Haroon Rashid Siddiqui vs United Bank Of India
2023 Latest Caselaw 888 MP

                                     W.P. No.23808/2018
                            1

     IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                    AT JABALPUR

                        BEFORE

        HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE NANDITA DUBEY

            WRIT PETITION No. 23808 of 2018

BETWEEN:-

HAROON RASHID SIDDIQUI S/O SHRI IQBAL SIDDIQUI, AGED
ABOUT 32 YEARS, OCCUPATION: EX EMPLOYEE OF UNITED
BANK OF INDIA, R/O IQBAL AHMAD SIDDIQUI, JHANSI ROAD
CHHATARPUR, DISTRICT CHHATARPUR (MADHYA PRADESH)

                                       ....PETITIONER

(BY MS SHOBHA MENON - SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH MS.
AANCHAL SARAF - ADVOCATE)

AND

1.     UNITED BANK OF INDIA THROUGH ITS MANAGING
       DIRECTOR AND C.E.O. UNITED TOWER 11 HEMANT BASU
       SARANI KOLKATTA DISTT KOLKATA (WEST BENGAL)


2.     GENERAL MANAGER UNITED BANK OF INDIA HEAD
       OFFICE KOLKATA WEST BENGAL (WEST BENGAL)


3.     CHIEF REGIONAL MANAGER UNITED BANK OF INDIA
       3RD FLOOR JEET TOWER, OPP. RAJKUMAR COLLEGE,
       G.E.ROAD, RAIPUR, DISTRICT RAIPUR (CHHATTISGARH)
                                             W.P. No.23808/2018
                                2

4.    ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER (D AND IR) AND
      DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY UNITED BANK OF INDIA
      DISCIPLINARY AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS DIVISION
      HEAD OFFICE, KOLKATA (WEST BENGAL)


5.    CHAIRMAN CUM MANAGING DIRECTOR PUNJAB
      NATIONAL BANK PLOT NO. 4 SECTOR 10 DWARKA,
      NEW DELHI.


6.    GENERAL MANAGER (HUMAN RESOURCES) PUNJAB
      NATIONAL BANK PLOT NO. 4 SECTOR 10 DWARKA
      NEW DELHI.


(BY SHRI GREESHM JAIN - ADVOCATE)

                                               ....RESPONDENTS



      Reserved on        : 03.08.2022
      Pronounced on       : 16.01.2023


       This petition having been heard and reserved for orders,
coming on for pronouncement this day, the Court pronounced
the following :

                           ORDER

By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has called in question of order of removal from service dated 06.09.2018 as well as the order passed by the W.P. No.23808/2018

appellate authority dated 29.01.2019, which was subsequently added by amendment dated 12.03.2019, whereby his appeal was rejected.

2. Brief facts leading to filing of present case are:

Petitioner, an employee of respondent Bank was transferred to Champai Branch (Cachar Region) i.e., Assam from Satna on 23.08.2017. His transfer order was modified vide order dated 22.09.2017 from Champai Branch to Doolahat Branch (Dibrugarh Region). He was served with a charge-sheet on 18.11.2017 under Regulation 6 of the United Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976, wherein 5 charges were levelled against him. After conducting departmental enquiry in terms of above letter of charge, enquiry report dated 29.05.2018 was submitted before the Disciplinary authority and a copy of the same was also sent to the petitioner to submit his submission on the finding of Enquiry Officer. Petitioner submitted his written submissions vide letter dated 26.06.2018. The Disciplinary Authority, vide order dated 06.09.2018 found the grave misconduct proved and imposed the major penalty of "Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification from future employment", in terms of Regulation 4(i) of the 1976 Regulations. Aggrieved by the order dated 06.09.2018, petitioner preferred an appeal on 28.10.2018. The appellate authority W.P. No.23808/2018

however, affirmed the penalty imposed and dismissed the appeal and communicated the order to the petitioner. Hence this petition.

3. The order is assailed on the ground that the same is passed by an incompetent authority and in voilation of service regulations of 1979; the disciplinary authority was personally biased with the petitioner and principles of natural justice has been violated, as no opportunity of hearing was given nor the relevant documents were supplied to the petitioner.

4. Learned counsel for the respondents at the outset has raised preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of writ petition on the ground that no cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, since, the petitioner was posted at Doolahat Branch of United Bank of India in the State of Assam and the entire departmental enquiry was also conducted at Kolkata. The communication from charge sheet to the final order was served to petitioner, when he was posted at Doolahat Branch under the Dibrugarh region. The appellate order was also issued from head office at Kolkatta, though it was served to petitioner at Chhatarpur (M.P.). It is stated that the cause of action if any accrued to petitioner was either within the territorial jurisdiction of Assam or Kolkatta and no cause of action accrued within the jurisdiction of this Court.

W.P. No.23808/2018

5. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order of appellate authority was served on him at Chhatarpur (M.P.), therefore, a part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court where he received the appellate order dismissing /rejecting his appeal. Learned senior counsel argued that in view of the expression used in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, even if a fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter.

6. The expression cause of action is not defined in the Constitution. Section 20(c) of C.P.C. provides for the exercise of jurisdiction when a cause of action wholly or in part arose within the jurisdiction of a Court. A cause of action means every fact, which, if traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an action no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded.

W.P. No.23808/2018

7. In Kusum Ignots and Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India and another, (2004) 6 SCC 254, the Supreme Court elaborately discussed clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly the meaning of the word "cause of action" and observed :

6. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitutes the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean that every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. Its importance is beyond any doubt. For every action, there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily.

