Shital Singh Tomar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh Thr
2022 Latest Caselaw 13321 MP

                            1

        IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                     AT GWALIOR

                        BEFORE

     HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE GURPAL SINGH AHLUWALIA

              ON THE 11th OF OCTOBER, 2022

             WRIT PETITION NO. 2649 OF 2015

      BETWEEN:-

      SHITAL SINGH TOMAR, AGED 30
      YEARS, S/O SHRI VIJAY SINGH
      TOMAR, POST - PEON, POSTED
      MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, MORENA,
      DISTRICT MORENA (MADHYA
      PRADESH)

                                        ........PETITIONER

      (BY SHRI D.S. RAGHUVANSHI - ADVOCATE)

      AND

1.    STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
      THROUGH           PRINCIPAL
      SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
      URBAN       ADMINISTRATION,
      VALLABH   BHAWAN,   BHOPAL
      (MADHYA PRADESH)

2.    THE   COLLECTOR      (URBAN
      DEVELOPMENT), DISTRICT DHAR
      (MADHYA PRADESH)

3.    THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL DHAR,
      DISTRICT   DHAR    (MADHYA
                                            2

       PRADESH)

4.     THE     MUNICIPAL    COUNCIL
       MORENA, DISTRICT MORENA
       (MADHYA PRADESH) THROUGH
       ITS CHIEF MUNICIPAL OFFICER

                                                            ........RESPONDENTS

     (SHRI SANJAY KUMAR SHARMA - GOVERNMENT
ADVOCATE FOR STATE)
     (SHRI ARUN DUDAWAT - ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT
NO. 3)
     (SHRI   MAHESH   GOYAL    -  ADVOCATE    FOR
RESPONDENT NO. 4)

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       This petition coming on for hearing this day, the Court passed the
following:
                                       ORDER

This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed seeking following relief:-

(i) That, order dt. 22-04-2015 (Annexure P/1) by which the resolution dt. 27-04-2013 has been suspended and the regularization of the petitioner has been cancelled, may kindly be quashed.

(ii) That, it may be held that the resolution no. 194 dt. 27-04-2013 is legal and valid and therefore the petitioner has been rightly regularized vide order dt. 29-04-2013.

(iii) That, the respondents may kindly be directed to grant all consequential benefits of the post of peon on regular basis.

(iv) That, the other relief doing justice including cost be awarded.

2. It is the case of the petitioner that he is aggrieved by order dated

22.04.2015 passed by the Collector, Dhar, by which the order of regularization dated 29.04.2013 was cancelled.

3. It is the case of the petitioner that in the year 2005 he was appointed as daily wages employee in Municipal Council, Morena, where he worked till 2009. Thereafter, in the month of March, 2010, the petitioner was engaged as a daily wager in Municipal Council, Dhar. Since the post of peon was lying vacant in the Municipal Council, Dhar, therefore, by resolution No. 194 dt. 27.04.2013, PIC took a decision to regularize the services of the petitioner as well as other employees. Since the post meant for reserved category of handicapped quota, was also lying vacant and he was the only candidate to be regularized under the handicapped category therefore his regularization was proper. After the resolution dated 27.04.2013 was passed, an order dated 29.04.2013 was issued. After the services of the petitioner were regularized, he was transferred by the State Government by order dated 20.10.2014 from Municipal Council, Dhar to Municipal Council, Morena. However, by the impugned order dated 22.04.2015, his regularization order has been cancelled.

4. A preliminary objection has been raised by the counsel for the respondents. It is submitted that the resolution dated 27.04.2013 was passed by the PIC, Dhar and the order dated 29.04.2013 was issued by the Municipal Council, Dhar. The order of regularization was cancelled by Collector, Dhar and, thus, the entire cause of action arose at Dhar. Merely because the order of Collector was communicated to the petitioner at Morena, it would not give rise to any part of cause of action and as no part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial

jurisdiction of this Court, therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition.

5. Considered the submission made by counsel for the parties.

6. Article 226 of the Constitution of India reads as under :-

226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.

(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.

[(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without-

(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and

(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or

where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated.

(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32.

7. The petitioner has approached Gwalior Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh merely because of the fact that the impugned order was communicated to him at Morena.

8. Now the question for consideration is as to whether the place where the impugned order was communicated would give rise to a part of cause of action or not?

9. This aspect has already been considered by this Court in the case of Rajendra Singh Bhadoriya Vs. Union of India & Others, reported in, 2020 (1) MPLJ 168, where after considering the various judgments passed by the Supreme Court, it was held that as under :

14. Article 226 of the Constitution of India confers the power upon the High Court to issue directions etc. in relation to the territories within which the cause of action wholly or in part arises for the exercise of such power.

17. The cause of action would mean those disputed issues which are required to be decided while adjudicating the claim of the litigating parties. When the place of residence of a litigating party has no relevance with the subject-matter of the lis, then the same cannot be said to be an integral part of cause of action.

19. Thus, Article 226 of the Constitution of India

does not provide that the residence of the petitioner would give rise to a part of cause of action.

10. Thus, merely because the impugned order was served at the address of petitioner would not mean that any part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Bench.

11. It is also submitted by counsel for petitioner that the Supreme Court in the case of Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India & Ors, reported in 2014 (9) SCC 329 has held that the result communicated to the employee at his given address would also give rise to a part of cause of action.

12. In the case of Nawal Kishore Sharma (Supra), the employee was serving as a seaman. Later on, he was found suffering from dilated cardiomyopathy (heart muscle disease) and accordingly, the registration of the employee as seaman was cancelled. Thereafter, the employee settled down at his native place and sent several letters/representations from there to respondents for his financial claims as per statutory provisions and terms of contract. The respondent Corporation communicated to the employee that since he was declared unfit for sea service due to heart problems, he will be entitled to receive compensation of Rs.2,75,000/- which was offered but was not accepted by employee and it was also informed that he is not entitled to receive disability compensation which becomes payable only in case a seaman becomes incapacitated, as a result of injury. Thus, the petition was filed before the High Court of Patna. While considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the said case, it was held that even if a fraction of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of a Court, then the said Court shall also have a jurisdiction to entertain the petition.

13. However, in the present case, there is nothing on record to show that any cause of action has any close connection with discharge of his duties.

14. Furthermore, cause of action is a bundle of facts which requires adjudication. Place of residence or place of communication of order, does not require any adjudication. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that since the resolution in question was passed by PIC, Dhar and the order dated 29.04.2013 was passed by Municipal Council, Dhar, as well as impugned order was passed by Collector, Dhar, therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that the entire cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Indore Bench of this Court and, accordingly, it is held that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition.

15. Accordingly, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed.

(G.S. AHLUWALIA) JUDGE Abhi Digitally signed by ABHISHEK CHATURVEDI Date: 2022.10.12 18:55:45 +05'30'