious. A private law is that part of a legal system which is a part of
common law that involves relationships between individuals, such as law
of contract or torts. Therefore, even if writ petition would be maintainable
against an authority, which is 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution,
before issuing any writ, particularly writ of mandamus, the Court has to
satisfy that action of such an authority, which is challenged, is in the
domain of public law as distinguished from private law."
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Relying upon K.K. Saksena (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Ramakrishna Mission Vs. Kago Kunya reported in (2019)
16 SCC 303 had held that:
"34. Thus, contracts of a purely private nature would not be subject to
writ jurisdiction merely by reason of the fact that they are structured by
statutory provisions. The only exception to this principle arises in a
situation where the contract of service is governed or regulated by a
statutory provision. Hence, for instance, in K.K. Saksena this Court held
that when an employee is a workman governed by the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, it constitutes an exception to the general principle that a
contract of personal service is not capable of being specifically enforced
or performed."
(Emphasis supplied)
W.A No. 1619 of 2022
14. Therefore based on the principles outlined in K.K. Saksena (supra)
as well as Kago Kunya (supra), a thorough examination is required to
fathom, if there is a character of public law involved in the present lis and
if that is there and the petitioner has felt that he stands violated of his
precious fundamental right or any legal right for that matter, then this is
Court's bounden duty to inspect the propriety of the same. However, the
hurdle which remains to be crossed is to examine if the said school, being
an unaided school, is amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
15. The above aspect is now being evaluated as under:
To impart education is a State function, it is the obligation of the
welfare State to ensure that children are imparted education, which is one
of the directive principles of State Policy enshrined in Article 41 of the
Constitution of India. The State can, however, delegate its functions to the
private sector educational institutions and while doing so, the State has
created its limbs as it was in the case of companies and corporation to
discharge its constitutional obligation of imparting education at all levels
from primary to higher education.
16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Unni Krishnan reported
in AIR 1993 SC 2178 held that private educational institutions discharge
public duties irrespective of the fact they receive aid or not. The absence
of aid does not detract from the public nature of the duty. These
institutions supplement the effort of the State in educating the people
which is the principal duty cast upon the State under the constitutional
scheme. Relevant excerpt is quoted below:
"83. The emphasis in this case is as to the nature of duty imposed on the
body. It requires to be observed that the meaning of authority under
Article 226 came to be laid down distinguishing the same term from
W.A No. 1619 of 2022
Article 12. In spite of it, if the emphasis is on the nature of duty on the
same principle it has to be held that these educational institutions
discharge public duties. Irrespective of the educational institutions
receiving aid it should be held that it is a public duty. The absence of aid
does not detract from the nature of duty."
17. The case of Unni Krishnan came to be partly overruled by the
subsequent eleven Judge Bench in T.M.A. Pai Foundation and others
Vs. State of Karnataka and others reported in AIR 2003 SC 355,
however, the ratio decidendi, in so far educational institution discharging
public function and it is the duty of the State to provide education to
children from the age of six to fourteen years held to be fundamental right
was affirmed.
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court again got an opportunity to examine the
issue as to whether private institution imparting education in higher
studies to students is discharging 'public function' and whether, Deemed
University notified by the Central Government under Section 3 of the
University Grants Commission Act, 1956 which, inter alia, provides for
effective discharge of public function, namely, education for the benefit of
public is an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution
then as a necessary consequence, it becomes amenable to writ jurisdiction
of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court in the case
of Janet Jayapaul Vs. SRM University & Others reported in (2015) 16
SCC 530 held that the institution engaged in/and imparting higher studies
to students is discharging 'public function' by imparting education.
Relevant excerpt is quoted below:
"This we say for the reasons that firstly, respondent No. 1 is engaged in
imparting education in higher studies to students at large. Secondly, it is
discharging "public function" by way of imparting education. Thirdly, it
W.A No. 1619 of 2022
is notified as a "Deemed University" by the Central Government under
Section 3 of the UGC Act. Fourthly, being a "Deemed University", all the
provisions of the UGC Act are made applicable to respondent No. 1,
which inter alia provides for effective discharge of the public function -
namely education for the benefit of public. Fifthly, once respondent No. 1
is declared as "Deemed University" whose all functions and activities are
governed by the UGC Act, alike other universities then it is an
"authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Lastly,
once it is held to be an "authority" as provided in Article 12 then as a
necessary consequence, it becomes amenable to writ jurisdiction of High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution."