8. This provision was again considered by the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu and others, (1994) 4 SCC 711 and the Supreme Court has observed :-

8. From the facts pleaded in the writ petition, it is clear that NICCO invoked the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court on the plea that a part of the cause of action had arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. According to NICCO, it became aware of the contract proposed to be given by ONGC on reading the advertisement which appeared in the Times of W.P. No.23808/2018

India at Calcutta. In response thereto, it submitted its bid or tender from its Calcutta office and revised the rates subsequently. When it learnt that it was considered ineligible it sent representations, including fax messages, to EIL, ONGC, etc., at New Delhi, demanding justice. As stated earlier, the Steering Committee finally rejected the offer of NICCO and awarded the contract to CIMMCO at New Delhi on 27-1-1993. Therefore, broadly speaking, NICCO claims that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court because it became aware of the advertisement in Calcutta, it submitted its bid or tender from Calcutta and made representations demanding justice from Calcutta on learning about the rejection of its offer. The advertisement itself mentioned that the tenders should be submitted to EIL at New Delhi; that those would be scrutinised at New Delhi and that a final decision whether or not to award the contract to the tenderer would be taken at New Delhi. Of course, the execution of the contract work was to be carried out at Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore, merely because it read the advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would not, in our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action. Besides the fax message of 15-1-1993, cannot be construed as conveying rejection of the offer as that fact occurred on 27-1-1993. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even if the averments in the writ petition are taken as true, it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.

9. In State of Rajasthan and Others Vs. Swaika Properties and another (1985) 3 SCC 217, the Supreme Court W.P. No.23808/2018

opined that mere service of notice would not give rise to any cause of action unless service of notice was an integral part of cause of action.

10. In Kusum Ignots (supra), the Supreme Court observed:

27. When an order, however, is passed by a Court or Tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other words as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority.

11. The Full Bench of Kerala High Court in the case of Naik Nakul Deo Singh Vs. the Deputy Commandant CISF and others while considering the question as to whether receipt of an order passed by an appellate authority in a disciplinary proceeding would constitute cause of action, upon noticing the definition thereof as stated in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure, 15th Edn., Vol. 1 at page 251 and a decision of the Court of Appeal in W.P. No.23808/2018

Paragon Finance Plc v. D.B. Thakerar & Co. [(1999) 1 All ER 400], opined :

"The fact that a person who was dismissed from service while he was in service outside the State would have to suffer the consequence of that dismissal when he is in his native place by being rendered jobless, is not a fact which constitutes the bundle of facts giving rise to a cause of action in his favour to challenge his dismissal. That right accrued to him earlier when he was dismissed from service outside the State and he lost his employment. Similarly, when an appeal is filed by him to an appellate authority who is outside the jurisdiction of this High Court and that appeal is dismissed by the appellate authority, the merger in the decision of the Appellate Authority takes place when the appeal is dismissed and not when the appellant receives the order. What a writ petitioner need plead as a part of his cause of action is the fact that his appeal was dismissed wholly or in part and not the fact that the order was communicated to him. That plea is relevant only to show when the right of action arose in his favour. The receipt of the order only gives him a right of action on the already accrued cause of action and enables him to meet a plea of laches or limitation raised in opposition. That the consequences of a proceeding in the larger sense are suffered by a person in his native place is not a ground to hold that the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the native place is situate is also competent to entertain a Writ Petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. When a person is dismissed or reduced in rank, he suffers the consequences where he was employed at the relevant time and not in his native place to which he might have retired on his dismissal."

W.P. No.23808/2018

12. It is thus clear that a person residing else where being aggrieved by the order of government or authority or person may have a right of action at law but jurisdiction of that High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be invoked only within whose territorial limits the cause of action wholly or in part arises. It is settled proposition that cause of action arises by the action or order of government or authority and not by the residence of the person aggrieved.

13. From the afore-referred decision it is clear that the receipt of communication by itself does not constitute a bundle of facts constituting the cause of action. At the best, receipt of communication of the order only gives the party a right of action which may give rise to enforce a cause of action. The actual service of order is only a mode of conveying the order, therefore, it only confer a right of action. In order to maintain a writ petition, the petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has been infringed by the respondent Bank within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

14. In the present case, the averments made in the writ petition even if taken to be correct in its entirety would not confer any jurisdiction on this Court. It is undisputed that the disciplinary proceeding was initiated and the punishment was imposed at W.P. No.23808/2018

Kolkatta, while the petitioner was posted at Doolahat Branch of the respondent Bank in the State of Assam. The impugned order of punishment dated 06.09.2018, passed at Kolkatta by the Assistant General Manager (D&IR) and Disciplinary Authority, was served on petitioner at Doolahat, both these places are outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The order dated 29.01.2019, rejecting his appeal was passed by the Chief Manager (D & IR Division) at Kolkatta. Just because the order passed by the appellate authority dated 29.01.2019 was transmitted to the petitioner, while he was residing at Chhatapur (M.P.), though may give rise a right to action to the petitioner, but will not give rise to a cause of action nor will it confer the territorial jurisdiction to this Court to entertain the instant petition.

15. This writ petition is, therefore, dismissed on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition. In the light of the conclusion, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the case.

(Nandita Dubey) Judge 16/01/2023 gn Digitally signed by SMT. GEETHA NAIR Date: 2023.01.16 17:15:19 +05'30'