19. Further, the eleven Judge Bench in T.M.A. Pai (supra) while
considering the relationship between the management and the
employees/teachers of private technical and higher education though being
contractual in nature but, in the case of educational institutions, the Court
was of the opinion that requiring a teacher or a staff to go to civil court for
the purposes of seeking redress is not in the interest of education. The
Court held that: (Extract of Para 50)
"In the case of educational institutions, however, we are of the opinion
that requiring a teacher or a member of the staff to go to a civil court for
the purpose of seeking redress is not in the interest of general education.
Disputes between the management and the staff of educational
institutions must be decided speedily, and without the excessive incurring
of costs."
20. If further this aspect is analyzed the Parliament of India, in its
wisdom, passed the 86th Amendment Act in 2002 which introduced
Article 21A into Part-III of the Constitution of India and enshrined the
right to education as a fundamental right for all children. In furtherance of
giving effect to such fundamental right, the Parliament passed the Right to
Education Act, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act of 2009')which has
W.A No. 1619 of 2022
been in effect from April 1, 2010 onwards. Section 2(n) of the Act of 2009,
defines "School" in the following terms (Relevant extract) is reproduced
below:
"(n) ― school means any recognized school imparting elementary
education and includes--
(i) ..............
(ii) .............
(iii) ............
(iv) an unaided school not receiving any kind of aid or grants to meet its
expenses from the appropriate Government or the local authority."
21. Clause (n) to sub-section (2) of Section 38 of the Act of 2009
provides the appropriate Governments (as defined under section 2(a) of
Act of 2009) with the power to make subsidiary Rules with regard to such
grievance redressal mechanism and in pursuance of the powers conferred
under Section 38 of the Act of 2009, the State of Madhya Pradesh had
framed the Rules in the name of Right of children to Free and compulsory
Education Rules, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as 'Rules of 2011') and
under rule 16(8) of the Rules of 2011 there is a Grievance Redressal
Mechanism, which castes responsibility on the school to develop such
mechanism and if there is no such mechanism developed by the school a
patent manifestation of the violation of rights of an employee under the
Act of 2009 read with the Rules of 2011 would be apparent, which makes
it a fit case for judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
22. Therefore, the organic inference that follows is that since the said
school which is run by appellant, being an unaided school, by virtue of the
Section 2(n) of the Act of 2009, coupled with Rules of 2011 had come to
discharge a public duty as was cast upon it by the said statutes. Such a
W.A No. 1619 of 2022
public duty stands obligatory, in our opinion, in terms of both Article 21A
of the Constitution of India as well as the Act of 2009 and Rules of 2011
which gave effect to the fundamental right in unequivocal terms.
23. Therefore, we are of the opinion, that the quoted provisions of the
Act of 2009 read with quoted provisions of the Rules of 2011, indeed
regulates the contract of service of the respondents, and this thereby falls
within the exception as stated in K.K. Sakesna (supra) and Kago Kunya
(supra).
24. Considering the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court as also the
fact that the appellant is a private unaided institution imparting
education to students which is otherwise a primary function of the State
and is performing function/public duty and accordingly it is amenable
to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Further since action under challenge falls in the domain of public law,
the appellant has been discharging a public duty under the prescription
of a statute and subsidiary rules made thereunder i.e the Act of 2009,
rules framed under the Act of 2009 by the State of Madhya Pradesh
named as The Right of children to Free and Compulsory Education
Rules, 2011, for denial any rights of his rights in connection with
public duty imposed on such body, public law remedy can be enforced
and as the service conditions of the respondents have direct nexus of the
discharge of a public duty, their case would be covered under the
exception clause, therefore amenable under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
25. This Court fully agrees with the findings given by the learned
Single Judge. There is no error apparent on the face of record to
interfere with the findings of learned Single Judge.
W.A No. 1619 of 2022
26. Accordingly, writ appeal being bereft of merits and substance is
hereby dismissed. No order as to cost.
(S. A. DHARMADHIKARI) (PRAKASH CHANDRA GUPTA)
JUDGE JUDGE
09.05.2023 09.05.2023
sh
Digitally signed
by SEHAR
HASEEN
Date: 2023.05.10
19:22:54 +05'30'
